Works by Locke, John
WORKS 
JOHN  LOCKE. 
A NEW  EDITION,  CORRECTED. 
IN TEN VOLUMES. 
VOL. 111. 
LONDON : 
PRINTED FOR  THOMAS  TEGG ;  W.  SHARPE AND SON ;  G. OFFOR; 
G.  AND  J. ROBINSON ;  J.  EVANS  AND  CO. : ALSO  R. GRIFFIN 




Essay on Human Understanding, book iv. ch. 5, &c.  -  1 
A Defence of Mr. Loclte's Opinion concerniug Pcrso~lal  Identity  177 
Appendix  to the Defence  of  Mr.  Loclie's  Opinioii concer~iing 
PersonalIdentity  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  199 
Of the Conduct of the Understanding -  -  -  -  - 203 
Some Tlioughts concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman  291 
Elements of  Natural Pliilosophy  -  -  -  -  - 301 
A  New Method of  a Common-Place-Book  -  - 331 
Index to the Essay concerning Human Understanding  -  -  351 
Index to the Additional l'ieces  in this Volume  -  -  - 377 CONTENTS 
0  F 
VOLUME 111. 
BOOK IV.  CONTINUED. 
CHAPTER  V. 
OW TRUTH IN GENERAL. 
SECT. 
1.  What truth is. 
2. A right joining  or separating of  signs; i. e. ideas or words. 
3.  Which make rnental or verbal propositions. 
4.  Mental propositions are very hard to be  treated of. 
5.  Being  nothing  but joining  or  separating  ideas,  without 
words. 
6.  \%'hen  mental  propositions  contain  real  trotlr,  and  when 
verbal. 
7.  Objection  against  verbal  truth,  that  thus it  may  be  all 
chimerical. 
8. Answered, real truth is ahout ideas agreeing to things. 
1).  Falselrood  is the joining  of  names,  otherwise  than  their 
ideas agree. 
10.  General propositions to  be  treated of more at large. 
11.  Moral and metaphysical truth. 
CHAPTER VI. 
OF UNIVERSAL  PROPOSITIONS,  THEIR TRUTH  AND  CERTAINTY. 
SECT. 
1.  Treating of words,  necessary to knowledge. 
2.  General troths hardly to be understood, but in verbal  pro- 
positions. 
3. Certainty two-fold,  of truth, and of knowledge. 
4. No proposition can be known to be  true, where tire essence 
of each species mentioned is not known. 
5.  This more particularly concerns substances. 
6.  The truth  of  few  universal  propositions  concerning  sub- 
stances is to bc known. Contents.  vii  vi  Contents. 
7.  Because co-existence  of ideas in few cases is to be known. 
8,  9.  Instance in gold. 
10.  As far  as any such  co-existence  can  be  known,  so  far 
universal  propositions  may be certain.  But this will  go 
but a little way,  because, 
11,  12. The  qualities, which make our complex ideas of  substaoces, 
depend  mostly  on  external,  remote,  and unperceived 
causes. 
13.  Judgment may reach farther, but that is not knowledge. 
14. What is requisite for our knowledge of substances. 
15. Whilst our ideas of  substances contain not their rsal con- 
stitutions, we  can  make but  few  general,  certain  pro- 
positions concerning them. 




.  They are self-evident. 
2.  Wherein that self-evidence consists. 
3.  Self-evidence not peculiar to received axioms. 
4.  First,  as to  identity  and  diversity,  all  propositions  are 
equally self-evident. 
5.  Secondly,  in co-existence,  we  have  few  self-evident  pro- 
positions. 
6.  Thirdly, in other relations we may have. 
7.  Fourthly, concerning real existence, we have none. 
8.  These axioms do not much influence our other knowledge. 
9.  Because they are not the truths the first known. 
10.  Because on them the other parts of  our knowledge  do not 
depend. 
11. What use these general maxims have. 
12. Maxims,  if  care be  riot  taken in the use of  words,.may 
prove contradictions. 
13.  Instance in vacuum. 
14.  They prove not the existence of things without US. 
15. Their application dangerous about colnplex ideas. 
16-18.  Instance in man. 
19. Little use of  these maxims,  in  proofs,  where we have clear 
and distinct ideas. 
20. Their use dangerous, where our ideas are confused. 
CHAPTER VIII. 
OF TRIFLING PROPOS~TIONS. 
SECT. 
1.  Some propositions bring no incrcase to our knowledge. 
3, 3.  As, fi&t,  identical prop&itions. 
4.  Secondly, when a part of any cornplex idea is predicated of 
the whole. 
5.  As part of  the definition of  the term defined. 
6. Instance, man and palfry. 
7.  For this teaches but the signification  of  words. 
8.  But no real knowledge. 
9. General  propositions,  concerning  substances,  are  often 
trifling. 
10. And why. 
11.  Thirdly, using words variously,  is trifling with them. 
13. Marks of verbal propositions.  First, predication in abstract. 
13.  Secondly, a part of the definition,  predicated of any term. 
CHAPTER IX. 
OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE. 
SECT. 
1. General, certain propositions  concern not existence. 
2.  A threefold knowledge of existence. 
3.  Our knowledge of our own existence is intuitive. 
CHAPTER X. 
OF THE EXISTENCE OF A  GOD. 
SECT. 
1. We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a God. 
2. Man knows that lie hirnself  is. 
3.  He  knows also,  that nothing cannot produce a being,  there- 
fore something eternal. 
4. That eternal being must he most powel.ful. 
5. And most knowing. 
6. And therefore God. 
7. Our idea of a most perfect being, not the sole proof of a God. 
8. Something from eternity. 
9.  Two sorts of  beings, cogitative and incogitative. 
10. Incogitative being cannot produce a cogitative. 
11, 12. Therefore there has been an eternal wisdom. 
13. Whether material or no. 
14.  Not material,  first,  because every particle of  matter is not 
cogitative. 
15. Secondly, one particle alone of  matter cannot be cogitative. 
16.  Thirdly, a system of iricogitative matter cannot be cogitative. 
17. Whether in motion  or at rest. 
18, 19.  Matter not co-eternal with an eternal mind. 
CHAPTER XI. 
OF TIIE KNOWI.ED(;E:  OF  TII& EXISTENCE OF OTHER THINGS. 
SECT. 
1.  Is to be had only by sensation. 
2.  Instance, whiteness of  this paper. viii  Contents. 
3.  This, though not  so  certain  as dernonstration,  yet m;ty be 
called  knowledge,  and  proves  the  existence  of  things 
without us. 
4. First, because  we  cannot  have  them  but  by  the iulets of 
the senses. 
5.  Secondly,  because  an idea from  actual sensation,  and au- 
other from memory,  are very distinct perceptions. 
6.  Thirdly, pleasure or pain,  which accompanies actual sensa- 
tion,  accompanies not the returning of  those ideas,  with- 
out the external objects. 
7. Fourthly,  our senses assist one another's testimony, of the 
existence of  outward things. 
8. This certainty is as great as our condition needs. 
9.  But reaches no farther than actual sensation. 
10.  Folly to expect dernonstration in  every thing. 
11.  Past existence is known by memory. 
12. The existence of spirits not knowable. 
13. Particular propositions concerning existence,  are knowable. 
14.  And general propositions concerning abstract ideas. 
CHAPTER XII. 
OF THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR KXOWLEDGE. 
SECT. 
I. Knowledge is not from maxims. 
2.  (The occasion of  that opinion.) 
3.  But from the comparing clear and distinct ideas. 
4.  Dangerous to build upon precarious principles. 
5. This no certain way to truth. 
6.  l3ut to compare clear, complete ideas under steady r-mes. 
7.  The true method of advancing knowledge,  is by copsidering 
our abstract ideas. 
8.  By which,  morality, also, may be made clearer. 
9.  But knowledge  of  bodies  is  to  be  improved  only  by  ex- 
perience. 
10. This may procure us convenience, not science. 
11.  We are fitted  for  moral knowledge,  and natural improve- 
ments. 
12.  But ~rlust  beware of  hypotheses and wrong principles. 
13.  'l'l~e true use of hypotheses. 
14.  Clear and distinct ideas, with settled names, and the fiud- 
ing of  those, which show their agreement or disagreement, 
are the ways to enlarge our knowledge. 
15.  Mathematics an instance of  it. 
CHAPTER XIII. 
SOME  OTHER CONSIUERATIOXS CONCERNING OUR KNOWLEDGE. 
SECT. 
1.  Our knowledge partly necessary, partly voluntary. 
2. The application voluntary;  but we know ils things are,  not 
as we please. 
3.  instances in number,  and in natural religion. 
CHAPTER  XIV. 
OF JUDGMEXT. 
SECT. 
1.  Our kn~wledge  being short, we want solnetliing else. 
2. What use to be made of  this twilight estate. 
3. Judgment s111)plies  the wan1 of  know!eclge. 





1. l'robability  is  tire  appearance of  agreement,  upon  fiilliblc: 
proofs. 
2. 11 is to supply the want of  kuowledge. 
3. Being that,  which  makes  us  presunle  things  to  be  true, 
before we know them  to be so. 
4.  The grounds of  probability are two;  confor~nity  with  our 
own experience, or the testimony of  others' cxperirnce. 
3.  In this all the argulnents, pro and con, ought to Ibe  cx;lrtiinrd, 
before we co~ne  to a judgment. 
G.  They being capable of  great variety. 
CHAPTER XVI. 
SECT. 
OF THE DEGREES OF ASSENT. 
1.  Our assent ougl~t  to  be  regulatetl  by the grounds of  pro- 
babilitv. 
2. These cannot be always actually in view, and then we must 
content  ourselves  with  the remernbrancc,  that  we  oncc 
saw ground for such a degree of  assent. 
3.  The ill  consequence  of  this,  if our former judgnrent  were 
not rightly made. 
4.  The right nse of  it, is ~nutual  charity and forbearance. 
.5.  Probability is either of  lnatter of  fact or speculation. 
G.  The  concurrel~t  experience  of  all  other  men  wit11  ours 
produces assurance approacl~ing  to knowledge. 
7. Unquestionable testin~ony  and experience for the most part 
produce confidence. 
8. Fair testimony,  and the nature of  the thing indifferent, pro- 
duces also confident belief. 
9. Experience and  testimony clashing,  infinitely \xry tlrc dc- 
grees of probability. Contents.  xi  x  Contents. 
10. Traditional testimonies,  the farther removed,  the less their 
proof. 
11. Yet llistory is of  great use. 
12.  In  things,  which  sense  cannot  discover,  analogy  is  the 
great rule of  probability. 
13.  One case, where contrary experience lessens not the testi- 
mony. 




1. Various significations of the word reason. 
2.  Wherein reasoning consists. 
3. Its four parts. 
4.  Syllogism, not the great instrument of reason. 
5.  Helps little in demonstration, less in probability. 
6.  Serves not to increase our knowledge, but fence with it. 
7. Other helps should be sought. 
8.  We  reason about particulars. 
9. First, reason fails us for want of ideas. 
10.  Secondly, because of  obscure and imperfect ideas. 
11. Thirdly, for want of  intermediate ideas. 
12.  Fourthly,  because of wrong principles. 
13. Fifthly, because of  doubtful terms. 
14.  Our  highest  degree  of  knowledge  is  intuitive,  without 
reasoning. 
15. The next is demonstration by reasoning. 
16. To supply  the  narrowness  of this,  we  have  nothing but 
judgment upon probable reasonirrg. 
17.  Intuition, demonstration,  judgment. 
18.  Consequences of  words,  and consequences of  ideas. 
19.  Four sorts of arguments, first, ad verecundiam. 
20.  Secondly, ad ignorantiam. 
21.  Thirdly, ad horninem. 
22.  Fourthly, ad judicium. 
23.  Above, contrary, and according to reason. 
24.  Reason and faith not opposite. 
CHAPTER XVIII. 
OF  FAITH AND RRASON,  ANI) THEIR DISTINC'T PROVTNCP.' 
SECT. 
1. Necessary to know their boundaries. 
2.  Faith and reason what, as contra-distinguished. 
3. No  new simple idea can be conveyed by traditional rerclation. 
4. Traditional  revelation  may  makc  11s  know  pro1)o.ciliot1s, 
knowable also by rcnson, bat not with thc s;tmcX  crrtai~rt) 
that reason doth. 
5. Revelation  cannot  be admitted,  against the clear evidence 
of  reasolr. 
6. Traditional revelati011 m~ch  ~SS. 
7. Tliings al)ove rcason. 
8.  Or not contrary to reason, if  revealed, are matter of  fiiitlr. 
9.  Revelation  in  matters  where reason  cannot judge,  or  but 
probably,  ought to be hearkened to. 
10.- In  matters,  where  reason  can  afford  certain  knowlectgc, 
that is to be hearkened to. 
11. If tile boundaries  he  not set between  faith and reason, no 
enthusiasm,  or  estrav;~gancy  in  religion,  call  he  con- 
tradicted. 
CHAPTER  XIX. 
OF ENTHUSIASM. 
SECT. 
1. Love of truth necessary. 
2.  A forwardness to dictate, from whence. 
3. Force of enthnsiasnl. 
4.  Reason and revelation. 
3. Rise of  enthusiasm. 
6, 7.  Enthusiasm. 
8,  9.  Enthusiasm mistadken for seeing and feeling. 
10. Enthusiasm,  how to be discovered. 
1  I.  Enthusiasm fails of  evidence, tlli~t  the  proposition  is from  . . 
God. 
12.  Firmness of  persuasion,  no  proof  that  any proposition  is 
from God. 
13. Light in the mind,  what. 
14. Revelation must be judged  of  by reason. 
15, 16. Belief,  no proof of revelation. 
CHAPTER XX. 
OF WRONG ASSENT,  OK ERROR. 
SECT. 
1.  Causes of  error. 
2.  First, want of  proofs. 
3. Obj. What shall hecome of those who want them, aaswcred. 
4.  People hindered from inquiry. 
5.  Secondly, want of skill to use them. 
6.  Thirdly, want of will to use them. 
7. Fourthly,  wrong measures of probability;  whereof, 
8-10.  First, doubtful propositions,  taken from principles. 
1  1.  Secondly, received hypotheses. 
12. Thirdly, predominant passions. 
13.  The lneans of  evading probabilities, lst, supposed fallacy. 
14. 2dly, supposed arguments for the contrary. 
15.  What probabilities  determine the assent. xii 
16. Where it is in our power to suspend it. 
17. Fourthly, authority. 
18.  Men not in so many errors as is imagined. 
CHAPTER  XXI. 
OF THE DIVISION OF THE SCIENCES- 
SECT. 
1. Three sorts. 
2. First, Physica. 
3.  Secondly, Practica. 
4. Thirdly, X~~EIWVL'IX<. 
5. This is the first division of  the objects of knowledge. 
HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING. 
CHAPTER V. 
5  1.  WIIAT is  truth was  an  inquiry  TYllnt trutll 
many ages since ;  and it being that which  is. 
all mankind either do,  or preterld  to search  after, it 
cannot but be worth  our while  caref~~lly  to examine 
wherein it consists, and so acquaint ourselves with the 
nature of it, as to observe how the mind distinguishes 
it from falsehood. 
$ 2. Truth then  seems  to me,  in  the  A 
proper import of the word, to signify no-  joilling or 
thing but  the joining  or  separating  of  separating 
signs, as the things signified by them  do  ofsigns, i.  e. 
agree or disagree one with another.  The  ~~~~s~r 
joining or separating of signs, here meant, 
is  what  by  another  name we  call  proposition.  So 
that truth  properly  belongs  only  to  propositions : 
whereof there are two  sorts, viz. mental and verbal ; 
as there  are two sorts  of signs commonly  made usc 
of, viz. ideas arid  words. 
$ 3. To  form a clear  notion of truth, it 
is  vcry  necessary  to  consicler  truth  of  ,,,;,kc ,,,,,,, 
tl~ought,  and truth of words, distiilctly one  t:ll or verbal 
from another : but yet it is  vcry diifici~lt l:?"~os~- 
to treat of then1 asuntler ;  bec:luse it is uii-  tiolis. 
avoidable, in treating of mental propositions, to make 
VOL. Ill.  1; 2  2'rutl~  in General.  Book 4. 
use  of words ;  and then the instances given of mental 
propositions cease  immediately to be  barely mental, 
and become verbal.  For a mental proposition being 
nothing but a bare consideration of the ideas, as they 
are in our minds  stripped of names, they lose the na- 
ture of pnrely mental propositions  as soon as they are 
put into words. 
Mental pro-  4. And that which makes it yet harder 
l~ositio:lsnrc  to treat of  mental and verbal propositions 
'lard  to  separately  is,  that  most men,  if not  all, 
be treatedof.  in  their thinking and reasonings  within 
themselves,  make use  of  words  instead  of  ideas ;  at 
least when the subject of  their meditation contains in 
it conlplex ideas.  Which is a great evidence of the im- 
perfection and  uncertainty of  our ideas  of that kind, 
and may, if attentively made use of, serve for a mark 
to show  us,  what  are  those  things  we  have  clear 
and perfect established  ideas of, and what not.  For 
if we will  curiously observe  the way our  mind takes 
in thinking  and reasoning, we  shall find, I  suppose, 
that when we make  any propositions within our own 
thoughts  about white  or  black,  sweet  or  bitter,  a 
triangle or a circle, we can and often do frame in our 
minds the ideas themselves,  without reflecting on the 
names.  But when we would  consider, or  make pro- 
positions about the more  complex ideas, as of a man, 
vitriol, fortitude, glory, we usually put the name for 
the idea:  because  the ideas  these names  stand  for 
being for the most part  imperfect,  confused, and un- 
determined, we  reflect on  the names themselves, be- 
cause they are more clear,  certain,  and distinct, and 
readier occur  to our  thoughts than the pure  ideas ; 
and  so we  make use  of  these words  instead of  the 
idcas themselves,  even when we would  meditate and 
reason within  ourselves, and  make tacit mental pro- 
positions.  In substances, as has been already noticed, 
this is  occasioned  by the imperfection  of our  ideas ; 
we making  the name  stand  for the real  essence, of 
which we have  no idea  at all.  In  modes, it is occa- 
Ch. 5.  Truth in General.  3 
sioned by  the great number of simple  ideas that go 
to the  making  them up.  For  many of  them being 
compounded, the name  occurs much  easier than the 
idea itself, which requires time and attention 
to  be  recollected,  and  exactly  represented  to  the 
mind, even in those  men who  have formerly been  at 
the  pains to  do it ; and is utterly ilnpossible  to  be 
done  by those, who, though they have ready  in their 
memory the greatest  part  of  the cornmoil words  of 
that language, yet perhaps never troubled themselves 
in a11  their  lives  to consider what  precise  ideas the 
most  of them stood  for.  Some confused or  obscure 
notions have  served  their turns, and many who  talk 
very much  of religion  and conscience, of church and 
faith,  of  power  and  right,  of  obstructions  and  hu- 
mours,  melancholy  and  choler, would  perhaps  have 
little left in their thoughts and  meditations, ifone should 
desire  them to think  only of  the things theinselvcs, 
and lay by those words, with which they so often con- 
found others, and not seldom themselves also. 
§ 5. But to return to the consideration 
Being no-  of  truth : we  must,  I  say,  observe  two  thingbutt,,e 
sorts of propositions  that we are capable  joining or 
of making.  separating 
lFirst,mental, wherein the  ideasin our un-  ideas  with- 
derstandings are without the use of words 
out words. 
put together,  or  separated by  the mind,  perceiving 
or judging of  their agreement or disagreement. 
Secondly, verbal propositions,  which are words, the 
signs of our ideas, put together or separated in affirm- 
ative or negative sentences.  By which way of  affirm- 
ing or denying,  these  signs, made  by sounds,  are as 
it were put together or separated one from  another. 
So that proposition consists in joining  or  separating 
signs, and truth  consists  in  the pntting together  or 
separating those signs, according as the things,  which 
they stand for, agree or disagree. 
$ 6. Ever! one's experience will satisfy  Wlien  1x1~11- 
n e 4  I'rzltli  in General.  Book 4. 
tal  proposi-  him, that the  mind,  either by perceiving 
'On-  or supposing  the agreement or disagree- 
tain real 
,,,,a,  n,,d  ment  of  any  of  its  ideas,  does  tacitly 
wl~en  ver-  within itself put them into a kind of pro- 
bal.  position  afirmative or negative, which I 
have  endeavoured  to express  by  the terms  putting 
together and separating.  But this action of  the mind, 
which is so  familiar to every thinking and reasoning 
man, is easier  to bc  conceii cd by rci'cciing on what 
passes in us when we  afiri~~  or  clrmly,  thsn to be  es- 
plained by words.  ~xll~er~  a man has in his hcad the 
idea of two lines, viz. the side and diagonal of a sqiaarc, 
whereof  thc ciingonal is  an  inch long,  he may have 
the idea also of the division of that line into a certain 
number of  equal parts;  21. g. into five,  ten,  an hun- 
dred, a thousand, or any other number, and iijay liave 
the idea of that inch line  being  divisible, or not divi- 
sible,  into such equal parts, as  a  certain  number of 
them will be equal to the side-line.  Now whenever he 
perceives, believes,  or supposes such a kind of divisi- 
bility to agree or disagree to his idea of that line, he, 
as it were, joins  or separates those two ideas, viz. the 
idea of  that line, and thc idea of that kind of divisi- 
bility;  and so makes  a  mentnl proposition, which is 
true or false, according as such a kind of divisibility, a 
clivisibility into such  aliquot parts, does  really agree 
to that line or no.  When ideas are so put together, 
or separated in  the mind,  as they or  the things they 
stand  for  (lo  agree  or not,  that is, as I may caIl  it, 
mciital  truth.  But  truth  of  words  is  something 
more ;  and that is the  affirming or denying  of words 
one of  another, as thc ideas they stand for  agree or 
tlisagrec : and this again  is  two-fold ; either purely 
verbal  and trifling, which I  shall speak of, chap. viii. 
or real and instructive, wliicll  is  thc object  of  that 
rcnl knowlcdgc wliicll wc.  Ilavc spokrn of already. 
Objection  $ 7. But ?1crc  :t6;iill  will be apt to occur 
:Ig,unat  vcr-  the  snnlc  tlo111)t ;tl)o11t  truth,  that  did 
Ch. 5.  Truth in General.  5 
about knowledge :  and it will be objected,  bal truth, 
that if  truth be nothing  but the joining  that thus it 
may all be  and separating of words  in propositions, 
as the ideas they stand for  agree or  dis- 
agree in men's  minds,  the knowledge of truth is not 
so valuable  a  thing  as it is  taken  to be,  nor worth 
the pains  and time men  employ in  the search of it ; 
since by this account it amounts to no more than the 
conformity of words to the chimeras of men's  brains. 
Who knows not what odd notions  many men's heads 
are  filled  with,  and what  strange ideas  all  men's 
brains are capable  of? But if we  rest here, we know 
the truth of nothing by this rule, but of the visionary 
words in our own imaginations; nor have other truth, 
but what as much concerns harpies and centaurs as 
men  and horses.  For those,  and  the like,  may be 
ideas in our heads, and have their agreement and dis- 
agreement there, as well as  the ideas  of real beings, 
and so have as true propositions  made  about them. 
And it will be altogether as true a proposition to say 
all centaurs are animals, 3s that all men are animals; 
and the certainty of  one as great as the other.  For 
in both the propositions,  the words  are put together 
according to the agreement of the  ideas in our minds : 
and the agreement of the idea of animal with that of 
centaur is as clear  and visible  to the  mind,  as  the 
agreement of the idea of  animal with that of  man ; 
and so these two propositions are equally true, equally 
certain.  But of what  use is all such truth to us? 
$ 8.  Though what has been said in the 
Answered,  foregoing chapter, to distinguish real from  truth is 
imaginary knowledge, might suffice here,  about ideas 
in  answer  to this  doubt,  to distinguish  agreeing to 
real  truth  from  chimerical,  or  (if  you  th~ngs. 
please)  barely nominal,  they depending both on the 
same foundation ;  yet it may not be amiss here again 
to consider,  that though  our words  signify nothing 
but our ideas, yet  being  designed by them to signify 
things, the truth  they contain, when put into propo- 6  Truth in General.  Book 4. 
sitions, will be only verbal, when they stand for ideas 
in the mind, that have  not  an  agreement  with  the 
reality  of  things&  And  therefore truth, as  well  as 
knowledge,  may well  come under  the distinction  of 
verbal and real ;  that being only verbal truth, wherein 
terms are joined  according  to the agreement or dis- 
agreement  of  the ideas they stand  for, without  re- 
garding whether  our  ideas are  such  as really have, 
or are capable of having an existence in nature.  But 
then it is  they contain  real  truth, when  these  signs 
are joined,  as  our  ideas  agree ;  and when  our ideas 
are such as we  know are capable of  having an exist- 
ence in nature :  which in substances we cannot know, 
but by knowing that such have existed. 
Falsehoodis  § 9. Truth is the marking down in words 
joining  the agreement or disagreement  of  ideas 
as it is.  Falsehood is the marking down 
otl~erwise  in words the agreement  or disagreement 
their  of ideas otherwise than it is.  And so  fa^ 
ideas agree.  as these  ideas,  thus marked  by  sounds, 
agree  to their  archetypes,  so  far only is  the truth 
real.  The knowledge of this truth consists in know- 
ing what  ideas the words stand for,  and the percep- 
tion of the agreement or disagreement of those ideas, 
according as it is marked by those words. 
General  6 10. But because words are looked on 
propositions 
to  be  treated 
of more at 
large. 
about it. vr 
J  -- - 
as the great conduits of truth and know- 
ledge, and that in conveying and receiving 
of  truth,  and  commonly  in  reasoning 
re  make use  of words  and propositions ; I 
shall mire at large inquire, wherein  iheAcertainty  of 
real  truths,  contained  in  propositions,  consists, and 
where it is to be had ;  and endeavour to show in what 
sort of  universal propositions we are capable of being 
certain of their real truth or falsehood. 
I  shall  begin  with  general  propositions,  as  those 
which  most  employ our  thoughts, and exercise  our 
contemplation.  General,  truths are most looked after 
by the  mind, as  those  that most  enlarge  our know- 
ledge ;  and by their  comprehensir~eness  satisfying us 
at once  of  many particulars,  enlarge our view, and 
shorten our way to knowledge. 
$ 11. Besides truth taken in the strict  Moral and 
sense  before-mentioned,  there  are other  metaplly- 
sorts of truth ;  as, 1.  Moral truth, which is  trutl'- 
speaking of things according to the persuasion of our 
own  minds, though  the proposition  we  speak agree 
not to the reality of  things.  2. Metaphysical truth, 
which is  nothing  but the  real  existence  of  things, 
conformable to the ideas  to which  we have  annexed 
their names.  This, though it seems to consist in  the 
very beings  of things,  yet, when  considered  a  little 
nearly,  will  appear  to include  a  tacit  proposition, 
whereby the mind joins  that  particular thing to the 
idea it had  before  settled with  a  name  to it.  But 
these considerations  of  truth,  either having  been be- 
fore taken riotice of, or not being much to our present 
purpose,  it may suffice here  only to have mentioned 
them. 
CHAPTER VI. 
Of  Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty. 
3 1. THOUGH  the examining and judg-  Treating of 
ing of  ideas  by themselves,  their  names  words ne- 
being  quite laid  aside, be  the best  and  ~~~~$~e. 
surest  way  to clear  and  distinct know- 
ledge ;  yet,  through the  prevailing custom  of using 
sounds for ideas, I think  it  is very seldom practised. 
Every one may observe  how common it is for  names 
to bc made  use  of,  instead  of  the ideas themselves, 
even when  men  think  and  reason within  their  own 
breasts ;  especially if  the ideas be very complex, md 
made up of a great collection  of siillple  ones.  This 
malies the consideratioll of words ancl propositions so 
necessary a part of  the treatise of knowledge, that it 8  Universal P?*opositions,  Book 4. 
is very hard to speak intelligibly of  the one without 
explaining the other. 
General  § 2.  All the knowledge we have, being 
truths  only of particular or general truths, it is 
hardly  be  evident that whatever may be done in the 
understood, 
but in ver-  former of these, the latter, which  is that 
bal propoai-  which with reason  is nost sought after, 
tions.  can never  be  well made  known, and  is 
very seldom apprehended, but as conceived  and  ex- 
pressed in words.  It  is not therefore out of our way, 
in the examination of  our knowledge, to inquire into 
the truth and certainty of universal propositions: 
Certainty  $ 3. Rut that we may not be misled in 
two-fold, of  this  case,  by  that  which  is  the  danger 
truth and of  every where, I mean by the doubtfulness 
knowledge-  of terms, it is fit to  observe, that certainty 
is two-fold ;  certainty of truth, and certainty of know- 
ledge.  Certainty of  truth is,  when words are so put 
together  in  propositions,  as  exactly  to express  the 
agreement  or  disagreement  of  the ideas they stand 
for, as really it is.  Certainty of knowledge is to per- 
ceive the agreement or disagreement of  ideas,  as ex- 
pressed  in  any  proposition.  This  we  usually  call 
knowing,  or  being  certain of  the truth of  any pro- 
position. 
N~ proposi-  § 4. Now because we cannot be certain 
tion can be  of the truth of  any general proposition, 
k~~ownto  be  unless we  know the precise  bounds  and 
true, where 
the essence  extent of  the species its terms stand for, 
of each  it  is necessary we should know the essence 
speciesrnen-  of  each species, which is that which con- 
timed is not  stitutes and bounds it.  This, in all simple 
known.  ideas and modes, is not hard to do.  For 
in these, the real and nominal essence being the same ; 
or, which is all one, the abstract idea which the general 
term stands for being the sole essence and boundary 
that is  or can be supposed of the species;  there can 
be no  doubt, how far the species  extends,  or what 
things are comprehended under each term : which, it 
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is evident, are all that have an exact conformity with 
the idea it stands for, and no other.  But in substances 
wherein  a real  essence  distinct  from the nominal  is 
supposed  to  constitute,  determine,  and  bound  the 
species,  the extent  of  the general word  is very  un- 
certain:  because  not  knowing this  real essence,  we 
cannot know what is, or what is not of that species ; 
and consequently what may, or may not with certainty 
be  affirmed of it.  And  thus speaking of  a man,  or 
gold,  or  any other species  of  natural substances,  as 
supposed  constituted by  a  precise  and real essence, 
which  nature regularly  imparts to every  individual 
of that kind, whereby it is made to be of that species, 
we cannot be certain of  the truth of any affirmation 
or negation made of  it.  For man, or gold, taken in 
this sense,  and used  for species of  things constituted 
by real essences, different  from the complex idea in 
the  mind  of  the  speaker,  stand  for  we  know  not 
what;  and  the  extent of  these  species,  with  such 
boundaries,  are so unknown  and undetermined, that 
it is impossible with any certainty to affirm,  that all 
men  are  rational,  or  that all  gold  is  yellow.  But 
where the nominal essence is kept to, as the boundary 
of  each species,  and  men extend  the application of 
any general term  no  farther than to the particular 
things in which the complex idea it stands for is  to 
be found, there they are in no danger to mistake the 
bounds of each species, nor can be  in doubt, on this 
account,  whether any propositions  be true or no.  I 
have chosen to explain this uncertainty of propositions 
in this scholastic way, and have made use of the terms 
of  essences  and species,  on purpose  to show the ab- 
surdity and inconvenience  there is  to think of them 
as of  any other sort of  realities than barely abstract 
ideas  with  names  to  them.  To suppose  that the 
species  of  things  are  any  thing but  the sorting of 
them under general names,  according as they agree 
to  several  abstract  ideas,  of  which  we  make  those 
names the signs,  is to confound truth,  and introduce 10  Universal Propositions,  Book 4. 
uncertainty  into all general propositions that can be 
made  about  them.  Though  therefore  these  things 
might, to people not possessed  with scholastic learn- 
ing, be treated of  in a  better  and clearer way; yet 
those wrong notions of essences or species having got, 
root in most people's  minds, who  have received  any 
tincture from the learning which has prevailed in this 
part of  the world, are to be discovered and removed, 
to  make way for that use of words which should convey 
certainty with it. 
This more  $  5.  The names  of  substances  then, 
particularly  whenever  made  to  stand  for  species, 
concerns  which  are supposed to be constituted by 
substances.  real  essences,  which  we  know  not,  are 
not capable to convey certainty to the understanding: 
of the truth of  general propositions  made up of such 
terms,  we  cannot  be  sure.  The reason  whereof  is 
plain :  for how can we be sure that this or that quality 
is in gold, when we know not what is or is not gold? 
Since  in  this  way  of  speaking nothing  is  gold  but 
what partakes of  an essence, which we not knowing, 
cannot know where it is or is not,  and so cannot be 
sure that any parcel of matter in the world is or is not 
in this sense gold ;  being incurably ignorant, whether 
it has or has not that which makes  any thing to be 
called gold, i.  e.  that real essence of gold whereof we 
have no idea at all :  this being as impossible for us to 
know, as it is for a blind man to tell in what flower 
the colour of  a pansy is or is not to be found, whilst 
he has no idea of  the colour of  a pansy at all.  Or if 
we could (which is impossible) certainly know where 
a real essence, which we know not, is ;  v. g. in what 
parcels of matter the real essence of gold is ;  yet could 
we not be sure, that this or that quality could wit11 
truth be  affirmed  of  gold: since it is impossible  for 
us to know,  that this  or  that quality  or idea has a 
necessary connexion with a real essence, of which we 
have no idea at all,  whatever species that supposed 
real essence may be imagined to constitute. 
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$ 6.  On the othet side,  the names  of 
The  truth of  when  made  use  of  as  they  few  uni-  should be, for the ideas men have in their  versal  Pro- 
minds,  though  they  carry  a  clear  and  positions 
determinate signification with them, will  concerning 
substances is  not  yet serve us to make many universal 
tobeknoan.  propositions,  of  whose  truth  we  can be 
certain.  Not because in this use of  them we are un- 
certain what things are signified by them,  but because 
the complex  ideas they stand for are such combina- 
tions of  simple ones, as carry not with  them any dis- 
coverable connexion  or repugnancy, but with a very 
few other ideas. 
8 7.  The complex ideas, that our names 
Because co-  of the species of substances properly stand  existence  of  for, are collections of such qualities as have  ideas in few 
been observed to co-exist in an unknown  cases is to 
substratum, which we call substance :  but  be known. 
what  other  qualities  necessarily  co-exist  with  such 
combinations  we  cannot  certainly know,  unless  we 
can discover their natural dependence; which in their 
primary qualities we can go but a very little way in; 
ahd in all their  secondary qualities  we  can discover 
no connexion at all,  for the reasons mentioned,  chap. 
iii. viz.  1. Because we how  not the real constitutions 
of  substances, on which  each secondary quality par- 
ticularly  depends.  2. Did  we  know  that,  it would 
serve us only for experimental (not  universal) know- 
ledge ;  and reach with certainty no farther than that 
bare  instance:  because  our understandings  can dis- 
cover no conceivable connexion between any secondary 
quality and any modification whatsoever of any of the 
primary ones.  And therefore there are very few ge- 
neral propositions  to be made concerning substances, 
which can carry with them undoubted certainty. 
8 8. All gold is fixed, is a proposition 
in  whose truth we cannot be certain of, how  gold. 
universally soever it be believed.  For if, 
according to the useless  imagination of  the schools, 12  Universtrl Propositio?zs,  Book 4. 
any one supposes the term gold to stand for a species 
of things, set out by nature, by a real essence belong- 
ing to it, it is evident he knows not what particular 
substances are of  that species;  and so  cannot, with 
certainty, affirm any thing universally of  gold &But 
if he makes gold  stand for  a species determined  by 
its nominal  essence,  let the nominal essence,  for ex- 
ample,  be  the complex  idea of  a  body  of  a  certain 
yellow colour, malleable, fusible, and heavier than any 
other known; in  this proper use of  the word  gold, 
there is no difficulty to know what is or is not gold. 
But yet no other quality can with certainty  be  uni- 
versally affirmed  or denied  of  gold, but what hath a 
discoverable  connexion  or  inconsistency  with  that 
nominal essence.  Fixedness,  for example, having no 
necessary  connexion, that we can discover,  with the 
colour, weight,  or any other simple idea of  our com- 
plex one, or with the whole combination together;  it 
is impossible that we should certainly know the truth 
of this proposition,  that all gold is fixed. 
$ 9. As there is no discoverable connexion between 
fixedness  and the colour,  weight,  and other  simple 
ideas of that nominal essence of  gold ; so if we make 
our  complex  idea  of  gold  a  body  yellow,  f~~sible, 
ductile, weighty,  and fixed, we  shall be at the same 
uncertainty  concerning  solubility  in  aq.  regia,  and 
for  the same reason:  since we can  never,  from  con- 
sideration  of  the  ideas  themselves,  with  certainty 
affirm  or  deny  of  a  body,  whose  complex  idea  is 
made  up of  yellow,  very  weighty,  ductile,  fusible, 
and fixed, that it is soluble in aqua regia;  and so on, 
of the rest of its qualities.  I would gladly meet with 
one  general  affirmation  concerning  any  quality  of 
gold,  that  any  one  can  certainly know  is  true.  It 
will,  no  doubt, be presently  objected, is  not this  an 
universal  proposition,  all  gold is malleable ?"  To 
which  I  answer,  it is  a  very  certain  proposition,  if 
malleableness  be  n  part  of  the  complex  idea  the 
word  gold  stands  for.  But then  here  is  nothing 
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affirmed of  gold, but that that souncl  stands  for  an 
idea in which  malleableriess is contained :  and sucli a, 
sort of  truth and certainty as this,  it. is to say a cen- 
taur is four-footed.Mut if  malleableness  makes  not 
a part of the specific essence the name of gold stands 
for, it is plain, "  311  gold is malleable" is not a certain 
proposition.  Because let the complex idea of gold be 
made  up of  which  soever  of  its  other qualities  you 
please,  malleableness  will  not  appear  to depend  on 
that complex  idea,  nor follow  from  any sirnple  one 
contained in it : the connexion that n~alleableness  has 
(if  it has any) with  those  other qualities, being only 
by the intervention of  the real constitution of  its in- 
sensible  parts;  which,  since  we  know not,  it is  im- 
possible we should perceive that connexion,  unless we 
could discover that which ties them together. 
S  10&The more,  indeed,  of  these  co-  A, fa,. ,, 
existing qualities we unite into one com-  any such co- 
plex idea; under one name, the n~ore  pre-  esiste1)ce 
can be  cise  and determinate we  make tlie  sigoi- 
kno,vn,  fication of that word ;  but never yet make  f,, ..iVe,,,l 
it therebv more cauable of  universal cer-  prol~ositions 
tainty,  ii  respect bf other qualities not b'li  be Cer- 
tain.  But  contained in our complex idea.  since we  tllis will go 
perceive not their connexion or dependence  but a little 
on  one  another, being  iernorant both  of  way, be- 
u  u 
that  real  constkution  in which  they are 
all founded, and also how they flow from it.  For tlie 
chief part of  our knowledge concerning substances is 
not, as in other things,  barely of  the relation of  two 
ideas that may exist separately; but is of the necessary 
connexion and co-existence of several clistinct iilens in 
the same subject, or of their repugnancy so to co-exist. 
Could we  begin at the otl~er  end,  and discover what 
it was,  wherein  that colour  consistccl, what  made  n 
body lighter or heavicr, what tcsture of  parts madc 
it malleable, f~isiblc,  aid  fixed, nncl  fit to bc tlissol~ctl 
in this sort of' liquol.,  and not in  aiiotlrcr ; if (1 say) 
wc had sucli nil iclca  as this of  l)odics, aiicl  coultl per- 14  Universal Propositions,  Book 4. 
ceive wherein all sensible qualities originally consist, 
and how they  are produced;  we  might frame such 
ideas  of  them  as  would  furnish  us  with  matter  of 
more general knowledge, and enable us to make uni- 
versal  propositions,  that should  carry  general truth 
and certainty  with  them.  But whilst  our  complex 
ideas of  the sorts of  substances  are so  remote  from 
that internal real constitution, on which their sensible 
qualities depend, and are made up of  nothing but an 
imperfect  collection  of  those  apparent  qualities  our 
senses can discover;  there can be  few  general pro- 
positions  concerning  substances,  of  whose  real truth 
we can be certainly assured : since there are but few 
simple ideas,  of  whose  connexion  and necessary  co- 
existence we can have certain and undoubted know- 
ledge.  I imagine, amongst all the secondary qualities 
of substances, and the powers relating to them, there 
cannot any two be named, whose  necessary co-exist- 
ence,  or  repugnance  to  co-exist,  can  certainly  be 
known, unless  in those of  the same sense, which ne- 
cessarily  exclude one  another,  as  I  have  elsewhere 
showed.  No one, I think, by the colour that is in any 
body, can certainly know what smell, taste, sound, or 
tangible qualities it has, nor what alterations it is ca: 
pable  to make  or  receive,  on  or from  other bodies. 
The same may be said of the sound or taste, &c.  Our 
specific  names  of  substances  standing for  any  col- 
lections of  such ideas, it is not to be wondered, that 
we can with them make very few general propositions 
of  undoubted real certainty#  But yet so  far as any 
complex idea, of any sort of substances, contains in it 
any simple  idea,  whose  necessary  co-existence  with 
any other  may  be  discovered,  so far universal  pro- 
positions  may with  certainty be made concerning it. 
u.  g.  could  any  one  discover  a necessary  connexioll 
between  malleableness,  and the colour  or weight of 
gold, or any other part of the complex idea signified 
by that name, he might make a certain universal pro- 
position concerning gold in this respect ;  and the real 
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truth of this proposition,  that all gold is malleable," 
would be as certain as of this, "the three angles of all 
right-lined  triangles are all equal to two right ones." 
f,  11. Had we such ideas of substances, 
quali-  as to know what real  constitutions  pro-  ties  whiell  duce those  sensible  qualities  we  find  in  make our 
them, and how those qualities flowed from  conlplex 
thence, we could, by the specific  ideas of  ~~~~~f~~- 
their real essences in our own minds, more  pend mostly 
certainly find out their properties and dis-  one  xternal, 
cover what qualities they had or had not,  remote,  and 
than we  can now  by our senses : and to  ::i,"fTd 
know the properties of  gold, it would  be 
no more necessary that gold should exist, and that we 
should make experiments upon it, than it is necessary 
for the knowing the properties of  a  triangle, that a 
triangle should exist in  any matter;  the idea in our 
minds would  serve for the one  as well  as the other. 
But we are so far from being admitted into the secrets 
of nature,, that we scarce so much as ever approach 
the first entrance towards them.  For we are wont to 
consider  the substances we meet with,  each of them 
as an entire thing by itself, having all its qualities in 
itself,  and independent of  other things ;  overlooking, 
for  the most part,  the operations  of  those  invisible 
fluids  they  are encompassed  with,  and  upon  whose 
motions  and operations  depend  the greatest part of 
those  qualities  which  are  taken not~ce  of  in  them, 
and are made by us the inherent marks of distinction 
whereby we know and denominate them.  Put a piece 
of  gold  any where  by itself, separate from the reach 
and influence of  all  other bodies, it will  immediately 
lose all its colour and weight, and perhaps malleable- 
ness too ;  which, for aught I know, would be changed 
into a perfect friability.  Water, in which to us fluidity 
is an essential quality, left to itself, would cease to be 
fluid.  But if inanimate  bodies  owe so much of  their 
present state to other bodies without them, that they 
would  not  be  wlwt  they  appear to  us,  were  those 1  6  Universul Propositions,  Book 4. 
bodies that cnviron them removed ;  it is  yet more so 
in vegetables, which are nourished, grow, and produce 
leaves,  flowers,  and  seeds in  a  constant  succession. 
And if we look a little nearer into the state of animals, 
we shall find that their dependence, as to life, motion, 
and the most considerable qualities to be observed in 
them, is so wholly  on extrinsical causes and qualities 
of other bodies that make no part of  them, that they 
cannot subsist  a momeilt without  them : though yet 
those  bodies  on  which  they depend  are little talien 
notice of, and make no part of  the complex  ideas we 
frame of those animals.  Take the air but for a minute 
from the greatest  part of  living creatures, and they 
presently lose  sense,  life,  and  motion.  This the ne- 
cessity of  breathing  has  forced  into our knowledge. 
But how  many  other extrinsical,  and possibly  very 
remote bodies, do the springs of  these admirable ma- 
chines depend on, which are not vulgarly observed, or 
so  much  as  thought on;  and how  many are there, 
which  the severest  inquiry can never discover ! The 
inhabitants of  this  spot of  the universe,  though re- 
moved so many millions of miles from the sun, yet de- 
pend so much on the duly tempered motion of particles 
coming from,  or agitated by it, that were this earth 
removed but a  small part of  the distance out of  its 
present situation, and placed a little farther or nearer 
that source of heat, it is more than probable that the 
greatest part of the animals in it would  immediately 
perish : since we find them so often  destroyed  by an 
excess  or defect of  the sun's  warmth,  which  an ac- 
cidental position, in some parts of this our little globe, 
exposes them to.  The qualities  observed  in a  load- 
stone must  needs  have  their source  far  beyond  the 
confines of that body ; and the ravage made often on 
several sorts of animals by invisible causes, the certain 
death (as we are told) of  some of them, by barely pass- 
ing the line, or,  as it is certain of  other, by being re- 
moved  into n neighbouring country ; evidently show 
that the concurrence and operations of several bodies, 
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with which they are seldom thought to have any thing 
to do, is absolutely necessary to make them be what 
they appear to us,  and  to preserve those qualities  by 
which we  know and distinguish them.  We are then 
quite out of the way, when we think that things con- 
tain within themselves the qualities that appear to us 
in them ;  and we in vain  search for that constitution 
within the body of  a fly,  or an elephant, upon which 
depend those qualities and powers we observe in them. 
For  which  perhaps,  to understand  them  aright, we 
ought to look not only beyond this our earth and  at- 
mosphere, but even beyond  the sun, or remotest star 
our eyes  have  yet  discovered.  For  how  much  the 
being  and operation of  particular substances in this 
our globe depends on causes utterly beyond our view, 
is impossible for us to determine.  We see and per- 
ceive some of  the motions and grosser operations of 
things here about us ; but whence the streams come 
that keep all these curious  machines  in motion and 
repair,  how  conveyed  and  modified,  is  beyond  our 
notice  and  apprehension:  and  the great  parts and 
wheels, as I may so say, of  this stupendous structure 
of the universe, may, for aught we know, have such a 
connexion  and  dependence  in  their  influences  and 
operations one upon another, that perhaps things in 
this  our  mansion  would  put on quite  another face, 
and cease  to be  what  they are,  if  some one of  the 
stars or great bodies,  incomprehensibly remote from 
us,  should  cease  to be  or move  as it does.  This is 
certain, things however absolute and entire they seem 
in themselves,  are but retainers  to other parts of  na- 
ture, for that which they are most taken notice of  by 
us.  Their observable qualities, actions,  and powers, 
are owing to something without them ; and  there is 
not so complete and perfect  a part that we  know of 
nature, which does not owe the being it has, and the 
excellencies of it, to its neighbours ; and we must not 
confine our thoughts within  the surface of  any body, 
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but look a great deal farther, to comprehend perfectly 
those qualities that are in it. 
§ in. If this he so,  it is  not  to be wondered, that 
we have very imperfect ideas of substances ;  and that 
the real  essences,  on which  depend  their  properties 
and operations, are unknown to us.  We cannot dis- 
cover so much as that size, figure, and texture of their 
minute  and  active  parts, which  is  really  in them; 
much less the different motions and impulses made in 
and upon them by bodies  from without,  upon which 
depends,  and by which  is  formed,  the greatest  and 
most  remarkable  part of those qualities we  observe 
in them, and of which our complex ideas of them are 
made up.  This consideration alone is enough to put 
an end to all our hopes  of ever  having the ideas of 
their real essences ;  which whilst we want, the naini11al 
essences we make use of instead of them will be able 
to furnish  us  but very  sparingly with  any  general 
knowledge,  or universal propositions capable of real 
certainty. 
Judgment  $ 13. We are not therefore to wonder, 
may reach  if certainty be to be found in very few ge- 
farther, but  neral propositions  made concerning sub- 
that is not  stances :  our knowledge of their qualities 
knowledge.  and  properties goes very seldom farther 
than our  senses  reach and idform us.  Possibly  in- 
quisitive and observing men may, by strength of judg- 
ment,penetrate farther,and on probabilities taken  from 
wary observation, and hints well laid together, often 
guess right at  what experience has not yet discovered 
to them.  But this is but guessing still ;  it amounts 
only to opinion, and has  not that certainty which is 
requisite to knowledge.  For  all general knowledge 
lies only in our own  thoughts, and consists barely in 
the contemplation of our own abstract ideas.  Where- 
ever  we  perceive  any  agreement  or  disagreement 
amongst  them,  there  we  have  general knowledge; 
and,  by  putting the names  of  those  ideas  together 
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accordingly in propositions,  can with  certainty pro- 
nounce general truths.  But because the abstract ideas 
of  substances, for which  their  specific  names  stand, 
whenever they have any distinct and determinate sig- 
nification,  have  a  discoverable  connexion  or  incon- 
sistency with but a very few other ideas ;  the certainty 
of universal propositions concerning substances is very 
narrow and  scanty in  that part, which  is  our prin- 
cipal inquiry concerning them; and there are scarce 
any of the names  of substances, let the idea it is  ap- 
plied to be what  it will,  of which  we  can generally 
and with  certainty pronounce, that it has or has not 
this or that other  quality belonging  to it, and con- 
stantly  co-existing  or  inconsistent  with  that  idea, 
wherever it is to be found. 
§ 14. Before we can have any tolerable  what  is re- 
knowledge  of  this  kind,  we  must  first  quisite for 
know what changes the primary qualities  our know- 
of one body do regularly produce in the  ledge of 
primary qualities  of  another,  and howd Substances. 
Secondly,  we  must know  what  primary qualities of 
any body  produce  certain sensations or ideas in  us. 
This is in truth no less than to know all the effects of 
matter, under its divers modifications of bulk, figure, 
cohesion  of parts, motion  and rest.  Which, I think 
every body  will  allow,  is  utterly  impossible  to be 
known by us without  revelation.  Nor if  it were re- 
vealed to us, what sort of figure, bulk, and motion of 
corpuscles, would  produce  in  us the sensation  of  a 
yellow colour, and what sort of figure, bulk, and tex- 
ture of parts, in the superficies of any body,  were fit 
to give such corpuscles  their due motion  to produce 
that colour ;  would that be enough to make universal 
propositions  with  certainty,  concerning  the  several 
sorts of them, unless we  had  faculties acote enough 
to perceive the precise  bulk, figure, texture, and mo- 
tion of  bodies  in those  minute parts, by which  they 
operate on our senses, so that we might by those frame 
our abstract  ideas of  them.  I have mentioned  here 
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only corporeal substances, whose  operations seem to 
lie more  level  to our  understandings :  for as  to the 
operations of spirits, both  their thinking and moving 
of bodies, we  at first  sight  find  ourselves  at a  loss; 
though perhaps, when we have applied our thoughts 
a little nearer to the consideration of bodies, and their 
operations, and  examined  how far our  notions, even 
in  these,  reach,  with  any clearness, beyond  sensible 
matter of fact, we shall be bound to confess, that even 
in these too our discoveries amount to very little be- 
yond perfect ignorance and incapacity. 
Whilst our  § 15. This is evident, the abstract com- 
ideasofsub-  plex ideas  of substances,  for which  their 
stances con-  general names stand, not comprehending 
tain not  their real constitutions,  can afford us very 
their real 
constitu-  little  universal  certainty.  Because  our 
tions, we  ideas of them are not  made  up of  that, 
can make  on which  those  qualities we  observe  in 
:'fa[::$;  them, and would fnform ourselves about, 
p,opos~t~ons do depend, or with which  they have  any 
concerning  certain  connexion :  V. g. let the ideaa  to  " 
them.  which  we give the name man  be,  as  it 
commonly is, a body of the ordinary shape, with sense, 
voluntary motion, and reason joined to it.  This being 
the abstract idea, and consequently the essence of our 
species man, we can make butvery few general certain 
propositions concerning  man,standing for such an idea. 
Because not knowing the real constitution on which 
sensation, power of  motion, and  reasoning, with that 
peculiar shape, depend, and whereby they are united 
together in the same subject, there are very few other 
qualities with which we  can perceive them to have a 
necessary connexion : and  thereforqwe  cannot with 
certainty affirm, that all men sleep by intervals ;  that 
no man can be nouiished by wood or stones ;  that all 
men  will  be  poisoned  by  hemlock:  because  these 
ideas have no connexion or repugnancy with this our 
nominal essence of man, with  this  abstract idea that 
name  stands  for.  We must, in  these  and  the  like, 
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appeal to trial in particular subjects, which can reach 
but  a little way.  We must  content  ourselve:; with 
probability in the rest ; but can have  no general cer- 
tainty, whilst  our specific  idea  of  mall  contains not 
that real constitution, which is  tlie root, wherein all 
his inseparable qualities are unitccl, and from whence 
they  flow.  Whilst  our idea,  the word  man  stands 
for, is  only an imperfect  collection  of some  sensible 
qualities and powers  in  him, there  is  no discernible 
connexion  or repugnance bet\veen  our  specific idea 
and the operation  of  either the parts of  hemlock  or 
stones upon his constitution.  There are aniinnis thzt 
safely eat hemlock, and others that are nourished by 
wood  and  stones : but as  long as we  \~ailt  idezs  of' 
those real constitutions  of diRerent  sorts of auinlnls, 
whereon these and the like qualities  and powers  dc- 
pend, we  must  not  hope  to  reach  certainty in  uni- 
versal propositions concerning them.  Those few ideas 
only,  which  have  a  discernible  coiit~esion  with  our 
nominal essence, or any part of it, can afford us such 
propositions.  But these  are  so  few, and of  so little 
moment, that we  may justly look  on  our certain ge- 
neral knowledge of substances as almost none at all. 
§ 16. To  conclude ;  general  proposition^,  k,herei,l 
of what kind soever, are then only capable  lies the ge- 
of certainty, when the terms used i11  them  neral cer- 
stand for such ideas, whose agreement or  tainty  of' 
proposi-  disagreement,  as  there  expressed,  is ca- 
uable to be discovered bv us.  Arid wc are 
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then certain of tlleir truth or fa,Is,l!;e!lood,  when we per- 
ceive  the ideas  the terms stand  for to  agree or not 
agree, according  as  they arc  affirmed  or denied onc 
of  another.  Whence we  mny  take notice,  that  gc- 
neral certainty is never to be found  but in our ideas. 
Whenever we go to seek  it else\vllere in experiment, 
or observations witliout  us, our  kno\vledge  Voes  not 
beyond particulars.  It  is tlie conteinplation of  our own 
abstract ideas that aloile  is  able to afi-ord us  gcneral 
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CHAPTER  VII. 
Of Maxims. 
They are  8  1. THERE  are a sort of  propositions, 
self-evident.  which  under the name  of  maxims  and 
axioms have passed  for principles of science ;  and be- 
cause they are self-evident,  have  been  supposed in- 
nate,  although nobody (that I know) ever went about 
to show the reason and foundation of  their clearness 
or cogency.  It may however  be worth while  to in- 
quire into the reason of their  evidence, and see whe- 
ther it be  peculiar to them  alone, and  also examine 
how far  they influence and govern our other know- 
ledge. 
Wherein  § 2. Knowledge,  as has  been  shown, 
that self-  consists in  the perception  of  the agree- 
evidence  ment or disagreement ofideas :  now where 
consists.  that agreement or disagreement is per- 
ceived immediately by itself, without the intervention 
or help  of  any other,  there  our knowledge  is self- 
evident.  This will  appear to be so to any one, who 
will  but consider  any  of  those  propositions,  which, 
without any proof, he assents to at first sight :  for in 
all of them he will  find, that the reason  of his assent 
is from that agreement or  disagreement, which  the 
mind, by an immediate comparing them, finds in those 
ideas  answering  the affirmation  or negation  in  the 
proposition. 
self-evi-  § 3. This being  so,  in  the next place 
dence not  let us consider, whether this self-evidence 
peculiar to  be  peculiar  only  to those  propositions 
received  which commonly pass  under the name of 
axioms.  maxims, and have  the dignity of axioms 
allowed them.  And here it is plain, that several other 
truths,  not  allowed  to be  axioms,  partake  equally 
with them in this  self-evidence.  This we  shall  see, 
if we go over these several  sorts of agreement or dis- 
agreement of  ideas,  which  I  have  above-mentioned, 
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viz.  identity,  relation,  co-existence,  and real  exist- 
ence; whicli will discover to us, that not only those few 
propositions, which  have  had the credit of  maxims, 
are self-evident,  but  a great many,  even  almost an 
infinite number of other propositions are such. 
5 4. For, first, the  immediate perception  As  to 
of the agreement or disagreement of iden-  identity and 
tity, being founded  in  the mind's having  diversity,all 
distinct ideas, this affords us as many self-  ~ro~ositio"s  are equally 
evident propositions as  we have distinct  self-evident. 
ideas.  Every one,  that  has  any  know- 
ledge at all, has, as the foundation of it, various and 
distinct ideas : and it is the  first  act  of  the  mind 
(without which it can never be capable of any know- 
ledge)  to know every  one  of  its ideas  by itself, and 
distinguish  it from others.  Every one  finds in him- 
self, that he knows the ideas he has ;  that he knows 
also when any one is in his understanding, and what it 
is ;  and that when more than one are there, he knows 
them distinctly  and unconfusedly one from  another. 
Which always being so (it being impossible but that 
he should perceive what  he perceives)  he can never 
I  be in doubt when  any idea is in his mind,  that it is 
there, and is that  idea it is ; and that two  distinct 
ideas, when they are in  his mind,  are there, and are 
not one and the same idea.  So that all such affirma- 
tions and negations are made without  any possibility 
of doubt, uncertainty, or hesitation, and must  neces- 
sarily be assented to as soon  as understood;  that is, 
as soon as we  have  in our  minds  determined ideas, 
which the terms in the proposition  stand for.  And 
therefore whenever the mind with attention considers 
any proposition,  so  as to perceive  the two ideas sig- 
nified by the terms, and affirmed or denied one of the 
other, to be the same or different; it is presently and 
infallibly certain  of the truth of  such  a proposition, 
and this  equally,  whether  these  propositions  be in 
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less  so,  v.g.  whether  the general idea  of  being  be 
affirmed  of  itself, as  in this proposition, whatsoever 
is, is ;  or a more  particular idea be affirmed of itself, 
as a man is  a inan ;  or, whatsoever is white is white ; 
or whether the idea of  being in  general be denied of 
not being, which is the only (if I may so call it) idea 
different from it, as in this other proposition, it is im- 
possible for the same thing to be,  and not to be ; or 
any idea of any particular being be denied of  another 
difrerent from it, as, a man is not a horse ;  red is not 
blue.  The difference of  the  ideas,  as  soon  as  the 
terms are understood, makes the truth of the proposi- 
tion  presently  visible,  and  that with  an equal  cer- 
tainty and easiness in the less as well as the more ge- 
neral propositions,  and all  for  the same  reason, viz. 
because the mind perceives,  in any ideas that it has, 
the same idea to be the same with itself;  and  two 
different ideas to be different, and not the same.  And 
this it is  equally certain  of, whether  these  ideas  be 
more or less general, abstract, and comprehensive.  It 
is not therefore  alone  to these  two general propsi- 
tions, whatsoever  is,  is; and it is  impossible for the 
same thing to be, and not to be ;  that this sort of self- 
evidence belongs by any peculiar right.  The percep- 
tion of being, or not being, belongs  no more to these 
vague  ideas,  signified  by the terms whatsoever  and 
thing, than  it does  to  any other  ideas.  These two 
general maxims, amounting  to no  more in short but 
this,  that the same is the same, and  same is not dif- 
ferent, arc truths known in more particular instances, 
as well as in those general maxims,  and known  also 
in particular  instances, before  these general maxims 
are ever thought on, and draw all their force from the 
discernment  of  the mind  employed  about particular 
ideas.  There is  nothing  more visible  than that the 
mind, without the help of  any proof, or reflection on 
cithei. of tlicse gcneral propositions,perceives so clearly, 
and bllows SO certainly, thnt  the idea of white is thr: 
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idea of white, and not the idea of blue ;  and that the 
ideaof white, when it is in the mind, is there,  and is 
not absent ;  that the consideration of these axioms can 
add nothing to the evidence or certainty of its know- 
ledge.  Just so it is (as every one may experiment in 
himself) in all the ideas  a man has in his mind :  lie 
knows each to be  itself, and not to be  another ;  and 
to be in his mind, and not away when it is there, with 
a certainty that cannot be greater ;  and therefore the 
truth of no genera1 proposition  can be known with a 
greater certainty, nor add any thing to this.  So that 
in respect of identity, our intuitive knowledge reaches 
as far as our ideas ;  and we are capable of making as 
many self-evident  propositions  as we  have  names for 
distinct ideas.  And I appeal to every one's own mind, 
whether this proposition, a circle is a circle, be not as 
self-evident a proposition, as that consisting  of  more 
general terms, whatsoever  is, is ?  and again, whether 
this proposition, blue is not red, be not a proposition 
that the mind  can  no  more  doubt of,  as  soon as  it 
understands the words, than it does of that axiom, it 
is  impossible for  the  same  thing  to be,  and  not  to 
be ? and so of all the like. 
9  5@econdly,  as  to  co-existence,  or  i.  In eo  -ex- 
such  necessary  connexion  between  two  isten,, ,, 
ideas,  that, in  the  subject where  one of  have few 
them is  supposed,  there the  other  must  self-evident 
proposi-  necessarily be also8 of such agreement or 
tions  disagreement  as  this  the mind  has  an 
immediate perception but in very few of them.  And 
therefore in this sort we have but very little intuitive 
knowledge ;  nor are there to be found very many pro- 
positions  that  are self-evident,  though  some  there 
are ;  v.  g)  the idea of  filling a place equal to the con- 
tents of  its superficies,  being annexed to our idea of 
body, I think it is a self-evident  proposition, that two 
bodies cannot be in the same place. 
5  6.  Thirdly,  as  to  the  relations  of  S. In other 
modes, mathematicians have framed many  relations we 
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equality.  As,  equals taken from equals, the remainder 
will be equal;  which, with the rest of that kind, how- 
ever they are received  for maxims  by the mathema- 
ticians,  and are unquestionable  truths; yet, I think, 
that any one who  considers them will not find,  that 
they have a clearer self-evidence than these, that one 
and one are equal to two ;  that if you take from the 
five fingers of one hand two, and from the five fingers 
of the other hand two, the remaining numbers will be 
equal.  These and a thousand other such propositions 
may be found in numbers,  which,  at the very  first 
hearing,  force  the assent,  and carry with  them  an 
equal, if  not greater clearness, than those mathema- 
tical axioms. 
4.  Concern-  $7.  Fourthly, as to real existence, since 
ing real  that has no connexion with  any other of 
existence  our ideas, but that of ourselves, and of a 
we have 
none.  first  being,  we  have  in that,  concerning 
the real existence of all other beings, not 
so much as demonstrative,  much  less  a  self-evident 
knowledge ;  and therefore concerning those there are 
no maxims. 
These ax-  $ 8.  In the next place let us consider 
ioms do not  what influence these received maxims have 
much influ-  upon the other parts  of our knowledge. 
ence our  The rules established in the schools, that  -- 
other know-  all reasonings are ez precognitis et pre-  ledge.  concessis, seem  to lay the foundation  of 
a11 other knowledge in these maxims,  and to suppose 
them to be precognita;  whereby,  I think,  are meant 
these two things : first, that these  axioms are those 
truths that are first known  to the mind.  And,  se- 
condly, that upon them the other parts of our know- 
ledge depend. 
Because  S 9.  First, that they are not the truths 
they are not  first known  to the mind,  is  evident  to 
the truths  experience, as we have shown in  another 
we first  place, book i. chap. ii.  Who perceives not 
knew.  that achild ceftainly knows that  ;c  stranger 
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is not its mother, that its sucking-bottle is not the rod, 
long  before  he  knows that it is  impossible for  the 
same thing to be  and not to be?  And  how  many 
truths are there about numbers, which it is  obvious 
to observe that the mind is perfectly acquainted with, 
and fully convinced  of,  before  it  ever  thought  on 
these general maxims,  to which mathematicians,  in 
their  arguings,  do sometimes refer them !  Whereof 
the reason  is very plain;  for  that which  makes  the 
mind assent to such propositions being  nothing else 
but the perception it has of  the agreement or  dis- 
agreement of  its ideas,  according  as  it  finds  them 
affirmed or denied one of another,  in words it under- 
stands ; and every idea being known to be what it is, 
and every two  distinct  ideas  being  known  not  be 
the same;  it must necessarily follow,  that such self- 
evident  truths  must  be  first  known,  which  con- 
sist  of  ideas  that are  first  in  the  mind:  and the 
ideas  first  in  the  mind,  it  is  evident,  are  those 
of  particular things, from whence,  by  slow  degrees, 
the understanding proceeds to some few general ones; 
which  being  taken  from  the ordinary  and  familiar 
objects  of  sense,  are settled  in  the mind,  with  ge- 
neral names to them.  Thus particular ideas are first 
received  and  distinguished,  and  so  knowledge  got 
about them;  and next to them,  the less general  or 
specific,  which  are next  to particular:  for  abstract 
ideas are not so obvious or easy to  children, or the  yet 
unexercised mind,  as particular  ones.  If they seem 
so to grown men, it is only because  by constant and 
familiar use they are made  so.  For when we nicely 
reflect upon them, we shall find, that general ideas are 
fictions and contrivances of  the mind,  that carry dif- 
ficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves 
as we are apt to imagine.  For esample, does it not re- 
quire some pains and skill to form the general idea of a 
triangle (whichis yet none of the most abstract,compre- 
hensive,  and difficult ?)  for it must be neither oblique 
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non ;  but all and none of these at once.  In effect, it 
is  something imperfect,  that  cannot  exist; an  idea 
wherein  some  parts  of  sevtral  different  and incon- 
sistent ideas  are put together.  It is true, the mind, 
in this  imperfect  state, has  need  of  such ideas, and 
makes  all  the haste  to them it can,  for  the conve- 
niency of  communication  and enlargement of  know- 
ledge;  to both which  it is  naturally very  much  in- 
clined.  But yet one has reason to suspect such ideas 
are marks of our imperfection; at least this is enough 
to show, that the most abstract and general ideas are 
not  those  that the  mind  is  first  and  most  easily 
acquainted  with,  not  such as  its earliest knowledge 
is conversant about. 
Because on  9  10.  Secondly,  from  what  has been 
them the  said  it plainly  follows,  that these  mag- 
other parts  nified maxims are not the principles and 
ofourknow-  -.  foundations of  all our  other  knowledge. 
ledgedonot  For  if  there  be  a  great  many  other  depend. 
truths, which have as inuch self-evidence 
as they, and a great many that we know before them, 
it is impossible  they  should  be  the principles  from 
which we  deduce  all other truths.  Is it impossible 
to know that one and two are equal to three, but by 
virtue of this, or some such axiom,viz. the whole is equal 
to all its parts taken together? Many a one knows that 
one and two are equal to three, without having heard 
or thought on that,  or any other axiom,  by  which  it 
might be proved : and  knows it as certainly as  any 
other man  knows  that the whole  is  equal to all its 
parts,  or  any other  maxim,  and  all from  the  same 
reason  of  self-evidence;  the equality  of  those  ideas 
being as visible and certain to  him without that, or any 
other axiom, as with it,  it needing no proof to make 
it perceived.  Nor after the knowledge, that the whole 
is equal to all its parts, does he know that one and two 
are equal to three better  or more  certainly than he 
did before.  For if  there  be  any odds in those ideas, 
the whole  and  parts  are  more  obscure,  or  at least 
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more difficult to be settled in the mind, than those of 
one, two, and three.  And indeed, I think, I may ask 
these men, who will needs have all knowledge, besides 
those general principles  themselves,  to depcnd on ge- 
neral, innate,  and  self-evident principles,-what  prin- 
ciple is requisite  to prove,  that one and one are two, 
that two and two are four, that three times two  are 
six ?  Which  being  known  without  any  proof,  do 
evince, that either all knowledge does not depcnd on 
certain pr~cognita  or  general  maxims,  called  prin- 
ciples, or else  that these  are principles ; and if these 
are to be counted principles,  a great part of numera- 
tion will be so.  To which  if  we  add all the self-evi- 
dent propositions,  which  may be  made  about all our 
distinct ideas,  principles  will  be  almost  infinite,  at 
least innumerable, which men arrive to the knowledge 
of, at different ages ;  and a great many of these innate 
principles  they  never come to  know  all  their lives. 
But whether  they come in  view  of  the mind  earlier 
or later, this is true of them, that they are all ltnown 
by their native evidence,  are wholly independent, re- 
ceive no light, nor are capable of any proof  one from 
another ;  inuch less the more particular, from the more 
general; or  the  more  sinlple,  from  the  more  com- 
pounded : the more simple, and less abstract, being the 
most familiar, and the easier and earlier apprehended. 
But whichever be the clearest ideas, the evidence and 
certainty of all such propositions is in this, that a man 
sees the same idea to be the same idea, and infallibly 
perceives two different  ideas to be different ideas.  For 
when a man has in his understanding the ideas of one 
and of two, the idea of yellow, and the idea of blue, he 
cannot but certainly know, that the idea of one is the 
idea of one, and not the idea of two ;  and that the idea 
of  yellow is the idea of  yellow,  and not  the idea  of 
blue.  For  a man  cannot  confound  the ideas  in his 
mind, which  he has  distinct: that would  be  to have 
them confuscd and distinct at the same time, which is 
a contradiction : and to have  none distinct is to have 30  Maxims.  Book 4. 
no use of our faculties, to have no knowledge at all. 
And  therefore what idea soever is  affirmed  of itself, 
or whatsoever two entire distinct ideas are denied one 
of another, the mind cannot but assent to such a pro- 
position,  as infallibly true,  as soon as  it understands 
the terms, without hesitation or need of  proof,  or re- 
garding those made in more general terms, and called 
maxims. 
What use  $1  1. What shall we then say ?  Are these 
these ge-  general maxims of no use ?  By no means ; 
neral  though perhaps their use is not that which 
maxims  it is  commonlv taken to be.  But since 
have.  doubting in t6e least of what hath been 
by some men ascribed to these maxims may be apt to 
be cried out against, as overturning the foundations 
of all the sciences ;  it may be worth while to consider 
them, with respect to other parts of our knowledge, 
and examine more particularly to what purposes they 
serve, and to what not. 
1. It is evident from what has been already said, 
that  they  are of  no  use  to  prove  or confirm  less 
general self-evident propositions. 
2.  It is as plain  that they are not, nor have been 
the foundations whereon any science hath been built, 
There is, I know,  a  great deal of  talk,  propagated 
from scholastic men,  of  sciences  and the maxims  on 
which  they are built : but  it has been  my ill luck 
never to meet with any such sciences ; much less any 
one built upon these two maxims, what is,  is ;  and it 
is impossible for the same  thing to be, and not to be. 
And I would  be  glad  to be  shown where  any such 
science,  erected  upon  these,  or  any other  general 
axioms, is to be found : and should be obliged to any 
one who would lay before  me  the frame and system 
of  any  science  so  built  on  these  or  any  such-like 
maxims,  that could  not  be shown to stand  as  firm 
without any  consideration  of  them.  I ask,  whether 
these  general maxims  have not the same use in the 
study of  divinity,  and in  theological  questions,  that 
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they have in other sciences ?  They serve here too to 
silence wranglers, and put an end  to dispute.  But 
I think that nobody will therefore say, that the chris- 
tian religion is built  upon  these maxims, or that the 
knowledge we have of it is derived from these prin- 
ciples.  It is from revelation we have received it,  and 
without revelation these maxims had never been able 
to help us to it.  When we find out an idea, by whose 
intervention we discover the connexion of two others, 
this  is  a  revelation  from God to us, by the voice of 
reason.  For we then come to know a truth that we 
did not know before.  When God declares any truth 
to us,  this is  a  revelation  to us  by the voice  of his 
spirit, and we are advanced in our knowledge.  But 
in neither of  these  do we receive our light or know- 
ledge from maxims.  But  in the one the things them- 
selves  afford  it,  and  we  see  the truth in them  by 
perceiving  their  agreement  or disagreement:  in the 
other, God himself affords it immediately to us,  and 
we  see  the truth  of  what  he  says in his  unerring 
veracity. 
3.  They are not of use to help men forward in the 
advancement of sciences, or new discoveries of yet un- 
known truths.  Mr. Newton,  in his  never enough to 
be  admired  book,  has  demonstrated  several  propo- 
sitions,  which  are  so  many  new  truths,  before  un- 
known to the world, and are farther advances in ma- 
thematical knowledge ;  but, for the discovery of these, 
it was  not  the general maxims, what is,  is;  or the 
whole is bigger than a part,  or  the like,  that helped 
him.  These were not the clues that led him into the 
discovery of the truth and  certainty of  those propo- 
sitions.  Nor was  it by them  that he got the know- 
ledge  of  those  demonstrations;  but  by  finding  out 
intermediate  ideas,  that  showed  the  agreement  or 
disagreement of the ideas, as expressed in the propo- 
sitions he demonstrtltcd.  This is the greatest exercise 
and improvement of human  understanding in the en- 
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wherein they are far enough from receiving any help 
from the contemplation of these, or the like magnified 
maxims.  Would those who have this traditional ad- 
miration of these propositions, that they think no step 
can be made in knowledge without the support of an 
axiom,  no stone laid in the building of  the sciences 
without  a  general  maxim,  but distinguish  between 
the method of acquiring knowledge, and of communi- 
cating; between the method of raising any science and 
that of  teaching it to others as far as it is advanced ; 
they would see that those  general maxims were not 
the foundations on which the first discoverers raised 
their admirable structures, nor the keys that unlocked 
and  opened  those  secrets  of  knowledge.  Though 
afterwards, when schools  were  erected,  and sciences 
had their professors  to teach what others had found 
out,  they often made use  of  maxims,  i. e. laid down 
certain propositions which were self-evident,  or to be 
received  for  true;  which  being  settled in  the minds 
of  their  scholars,  as unquestionable verities,  they on 
occasion  made use of, to convince them of  truths in 
particular instances that were not so familiar to their 
minds as those general axioms which had before been 
inculcated  to  them,  and  carefully  settled  in  their 
minds.  Though these particular instances, when well 
reflected  on,  are no  less  self-evident  to the under- 
standing than the general maxims  brought  to con- 
firm them : and it was  in those particular  instances 
that the first cliscoverer found the truth, without the 
help of the general maxims :  ad  so may any one else 
clo,  who  u  it11  attention consiclers them. 
To  come therefore to the use that is made of maxims. 
1. They are of use, as has been observed, in the or- 
dinary methods of teaching sciences as far as they are 
advanced;  but of  little  or none  in  advancing  them 
farther. 
2. Thcy arc of  use in tlisputes,  for the silencing  of 
obstinate  wranglers,  and  bringing  those  contests  to 
some  conclusion.  Whethc'l. n  need  of  them  to that 
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end  came  not  in,  in  the manner  following,  I crave 
leave to inquire.  The schools having made disputa- 
tion the touchstone of men's abilities, and the criterion 
of knowledge, adjudged victory to him  that kept the 
field :  and he that had the last word was concluded to 
have the better of  the argument, if  not of  the cause. 
But because by this means there was like to be no de- 
cision between  skilful combatants,  whilst  one  never 
failed of  a medius terminus to prove any proposition ; 
and the other could as constantly, without or with a 
distinction, deny the major  or minor; to prevent, as 
much  as could  be,  running  out of  disputes  into  an 
endless train  of  syllogisms,  certain  general proposi- 
tions,  most  of  them indeed self-evident,  were  iutro- 
duced into the schools ; which being such as all inen 
allowed  and  agreed  in,  were  looked  on  at< aeneral 
measures  of  truth,  and served  instead  of  principles 
(where  the disputants  had not lain down  any  other 
between  them) beyond  which  there  was  no  going, 
and which  must not  be  receded  from by either  side. 
And  thus  these  maxims  getting the name  of  prin- 
ciples, beyond which men in dispute could not retreat, 
were  by  mistake taken to be originals  and  sources, 
from whence  all  knowledge began,  and the founda- 
tions whereon the sciences were built.  Because \vl?en 
in  their  disputes  they  caiile  to  any  of  these,  they 
stopped there,  and went no farther; the matter was 
determined.  But how  much  this is a  mist:lii~  llnth 
been already shown. 
This method of the schools, which have bee11 thought 
the fountains of knowledge, introduced, as I suppose, 
the like use of these maxims into n great part of con- 
versation  out of  the schools,  to stop the mouths  of 
cavillers, whom any one is excused  from arguing any 
longer with, when they deny these general self-evident 
principles received  by  all reasonable inell, who  hnvc 
once thought of them : but yet tlieir use Iiercin is but 
to put an  end  to ~rral-lgling.  They, in truth, nllcll 
urged  ill  such cases,  teach  nothing : that is  nlrendy 
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done by the intermediate ideas made use of in the de- 
bate, whose connexion  may be seen without the help 
of those maxims, and so the truth known before the 
maxim is produced,  and the argument brought to a 
first principle.  Men would give off a wrong argument 
before  it came to that, if in their disputes they pro- 
posed to  themselves the finding and embracing of truth, 
and not a contest for victory.  And thus maxims have 
their use  to put a stop to their  perverseness,  whose 
ingenuity should have yielded sooner.  But the method 
of the schools having allowed and encouraged men to 
oppose and resist evident truth till they are baffled, 
i. e. till they are reduced to contradict themselves  or 
some established principle ;  it is no wonder that they 
should not in civil conversation be  ashamed of  that, 
which in the schools is counted a virtue and a glory ; 
obstinately to maintain that side of the question they 
have chosen, whether true or false, to  the  last extremity, 
even after conviction :  a strange way to attain truth 
and knowledge,  and that which I think the rational 
part of mankind, not corrupted  by education,  could 
scarce believe should ever be  admitted amongst the 
lovers of truth, and students of religion or nature ;  or 
introduced into the seminaries of  those who  are to 
propagate the truths of religion or philosophy amongst 
the ignorant and unconvinced.  How much such a way 
of learning is like to turn young men's minds from the 
sincere  search and love  of  truth,  nay,  and to make 
them doubt whether  there is  any such thing,  or at 
least worth the adhering to, I shall not now inquire. 
This I think, that bating those places which brought 
the peripatetic philosophy into their schools, where it 
continued many ages, without teaching the world any 
thing but the art of wrangling ;  these maxims were no 
where thought the foundations on which the sciences 
were built, nor the great helps to  the advancement of 
knowledge. 
As to these general maxims therefore, they are, as I 
have said, of great use in disputes, to stop the mouths 
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of wranglers ;  but not of much use to the discovery of 
unknown truths,  or to help the mind forwards in its 
search after knowledge.  For who ever began to build 
his knowledge on this general proposition, what is, is; 
or, it is impossible for the same thing to be,  and not 
to be:  and from  either of  these,  as from a principle 
of  science,  deduced  a  system of  useful  knowledge? 
Wrong opinions often involving contradictions, one of 
these maxims, as a touch-stone, may serve well to show 
whither they lead.  But yet, however fit to lay open 
the absurdity  or  mistake  of  a  man's  reasoning  or 
opinion,  they are of  very  little use  for  enlightening 
the understanding:  and it will not be found, that the 
mind receives much help from them in its progress in 
knowledge;  which  would  be  neither  less,  nor  less 
certain,  were  these  two general  propositions  never 
thought 0n.d It is true, as I have said, they sometimes 
serve in argumentation to stop a  wrangler's  mouth, 
by showing the absurdity of  what he saith,  and by 
exposing him to the shame of  contradicting what all 
the world knows, and he himself cannot but own to be 
true,~Bnt  it is one thing to show a man that he is in 
an  error,  and  another to put him  in  possession  of 
truth;  and I would fain know what truths these two 
propositions are able to teach,  and by their influence 
make us  know,  which  we  did  not  know  before,  or 
could not know without them.  Let us reason from 
them as well as we can, they are only about identical 
predications, and influence, if any at all, none but such. 
Each particular  proposition  concerning  identity  or 
diversity is as clearly and certainly  known in itself, 
if attended to,  as either of these general ones :  only 
these general ones, as serving in all cases,  are there- 
fore more inculcated and insisted on.  As to other less 
general maxims, many of them are no more than bare 
verbal propositions,  and teach us nothing but the re- 
spect and iinport  of  names  one to another.  "  The 
whole is equal to all its parts ;"  what real truth, I be- 
seech you, does it teach us ?  What more is contained 
D  0, 36  Maxinzs.  Book 4. 
in that maxim than what the signification of the word 
totum, or the whole, does of itself import ? And he that 
knows that the word whole stands for what is  made 
up of all its parts, knows very little less than that the 
whole  is equal to all its parts.  And  upon  the same 
ground, I think that this proposition, a hill is higher 
than a valley,  and several the like, may also pass for 
maxims.  But yet masters of mathematics, when they 
would, as teachers of what they know, initiate others 
in that science,  do not without reason place this, and 
some  other  such  maxims,  at the  entrance  of  their 
systenls ;  that their scholars, having in the beginning 
perfectly  acquainted  their  thoughts with these  pro- 
positions made in such general terms, may be used to 
make such reflections, and have  these more general 
propositions,  as  formed  rules  and  sayings,  ready to 
apply to all particular  cases.  Not that,  if  they  be 
equally  weighed,  they  are  more  clear  and  evident 
than the particular instances they are brought to con- 
firm ; but that, being more familiar to the mind, the 
very  naming  them  is  enough  to satisfy  the under- 
standing.  But this, I say,  is more from our custom 
of using them, and the establishment t,hey have got in 
our minds,  by our often thinking of  them, than from 
the different evidence of the things.  But before custom 
has settled methods of thinking and reasoning in our 
minds, I am apt to imagine it is quite otherwise; and 
that the child, when a part of his apple is taken away, 
knows  it better  in that particular  instance  than by 
this general proposition,  the whole is equal to all its 
parts;  and that if  one of  these have  need to be con- 
firmed to him by the other, the general has more need 
to be  let into his  mind  by the particular,  than the 
particular  by  the  general.  For  in  particulars  our 
knowledge begins, and so spreads itself by degrees to 
generals.  Though afterwards the mind takes the quite 
contrary course, and having drawn its knowledge into 
as general propositions as it can, makes those familiar 
to its thoughts, and accustoms itself to have recourse 
to them,  as to the standards of  truth and  falsehood. 
By which  familiar use  of  thcm, as rules to measure 
the truth of other propositions, it comes in time to be 
thought, that more particular propositions have their 
truth and evidence from their conformity to these more 
general ones, which  in  discourse  and argumentation 
are  so  frequently  urged,  and  constantly  admitted. 
And  this I think  to be  the reason  why, amongst  so 
many self-evident propositions, the most general only 
have had the title of maxims. 
$ 12. One thing farther, I think, it may  Maxims, if 
not be amiss to observe  concerning these  care be not 
general maxims, that they are so far from  ::","f:'!: 
improving  or  establishing  our minds  in  ,g  p,,e 
true knowledge,  that if  our  notions  be  contradic- 
wrong, loose, or unsteady, and we resign  tions- 
up our thoughts to the sound of  words,  rather than 
fix them on settled determined ideas of things :  I say, 
these general maxims will serve to confirm us in mis- 
takes;  and in  such  a way of  use  of words,  which is 
most  common,  will  serve  to  prove  contradictions: 
a. g:  he that, with Des Cartes, shall frame in his mind 
an idea of what he calls  body to be  nothing but ex- 
tension,  may  easily  demonstrate  that  there  is  no 
vacuum, i. e.  no space void  of  body,  by this maxim, 
what  is,  is.  For  the idea to which  he annexes the 
name body being bare extension, his knowledge, that 
space  cannot  be  without  body,  is  certain.  For  he 
knows his own idea of extension clearly and distinctly, 
and knows that it is what it is, and not another idea, 
though it be called by these three names,  extension, 
body, space.  Which three words, standing for one and 
the same idea, may no doubt, with the same evidence 
and certainty, be affirmed one of  another, as each of 
itself:  and it is as certain, that whilst I use them all 
to stand for one  and the same idea,  this ~redication 
is as true and identical in its signification,  that space 
is body, as this predication is true and identical, that 
body is body, both in signification and soulld. 3  8  Maxinu.  Book 4- 
tj 13. But if another should come, and 
Instance in 
vacuum.  make  to himself  another  idea,  different 
from Des Cartes's, of the thing, which yet, 
with  Des Cartes, he calls by the same name body; 
and make his idea,  which he expresses by the word 
body, to be of  a thing that hath both extension  and 
solidity together ;  he will  as easily demonstrate that 
there may be a  vacuum  or  space  without  a  body, 
as Des Cartes demonstrated the contrary.  Because 
the  idea  to which  he gives  the name  space  being 
barely the simple one of  extension;  and the idea to 
which he gives the name body being the complex idea 
of  extension and resistibility,  or solidity, together in 
the same subject; these two ideas are not exactly one 
and the same, but in the understanding as distinct as 
the ideas of  one and two,  white and black, or as of 
corporeity and humanity, if I may use those barbarous 
terms : and therefore the predication of  them in our 
minds, or in words standing for them, is not identical, 
but the negation of them one of another, viz. this pro- 
position,  extension or space is not body, is as true and 
evidently certain,  as this  maxim, it is impossible  for 
the same thing to be,  and not to be,  can make any 
proposition. 
They prove  $ 14. But yet though both these  pro- 
not the ex-  positions (as you see) may be equally  demon- 
istence of  strated, viz. that there may be a vacuum, 
things wit''-  and that there cannot be a vacuum,  by 
out us.  these  two certain principles,  viz. what is, 
is; and the same thing cannot be,  and not be:  yet 
neither of  these principles will  serve to prove to us, 
that any,  or what bodies  do exist:  for  that we are 
left to our senses, to discover to us as far as they can. 
Those universal and self-evident principles, being only 
our  constant,  clear,  and distinct  knowledge  of  our 
own ideas, more general or comprehensive, can assure 
US of nothing that passes without the mind ;  their cer- 
tainty is founded  only upon the knowledge we have 
of each idea by itself, and of its distinction from others; 
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about which we cannot be mistaken whilst they are in 
our minds,  though we  may,  and often are mistaken 
when we retain the names without  the ideas ; or use 
them confusedly sometimes for one, and sometimes for 
another idea.  In  which cases the force of these axioms 
reaching only to the sound,  and not the signification 
of  the words,  serves only to lead  us into confusion, 
mistake,  and  error.  It is  to  show  men  that these 
maxims,  however  cried  up for  the great guards of 
truth, will not secure them from error in  a  careless 
loose  use  of  their  words,  that I have made this re- 
mark.  In all that is here suggested concerning their 
little use for the improvement of  knowledge, or dail- 
gerous use  in  undetermined  ideas,  I have  been  far 
enough from saying or intending they should be laid 
aside,  as some have  been too forward to charge me. 
I afirm them to be truths, self-evident truths; and so 
cannot be laid aside.  As  far as their influence will 
reach, it is in vain to endeavour, nor will I attempt to 
abridge it.  Rut yet, without  any injury to truth or 
knowledge, I may have  reason to think  their  use is 
not answerable to the great stress which  seems to be 
laid on them; and I may warn nlen not  to make aa 
ill  use  of  them,  for  the  confirming  tllcinselves  in 
errors. 
9 15.  But let them be of what use they  T,,eir  appl 
\\-111 in  wrbal propositions,  they  cannot 
discover or prove  to us  the least  linow-  gerousabout  . - 
ledge of the nature of substances, as they  co~ll~lex 
are found  and exist without  us,  any far-  idcns, 
ther than grounded on experience.  And though the 
consequence of  these  two  propositions,  called  prin- 
ciples, be very clear,  and their  use  not dangcro~~s  or 
l~ortful,  in the probation of sueli things wherein there 
is no need at all of  them  for  proof,  but  such :is  are 
clear by themselves wltllout them, viz. where our itleas 
are determined,  and known by the names that stand 
for them :  yet when these principles, viz,  what is,  is ; 
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to be;  are made use  of  in the probation of  proposi- 
tions, wherein are words standing for complex ideas; 
v. w. man,  horse, gold,  virtue;  there they are  of  in-  b  finite danger,  and most commonly make men receive 
arid retain  falsehood  for manifest  truth,  and uncer- 
tainty for  demonstration : upon  which  follow  error, 
obstinacy, and all the mischiefs that can happen from 
wrong  reasoning.  The reason  whereof  is  not  that 
these principles are  less true, or of less force in proving 
prop~sitions  made of terms standing for complex ideas, 
than where  the propositions  are about simple ideas ; 
but because  men  mistake  generally,  thinking  that 
where the same terms are preserved,  the propositions 
are about the  same  things,  though  the ideas  they 
stand for are in truth different :  therefore these maxims 
are made use of  to support those, which in sound and 
appearance are coi~tradictory  propositions ;  rzs  is clear 
in  the demonstrations above-mentioned about avacuum. 
So that whilst men take  words for things,  as usually 
they  do,  these  nlaxilns may and do commonly serve 
to prove  contradictory propositions : as  shall yet  be 
farther made manifest. 
Instailce in  9  16.  For  instance,  let  man  be  that 
man.  concerning which you would by these first 
principles demonstrate any thing, and we 
shall  see,  that  so  far  as  demonstration  is  by  these 
principles,  it is  only verbal,  and gives  us no certain 
universal true proposition or knowledge of  any being 
existing without us.  First, a child having framed the 
idea of a man,  it is probable that his idea is just like 
that picture,  which  the  painter  makes of  the visible 
appearances joined together ;  and such a complication 
of  ideas together in his understanding makes up the 
single  complex  idea  which  he  calls  man,  whereof 
white or flesh-colour  in England being onc, the child 
can dc~nonstrate  to you  that a negro is not a man, 
because white coIour was one  of  the constant  simple 
ideas of  the complex  idea he calls man:  and thcre- 
fore hc can  dcmonstratc  by  tlic principlc,  it is  im- 
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possible  for  the  same  thing  to be,  and  not  to be, 
that a negro is not a man;  the foundation of  his cer- 
tainty being  not  that  universal  proposition,  which 
perhaps he never heard nor thought of,  but the clear 
distinct perception he hat11 of his ow11 simpIe ideas of 
black  and white,  which  he  cannot  be  persuaded  to 
take, nor can ever mistake one for another, whether he 
knows that maxim or no :  and to  this child, or any one 
who hath such an idea,  which  he calls man,  can you 
never demonstrate that a man hath a soul, because his 
idea of  man includes  no  such  notion  or  idea  in it. 
And therefore,  to him,  the  principle of  what is,  is, 
proves not this matter; but it depends  upon  collec- 
tion and observation, by which he is to make his com- 
plex idea called man. 
§ 17.  Secondly,  another that hath gone farther in 
framing and collecting the idea he  calls  man  and to 
the outward  shape  adds  laughter  and rational  dis- 
course, may demonstrate that infants and changelings 
are no men,  by this  maxim,  it is  impossible  for  the 
same thing to be,  and not to be ;  and I have discoursed 
with very rational men, who have actually denied that 
they are men. 
5 18. Thirdly, perhaps another makes up the coin- 
plex idea which he calls man only out of  the ideas of 
body  in  general,  and the  powers  of  language and 
reason, and leaves out the shape ~~liolly  : this man is 
able to demonstrate, that a man may have no hands, 
but be quadrupes, neither of  those being included in 
his idea of man; and  in whatever  body or  shape he 
found speech and reason joined, that was a man : be- 
cause having a  clear  knowledge  of  such  a complex 
idea, it is certain that what is. is. 
§ .19. So that,  if  rightly considered, 1 
Little use of  think we  may say,  that where  our ideas  I,,,,,  ,,,- 
are determined  in  our minds,  and have  imsi,, ,roofs 
annexed to them by us known and steady  where we 
names  under  those  settled  determina-  ~~~ec{~~~~ct 
tions,  there is little need or no use at all  idcas. 
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or disagreement  of  any  of  them.  He that cannot 
discern the truth or  falsehood  of  such  propositions, 
without the help of  these  and the like maxims,  will 
not be  helped  by  these  maxims  to do  it: since he 
cannot be supposed to know the truth of these maxims 
themselves without proof,  if he cannot know the truth 
of others without proof,  which  are as self-evident  as 
these.  Upon this ground  it is,  that intuitive know- 
ledge neither requires nor admits any proof, one part 
of  it more  than  another.  He that will  suppose  it 
does, takes away the foundation of all knowledge and 
certainty : and he that needs any proof  to make him 
certain, and give his  assent to this proposition,  that 
two are equal to two, will also have need of  a proof 
to make him admit, that what is,  is.  He  that needs a 
probation to convince  him,  that two  are not  three, 
that white is not black, that a triangle is not a circle, 
&c.  or any other  two  determined  distinct  ideas are 
not one and the same, will need also a demonstration 
to convince him,  that it is impossible  for  the same 
thing to be,  and not to be. 
V 
Their use  $ 20. And as these maxims are of little 
dangerous  use where we have determined ideas,  so 
wh&e our  they are, as I have showed,  of  dangerous 
ideas are  use where our ideas are not determined ; 
confused*  and where we use words that are not an- 
nexed to determined ideas, but such as are of  a loose 
and wandering signification,  sometimes standing for 
one, and sometimes for another idea :  from which fol- 
low mistake and error, which these maxims (brought 
as proofs to establish propositions,  wherein the terms 
stand for undetermined  ideas) do by their  authority 
confirm and rivet. 
CHAPTER VIII. 
Of  figing  Propositions. 
$ 1. WHETHER  the maxims  treated of  Somep  mpo- 
in the foregoing chapter be of that use to  ,itions  bring 
real knowledge as is generally supposed,  no increase 
I leave to be considered.  This, I think,  to our know- 
may  confidently be  affirmed,  that there  led". 
are universal propositions,  which though they be cer- 
tainly true,  yet they add no light to our understand- 
ings, bring no increase to our knowledge.  Such are, 
$ 2. First, all purely identical proposi-  A,,  first, 
tions.  These obviously, and at first blush,  identical 
appear to contain no instruction in them.  1)roposi- 
For when we affirm the said term of itself, 
whether it be barely verbal, or whether it contains any 
clear and real idea,  it shows us nothing but what we 
must certainly know before,  whether  such a proposi- 
tion  be  either made  by or proposed to us.  Indeed, 
that most general one,  what is,  is,  may serve some- 
times  to show  a man the absurdity he is guilty of, 
when by circumlocution, or equivocal terms, he would, 
in particular instances, deny the same thing of itself; 
because nobody will so openly bid defiance to  common 
sense,  as to affirm visible arid direct contradictions in 
plain words;  or  if  he does,  a  man  is  excused if  he 
breaks off any farther discourse with him.  But yet, I 
think, I may say,  that neither  that received  maxim, 
nor  any other  identical  proposition  teaches us  any 
thing:  and though in  such kind of  propositions  this 
great and magnified maxim, boasted to be thc founda- 
tion of demonstration, may be  and often is made use 
of to confirm them ; yet  all it proves  ainouiits to no 
more than this,  that the same word  may with great 
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the truth. of  any such proposition;  and let me  add 
also,  without any real knowledge. 
$ 3.  For at  this rate, any very ignorant person, who 
can but make a proposition, and knows what he means 
when he says ay or no,  may make a million of  pro- 
positions, of whose truths he may be infallibly certain, 
and yet not know one  thing in the world thereby; 
v. g. what is a soul,  is a soul ; or a soul is a soul ; a 
spirit is a spirit ; a fetiche is a fetiche, &c.  These all 
being equivalent to this proposition,  viz.  what is, is, 
i. e. what hath existence, hath existence ;  or who hath 
a soul,  hath a soul.  What is this more than trifling 
with words ? It is but like a monkey shifting his oyster 
from one hand to the other ;  and had  he but words, 
might, no doubt, have said, "  oyster in right hand is 
subject, and oyster in left hand is predicate :"  and so 
might have made a self-evident proposition of  oyster, 
i. e. oyster is  oyster;  and yet, with all this,  not have 
been one whit the wiser  or more knowing :  and that 
way of  handling the matter would much at one have 
satisfied the monkey's  hunger, or a man's understand- 
ing ;  and they would have improved in knowledge and 
bulk together. 
I know there are some who, because identical pro- 
positions  are self-evident,  show  a  great concern  for 
them, and think they do great service to philosophy 
by crying them up,  as if in  them was contained  all 
knowledge,  and the understanding were led into all 
truth by them only.  I grant as forwardly as any one, 
that they are all true and self-evident.  I grant farther, 
that the foundation of all our knowledge  lies in the 
faculty we have of perceiving the same idea to be the 
same,  and of  discerning it from those that are dif- 
ferent, as I have shown in the foregoing chapter.  But 
how that vindicates the making use of  identical pro- 
positions, for the improvement of knowledge, from the 
imputation of  trifling, I do not see.  Let any one re- 
peat, as often as he pleases,  that the will  is the will, 
or lay what stress on it he thinks fit; of what use is 
this, and an infinite the like propositions,  for the en- 
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larging  our knowledge &et  a man abound, as much as 
the plenty of  words which he has will permit,  in such 
propositions as these ;  a law is a law, and obligation is 
obligation;  right  is  right,  and  wrong  is  wrong : 
will these and the like ever help him to an acquaint- 
ance with  ethics ?  or  instruct  him  or  others in  the 
knowledge  of  morality?  Those  who  know  not,  nor 
perhaps ever  will  know,  what  is  right and  what  is 
wrong, nor the measures of them ;  can with as much 
assurance  make,  and  infallibly  know  the truth of, 
these and all such propositions, as he  that is best En- 
structed in morality can do.  But what advance  do 
such propositions give in the knowledge of  any thing 
necessary or useful for their conduct ?* 
He would  be thought to do little 'less than trifle, 
who,  for  the enlightening the understanding in any 
part of knowledge, should be busy with identical pro- 
positions,  and  inslst  on such maxims as these:  sub- 
stance is substance, and body is body ; a vacuum is a 
vacuum,  and  a  vortex is  a  vortex;  a  centaur is  a 
centaur,  and a chimera  is  a  chimera, &c.  For these 
and  all  such  are equally true,  equally certain,  and 
equally self-evident. But  yet they cannot but be counted 
trifling, when made use of as principles of instruction, 
and stress laid on them, as helps to knowledge :  since 
they teach nothing but what every one, who is capable 
of discourse, knows without being told ;  viz.  that the 
same term is the same term,  and the  same  idea the 
same idea.  And  upon  this  account  it was  that I 
formerly did,  and do still think,  the offering and in- 
culcatin~  such propositions,  in  order to give the un- 
derstanding any new light or inlet into the knowledge 
of things, no better than trifling. 
Instruction lies in something very different ;  and he 
that would  enlarge his  own,  or  another's  mind,  to 
truths he  does  not  yet  know,  must  find  out inter- 
mediate ideas, and then lay them in such order one by 
another, that the understandin5 may see the agree- 
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tions that do  this  are instructive;  but they are far 
from such as affirm the same term of itself: which is 
no way to advance one's  self  or others in any sort of 
knowledge.  It no  more helps to that, than it would 
help any one,  in his  learning to read,  to have  such 
propositions  as these inculcated to him.  An A is an 
A, and a B is a B ; which a man may know as well as 
any schoolmaster, and yet never be able to read a word 
as long as he lives.  Nor do these, or any such identical 
propositions,  help him one jot forwards in the skill of 
reading, let him make what use of them he can. 
If those who  blame  my calling them trifling pro- 
positions had but read,  and been at the pains to un- 
derstand, what I had above writ in very plain English, 
they could not but have seen that  by identical proposi- 
tions I mean only such, wherein the same term, im- 
porting the same idea, is affirmed of  itself:  which I 
take to be the proper signification of  identical  pro- 
positions :  and concerning all such, I think I may con- 
tinue safely to say, that to propose t,hem as instructive 
is no better than trifling.  For no  one who  has the 
use of reason can miss them, where it is necessary they 
should be taken notice of; nor doubt of  their truth, 
when he does take notice of them. 
But if men will call propositions identical, wherein 
the same term is not affirmed of  itself, whether they 
speak more properly than I  others must judge:  this 
is certain,  all that  they say of  propositions  that are 
not identical in my sense,  concerns not me,  nor what 
I have said ;  all that I have said relating to those pro- 
positions wherein the same term is affirmed of  itself. 
And I would  fain see an instance,  wherein any such 
can be made use of,  to the advantage and improve- 
ment  of  any  one's  knowledge.  Instances  of  other 
kinds, whatever use may be made of them, concern not 
me, as not being such as I call identical. 
Secondly,  5 4.  Secondly,  another sort of  trifling 
~vllen  a part  propositions is, when  a part of  the csm- 
of ally corn-  plcx idea is prcclicateci of the name of the 
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whole ; a  part  of  the  definition  of  the  plex idea ia 
word defined.  Such are a11  propositions  :;,"$,":fee 
wherein  the genus  is  predicated  of the 
species, or more comprehensive of less comprehensive 
terms :  for what information, what knowledge  carries 
this proposition  in it,  viz.  lead is  a  metal, to a man 
who knows the complex idea the name lead stands for ? 
all the simple ideas that go to the complex one sig- 
nified by the term metal, being  nothing but what he 
before comprehended, and signified by the name lead. 
Indeed, to a man that knows  the signification of the 
word metal, and not  of the word lead, it is a shorter\ 
way to explain the signification of the word lead, by 
saying it is a metal, which  at once  expresses several 
of its simple  ideas, than to enumerate  them one by 
one, telling him it is a body very heavy,  fusible, and 
malleable. 
1  5. Alike trifling it is, to predicate any  As  of  other part of the  definition  of  the term  the defini- 
defined, or to affirm any one of the simple  tion of the 
ideas of a complex one of the name of the  term de- 
whole  complex  idea;  as,  all gold is  fu-  fined. 
sible.  For fusibility being one  of  the simple  ideas 
that goes to the making  up  the  complex  one  the 
sound  gold  stands for, what  can it be  but playing 
with sounds,  to affirm that of the name gold which is 
com  rehended in its received  signification ?  It  would 
be  t  ought  little  better  than  ridiculous,  to  affirm  K 
gravely as a  truth of moment,  that gold is yellow ; 
and I see not how it is any jot more material to say, 
it is fusible, unless that quality be left out of the com- 
plex idea,  of which  the eound gold  is the mark  in 
ordinary speech.  What instruction can it carry with 
it, to tell one that which  he hath been told already, 
or he is supposed to know before ? For I am supposed 
to know the signification of the word another uses to 
me,  or else he is to tell me.  And if I know that the 
name  gold  stands  for  this  complex  idea  of  body, 
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struct me to put it solemnly afterwards in a proposi- 
tion, and gravely say, all gold is fusible.  Such pro- 
positions can only serve  to show the disingenuity of 
one, who will go from the definition of his own terms, 
by reminding him sometimes of it ;  but carry no know- 
ledge with  them, but of  the  signification  of words, 
however certain they be. 
§ 6. Every man is an animal, or living 
Instance,  body, is  as certain  a  proposition as can 
man and 
palfry.  be; but no more conducing to the know- 
ledge of  things, than to say,  a palfry is 
an ambling horse, or a neighing ambling animal, both 
being only about the signification of words, and make 
me know but this ; that body, sense,  and motion,  or 
power  of  sensation  and moving, are three  of  those 
ideas that I  always comprehend  and signify by the 
word man ; and where  they are not to be  found to- 
gether, the name man belongs not to that thing :  and 
so of the other,  that body,  sense,  and  a certain way 
of  going, with  a  certain kind  of  voice, are some  of 
those ideas which I always  comprehend and  signify 
by  the word  palfry;  and when  they  are not to be 
found together, the name palfry belongs  not to that 
thing.  It  is just the same,  and to the same purpose, 
when any term standing for  any one  or  more of the 
simple ideas, that all together make up that complex 
idea which is called man, is affirmed of the term man: 
v. g.  suppose  a  Roman  signified  by  the word  homo 
all these  distinct  ideas  united in one  subject, "  cor- 
porietas, sensibilitrrs, potentin se movendi, rationalitas, 
risibilitas ;"  he might, no  doubt, with great certainty, 
universally affirm one, more,  or all of these  together 
of the word homo,  but did no more than say that the 
word homo, in his country, comprehended in its signi- 
fication all these ideas.  Much like a romance knight, 
who  by the word  palfry  signified  these  ideas; body 
of a certain  figure,  four-legged,  with  sense,  motion, 
ambling, neighing, white, used  to have  a  woman on 
his back ;  might with  the same  certainty universally 
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affirm also any or all of these of the word palfry: but 
did thereby teach no more, but that the word palfry, 
in his or romance language, stood  for  all these, and 
was not to be applied to any thing where any of these 
was  wanting.  But he  that  shall tell  me,  that  in 
whatever thing sense,  motion,  reason,  and laughter, 
were united, that thing had actually a notion of God, 
or would be cast into a sleep by opium, made indeed 
an instructive proposition :  because neither having the 
notion  of God, nor  being  cast into sleep by opium, 
being contained  in  the idea  signified  by  the word 
man, we are by such propositions  taught something 
more than barely what the word man stands for ;  and 
therefore the knowledge contained in it is more than 
verbal. 
Q 7.  Before  a  man  makes any proposi-  For this 
tion,  he is  supposed to  understand the  teaclles but 
terms he uses  in it, or else he talks like  the siani- 
a  parrot,  only  a  noise by imita-  ficatii  of 
tion,  and framing certain  sounds, which  words. 
he has learnt of-others;  but not  as a rational crea- 
ture, using  them for  signs  of  ideas which he has in 
his mind.  The hearer also is supposed to understand 
the terms as the speaker uses  them, or else  he talks 
jargon,  and makes an unintelligible noise.  And there- 
fore he trifles with words who makes such a proposi- 
tion,  which, when  it is  made, contains  no more than 
one of the terms does, and which a man was supposed 
to know  before;  v. g. a  triangle hath three sides, or 
saffron is yellow.  And thjs  is  no  farther  tolerable, 
than where a man goes  to explain his  terms to one 
who is supposed or declares himself not to understand 
him :  and then it teaches only the signification of that 
word, and the use of that sign. 
§ 8. We  can know then thi  truth oftwo  no  real 
sorts  of  propositions  with  perfect  cer-  knowledge. 
tainty; the one  is, of  those  trifling  pro- 
positions  which  have  a  certainty in them, but it is 
only  a  verbal  certainty, but not  instructive.  And, 
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secondly, we can know the truth, and so may be cer- 
tain in  propositions,  which  affirm something  of  an- 
other, which is a necessary consequence of its precise 
complex idea, but not conta,ined in it :  as that the ex- 
ternal angle of all triangles  is bigger than either of 
the opposite  internal  angles; which  relation of the 
outward  angle  to either  of  the  opposite  internal 
angles making no part of the complex idea  signified 
by the name triangle, this  is  a  real truth, and con- 
veys with it instructive real knowledge. 
General  $ 9. We having little  no knowledge 
nroDositions  of what combinations there be of simple  . . 
concerning  ideas existing together in substances, but  -  - 
substances  by our senses, we  cannot  make  any uni- 
are often 
trifling.  versa1  certain  propositions  concerning 
them,  any farther  than  our  nominal  es- 
sences lead us :  which being to a very few and incon- 
siderable truths, in respect of those which depend on 
their real constitutions, the general propositions that 
are made  about  substances, if  they arc:  certain, are 
for  the most  part but trifling;  and if they are in- 
structive, are uncertain, and such  as we  can have no 
knowledge of their real truth, how  much soever con- 
stant  observation  and  analogy may assist  our judg- 
ment in guessing.  I-Ience it comes to pass,  that one 
may  often  meet  with very  clear  and  coherent  dis- 
courses, that amount yet to nothing.  For it is plain, 
that names of substantial beings, as well as others, as 
far as they have relative significations affixed to them, 
may, with great truth,  be joined  negatively and af- 
firmatively in propositions, as their relative definitions 
make them fit to be so joined; and propositions consist- 
ing of such  terms, may, with  the same  clearness, be 
deduced one  frorn  another, as  those that convey the 
most real truths :  and all this,  without any knowledge 
of the nature or reality of things existing without us. 
By this method  one may  make  demonstrations  and 
undoubted propositions in words, ancl yet thereby ad- 
vance  not  oiie jot 111 the  knowledge  of thc trutll of 
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things ;  v. g. he that having  learnt  these  following 
words,  with their ordinary mutually relative accepta- 
tions annexed to them ;  v. g. substance, man, animal, 
form,  soul, vegetative,  sensitive, rational,  may make 
several undoubted  propositions  about the soul, with- 
out knowing at all what the soul really is:  and of 
this sort, a  man may find  an infinite  number of pro- 
positions,  reasonings,  and  conclusions,  in  books  of 
metaphysics,  school-divinity, and some sort of natural 
philosophy ; and,  after  all,  know  as little  of  God, 
spirits, or bodies, as he did  before he set out. 
8  lo.  He that ]lath  liberty to define,  And why. 
i. e. to determine the signification of his 
names  of  substances  (as  certainly  every  one  does 
in effect, who  niakes them  stand for  his  own  ideas) 
and  makes their  significations at a  venture,  taking 
them froin  his  own or  other men's  fancies, and not 
from  an examination  or  inquiry into the  nature of 
things themselves ; may, with little trouble,  demon- 
strate them one of another, according to those several 
respects and mutual relations he has given them one 
to  another; wherein,  however  things  agree  or  dis- 
agree in their own nature, he needs mind nothing but 
liis own  notions, with  the names  he  hath bestowed 
upon them :  but thereby no  more increases  his  own 
knowledge,  than  he  does  his  riches, who, taking  a 
bag of counters, calls one in a certain place a pound, 
another in another place a  shilling, and a third in a 
third  place  a  penny;  and  so  proceeding,  may  un- 
doubtedly reckon right, and cast up a great sum, ac- 
cording to his  counters  so placed, and standing  for 
more or less as he pleases, without  being  one jot the 
richer, or without even knowing how much  a pound, 
shilling, or penny is,  but only  that one  is contained 
in  the  other  twenty  times,  and  contains  the other 
twelve :  which a man may also do in the signification 
of words,  by making them, in respect  of one another, 
more, or less, or equally comprehensive. 
$11.  Though  yet concerningmost words  Thirdly, 
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using words  used in discourses, equally argumentative 
is  and controversial, there  is  this  more  to 
trifling  with 
them.  be complained of, which  is the worst sort 
of trifling,  and which  sets us yet  farther 
from  the certainty of  knowledge we  hope to attain 
by them, or find  in them ;  viz. that most writers  are 
so  far from  instructing us  in  the nature  and know- 
ledge  of things, that they use their words loosely and 
uncertainly, and do not, by using them constantly and 
steadily in  the same  significations, make  plain  and 
clear deductions of words one from another, and make 
their discourses coherent  and clear (how little soever 
they were  instructive) ; which were  not  difficult  to 
do,  did they  not find it convenient to shelter  their 
ignorance or obstinacy under the obscurity and per- 
plexeclness of their terms :  to which, perhaps, inadver- 
tency and ill custom do in many men much contribute. 
Marks of  § 12. To conclude ; barely verbal pro- 
verbal pro-  positions may be known by these following 
positions :  marks : 
1. Predica-  First, all propositions, wherein two abs- 
tion in  tract terms are affirmed  one  of  another, 
tract.  are  barely  about  the  signification  of 
sounds.  For since no  abstract idea can be the same 
with  any other but itself, when  its abstract name  is 
affirmed of any other term, it can signify no more but 
this, that it may or ought to be called by that name, 
or that these two names signify the same idea.  Thus 
should any one say, that parsimony is frugality, that 
gratitude  is justice,  that this or that action is or  is 
not temperate; however  specious these and the like 
propositions  may at  first  sight  seem,  yet when  we 
come to press  them, and examine  nicely what  they 
contain, we shall find that it all amounts to nothing 
but the signification of those terms. 
2. A part of  $13.  Secondly, all propositions wherein 
the defini-  a  part of  the  complex  idea,  which  any 
tion pre-  term stands for, is predicated of that term, 
dicated of  are only verbal ; v. g.  to say that gold is 
any term.  a  metal  or  heavy.  And  thus  all  pro- 
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positions, wherein more  comprehensive words, called 
genera, are affirmed of subordinate or  less  compre- 
hensive,  called  species,  or  individuals,  are  barely 
verbal. 
When by these two  rules we  have  examined the 
propositions that make up the discourses we ordinarily 
meet with  both  in  and out of  books, we  shall, per- 
haps, find that a greater part of them, than is usually 
suspected, are purely about the signification of words 
and contain nothing  in  them  but the  use  and  ap- 
plication of these signs. 
This,  I  think,  I may  lay  down  for  an infallible 
rule, that wherever the distinct idea any word stands 
for is not known  and considered,  and something not 
contained in the idea is not  affirmed or denied of it; 
there our thoughts stick wholly  in  sounds,  and are 
able to attain no real truth or falsehood.  This, per- 
haps, if well  heeded,  might  save  us a  great deal of 
useless amusement and dispute, and very much shorten 
our trouble and wandering, in the search of real and 
true knowledge. 
CHAPTER IX. 
Of  our Knowledge of Existence. 
§ 1. HITHERTO  we have only considered  Ge,l,r,,  cer- 
the essences of  things, which  being  only  tainproposi- 
abstract ideas,  and thereby removed  in  tions con- 
our  thoughts  from  particular  existence  :ernnot  ex- 
(that being the proper  operation  of the 
istence. 
mind,  in abstraction,  to consider  an idea  under  no 
other existence, but what it has in the understanding) 
gives us no knowledge of real existence at  all.  Where 
by the way we  may take notice, that universal  pro- 
positions, ofwhose truth or falsehood we can have cer- 
tain knowledge,  concern not existence;  and  farther, 
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would not be  certain  if they were made general, are 
only  concerning  existence;  they declaring  only  the 
accidental union  or  separation of  ideas in things ex- 
isting, which, in their abstract natures, have no known 
necessary union or repugnancy. 
A  threefold  tj  2.  But, leaving the nature of proposi- 
knowledge  tions and different ways of predication to 
ofexistence.  be  considered  more  at large in another 
place, let us proceed  now to inquire  concerning our 
knowledge  of  the  existence  of things,  and  how  we 
come by it. 1-1  say then, that we have the knowledge 
of our own existence by intuition ;  of the existence of 
God by demonstration ;  and of other things by sensa- 
tion.& 
Our know-  $ 3. As for our own  existence, we per- 
fedge ofour  ceive it so plainly,  and so  certainly, that 
own exist-  it neither  needs  nor  is  capable  of  any 
ence is ill-  proof.  For nothing can be more evident 
tuitive.  to us than  our own existence ;  I think, I 
reason, I feel pleasure and pain :  can any of these be 
more evident to me  than  my  own  existence ?  If I 
doubt of all other things,  that very doubt makes me 
( 
perceive my own existence, and will not  suffer me to 
doubt of that.  For if I know I feel pain, it is evident 
I have as certain perception of  my own  existence, as 
of  the existence of  the pain  I feel:  or  if I know I 
doubt, I have  as certain perception  of the existence 
of  the  thing  doubting,  as  of  that  thought which I 
call  doubt.  Experience then  convinces  us that we 
have  an  intuitive  knowledge  of  our  own  existence, 
and an internal infallible perception that we are.  In 
every act of  sensation,  reasoning, or thinking, we are 
conscious to ourselves of our own being ; and, in this 
matter, come not  short of the highest degree of cer- 
tainty. 
CHAPTER X. 
OJour  Knowledge of the Existence  of  a God. 
Q  I. THOUGH  God has given us no in-  We arc ca- 
nate  ideas  of  himself;  though  he  Elas  pable of  ..  .  - 
stamped  no  original  characters  on  our  finowing 
minds, wherein we  may read  his  being ;  ce'tai"'~ 
that there is  yet  having  furnished  us  with  those  fa-  a God. 
culties our minds  are endowed  with, he 
hath not left himself without witness : since we have 
sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear 
proof  of  him,  as long  as  we  carry  ourselves about 
us.  Nor can we justly  complain of  our ignorance in 
this great point,  since he has  so plentifully provided 
us with the means  to discover  and know him,  so far 
as is necessary to the end of  our being, and the ereat 
concernment of our happiness.  But though this  be 
the most  obvious  truth that  reason  discovers;  and 
though its evidence  be  (if  P mistake  not)  equal to 
mathematical certainty:  yet it requires  thought and 
attention, and the mind must apply itself to a regular 
deduction of it from some part of our intuitive know- 
ledge, or else we shall be  as uncertain  and ignorant 
of this as of  other propositions,  which  are in them- 
selves capable of clear demonstration.  To  show there- 
fore that we are capable  of knowing,  i.  e. being cer- 
tain that  there is a God, and how we may come by this 
certainty,  I think we  need  go no farther  than  our- 
selves, and that undo~lbted  knowledge we have of our 
own existence. 
$ 2.p think it is beyond  question, that 
Man knows  man has a clear idea of his own being ;  he 
tllst  knows  certainly he exists, and that he is  ,,If  is. 
something]  He that can doubt, whether 
he be any thing or no, I speak  not to? no morc than 
I would  argue with pure nothing,  or  endeavour to 
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one  pretends  to be  so  sceptical  as  to deny his own 
existence (for really to doubt  of  it is manifestly im- 
possible), let him for me enjoy his beloved happiness 
of being  nothing,  until hunger,  or  some other pain, 
convince him  of  the contrary.  This then, I think, I 
may  take  for  a  troth,  which  every  one's  certain 
knowledge  assures  him  of,  beyond  the  liberty  of 
doubting, viz. that he is something that actually exists. 
He  knows  § 3.  In the next place,  man knows by 
also that no-  an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing 
thingcannot  can no more produce any real being than 
produce a 
being,  it can be equal to two right angles.  If a 
therefore  man knows  not  that non-entity,  or  the 
something  absence of  all being,  cannot be equal to 
eternal.  two  right  angles,  it  is  impossible  he 
should know any demonstration in Euclid.  If there-  - 
fore we know there is some real being, and that non- 
entity cannot produce any real being, it is an evident 
demonstration,  that from  eternity  there  has  been 
something ;  since  what was  not from  eternity had a 
beginning;  and what  had a beginning  must  be  pro- 
duced by something else. 
c 
~h~~~~~~~~l  § 4. Next, it is evident, that what had 
being must  its being  and  beginning  from  another, 
be most  must also  have  all that which  is  in, and 
powerful.  belongs  to its being,  from  another  too. 
All the powers it has must be owing to, and received 
from, the same  source.  This eternal source then of 
all being must also be the source and original  of  all 
power;  and so this  eternal being  must  be  also the 
most powerful. 
And most  § 5.  Again, a lnan finds in himself per- 
knowing.  ception  and knowledge.  We have then 
got one  step farther;  aid  we are certain 
now,  that there is  not  only  some  being,  but  some 
knowing intelliqent  being in the world. 
There was a time, then, when there was no knowing 
being, and when knowledge began to be ;  or else there 
has been  also a knowing  being from  eternity.  If it 
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be  said,  there  was  a  time  when  no  being  had  any 
knowledge, when  that eternal  being was void  of  all 
understanding; I reply,  that then  it was  impossible 
there should ever have been  any knowledge :  it being 
as impossible that things wholly void  of  knowledge, 
and operating blindly,  and  without  any perception, 
should produce a knowing being,  as it is  impossible 
that a triangle should make itself three angles bigger 
than two right ones.  For it is  as repugnant to the 
idea of senseless matter, that it should put into itself 
sense, perception,  and knowledge,  as it is repugnant 
to the idea of a triangle, that it should put into itself 
greater angles than two rieht ones. 
U 9  6.  T~US  from  the  consideration  of 
And there-  ourselves, and what we  infallibly find  in  fore God.  our own constitutions, our reason leads us 
to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth, that 
there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing 
being; which whether any one will please to call God, 
it matters not.  The thing is  evident,  and from this 
idea, duly considered, will easily be deduced all those 
other attributes which  we  ought  to ascribe  to this 
eternal  being.  If  nevertheless  any one  should  be 
found so senselessly arrogant as to suppose man alone 
knowing and wise, but yet the product  of  mere ig- 
norance and chance ;  and that all the rest of the uni- 
verse  acted  only by that blind  hap-hazard ;-I  shall 
leave with him that very rational  and emphatical re- 
buke  of  Tully, 1.  ii. De Leg. to be considered  at his 
leisure :  <-What  can be more sillily arrogant and mis- 
becoming,  than for  a  man to,  think  that he  has  a 
mind  and understanding in him,  but yet in dl the 
universe  beside  there is  no  such  thing ?YOr that 
those  things,  which  with  the utmost  stretch of  his 
reason  he can scarce  comprehend, should be  moved 
and  managed  without  any  reason  at  all ?  "Quid 
est enim  verius,  quam  neminem  esse  oportere  tam 
stulte arrogantem, ut in se mentem et rationem putet 
inesse,  in calo mundoque  non  putet?  Aut ea qua 58  Knowledge of  the Existence of a God. Book 4. 
vix  summa ingenii ratione  comprehendat,  nulla  ra- 
tione moveri putet ?" 
From what has been said, it is plain to me, we have 
a more certain knowledge of  the existence of a God, 
than of  any thing our senses  have  not immediately 
discovered to us.  Nay, I presume I may say, that we 
more certainly know that there is a God,  than that 
there is  any thing else without  us.  When 1 say we 
know, I mean  there is  such a knowledge within  our 
reach, which we cannot miss, if we will but apply our 
minds to that, as we do to several other inquiries. 
Our idea of  $7. How far the idea of a most perfect 
a most per-  being,  which  a  man  may  frame  in  his 
feet being  mind, does or does not prove the existence 
not the sole 
proof ofa  of a God, I will  not here examine.  For 
God.  in  the different make  of  men's  tempers 
and application of  their  thoughts,  some  arguments 
prevail more on  one,  and  some on  another,  for  the 
confirmation  of  the same  truth.  But yet,  I  think, 
this I may say,  that it is  an ill way  of  establishing 
this  truth,  and silencing  atheists,  to lay the whole 
stress of  so  important a point  as this  upon that sole 
foundation ;  and take some men's  having that idea of 
God in their minds (for it is evident some  men have 
none,  and some worse  than  none, and the most very 
different) for the only proof of  a deity :  and out of an 
over-fondness of  that darling invention cashier, or at 
least  endeavour  to  invalidate  all other  arguments, 
and  forbid  us  to hearken to those  proofs,  as being 
weak or  fallacious, which  our own existence and the 
sensible  parts of  the  universe  offer  so  clearly  and 
cogently to our thoughts,  that I deem  it impossible 
for a considering man to withstand them.  For I judge 
it as certain  and clear a truth,  as can  any where be 
delivered, that the invisible things of God  are clearly 
seen from the creation of the world, being understood 
by the things that are made, even  his  eternal power 
and  Godhead.  Though our  own being furnishes us, 
as I have  sllowc,  with an evirier~t  ancl  incontestable 
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proof of a deity,-and  I believe nobody can avoid the 
cogency of  it, who will  but as carefully attend to it, 
as to any other demonstration of so many parts;-yet 
this being so fundamental a truth, and of  that conse- 
quence, that all religion and genuine morality depend 
thereon,  I doubt not  but I shall be forgiven  by my 
reader, if I go  over some pasts of this argument again, 
and enlarge a little more upon them. 
5 8.  There is no  truth more  evident,  something 
than that something must  be from eter-  from eter- 
nity.  I never yet heard of any one so un-  nity. 
reasonable, or that could  suppose so manifest  a con- 
tradiction, as a time wherein  there was perfectly no- 
thing:  this being  of  all absurdities the greatest, to 
imagine that pure  nothing,  the perfect negation and 
absence  of  all beings,  should  ever produce any real 
existence. 
$-It being then unavoidable for a11  rational creatures 
to conclude, that something has existed from eternity ; 
let us next see what kind of  thing that must be. $- 
$ 9.  There are but two sorts of beings  Two sorts of  in  the world,  that  man  knows  or  con-  beings, 
ceives.  cogitative 
First, such as are purely material, with-  and incOgi- 
out sense,  perception,  or thought, as the  tative. 
clippings of our beards, and parings of our nails. 
Secondly, sensible, thinking, perceiving beings, such 
as  we  find  ourselves to be,  which,  if  you  please,  we 
will hereafter call cogitative and incogitative beings ; 
which to our present purpose, if for nothing else, are, 
perhaps, better terms than material and inimaterial. 
$ 10. If then there must be something 
incogita-  eternal, let us  see what  sort  of  beiug it  tive beillg 
must be.  And to that, it is very obvious  cannot  pro- 
to reason,  that it must  necessarily  be a  ;zi::O- 
cogitative being.  For it is as impossible to 
conceive,  that ever  bare  incogitative  matter should 
produce a thinking intelligent  being, as that nothing 
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parcel of matter eternal, great or small, we shall find 
it, in itself, able  to produce nothing.  For example ; 
let us suppose the matter of the next pebble we meet 
with eternal, closely united,  and the parts firmly at 
rest together;  if  there were  no  other being  in the 
world,  must  it not eternally  remain  so,  a  dead in- 
active  lump  ?  Is it possible  to  conceive  it can add 
motion to itself, being purely matter,  or produce any 
thing ?  &Matter, then,  by  its  own  strength, cannot 
produce in itself  so  much  as motion : the motion it 
has must  also be from  eternity,  or else be produced 
and added to matter by some other being more power- 
ful than mattei,  matter,  as  is  evident,  having not 
power to produce  motion in itself.  But let us  sup- 
pose  motion  eternal  too;  yet  matter,  incogitative 
matter and motion,  whatever changes  it might pro- 
duce of figure and bulk, could never produce thought : 
knowledge  will still be as far beyond  the power of 
motion  and matter to produce,  as matter is beyond 
the power of nothing or non-entity  to produce.  And 
I  appeal to every one's  own  thoughts,  whether  he 
cannot  as easily  conceive  matter  produced  by  no- 
thing,  as thought to  be  produced  by  pure matter, 
when before  there was  no  such thing as thought, or 
an intelligent  being  existing ?  Divide matter into 
as minute  parts  as you  will  (which  we  are apt to 
imagine a  sort of  spiritualizing, or making a think- 
ing thing of  it); vary the figure and motion of it as 
much as you please ; a globe,  cube,  cone,  prism, cy- 
linder,  &c.  whose  diameters  are  about  1000000th 
part  of  a  pry *,  will  operate  no  otherwise  upon 
other bodies of proportionable bulk,  than those of an 
* A gry is -;, of a line, a line  of an inch, an inch  of a phi- 
losophical  foot,  a  philosophical  foot  + of  a  pendulum,  whose 
diadroms,  in  the  latitude  of  45  degrees,  are  each  equal to one 
second of time or ,\  of a minute.  I have  affectedly made use OF 
this measure here, and  the parts of it,  under a decimal division, 
with names to them ;  because, I think, it would be of general con- 
venience,  that this should be thf: common measure, in the com- 
monwealth of letters. 
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inch or foot diameter;  and you may as rationally ex- 
pect to produce  sense, thought, and knowledge,  by 
putting together, in a certain figure and motion, gross 
particles  of  matter,  as  by  those  that  are  the very 
minutest  that  do  any  where  exist.  They  knock, 
impel, and resist  one another, just  as the greater do, 
and that is  all they can do.  So that if we will sup- 
pose nothing first, or eternal ;  matter can never begin 
to be:  if  we  suppose bare  matter, without  motion, 
eternal; motion can never begin to be :  if we suppose 
only matter and motion first, or eternal ;  thought can 
never begin to be.  For it is impossible  to conceive 
that matter,  either  with  or  without  motion,  could 
have  originally in and  from itself  sense,  perception, 
and knowledge ; as is evident  from hence, that then 
sense, perception, and knowledge must be a property 
eternally inseparable  from  matter and every particle 
of it.  Not to add that though our general or specific 
conception  of  matter makes  us  speak  of  it  as  one 
thing,  yet  really  all  matter  is  not  one  individual 
thing, neither is there any such thing existing as one 
material being,  or one  single  body that we know  or 
can  conceive.  And  therefore  if  matter  were  the 
eternal first cogitative  being, there would not be one 
eternal infinite cogitative being,  but an infinite num- 
ber of eternal finite cogitative beings, independent one 
of  another, of  limited  force  and  distinct  thoughts, 
which could never produce that order, harmony, and 
beauty which are to be found in nature.  Since there- 
fore whatsoever is the first eternal being must neees- 
sarily  be cogitative;  and whatsoever  is  first  of  all 
things  must  necessarily  contain  in  it and  actually 
have, at least,  all the perfections  that can ever  after 
exist ; nor can it ever give to another any perfection 
that it hath not, either actually in itself, or at least in 
a higher degree;  it necessarily follows,  that the first 
eternal being cannot be matter. 
$  11.  If rherefore it be  evident,  that  Therefore 
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been an  eternity,  it is also as evident,  that that 
eternal  something must  necessarily be  a cogita- 
tive being :  for it is as impossible that in- 
cogitative matter should produce  a cogitative being, 
as that nothing, or the negation of  all being, should 
produce a positive being or matter. 
$12. Though this discovery of the necessary exist- 
ence of an eternal mind does sufficiently lead us into 
the knowledge of  God; since it will hence follow, that 
a11  other knowing beings that have a beginning must 
depend on him, and have no other ways of knowledge, 
or  extent of  power,  than what  he  gives  them;  and 
therefore if he made those, he made  also the less ex- 
cellent  pieces  of  this universe,  all inanimate beings, 
whereby his omniscience, power,  and providence will 
be established, and a11 his other attributes necessarily 
follow:  yet to clear up this  a  little  farther, we will 
see what doubts can be raised  against it. 
Whether  $13. First, perhaps it will be said, that 
material  though it be as clear as demonstration can 
or no.  make it, that there must be an eternal be- 
ing, and that being must also be knowing ;  yet it does 
not follow, but that thinking being may also be ma- 
terial.  Let it be  so;  it equally still  follows,  that 
there is  a  God.  For  if  there  be  an eternal, omni- 
scient, omnipotent being,  it is certain that there is a 
God, whether you imagine  that being to be materiat 
or  no.  But herein, I suppose,  lies  the  danger  and 
deceit  of  that  supposition : there  being  no  way  to 
avoid  the  demonstration,  that  there  is  an  eternal 
knowing  being,  men,  devoted to matter, would will- 
ingly have it granted, that this knowing being is ma- 
terial ; and then  letting slide out of  their minds,  or 
the discourse, the demonstration whereby an eternal 
knowing being was proved necessarily to exist, would 
argue all to be matter, and so deny a God, that is, an 
eternal cogitativc being ;  whereby they are so far from 
establishing, that they destroy their  own  hypothesis. 
For if there can  be, in  their  opinion,  eternal matter, 
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witl~out  any eternal cogitative being,  they manifestly 
separate matter and thinking, and suppose no neces- 
sary connexion of the one with the other, and so esta- 
blish  the necessity  of  an eternal  spirit,  but  not  of 
matter ; since  it has  been  proved  already,  that  an 
eternal cogitative being is unavoidably to be granted. 
Now  if  thinking  and matter may be  separated,  the 
eternal existence of matter will  not  follow from  the 
eternal existence of  a cogitative being, and they sup- 
pose it to no purpose. 
5  14.  But now let us suppose thev can 
satisfy  themselves  or  oth&,  thatd this  Not mate- 
eternal thinking being is material.  rial,  cause  1.  every  Be- 
First, I would ask them, Whether they  particle of 
imagine, that all matter, everv  article of  matter is not 
matter, thinks ?  This, I supp&e, they will 
scarce say; since then there would be as many eternal 
thinking beings  as there are particles of  matter, and 
so an infinity of gods.  And yet if they will not allow 
matter as matter, that is every particle of matter to be 
as well cogitative as extended, they will have as hard 
a task to make out to their  own reasons a cogitative 
being  out of incogitative particles,  as  an  extended 
being out of unextended parts, if I may so speak. 
$ 15.  Secondly, if  all matter does not  2. One par- 
think, I next ask, "  Whether it be only one  ticle  alone 
atom that does so?"  This has as many ab-  of matter 
surdities as the other ;  for then this atom  cannot .be 
of matter must he alone eternal or not.  If  cog~tatlve. 
this alone be  eternal, then this alone, by its powerful 
thought or will, made all the rest of matter.  And so 
we have the creation of matter by a powerful thought, 
which is that the materialists stick at.  For if they sup- 
pose one single thinking atom to have produced all the 
rest of matter, they cannot ascribe that pre-eminency 
to it upoil any other account than that of its thinking, 
the only wpposcd  difference.  But allow it to be by 
some othcr  way,  which  is  above  our conception,  it 
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their great maxim, ex nihilo niljit. If it be said, that all 
the rest of matter is equally eternal, as that thinking 
atom, it will be to say any thing at pleasure,  though 
ever so absurd:  for to suppose all matter eternal, and 
yet one small particle  in knowledge  and power  in- 
finitely  above  all the rest,  is  without  any the least 
appearance of reason to frame an hypothesis.  Every 
partide of  matter,  as  matter,  is  capable  of  all  the 
same figures and motions  of  any other; and I chal- 
lenge any one, in his thoughts, to add any thing else 
to one above another. 
3. A system  9 16. If then neither one peculiar atom 
ofincogita-  alone can be this eternal thinking being ; 
tive matter  nor  all matter as matter,  i. e.  every par- 
cannot be  ticle of matter, can be it ;  it only remains, 
cogitative.  that it is some certain system of  matter 
duly put together, that is this thinking eternal being. 
This is  that, which, I imagine, is that notion which 
men are aptest to have of God, who would have him a 
material  being,  as most readily suggested to  them, 
by the ordinary conceit they have of  themselves, and 
other men, which  they take to be  material thinking 
beings.  But this imagination, however more natural, 
is no less absurd  than the other; for to suppose the 
eternal thinking being to be nothing else but a com- 
position of particles of matter, each whereof is incogi- 
tative, is to ascribe all the wisdom and knowledge of 
that eternal being only to the juxta-position  of parts ; 
than which  nothing  can  be more  absurd.  For un- 
thinking particles  of  matter,  however  put together, 
can have nothing thereby added to them,  but a new 
relation  of  position,  which  it  is  impossible  should 
give thought and knowledge to them. 
§ 17. But farther, this corporeal system 
Whether in  either has  all its parts at rest,  or it is a 
motion or 
at rest.  certain  motion  of  the parts wherein  its 
thinking  consists.  If it be  perfectly at 
rest,  it is  but one  lump, and so  can have no privi- 
leges above one atom. 
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If it be the motion of its parts on which its thinking 
depends, all the thoughts there must be unavoidably 
accidental and limited; since all the particles that by 
motion  cause thought,  being  each  of  them in  itself 
without any thought, cannot regulate its own motions, 
much less be regulated by the thought of the whole ; 
since that thought is not the cause of motion (for then 
it must be antecedent to it, and so without it) but the 
consequence of it, whereby freedom, power, choice, and 
all rational and wise thinking or acting, will be quite 
taken away:  so that such a thinking being will be no 
better nor wiser than pure blind  matter; since to re- 
solve all into the accidental unguided motions of blind 
matter,  or into thought depending on unguided  rno- 
tions of blind matter,  is the same thing ; not to men- 
tion the narrowness of  such thoughts and knowledge 
that must depend on the motion of  such parts.  I3ut 
there needs no  enumeration of  any more  absurdities 
and impossibilities in this hypothesis (however full of 
them it be) than that before-mentioned ;  since let this 
thinking system be all, or a part of the matter of the 
universe, it is impossible that any one particle should 
either know its own or the rnotion of any other particle, 
or the whole know the motion of every particle ; and 
so  regulate its own thoughts  or motions,  or indccd 
have ny  thought resulting- from such motion. 
9 18. Others would  have matter to be  Matter not 
eternal, notwithstanding that they allow  CO-eternal 
an eternal,  cogitative, imnlateria.1 being.  with an eter- 
This, though it take not away the being  ""I  mi"d. 
of a  God, vet since it denies one  and  the first great 
piece of hi;workmanship,  the creation, let us coGider 
it a little.  Matter must be allowed  eternal.  Why ? 
because you cannot conceive how it can be made out of 
nothing.  Why do you not also think yourself etcrnal ? 
You will  answer,  perhaps,  because  about twenty or 
forty years since you began to be.  But if I ask you 
what  that you is,  which  began  then  to be,  you can 
scarce tell me.  The matter, whereof  you arc madc, 
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began  not  then to be; for  if  it did,  then it is  not 
eternal:  but it began to be  put together in such a 
fashion  and frame as makes up your body;  but yet 
that frame of  particles  is not you,  it makes not that 
thinking thing you  are ; (for I have  now to do with 
one who allows an eternal, immaterial, thinking being, 
but would have unthinking matter eternal too) there- 
fore when did that thinking thing begin  to be? If it 
did never  begin to be,  then  have you  always been a 
thinking thing from eternity ;  the absurdity whereof 
I need not confute, till I meet with one who is so void 
of  understanding  as to own it.  If therefore you can 
allow a thinking thing to be made out of nothing (as 
a11  things that are not eternal must be) why also can 
you not allow  it possible  for a material  being  to be 
made out of nothing, by an equal power, but that you 
have the experience of the one in view,  and not of the 
other ?  though,  when  well  considered,  creation  of  a 
spirit will  be found to require no less power than the 
creation of matter.  Nay, possibly, if we would eman- 
cipate  ourselves  from vulgar notions,  and raise  our 
thoughts as far as they would  reach, to a closer con- 
templation of things, we might be able to aim at  sonle 
dim and seeming conception how matter might at first 
be  made,  and begin  to exist by  the power  of  that 
eternal first being : but to give beginning and being 
to a spirit, would be found a more inconceivable effect 
of  omnipotent power.  But,  this  being what would 
perhaps  lead  us  too  far  from  the notions  on  which 
the philosophy now in the world is built, it would not 
be pardonable to deviate so far from them ; or to in- 
quire, so far as grammar itself would authorise,  if the 
comrrlon settled opinion opposes it :  especially in thig 
place, where the received doctrine serves well enough 
to our  present  purpose,  and leaves  this past doubt, 
that the creation or beginning of  any one  substance 
out of  nothing being once  admitted,  the creation of 
all other, hut the Creator himself, may, with the same 
casc,  be supposed. 
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fj  19. But you will eay, is it not impossible to admit 
of the making any thing out of nothing, since we can- 
not possibly conceive it ?  I answer, No : 1, Because it 
is  not reasonable to deny  the power  of  an  infinite 
being,  because we cannot comprehend its operations. 
We do not deny other effects  upon this ground, be 
cause we cannot possibly conceive the manner of  their 
production.  We cannot conceive how any thing but 
impulse of body can move body ;  and yet that is not 
a  reason  sufficient  to make  us  deny  it impossible, 
against the constant experience we have of  it in our- 
selves, in all our voluntary  motions,  which  are pro- 
duced in us only by the free action or thought of our 
own minds ;  and are not, nor can be the effects of the 
impulse  or  determination  of  the  motion  of  blind 
matter in or upon  our own bodies ;  for then it could 
not be  in our power  or choice to alter it.  For ex- 
ample : my right hand writes, whilst my left hand is 
still.  What causes  rest in  one,  a,nd motion  in  the 
other ?  Nothing but my will, a thought of  my mind ; 
my thought only changing, the right hand rests, and 
the left hand moves.  This is matter of  fact,  which 
cannot be denied.  Explain this, and make it intelligi- 
ble,  and then  the next  step will  be  to understand 
creation.  For the giving a new determination to the 
motion of the animal spirits (which some make use of 
to explain voluntary motion) clears not the difficulty 
one: jot: to alter the determination of motion being in 
this case no easier nor less than to give motion itself; 
since  the  new  determination  given  to the  animal 
spirits must be either immediately by thought,  or by 
some other body put in their way by thought, which 
was  not  in their  way  before,  and so  must  owe  its 
motion to thought ;  either of  which leaves voluntary 
motion  as  unintelligible  as  it  was  before.  In  the 
mean time it is an overvaluing ourselves to reduce all 
to the narrow measure of  our capacities,  and to con- 
clude all things impossible to be done, whose mnnncr 
of doing exceeds our comyrehel~sion. This is to ixlaki: 
F 2 68  Knowledge of  the  Book 4. 
our comprehension infinite, or God finite, when what 
we can do is liniited to what we  can conceive of it. 
If you do not understand the operations of  your own 
finite mind,  that thinking  thing within you,  do not 
deem  it  strange,  that  you  cannot  comprehend  the 
operations  of  that eternal infinite  mind,  who  made 
and governs all things, and whom the heaven of  hea- 
vens cannot contain. 
CHAPTER XI. 
Of  our Knowledge of  the Existence of  other Things. 
It  is to be  5 1. THE  knowledge of  our own being 
liad only by  we have by intuition.  The existence of a 
sensation.  God  reason  clearly makes known  to us, 
as has been shown. 
The knowledge of the existence of any other thing 
we  can have only by sensation : for  there being  no 
necessary connexion of real existence with any idea a 
man hath in his  memory, nor of  any other existence 
but that of God, with the existence of  any particular 
man; no particular man  can know  the existence of 
any other being, but only when by actual operating 
upon  him it makes itself  perceived  by him.  For the 
having  the idea  of  any thing in our mind  no more 
proves  the existence of  that thing,  than the picture 
of  a  man evidences  his  being  in  the world,  or  the 
visions of a dream make thereby a true history. 
6  2.  It  is therefore the actual receiving 
Instance,  of &leas  from without, that gives us noti&  whiteness of 
pqer.  of the existence of other things, and makes 
us know that something doth exist at  that 
time without us, which causes thatrdea in us, though 
pcrhaps wc neither know nor consider how it does it: 
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for it takes not from the certainty of our senses, and 
the ideas we receive  by them,  that we know not the 
manner  wherein  they  are produced:  v. g. whilst  I 
write  this,  I have,  by  the psper affecting my  eyes, 
that idea produced  in my mind  which, whatever ob- 
ject causes, I call white;  by which I know that that 
quality or accident (i. e. whose appearance before my 
eyes always causes that idea)  doth really  exist,  and 
hath a being without me.  And of  this, the greatest 
assurance I can possibly  have,  and to which  my fa- 
culties can attain, is the testimony of  my eyes, which 
are the proper and sole judges of this thing,whose testi- 
mony I have reason to rely on as so certain, that I can 
no more doubt, whilst I write this, that I see white and 
black,  and that something really  exists,  that causes 
that sensation in me,  than that I write  or move my 
hand:  which is a certainty as great as human nature 
is capable  of,  concerning the existence of  any thing 
but a man's  self alone, and of God. 
9 3. The notice we have  by our senses  Tllis thougl,  of the existing of things without us, though  ,,,_ 
it be not altogether so certain as our in-  tain as de- 
tuitive knowledge,  or  the deductions of  monstration, 
our reason, empgied about the clear abs-  :';,,"d"&,!'i- 
tract ideas of  our own  minds:  yet it is  ledge,  and 
an assurance  that deserves  the name of  the 
knowledge.  If we persuade ourselves that  existence of 
things with-  our faculties act and inform us right, con-  out us. 
cerning the existence of those objects that 
affect them, it cannot  pass  for  an ill-grounded  con- 
fidence:  for  I  think  nobody  can,  in  earnest,  be  so 
sceptical as to be uncertain of  the existence of  those 
things which he sees and feels.  At least, he that can 
doubt so  far (whatever  he may  have  with  his  own 
thoughts) will  never have any controversy  with me; 
since he can never be  sure I say any thing contrary 
to his own  opinion.  As  to myself,  I think  God has 
given me assurance enough of  the existence of  things 
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produce in myself  both pleasure  and pain,  which is 
one great concernment of my present state.  This is 
certain, the confidence that our faculties do not herein 
deceive us is the greatest assurance we are capable of, 
concerning the existence of material beings.  For we 
cannot act any thing, but by our faculties ;  nor talk 
of  knowledge  itself,  but by the helps of those facul- 
ties,  which are fitted to apprehend even what know- 
ledge is.  Rut besides  the assurance  we  have  from 
our senses themselves, that they do not err in the in- 
formation they give  us,  of  the existence  of  things 
without us, when  they are affected by  them, we  are 
farther confirmed  in this assurance by other concur- 
rent reasons. 
1. Because  $ 4. First, it is plain those perceptions 
we cannot  are  produced  in  us  by  exterior  causes 
have them  affecting our senses;  because thove  that 
but by the  want the organs of  any sense never can 
the  have  the  ideas  belonging  to that sense 
senses.  produced  in  their  minds.  This  is  too 
evident to be doubted : and therefore we cannot but 
be  assured that they come in by the organs of that 
sense, and no other way.  The organs themselves,  it 
is plain, do not produce them ;  for then the eyes of a 
man in the dark would  produce colours, and his nose 
smell roses in the winter :  but we see nobody gets the 
relish of a pine-apple till he goes to the Indies, where 
it is, and tastes it. 
2. Because  $ 5. Secondly, because sometimes I find 
an idea from  that I cannot avoid the having those ideas 
actual sen-  produced in my mind.  For though when 
sation, a'rd  my eyes  are shut, or windows fast, I can 
another 
from ,,_  at pleasure recal to my mind the ideas of 
mory, are  light, or the sun, which former sensations 
very distinct  had Iodged  in my  memory ; so I can at 
perceptions.  pleasure  lay by that idea,  and take into 
my view that of the smell of a rose, or taste of sugar. 
But,  if  I  turn my  cyes  at noon  towards  the sun, I 
cannot avoid  the ideas, which the light,  or sun, then 
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produces in me.  So that there is a manifest difference 
between the ideas laid up in my memory (over which, 
if  they were there only, I should have constantly the 
same power to dispose of  them,  and  lay them by at 
pleasure) and those which force themselves upon me, 
and I cannot  avoid  having.  And  therefore  it must 
needs be some exterior cause, and the brisk acting of 
some objects without me, whose efficacy I cannot re- 
sist,  that produces  those  ideas in  my  mind,  whether 
I  will  or  no.  Besides,  there  is  nobody  who  doth 
not  perceive  the difference  in  himself  between  con- 
templating  the sun, as he hath the idea  of  it in his 
memory, and actually looking upon it; of  which two 
his perception is so distinct, that few of  his ideas are 
more distinguishable  one  from another.  And  there- 
fore  he  hath  certain  knowledge,  that  they  are not 
both memory, or the actions of  his mind, and fancies 
only within him ; but that actual seeing hath a cause 
without. 
$ 6.  Thirdly, add to this, that many of  3. pleaSur, 
those ideas are produced in us with pain,  or pain 
which  afterwards  we  remember  without  companies  the least offence.  Thus the pain of heat  sen- 
or  cold,  when  the idea  of  it is  revived  sation, ac- 
in  our minds.  gives  us  no  disturbance;  companies 
which,  when fert,  was very  troublesome,  ~~~n?~~  y; 
and  is  again,  when  actually  repeated;  ideas 
which  is  occasioned  by  the disorder the  without the 
external object causes in our bodies when  external 
applied to it.  And we remember the pains 
of hunger, thirst, or the head-ache,  without any pain 
at all;  which would  either never  disturb us,  or else 
constantly do it,  as often  as we  thought of  it, were 
there nothing more but ideas floating in our minds, 
and appearances entertaining our fancies, without the 
real  existence  of  things  affecting  us  from  abroad. 
The same  may  be  said  of  pleasure,  accompanying 
several actual sensations : and  though mathematical 
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amining them by diagrams gives great credit to the 
evidence  of  our  sight,  and  seems  to give  it a  cer- 
tainty  approaching  to that of  demonstration  itself. 
For  it would  be  very  strange  that  a  man  should 
allow it for an undeniable truth, that two angles of a 
figure,  which he measures  by  lines and  angles of  a 
diagram, slwuld be bigger  one than the other; and 
yet doubt of  the existence of  those lines and angles, 
which  by  looking  on  he makes  use  of  to measure 
that by. 
tj 7. Fourthly, our senses in many cases 
4. Our senses 
assist one  bear witness to the truth of  each other's 
anotl~er's  report,  concerning  the existence  of  sen- 
testimony of  sible things without us.  He that sees a 
exist-  fire  may,lf he doubt whether  it be apy 
ence of out- 
ward things.  thing more than a bare fancy, feel it too ; 
and be convinced, bv ~uttin~  his hand in  '  .'A 
it :  which certainly could  never be  put Ynto such ex- 
quisite pain by a  bare idea or  phantom, unless  that 
the pain  be a fancy too ; which yet he cannot,  when 
the burn is well, by raising the idea of  it, bring upon 
himself again. 
Thus I  see, whilst  I  write this,  I can change the 
appearance of the paper :  and by designing the letters 
tell  beforehand  what  new  idea  it shall exhibit  the 
very next moment, by barely drawing my pen over it: 
which will neither appear (let me fancy as much as I 
will) if  my hands stand still; or though I move  my 
pen,  if my eyes be shut : nor, when those characters 
are once made on the paper, cah I choose afterwards 
but see them as they are; that is,  have the ideas of 
such letters as I have made.  Whence it is manifest, 
that they are not barely the sport and play of my own 
imagination, when I find that the characters, that were 
made at the pleasure of my own thought, do not obey 
thein; nor yet cease to be, whenever I shall fancy it; 
but continue  to affect the senses constantly  and re- 
gularly, according to the figures I made them.  To 
which  if we  will  add,  that the sight  of  those  shall, 
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from another man, draw such  sounds as I beforehand 
design they shall stand for ;  there will be little reason 
left to doubt that those words I write do really exist 
without me, when they cause a long series of regular 
sounds to affect my ears, which could not be the effect 
of my imagination, nor could my memory retain them 
in that order. 
8.  But yet,  if  after all this  any one  This cer- 
will  be  so  sceptical  as  to  distrust  his  tainty is as 
senses, and to affirm that all we  see and  great as our 
hear, feel and taste, think and do, during 
our whole being, is but the series and de- 
luding appearances of  a long dream, whereof there is 
no  reality ;  and therefore will  question the existence 
of all things, or our knowledge of any thing ; I must 
desire him to consider, that, if a11 be a dream, then he 
iloth but dream  that he makes  the question;  and so 
it is not much matter that a waking  man should an- 
swer him.  But yet, if he pleases, he may dream that 
I make  him  this answer, that the certainty of  things 
existing in rerum natura, when nre have the testimony 
of our senses for it,  is not only as great as our frame 
can  attain  to,  but  as our condition needs.  For our 
faculties being suited not to the full extent of  being, 
nor to a perfect,  clear,  comprehensive knowledge of 
things  free  from all doubt and  scruple;  but to the 
preservation  of  us,  in  whom  they  are,  and  accom- 
modated to the use of life ;  they serve to our purpose 
well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of 
those things which are convenient or  inconvenient to 
us.  For he that sees a candle burning, and hath ex- 
perimented the force of its flame, by putting his finger 
in it, will little doubt that this is something existing 
without him, which  does him harm, and puts him to 
great pain : which is assurance enough, when no man 
requires greater certainty to govern his actions by than 
what is as certain as his  actions themselves.  And  if 
our dreamer pleases to try whether the glowing heat 
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in a drowsy man's  fancy ;  by putting his hand into it 
he may perhaps be wakened  into a  certainty greater 
than he could  wish,  that it is something  more than 
bare  imagination.  So that this evidence is as great 
as we can desire,  being as certain to us as our plea- 
sure or pain, i. e.  happiness or misery ;  beyond which 
we have no concernment, either of knowing or being. 
Such an assurance of  the existence of things without 
us is sufficient to direct us in the attaining the good, 
and avoiding the evil, which is caused by them ;  which 
is the important concernment we have of being made 
acquainted with them. 
B~~ reachev  $ 9.  In fine, then,  when our senses do 
no farther  actually convey  into our understandings 
than actual  any idea, we  cannot but be satisfied that 
sensation.  there doth something at that time really 
exist without us,  which  doth  affect  our senses,  and 
by  them  give  notice  of  itself  to  our  apprehensive 
faculties,  and actually produce  that idea  which  we 
then  perceive:  and  we  cannot  so  far distrust their 
testimony as to doubt, that such collections of simple 
ideas, as we have observed by our senses to be united 
together,  do really exist together.  But this know- 
ledge extends as far as the present testimony of  our 
senses, employed about particular objects that do then 
affect them, and no farther.  For if I saw such a col- 
lection of  simple ideas,  as is wont  to be called man, 
existing together one minute since, and am now alone, 
I  cannot  be  certain that the same  man exists now, 
since there is no necessary connexion of his existence 
a minute since with his existence now :  by a thousand 
ways he may cease to be, since I had the testimony of 
my senses for his existence.  And if I cannot be cer- 
tain that the man I saw last to-day is now in being, 
I can less  be  certain  that he is  SO  who  hath been 
longer removed  from my senses, and I have not seen 
since ycstcrday, or siircc the last year :  and much less 
can I be certain of  the existence of men that I never 
saw.  A~id  therefore  though  it  be  highly  probable 
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that millions  of  men do now exist,  yet,  whilst  I am 
alone  writing  this,  I  have  not  that  certainty  of  it 
which we  strictly call knowledge;  though the great 
likelihood of  it puts me past doubt, and it be reason- 
able for me  to do several  things upon  the confidence 
that there are men (and men also of my acquaintance, 
with whom I have to do) now in the world:  but this 
is but probability, not knowledge. 
$  10. Whereby  yet  we  may  observe,  ~~ll~  to ex- 
how  foolish  and vain a thing it is for  a  pectdemon- 
man of a narrow knowledge, who having  stration in 
reason  given  him  to  judge  of  the  dif-  every 
ferent evidence and probability of  things,  and to be 
swayed accordingly,-how  vain, I say,  it is to expect 
demonstration and certainty in things not capable of 
it,  and refuse  assent  to very  rational  propositions, 
and act contrary to very plain  and  clear truths,  be- 
cause they cannot be made out so evident as to sur- 
mount  every  the least  (I will  not  say  reason  but) 
pretence of doubting.  He that in the ordinary affairs 
of  life would  admit of  nothing  but direct plain  de- 
monstration, would  be sure of  nothing in this worlcl, 
but of perishing quickly.  The wholesomeness of  his 
meat or drink would  not give him  reason to venture 
on it: and I would fain know, what it is he could do 
upon  such grounds as are capable of  no  doubt, no 
objection. 
5 11. As when our senses are actually  past  ,,;st- 
employed  about any object, we do know  ence is 
that it does exist ; so by our memory we  known by 
may  be  assured,  that heretofore  things  menlory. 
that affected  our senses  have existed.  And  thus we 
have knowledge of the past existence of several things 
whereof, our -senses having informed us, our memories 
still retain the ideas ;  and of this we are past a11  doubt, 
so  long as we  remember  well.  But this knowledge 
also reaches no farther than our senses have formerly 
assured us.  Thus seeing water at  this instant, it is an 
unquestionable truth to me that water doth exist: and 
remembering that I  saw it yesterday, it \\rill  also be 7  6  Knowledge  of  the  Book 4. 
always true,  and, as long as my  memory retains it, 
always  an undoubted proposition  to me,  that water 
did  exist the 10th of  July, 1688,  as it will  also  be 
equally true, that a certain number of very fine colours 
did exist, which at  the same time I saw upon a bubble 
of that water :  but, being now quite out of  the sight 
both of the water and bubbles  too, it is no more  cer- 
tainly known to me that the water doth now  exist, 
than  that the bubbles  or  colours  therein  do so;-  it 
being  no more  necessary that water should exist to- 
day, because it existed yesterday, than that the colours 
or bubbles  exist to-day  because  they existed yester- 
day; though it be exceedingly much more probable, 
because water hath been observed to continue long in 
existence, but bubbles and the colours on them quickly 
cease to be. 
The exist-  $  12.  What ideas  we  have  of  spirits, 
ence of  and how we come by them, I have already 
not  shown.  But though we have those ideas 
in  our minds,  and know  we  have  them 
there, the having the ideas of  spirits does not make 
us know that any such things do exist without us,  or 
that there are any finite spirits, or any other spiritual 
beings but the eternal God.  We have ground from 
revelation,  and several other reasons,  to believe with 
assurance  that  there  are  such  creatures : but,  our 
senses not  being  able to discover them, we want the 
means  of  knowing  their  particular  existences.  For 
we. can no  more  know,  that there  are finite  spirits 
really  existing, by  the idea we have  of  such beings 
in our minds, than by the ideas any one has of  fairies, 
or centaurs, he can come to know that things answer- 
ing those ideas do really exist. 
And  therefore  concerning  the  existence  of  finite 
spirits, as well  as  several other things, we  must con- 
tent ourselves  with  the  evidence  of  faith;  but uni- 
versal certain propositions concerning this matter are 
beyond our reach.  For however true it may be, v. g. 
that all  the intelligent spirits that God ever  created 
do still exist; yet  it can  never  make a part of  our 
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certain knowledge.  These and the like propositions 
we may assent to as highly probable,  but are not, I 
fear, in this state capable of  knowing.  We are not 
then to put others upon demonstrating, nor ourselves 
upon  search of  universal  certainty,  in  all those  mat- 
ters, wherein we  are not capable of  any other know- 
ledge,  but what  our  senses  give  us  in this  or  that 
particular. 
$ 13. By which it appears, that there 
are two sorts of propositions,  1. There is  Pr,positions 
one  sort of  propositions  concerning  the  concerning 
existence of any thing answerable to such  existence 
an idea :  as having the idea of an elephant,  :;?Ow- 
phenix, motion, or an angel, in my mind, 
the first and natural inquiry is, Whether such a thing 
does any where exist ?  And this knowledge is only of 
particulars.  No  existence  of  any thing without  us, 
but only of  God, can certainly be known farther thau 
our senses inform us.  2. There is another sort of pro- 
positions, wherein  is expressed the agreement or dis- 
cgreement of our abstract ideas, and their dependence 
on one another.  Such propositions may be universal 
and certain.  So having the idea of  God and myself, 
of  fear and obedience,  I cannot but be sure that God 
is to be feared and obeyed by me :  and this proposition 
will  be certain, concerning man in general,  if I have 
made an abstract idea of  such a species, whereof I am 
one particular.  But yet this proposition, how certain 
soever, that men ought to fear and obey God, proves 
not to me the existence of men in the world, but will 
be true of all such creatures, whenever they do exist: 
which certainty of  such general propositions depends 
on the agreement  or disagreement  to be discovered 
in those abstract ideas. 
$ 14. In the  former  case,  our  know-  Andgeneml 
ledge is the consequence of  the existence  prupu~tions 
of  things  producing  ideas in  our  minds  concerning 
by our senses :  in the latter, knowledge is  abstract 
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what they will) that are in our minds producing there 
general certain propositions.  Many of these are called 
aterne veritates, and all of  them indeed are so ;  not 
from being written all or any of them in the minds of 
all men,  or that they were any of  them propositions 
in one's  mind till he,  having got the abstract ideas, 
joined  or separated them by affirmation  or negation. 
But wheresoever we  can suppose such a creature as 
man  is,  endowed  with  such  faculties,  and  thereby 
furnished with such ideas as we have, we must con- 
clude, he must needs, when he applies his thoughts to 
the consideration of  his ideas, know the truth of  cer- 
tain propositions, that will arise from the agreement or 
disagreement which he will perceive in his own ideas. 
Such propositions are therefore called eternal truths, 
not  because  they  are eternal propositions  actually 
formed, and antecedent to the understanding, that at 
any  time  makes  them;  nor  because  they  are im- 
printed on the mind from  any patterns, that are any 
where out of  the mind,  and existed before:  but be- 
cause being once made about abstract ideas, so as to 
be true, they will, whenever they can be supposed to 
be made  again  at any time  past  or  to come,  by  a 
mind  having  those  ideas,  always  actually  be  true. 
For names being  supposed  to stand perpetually  for 
the same ideas, and the same ideas having immutably 
the same habitudes one to another; propositions con- 
cerning any abstract ideas,  that are once  true, must 
needs be eternal verities. 
CHAPTER XII. 
Of  the Improvement of  our Knowledge. 
Knowledge  $ 1.  IT having  been  the common  re- 
is not from  ceived  opiilion  amongst  men  of  letters, 
maxims*  that maxims were  the foundation  of  all 
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knowledge ;  and that the sciences were each of  them 
built  upon  certain prrecognita, from whence  the un- 
derstanding was to take its rise, rcnd  by which  it was 
to conduct  itself,  in its inquiries into the matters be- 
longing to that science ;  the beaten road of the schools 
has been, to lay down in the beginning  one  or more 
general propositions,  as foundations whereon to  build 
the knowledge  that was  to be  had of  that subject. 
These doctrines,  thus laid  down  for  foundations  of 
any science, were called  principles, as the beginnings 
from  which  we  must  set out,  and  look  no  farther 
backwards in our inquiries,  as we  have  already ob- 
served. 
$ 2. One thing which  might probably 
give an occasion to this way of proceeding  (The occa- 
sion of that  in other  sciences, was (as  I suppose) the  opinion.) 
good success it seemed to have in mathe- 
matics, wherein men being observed to attain a great 
certainty of  knowledge,  these  sciences  came by pre- 
eminence to be called  ~a~,jpa~.crta,  and Mcieiclr,  learning, 
or things learned, thoroughly learned, as having of all 
others the greatest certainty, clearness, and evidence 
in them. 
§  3.  But if  any one will  consider,  he 
Butfromthe  will  (I guess)  find,  that the  great  ad-  ,,paring 
vancement  and  certainty  of  real know-  clear and 
ledge,  which  men  arriJed  to  in  these  distinct 
ideas.  sciences, was  not  owing to the influence 
of  these  principles,  nor  derived  from  any  peculiar 
advantage they received  from  two or  three general 
maxims,  laid  down in the beginning; but from  the 
clear,  distinct,  complete  ideas  their  thoughts were 
employed  about, and the relation of equality and ex- 
cess so clear between some of them, that they had an 
intuitive knowledge, and by that a way to discover it 
in others, and this witllout the help of those maxims. 
For I ask, is it not possible for a young lad to know, 
that his whole  body is  bigger  than his  little  finger, 
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than a part; nor  be  assured of it, till he has learned 
that maxim ?  Or cannot a country wench know, that 
having  received  a  shilling from  one  that owes  her 
three, and  shilling also from another that owes  her 
three, the remaining debts in each of their  hands  are 
equal ?  Cannot she know this, I say, unless she fetch 
the certainty of it from  this maxim,  that if you take 
equals from  equals,  the remainder will  be  equals, a 
maxim which possibly she never heard or thought of? 
I desire any one to consider, from what has been else- 
where said, which is known first and clearest by niost 
people, the psrticular  instance, or the general rule ; 
and which it is that gives life and birth to the other? 
These general rules are but the comparing our more 
general and abstract ideas, which are the workmall- 
ship of the mind made, and names given to them, for 
the easier despatch in its reasonings, and drawing into 
comprehensive terms, and short rules, its various  and 
multiplied  observations.  But  knowledge  began in 
the mind,  and was  founded  on  particulars;  though 
afterwards, perhaps,  no notice  be  taken  thereof:  it 
being natural for the mind  (forward  still to enlarge 
its knowledge) most attentively to lay up those gene- 
ral notions,  and make the proper use of them, which 
is to disburden the memory of  the cumbersome  load 
of  particulars.  For  I  desire  it  may  be  considered 
what more  certainty there is to a child,  or  any one, 
that his body, little finger  and all, is bigger than his 
little finger  alone,  after  you  have  given to his body 
the name whole, and to his little finger the name part, 
than he could have had before ;  or what new knowledge 
concerning  his  body  can  these  two  relative  terms 
give him,  which  he  could  not  have  without  them? 
Could he not know that his body was bigger that1 his 
little finger,  if  his  language were  yet so  imperfect, 
that he had  no  such  relative  terms  as  whole  and 
part?  I ask farther, when he has  got these  names, 
how is he more certain that his body is a whole,  and 
his little finger a part, tliari he was  or  might  be cer- 
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tain, before  he  learnt those terms, that his body was 
bigger  than his little finger ?  Any one  may as  rea- 
sonably  doubt or  deny that his little finger is a part 
of his body, as that it is less than his body.  And he 
that can doubt  whether  it be  less, will  as certainly 
doubt whether it be a part.  So that the maxim, the 
whole is bigger than a part, can never be made use of 
to prove the little finger less than the body, but when 
it is  useless, by being  brought  to convince  one of  a 
truth which he knows already.  For he that does not 
certainly  know  that any parcel  of  matter, with  an- 
other parcel  of  matter  joined  to it, is  bigger than 
either of  them  alone, will  never  be  able to know it 
by  the help  of  these  two  relative  terms whole and 
part, make of them what maxim you please. 
$ 4.  But be it in the mathematics as it 
will, whether it be clearer, that taking an  to build 
inch from a black  line of two inches, and  upon pre- 
an inch from a red line of two inches, the  carious~rin- 
remaining  parts of  the two lines will be  ciples. 
equal, or that if  you take equals from equals, the re- 
mainder will  be  equals :  which, I say, of these two is 
the clearer  and first  known, I leave it to any one to 
determine, it not  being  material to my present occa- 
sion.  That which  I have  here to do,  is to inquire, 
whethet if  it be  the readiest  way to knowledge  to 
begin with  general  maxims,  and build upon them, it 
be  yet  a  safe way to take the principles which  are 
laid  down in  any  other  science  as  unquestionable 
truths ;  and so receive them without examination, and 
adhere to them, without suffering  them to be doubted 
of, because n~athematicians  have been so happy, or so 
fair, to use none but self-evident and  undeniable.  If 
this be so,  1 know not what may not pass for truth in 
morality, what may not be introduced and proved  in 
natural philosophy. 
Let that principle of some of the philosophers, that 
all is matter, and that there is nothing else, be received 
for certain  and indubitable,  and it will be easy to be 
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seen, by the writings of some that have revived it again 
in our days, what consequences it will lead us into.  Let 
any one,  with  Polemo,  take the world;  or with the 
stoics,  the aether,  or the sun;  or with Anaximenes, 
the air, to be God ;  and what a divinity, religion, and 
worship must we needs have !  Nothing can be so dan- 
gerous as principles  thus taken up without question- 
ing or examination ;  especially if they be such as con- 
cern morality, which influence men's  lives, and give a 
bias to all their actions.  Who might not justly expect 
another  kind  of  life  in Aristippus,  who placed hap- 
piness  in bodily  pleasure;  and  in Antisthenes,  who 
made virtue sufficient to felicity? And he who, with 
Plato,  shall place beatitude in the knowledge of God, 
will have his thoughts raised  to other contemplations 
than those who look not beyond  this  spot of  earth, 
and those perishing things which  are to be had in it. 
He that,  with Archelaus,  shall lay it down as a prin- 
ciple, that right and wrong, honest and dishonest, are 
defined  only by laws,  and not  by  nature,  will  have 
other measures of  moral rectitude and pravity than 
those who take it for granted, that we are under obli- 
gations antecedent to all human constitutions.  - 
§ 5.  If  therefore  those  that pass  for 
This  is no  principles are not certain (which we must  certain way 
to truth.  have some way to know,  that we may be 
able to distinguish them from  those that 
are doubtful) but are only made so to us by our blind 
assent, we are liable to be misled by them ;  and instead 
of being guided into truth, we shall, by principles,  be 
only confi~med  in mistake and error. 
8 6. But since  the knowledge  of  the 
But to  'Om-  certainty of  principles,  as  well  as of  all  pare clear 
complete  other truths,  depends only upon the per- 
ideas under  ception we have of the agreement or dis- 
steady  agreement of our ideas, the way to improve  names.  our knowledge is not, I am sure,  blindly, 
and with an implicit faith, to receive and swallow prin- 
ciples ;  but is, I think, to get and fix in our minds clear, 
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distinct, and complete ideas,  as far as they are to be 
had,  and  annex to them proper and constant names. 
And thus,  perhaps,  without any other principles  but 
barely considering those ideas, and by comparing them 
one with  another,  finding  their  agreement  and dis- 
agreement,  and their several relations and habitudes; 
we shall get more true and clear knowledge,  by the 
conduct of this one rule, than by taking up principles, 
and thereby  putting  our minds  into the disposal of 
others. 
$ 7. We  must, therefore, if we will pro-  The true  ceed as reason advises, adapt our methods  ,,,,thod  of 
of  inquiry to the nature of  the ideas we  advancing 
examine,  and the truth we search after.  knowledge 
General and certain truths are  only founded  ~c~{i~~;ur 
in the habitudes and relations of  abstract  abstract 
ideas.  A  sagacious  and  methodical  ap-  ideas. 
plication of our thoughts,  for the finding 
out these relations, is the only way to discover  all that 
can be put with truth and certainty concerning them 
into general propositions.  By what steps we  are to 
proceed  in these is to be learned in the schools of thc 
mathematicians, who from very plain and easy begin- 
nings,  by gentle  degrees,  and  a  continued  chain  of 
reasonings,  proceed  to the discovery and demonstra- 
tion of truths that appear at first sight beyond humnn 
capacity.  The art of finding  proofs, and the admirable 
methods they have invented  for the singling out, and 
laying  in order,  those  intermediate  ideas  that  de- 
monstratively show the equality or  inequality of  un- 
applicable quantities,  is that which  has  carried them 
SO far,  and produced such wonderful and unexpected 
discoveries : but whether ~omething  like this, in respect 
of other ideas, as well as those of magnitude, may not 
in time be  found out,  I will  not determine.  This, I 
think, I may say, that if other ideas, that are the real 
as well as nominal essences of their species, were pur- 
sued in  the  way  familiar  to mathematicians,  they 
would  carry our thoughts  farther,  and  with greater 
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evidence and clearness,  than possibly we  are apt to 
imagine. 
BY  which  5 8.  This gave  me  the confidence  to 
rl~orality  advance that conjecture, which I suggest, 
also may be  chap. iii. viz.  that morality is  capable of 
demonstration,  as  well  as  mathematics. 
For the ideas that ethics are conversant  about being 
all real essences,  and such  as I imagine have a dis- 
coverable connexion and agreement one with another; 
so far as we  can find their  habitudes  and relations, 
so far we shall be possessed of certain real and general 
truths : and I doubt not but,  if  a right method were 
taken,  a  great part of  morality might be made out 
with that clearness, that could leave, to a considering 
man,  no more reason to doubt than he could have to 
doubt  of  the truth of  propositions  in  mathematics, 
which have been demonstrated to him.  .. - 
But Itnow-  $ 9.  In our search after the knowledge 
of bo-  of  substances, our want of  ideas, that are 
dies is to be  suitable  to  such  a  way  of  proceeding, 
improve(1  obliges  us  to  a  quite  different  method. 
only by 
experience.  wevadvance  not-here,  as  in  the  other 
(where our abstract ideas are real as well 
as llomillal essences) by contemplating our ideas, and 
considering their relations and correspondencies ;  that 
helps us very little,  for  the reasons  that,  in another 
place, we have at large set down. )  By which I think 
it is  evident,  that substances  afford  matter  of  very 
a ion  little general knowledge ;  and the bare contempl  t' 
of  their abstract  ideas will  carry us but a very little 
way in the search of truth and certainty. kWhat then 
are we to do for the improvement  of  our knowledge 
in  substantial beings? Here we  are to take a quite 
contrary course ;  the want of ideas of their real essences 
sends us from our own thoughts to the things them- 
selves, as they exist.  Experience here must teach me 
what reason cannot;  and it is by trying alone that I 
can certainly know what other qualities co-exist with 
those of my complex idea,  rj. g. whether that yellow, 
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heavy, fusible body,  I call gold,  be malleable or no ; 
which experience  (which way  ever it grove  in  that 
particular body I examine) makes me not certain that 
it is so  in  all,  or  any other  yellow,  heavy,  fusible 
bodies, but that which I have tried.  Because it is no 
consequence one  way or the other from my  complex 
idea; the  necessity  or  inconsistence  of  malleability 
bath no visible connexion with the combination of that 
colour,  weight,  and fusibility in  any body.  What T 
have said here of  the nominal  essence of  gold,  sup- 
posed  to  consist  of  a  body  of  such  a  determinate 
colour,  weight,  and fusibility,  will  hold true if mal- 
leableness,  fixedness,  and solubility in aqua regia be 
added to it.  Our reasonings  from  these  ideas will 
carry us but a  little way  in the certain discovery of 
the other properties in those masses of matter wherein 
all these are to be found.  Because the other properties 
of  such bodies  depending not on  these,  but on that 
unknown real essence on which these also depencl, we 
cannot by them discover the rest ;  we can go no farther 
than the simple ideas of our nominal essence will carry 
us,  which  is  very little beyond  themselves;  and so 
afford  us but very sparingly any  certain,  universal, 
and useful truths.  For upon trial having found that 
particular piece (and all others of that colour, weight, 
and fusibility that I  ever  tried) malleable,  that also 
makes  now perhaps a  part of  my complex idea, part 
of  my nominal  essence  of  gold:  whereby  though 
I make my complex  idea,  to which  I affix the name 
gold, to consist of more simple ideas than before ;  yet 
still, it not containing the real essence of  any species 
of bodies, it helps me not certainly to know  (I say to 
know,  perhaps it may  to conjecture)  the  other  rc- 
maining  properties  of  that body,  farther  than  they 
have a visible connexion with some or all of the simple 
ideas that make  up my  nominal  essence.  For  ex- 
ample,  I  cannot  be certain  from  this  complex  idca 
whether gold be fixed or no ;  because, as before, there: 
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covered  betwixt  a  complex  idea  of  a  body  yellow, 
heavy,  fusible,  malleable,-betwixt  these, I say,  and 
fixedness ;  so that I may certainly know, that in what- 
soever body these are found,  there  fixedness  is sure 
to be.  Here again for assurance I must apply myself 
to experience ; as far as that reaches I may have cer- 
tain knowledge,  but no farther. 
This may  $ lo. I deny not but a man, accustomed 
procure us  to rational and regular experiments, shall 
conve-  be able to see  farther into the nature of 
nience, not  bodies, and guess righter at their yet un- 
science.  known  properties,  than  one  that is  a 
stranger to them : but yet, as I have said, this is but 
judgment and opinion,  not knowledge and certainty. 
This way of getting and improving our knowledge in 
substances  only  by experience and history, which  is 
all that the weakness of our faculties in this state of 
mediocrity which we are in  in this world  can attain 
to, makes me  suspect that natural philosophy is not 
capable  of  being  made  a  science.  We are  able, I 
imagine, to reach very little general knowledge con- 
cerning the species  of  bodies, and  their  several pro- 
perties.  &Experiments  and historical observations we 
may have,  from which we  may  draw advantages  of 
ease  and health,  and thereby increase  our  stock of 
conveniencies for this life ;  but beyond  this I fear our 
talents reach not, nor are our faculties, as I guess, able 
to advance. 6. 
We are  $11. From whence it is obvious to con- 
fitted for  clude,  that  since  our  faculties  are  not 
moral know-  fitted to  ~enetrate  into the internal fabric 
ledge and  and  reaf  essences  of  bodies ; but  yet 
natural im- 
provements.  plainly discover to us the being of a God, 
and the knowledge  of ourselves, enough 
to lead us into a full and cle;  discovery of bur duty 
and great concernment ;  it will become us, as rational 
creatures,  to employ those  faculties we  have  about 
what they are most adapted to, and follow the direc- 
tion  of nature, where  it seems  to  point  us  out the 
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way.  For it is rational to conclude that our proper 
employment lies in those  inquiries,  and  in  that sort 
of knowledge, which is most suited to our natural ca- 
pacities, and carries in it our greatest interest, i.  e. the 
condition of our eternal estate.  Hence I think I may 
conclude,  that morality  is  the  proper  science  and 
business of mankind in general ;  (who are both con- 
cerned and fitted to search out their summum bonum) 
as several arts, conversant  about several parts of na- 
ture, are the lot and private talent of particular men, 
for the common use of human life, and their own par- 
ticular  subsistence  in  this  world.  Of  what conse- 
quence the discovery of one natural body, and its pro- 
perties,  may be  to human life, the whole great con- 
tinent  of  America  is a  convincing instance ;  whose 
ignorance  in  useful  arts,  and want  of  the  greatest 
part of  the  conveniencies  of  life, in  a country that 
abounded with  all sorts of  natural plenty,  I  think, 
may be  attributed  to their  ignorance  of  what  was 
to be  found  in  a very  ordinary despicable  stone,  I 
mean the  mineral  of  iron.  And whatever we think 
of our parts or improvements in this part of the world, 
where knowledge  and plenty seem  to vie with each 
other ;  yet to  any one,  that will  seriously reflect on 
it, I suppose it will appear past doubt, that were the 
use of  iron lost among  us, we  should  in a  few ages 
be unavoidably reduced  to the wants and ignorance 
of the ancient  savage Americans, whose  natural  en- 
dowments  and provisions come no way short of those 
of the most flourishing and polite nations.  So that he 
who first made known the use  of that contemptible 
mineral  may  be truly styled the father  of  arts,  and 
author of plenty. 
12. I would not therefore be thought  But  to disesteem or dissuade the study of na-  beware of 
ture.  I readily agree the contemplation  hypotheses 
of his works gives us  occasion to admire,  and  wrong 
revere,  and glorify their Author : and, if  princ~ples. 
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kind than the monuments of exemplary  charity, that 
have at so great charge been  raised  by the founders 
of hospitals and alms-houses.  He that first invented 
printing, discovered  the use of the compass, or made 
public the virtue and right use of kin kina, did more 
for the propagation of knowledge, for the supply and 
increase  of useful commodities, and saved more from 
the grave, than those who built colleges, work-houses, 
and hospitals.  All  that I  would  say  is,  that  we 
should not be too forwardly possessed with  the  opi- 
nion or  expectation of  knowledge, where it is not to 
be had, or by  ways that will not attain to it; that we 
should not take doubtful systems for complete sciences, 
nor unintelligible  notions  for  scientifical demonstra- 
tions.  In the knowledge of bodies, we must be  con- 
tent to glean what we can  from  particular  experi- 
ments;  since  we cannot,  from  a  discovery  of  their 
real essences, grasp at a  time whole  sheaves, and in 
bundles  comprehend  the  nature  and  properties  of 
whole species  together.  Where our inquiry is  con- 
cerning co-existence, or repugnancy to co-exist, which 
by contemplation  of  our  ideas we  cannot  discover ; 
there  experience,  observation,  and  natural  history 
must give us by our senses,  and by retail, an insight 
into corporeal substances.  The knowledge of bodies 
we must get by our senses, warily employed in taking 
notice  of  their  qualities and  operations  on  one an- 
other:  and what we hope to know of separate spirits 
in this world we  must, I think,  expect only from re- 
velation.  He that shall  consider  how little  general 
maxims,  pr.ecarious  principles,  and  hypotheses  laid 
down at pleasure, have promoted true knowledge,  or 
helped to satisfy the inquiries of  rational  men after 
real improvements,-how  little, I say, the setting out 
at that end  has, for  many ages together,  advanced 
men's  progress towards the knowledge of natural phi- 
losophy,-will  think we have  reason  to thank those, 
who in this latter age have taken another course, and 
have  trod  out to us,  though  not an  easier  way  to 
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learned ignorance, yet a surer way to profitable kaow- 
ledge. 
S 13. Not that we may not, to explain  The true 
any ph~nomena  of  nature,  make  use  of  use of' by- 
any probable hypothesis whatsoever :  hy-  potheses- 
potheses,  if  they  are well  made,  are at least  great 
helps to the memory,  and often direct us to new dis- 
coveries.  But my  meaning  is,  that we  should  not 
take up any one  too  hastily (which  the mind, that 
would always penetrate into the causes of things, and 
have principles  to rest on, is very apt to do) till we 
have very well examined particulars, and made several 
experiments in  that thing which  we would  explain 
by our hypothesis, and see whether  it will  agree  to 
them all; whether our principles will  carry us quite 
through,  and not  be  as  inconsistent  with  one  phae- 
nomenon of nature as they seem to accommodate and 
explain another.  And at least that we take care, that 
the name of principles  deceive us riot, nor impose on 
us,  by making us  receive that for an unquestionable 
truth which is  really at best but a very doubtful eon- 
jecture, such as are most  (I had  almost  said  all) of 
the hypotheses in natural philosophy. 
$ 14. But whether  natural philosophy 
clear  be capable of certainty or no, the ways to  distinct 
enlarge our knowledge, as far as we  are  ideas wit6 
capable, seem to me, in short, to be these  settled 
two :  names, and 
-. 
the finding  First, the first is to get and settle in our  of those 
minds determined ideas of  those  things,  which show 
whereof  we  have  general  or  spec%;  their  agree- 
ment or dis-  names ;  at least,  so many of them  as we 
agreement,  would consider  and improve  our  know-  arc theways 
ledge in,  or reason  about.  And  if  they  to enlarge 
be specific ideas of substances, we should 
endeavour also to make them as complete 
as we  can, whereby I mean  that we  should  put to- 
gether as many simple ideas as,  being constantly ob- 
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and each  of  those  simple  ideas,  which  are  the in- 
gredients of  our complex  ones,  should  be  clear  and 
distinct in our minds.  For it being evident, that our 
knowledge  cannot  exceed our ideas; as  far as they 
are either imperfect, confused, or obscure, we cannot 
expect to have certain,. perfect, or clear knowledge. 
Secondly, the other is the art of  finding  out those 
intermediate ideas which may show us the agreement 
or repugnancy of other ideas, which cannot be imme- 
diately compared. 
Mathema-  $ 15. That these two (and not  the re- 
tics an in-  lying  on  maxims,  and  drawing  conse- 
stance of it.  quences from some general propositions) 
are the right methods of improving our knowledge in 
the ideas of other modes besides those of quantity, the 
consideration  of  mathematical knowledge will  easily 
inform  us.  Where first we  shall find, that  he that 
has  not a perfect  and clear idea  of those  angles or 
figures  of  which  he  desires to know  any  thing,  is 
utterly thereby incapable  of  any  knowledge  about 
them.  Suppose but a man not to have a perfect exact 
idea of a right angle, a scalenum, or trapezium ;  and 
there is  nothing  more  certain  than that  he will  in 
vain  seek  any demonstration about them.  Farther, 
it is  evident, that it was  not the influence  of those 
maxims,  which  are taken  for  principles  in  mathe- 
matics, that have led the masters of that science into 
those wonderful  discoveries  they have made.  Let a 
man of  good  parts know  all  the  maxims  generally 
made use  of  in mathematics  ever  so perfectly,  and 
contemplate their extent and  consequences  as much 
as he pleases,  he will  by their  assistancepI1 suppose, 
scarce ever come to know that the square of the hy- 
gothenuse in a right-angled  triangle  is equal to the 
squares of the two other sides.  The knowledge, that 
the whole  is equal to  all its parts, and  if you  take 
equals from equals, the remainder will  be equal, &c. 
helped  him  not,  I presume,  to this  demonstration: 
and a marl  may, I think, pore long enough on  those 
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axioms without ever  seeing one jot  the more of ma- 
thematical truths.  They have been discovered by the 
thoughts otherwise  applied : the mind  had other ob- 
jects,  other views  before  it, far different  from  those 
maxims, when it first got the knowledge of such truths 
in mathematics, which  men well  enough acquainted 
with  those  received  axioms,  but ignorant  of  their 
method  who  first  made  these  demonstrations,  can 
never  sufficiently admire.  And  who  knows  what 
methods, to enlarge our knowledge in other parts of 
science, may hereafter be invented, answering that of 
algebra in mathematics, which so readily finds out the 
ideas of quantities to measure others by; whose equa- 
lity or proportion we could otherwise very hardly, or, 
perhaps, never come to know ? 
CHAPTER XIII. 
Some farther  Considerations  concerning  our  I<?zow- 
ledge. 
5 1. OUR  knowledge, as in other things, 
Our know-  so in this, has so great a conformity with  ledge partly 
our sight, that it is neither wholly neces-  necessary, 
sary, nor wholly voluntary.  If  our know-  partly vo- 
ledge were altogether necessary, all men's  luntary. 
knowledge would  not only be  alike,  but every man 
would  know  all  that  is  knowable:  and  if  it were 
wholly voluntary, some men so little regard or value 
it, that they would have extreme little, or none at all. 
Men that have senses cannot choose but receive some 
ideas by them; and if they have  memory,  they can- 
not  but retain  some  of them;  and if they have  any 
distinguishing faculty, cannot but perceive the agree- 
ment or disagreement of  some of  them one with  an- 
other: as  he that has  eyes, if he will  open them by 
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ference in them.  But though s  man, with  his  eyes 
open in the light, cannot but see ;  yet there be certain 
objects, which  he may choose whether  he will  t,urn 
his eyes to ; there may be in  his  reach a  book  con- 
taining pictures and discourses, capable to delight or 
instruct him, which yet he may never  have  the will 
to open, never take the pains to look into. 
Theapplica-  § 8.  There is also  another thing  in a 
tionvolun-  mans power,  and that is, though he turns 
tary; but we  his eyes sometimes towards an object, yet 
know as 
things  he may choose whether he will  curiously 
not as we  survey it, and with an intent application 
please.  endeavour to observe  accurately all that 
is visible in it.  But yet what  he does see, he cannot 
see otherwise than he does.  It depends  not  on his 
will to see that black which  appears yellow ;  nor to 
persuade himself, that what actually scalds him feels 
cold.  The earth will not appear painted with flowers, 
nor the fields covered  with verdure, whenever he has 
a mind to it : in the cold winter he cannot  help see- 
ing it white and hoary, if he will  look abroad.  Just 
thus is it with our understanding ;  all that is voluntary 
in  our knowledge is  the  employing or withholding 
any of our faculties from this or that sort of  objects, 
and a more or less accurate survey of them: but, they 
being employed, our will hath no power to determine 
the knowledge of the mind one way or other ;  that is 
done only by the  objects  themselves, as far as they 
are clearly  discovered.  And  therefore,  as  far  as 
men's  senses  are  conversant  about external objects, 
the mind  cannot  but receive  those  ideas which  are 
presented by them, and be informed  of the existence 
of things  without : and so far as men's  thoughts con- 
verse with their  own  determined  ideas,  they cannot 
but, in some  measure, observe  the  agreement or dis- 
agreement that is to be found amongst some of them, 
which is so far knowledge : and if they have  names 
for those ideas which they have thus considered, they 
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must  needs  be  assured  of  the truth  of  those  pro- 
positions which  express  that agreement or disagree- 
ment they perceive in them, and be undoubtedly con- 
vinced of those truths.  For what a man sees, he can- 
not  but see;  and what he perceives,  he  cannot but 
know that he perceives. 
8 3. Thus he that has got the ideas of 
in  numbers, and hath taken the pains to com-  numbers. 
pare one,  two,  and three to six,  cannot 
choose but know that they are equal :  he that hath got 
the idea of a triangle, and found the ways to measure 
its angles,  and their  magnitudes,  is  certain  that its 
three angles are equal to two right ones ;  and can as 
little doubt  of  that  as  of  this truth,  '<  that it is im- 
possible for the same thing to be, and not to be."  -. 
-  He also that hnth the ixea of an intelli-  In 
gent, but frail and weak  being,  made by 
and depending on another, who is eternal. 
omnipitent, Grfeetly wise and good, will as certainly 
know that man is to honour, fear,  and obey God, as 
that the sun  shines when  he sees it.  For if he hath 
but the ideas of two such beings in his mind, and will 
turn his  thoughts  that way,  and consider  them, he 
will as certainly find that the inferior,  finite, and de- 
pendent, is under an obligation to obey the supreme 
and infinite, as he is certain to find that three, four, 
and seven are less than fifteen, if he will consider and 
compute those numbers; nor can he be surer in a clear 
morning that the sun is risen,  if he will but open his 
eyes, and turn them that way.  But yet these truths, 
being ever so certaih, ever so clear,  he may be  igno- 
rant of either, or all of them, who will never take the 
pains to employ his faculties, as he  should, to inform 
himself about them. Judgment.  Book 4. 
CHAPTER  XIV. 
0  f  Judgment. 
Our know-  § 1. THE  understanding faculties being 
ledge being  given to man, not barely for speculation, 
short, we  but also for the conduct of  his life, man 
want some-  would be  at a great loss if he had nothing 
thing else.  to direct him but what has  the certainty 
of  true knowledge.  For that being very  short and 
scanty, as we have seen,  he would be often utterly in 
the dark, and, in most of  the actions of  his life, per- 
fectly at a stand, had he nothing to guide him in the 
absence of clear and certain knowledge.  He  that will 
not eat till he has demonstration that it will nourish 
him,-he  that will not stir till he infallibly knows the 
business he goes about will succeed,-will  have little 
else to do but to sit still and perish. 
What use to  Q 2.  Therefore  as  God  has  set some 
be made of  things in broad day-light ;  as he has given 
this twilight  us some certain knowledg?,  though limited 
state.  to a few things in comparlson, probably, as 
a taste of what intellectual creatures are capable of, to 
excite in us a desire and endeavour after a better state ; 
so in the greatest part of our concernments he has af- 
forded us only the twilight, as I may so say, of probabi- 
lity;  suitable, I presume, to that state of mediocrity 
and probationership he has been pleased to place us in 
here;  wherein, to check our over-confidence and pre- 
sumption, we might by cvery day's experience be made 
. 
sensible of our short-sightedness and liableness to error; 
the sense whereof might be a constant admonition to  us, 
to spend the days of this our pilgrimage with industry 
and care,  in  the search  and following  of  that way, 
which might lead us to a state of  greater perfection :  it 
being highly rational to think,  even  were  revelation 
silent in  the case,  that  as  men  employ those talents 
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God has given  them here,  they shall accordingly  re- 
ceive their rewards at the close of the day, when their 
sun  shall  set,  and  night  shall put an  end to their 
labours. 
9 3.  The faculty which God has given  Judgment 
man to supply the want of clear and cer-  supplies the 
tain knowledge, in cases where that can-  of 
not  be  had,  is  judgment;  whereby  the  knowledge. 
mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree,  or, which 
is the same, any proposition to be true or false, with- 
out perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs. 
The mind  sometimes  exercises this judgment  out of 
necessity,  where  demonstrative  proofs  and  certain 
knowledge are not to be  had ; and sometimes out of 
laziness,  unskilfulness,  or haste,  even  where  demon- 
strative and certain proofs are to be had.  Men often 
stay not warily to examine the agreement or disagree- 
ment  of  two ideas, which  they are desirous  or con- 
cerned to know;  but, either incapable of  such atten- 
tion  as  is  requisite  in  a  long  train  of  gradations, 
or impatient  of  delay,  lightly  cast  their  eyes  on, 
or wholly pass by, the proofs ;  and so, without making 
out the demonstration, determine of the agreement or 
disagreement of two ideas as it were by aview of them 
as they are at  a distance, and take it to be the one or 
the other, as seems most  likely to them upon such a 
loose  survey.  This faculty of  the mind,  when it is 
exercised  immediately  about  things, is  called judg- 
ment ; when about truths delivered in words, is most 
commonly called assent  or dissent : which being the 
most  usual  way  wherein  the mind  has  occasion  to 
employ this faculty, I shall under these terms treat of 
it, as least liable in our language to equivocation. 
$4. Thus the  mind  has two faculties, 
is  conversant about truth and falsehood.  the presum- 
First,  knowledge, whereby it certainly  ingthings to 
perceives,  and  is  undoubtedlv  satisfied  be  with- 
out perceiu-  of, the agreement or disapeekent  of any  ins  it. 
ideas. 96  Probability .  Book 4. 
Secondly, judgment,  which is the putting ideas to- 
gether, or separating  them  from  one  another in the 
mind,  when  their certain agreement or disagreement 
is not perceived, but presumed to be so ;  which is, as 
the word  imports, taken to be  so before it certainly 
appears.  And  if  it so  unites, or  separates them,  as 
in reality things are, it is right judgment. 
CHAPTER XV. 
Of Probability. 
Probability  $  1.  As demonstration is the showing 
is  the ap-  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  two 
pearance of  ideas,  by the intervention of  one or more 
agreement  proofs, which have a constant, immutable, 
upon fallible 
proofs.  and visible  connexion  one  with another ; 
so probability is nothing but the appear- 
ance of  such  an agreement or disagreement, by the 
intervention of  proofs, whose  connexion  is  not  con- 
stant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be 
so, but is or appears for the most part to be so, and is 
enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to 
be true or false, rather than the contrary.  For exam- 
ple : in the  demonstratioll  of  it a  man perceives the 
certain immutable conliexion  there is of equality be- 
tween the three angles of a triangle, and those inter- 
mediate ones  which  are made use  of  to show their 
equality to two  right ones ;  and so by an intuitive know- 
ledge of the agreement or disagreement of  the inter- 
mediate ideas in each  step of  the progress, the whole 
series  is  continued  with  an  evidence  which  clearly 
shows the agreement  or disagreement of  those three 
angles in equality  to two  right ones : and thus he 
has  certain  knowledge  that  it  is  so.  But another 
man,  who  ncver  took  the  pains  to observe  the de- 
monstration,  hcaring a mathematician, a man of cre- 
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dit, affirm the three angles of a triangle to be equal to 
two right ones,  assents to it,  i.e. receives it for true. 
In which case the foundation  of  his assent is the pro- 
bability of the thing,  the proof being  such as for the 
most part carries truth with  it: the man  on  whose 
testimony he receivcs it not being wont to affirm any 
thing contrary to,  or besides his  knowledge,  espe- 
cially in matters  of  this  kind.  So  that that which 
causes  his  assent  to this  proposition,  that the three 
angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, that 
which makes him  take these ideas to agree, without 
knowing them to do so,  is the wonted veracity of the 
speaker in other cases, or his supposed veracity in this. 
5 a. Our knowledge, as has been shown,  11 is to sup- 
being  very  narrow,  and  we  not  happy  ply tbewant 
enough to find certain truth in every thing  of know- 
which we have occasion to consider ;  most  ledge. 
of the propositions we think, reason,  discourse, nay act 
upon, are such, as we  cannot  have undoubted know- 
ledge of their truth : yet some of them border so near 
upon certainty, that we  make  no  doubt at all about 
them ;  but assent to them as firmly, and act, according 
to that assent, as resolutely, as if they were infallibly 
demonstrated,  and that our knowledge of  them was 
perfect and certain.  But there being degrees herein 
from  the  very  neighbourhood  of  certainty  and  de 
monstration, quite down to improbability and unlike- 
ness,  even  to the confines  of  impossibility;  and also 
degrees of assent from full assurance and confidence, 
quite down to conjecture, doubt, and distrust : I shall 
come now,  (having,  as I think, found out the bounds 
of human knowledge and certainty) in the next place, 
to  consider the several degrees and grounds of probabi- 
lity, and assent or faith. 
3.  Probability is likeliness to be true,  Eei11g tl1at 
the very notation  of the word  signifying  whicll 
such a proposition, for which there be ar-  ~~$~~~~ 
guments or proofs, to make it pass or be  to bc 
received for true.  The entertainment the  true before 
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we know  mind gives to this  sort of  propositions is 
them to be  called belief,  assent,  or  opinion, which is 
so.  the admitting  or  receiving  any proposi- 
tion  for  true,  upon  arguments  or  proofs  that  are 
found to persuade  us to receive  it as true,  without 
certain knowledge that it is so.  And herein lies the 
difference  between  probability  and certainty,  faith 
and knowledge,  that in  all the parts  of  knowledge 
there is intuition ;  each immediate idea, each step has 
its visible  and certain  connexion;  in  belief,  not  so. 
That which makes me believe is something extraneous 
to the thing I believe; something not evidently joined 
on both sides to,  arid so not  manifestly showing the 
agreement or  disagreement  of  those  ideas that are 
under consideration. 
Thegrounds  $ 4. Probability, then, being to supply 
of probabi-  the defect of our knowledge, and to guide 
lity are two ;  US where that fails, is alwavs conversant 
conformity  about  propositions -whereof  we  have no 
with our 
own expe-  certainty, but only some  inducements to 
rience,  receive them for true.  The grounds of it 
or thetesti-  are, in short, these two follo6inrr : 
mony of 
others' ex-  First, the conformity of any &ing  with 
perience.  our own knowledge, observation, and ex- 
perience. 
Secondly, the testimony of others, vouching their ob- 
servation and experience.  In the testimony of others 
is to be considered, 1. The number.  2.  The integrity. 
f. The skill  of  the witnesses.  4.  The design of  the 
author, where it is  a  testimony out of a book  cited. 
5. The consistency of the parts and circumstances of 
the relation.  6.  Contrary testimonies. . 
$  5..  Probability  wanting  that  intui- 
this all  tive evidence, which infallibly determines 
the argu-  the understanding,  and  produces certain 
"ents  pro  knowledge,  the mind,  <f  it would  pro- 
and con 
ought  to be  ceed rationally,  ought to examine all the 
examined  grounds of  probability, and see how they 
before we  hake more or  less for  or against any 
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position,  before  it assents  to,  or dissents  come  to a 
from, it ; and,  upon a  due balancing  the  judgment, 
whole,  reject or receive  it with a more or  less  firm 
assent,  proportionably to  the preponderancy  of  the 
greater  grounds  of  probability  on  one  side  or  the 
other.  For example : 
If I myself see a man walk on the ice, it is past pro- 
bability, it is knowledge; but if another tells me he saw 
a man in England, in the midst of a sharp winter, walk 
upon water hardened with cold ;  this has so great con- 
formity with what is usually observed to  happen, that I 
am disposed bythe nature of the  thing itself to assent to 
it, unless some manifest suspicion attend the relation 
of that matter of fact.3But if the same thing be told to 
one born between the tropics, who never saw nor heard 
of any such thing before,  there the whole probability 
relies on testimony : and as  the relators  are more in 
number,  and of  more credit, and have no interest to 
speak contrary to the truth ; so  that matter of fact is 
like to  find more or less belief. Though to a man,whose 
experience has always been quite contrary,and who has 
never heard of any thing like it,  the most  untainted 
credit of a witness will scarce be able to find belief.  As 
it happened to a Dutch ambassador, who entertaining 
the king of  Siain with the particularities of  Holland, 
which  he  was inquisitive  after, amongst other things 
told him,  that the water in his  country would  some- 
times, in cold weather,  be  so  hard,  that men walked 
upon it, and that it would bear an elephant if he were 
there.  To which the king replied,  "  Hitherto I have 
believed the strange things you have told me, because 
I look  upon you  as a  sober fair man ; but now I am 
sure you lie." 
$ 6.  Upon thesc grounds  depends the 
probability of any proposition :  2nd as the  Tlle~being 
capable of  conformity of our knowledge, as  the cer-  great 
tairlty  of  observations,  as  the  frequency  ,;,ty. 
and coilstancy of'  experience, and the num- 
ber  and credibility  of  testimoaies,  do more  or  less 
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agree  or  disagree  with  it,  so  is  any  proposition  in 
itself more or less probable.  There is another, I con- 
fess, which, though by itself  it be  no true ground of 
probability, yet is often made use of for one, by which 
men most commonly regulate their assent, and upon 
which they pin their faith more than any thing else, 
and that is the opinion  of  others:  though there can- 
not be a  more  dangerous thing to rely on, nor more 
likely to mislead one; since there is much more false- 
hood  and  error  among men  than truth and  know- 
ledge.  And if the opinions and persuasions of others, 
whom  we  know and think  well  of,  be  a  ground  of 
assent, men have reason to  be Heathens in Japan, Ma- 
hometans in Turkey, Papists in Spain,  Protestants in 
England, and Lutherans in Sweden.  But of this wrong 
ground of assent I shall have occasion to speak more 
at large in another place. 
CHAPTER XVI. 
OJ  the  Degrees  of  Assent. 
Our assent  § 1.  THE  grounds  of  probability  we 
ought to be  have laid down in the foregoing chapter ; 
repulatedbv  as they are the foundations on which our 
th;  assent"is built,  so are they also  the mea- 
Of  pr0ba-  sure whereby its  several  degrees  are or  bility.  ought to be regulated:  onlv  we  are to 
take notice,  that whatever gFounds of probability there 
may  be,  they  yet  operate  no farther  on the mind, 
which searches after truth,  and endeavours to judge 
right, than they appear ;  at  least, in the first judgment 
or  search that the mind  makes.  I confess,  in  the 
opinions men have,  and firmly stick to, in the world, 
their assent is not a1wa.y~  from an actual view of  the 
reasons that at first prevailed with them;  it being in 
many cases almost impossible,  and in most very hard, 
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even for those who  have very admirable memories, to 
retain all the proofs  which, upon  a  due examination, 
made  them embrace  that side  of  the question.  It 
suffices  that they  have  once  with  care and fairness 
sifted the matter as far as they could,  and that  they 
have searched into all the particulars that they could 
imagine to give any light to the question, and with the 
best of their skill cast up the account upon the whole 
evidence;  and thus having once found on which side 
the probability appeared to them,  after  as  full  and 
exact an inquiry as they can make,  they lay up the 
conclusion  in their  memories  as a  truth they  have 
discovered;  and for  the future they remain satisfied 
with the testimony of  their memories,  that this is the 
opinion  that,  by the proofs  they have  once  seen  of 
it,  deserves  such  a  degree of  their  assent  as  they 
afford it. 
§ 2. This is all that the greatest part 
These can- 
of  -.  men are capable of doing, in regulating  not ,,,,,,  . -  -.  -  their  opinions  and judgments ;  unless  a  be actuaily 
man wl'll  exact of  them either to retain  in view, aid 
distinctly in their memories a11 the proofs  then we 
must con-  concerning any probable  truth, and that  tent our- 
too in the same order and regular deduc-  selves with 
tion of  consequences in which  they have  the remem- 
formerly  placed  or  seen  them,  which  ~~~~~~~~~ 
sometimes is enough to fill a large volume  ground for 
on one single question ;  or else they must  such a de- 
require a man,  for every opinion that he  gree of 
embraces, every day to examine the proofs 
-both  which are impossible.  It  is unavoidable there- 
fore that the memory be relied on in the case, and that 
men be persuaded  of  several  opinions,  whereof  the 
proofs are not actually in their thoughts ; nay, which 
perhaps they are not able actually to recal.4 Without 
this  the greatest  part  of  men  must  be  either  very 
sceptics, or change every moment, and yield themselves 
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them arguments, which, for want of memory, they are 
not able presently to answer. 
A 
The  ill con-  $ 5. I cannot but own, that men's stick- 
sequence of  ing to their past judgment,  and adhering 
this, if our  firmly  to  conclusions  formerly  made,  is 
formerjudg-  often the cause of great obstinicy in error 
merits were  and mistake.  But the fault is not that they  not rightly 
made.  rely on their memories for what they have 
before  well  judged,  but  because  they 
judged before they had well examined.  May we not 
find a great number (not  to say the greatest part) of 
men that think  they  have  formed  right judgments 
of  several  matters,  and that for no other reason but 
because they never thought otherwise ?  who  imagine 
themselves  to have judged  right  only because  they 
never questioned, never examined their own opinions? 
Which is indeed to think they judged  right because 
they never  judged  at all : and yet these of  all men 
hold  their  opinions  with the greatest stiffness ; those 
being  generally  the  most  fierce  and  firm  in  their 
tenets who have least examined them.  What we once 
know,  we  are certain  is  so ; and  we  may be secure 
that there  are no  latent proofs  undiscovered,  which 
may  overturn  our knowledge  or bring it in doubt. 
But, in matters of  probability,  it is not in every case 
we can be sure that we have all the particulars before 
us that any way concern the question ;  and that there 
is no evidence behind, and yet unseen, which may cast 
the probabiliby on  the other side,  and outweigh  all 
that at present seems to preponderate with us.  Who 
almost is there that hath the leisure,  patience,  and 
means,  to collect together all the proofs  concerning 
most of  the opinions he has,  so as safely to conclude 
that he hath a clear and full view,  and that there is 
no  more  to be  alleged  for  his  better  information? 
And yet we  are forced to determine ourselves on the 
one side or other.  The conduct of our lives,  and the 
managenlent of  our great concerns, will not bear de- 
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lay: for those depend,  for the most part,  on the de- 
termination  of  our  judgment  in  points  wherein  we 
are not capable of  certain  and  demonstrative know- 
ledge,  and wherein it is necessary for us to embrace 
the one side or the other. 
4.  Since therefore it is unavoidable to  The right 
the greatest part of men, if not all, to have  ,,,  ,fit.  is 
several  opinions  without certain and  in-  mutual ;]la- 
dubitable- proofs  of  their  truth,-and  it  rity and for- 
carries too great an imputation of  igno-  bearance. 
rance, lightness, or folly, for men to quit and renounce 
their  former  tenets  presently  upon  the offer  of  an 
argument  which  they  cannot  immediately  answer, 
and show the insufficiency  of,-it  would methinks be- 
come  all men  to maintain  peace,  and the  common 
offices of  humanity and friendship, in the diversity of 
opinions ;  since we cannot reasonably expect that any 
one  should  readily  and  obsequiously  quit  his  o~vii 
opinion, and embrace ours with a blind resignation to 
an authority  which  the  understanding  of  man  ac- 
knowledges not.  For however it may often mistake, 
it can own no other guide but reason, nor blindly sub- 
mit to the will  and dictates of  another.  If  he,  you 
would bring over to your sentiments, be one that ex- 
amines before he assents,  you must give him leave at 
his leisure to go  over the account again, and, recalling 
what is out of  his mind,  examine all the particulars, 
to see on which side the advantage lies :  and if he will 
not think our arguments of weight enough to engage 
him anew in so much pains, it is but what we often do 
ourselves in the like case ;  and we should take it amiss 
if others should prescribe to us what points we should 
study.  And if he be one who takes his opinions upon 
trust, how can we  imagine that he should  renounce 
those tenets which time and custom have so settled in 
his mind,  that he thinks them self-evident,  and of  an 
unquestionable  certainty;  or  which  he  takes  to  bc 
impressions  he has  received  from  God himself,  or 
from  men  sent by him ?  How can we  expect,  I say, 104  Degrees of  Assent.  Book 4. 
that opinions  thus settled should  be given up to the 
arguments or authority of  a  stranger or  adversary; 
especially if  there be any suspicion of  interest or de- 
sign,  as there never fails to be where men find them- 
selves ill treated? We should do well to commiserate 
our mutual ignorance,  and endeavour to remove it in 
all the gentle and fair ways of  information ;  and not 
instantly treat others ill,  as obstinate and perverse, 
because they will not renounce their own, and receive 
our opinions,  or  at least those we would  force upon 
them,  when  it is more than probable  that we are no 
less obstinate in not  embracing some of  theirs.  For 
where is the man that has incontestable evidence of the 
truth of all that he holds, or of the falsehood of  all he 
condemns;  or can say,  that he has examined ta the 
bottom all his own  or other men's  opinions ?  The ne- 
cessity  of  believing,  without  knowledge,  nay,  often 
upon  very  slight grounds,  in  this  fleeting  state of 
action and blindness we are in,  should make us more 
busy and careful  to inform  ourselves  than constrain 
others.  At least those, who have not thoroughly ex- 
amined to the bottom all their own tenets,  must con- 
fess they are unfit to prescribe to others ;  and are un- 
reasonable in imposing that as truth on other men's 
belief  which they themselves have not searched into, 
nor weighed  the  arguments of  probability on which 
they should receive or reject it.  Those who have fairly 
and truly examined, and are thereby got past doubt 
in all the doctrines they  profess  and govern them- 
selves  by,  would  have  a  juster  pretence  to require 
others to follow them :  but these are so few in number, 
and  find  so  little reason  to be  magisterial  in their 
opinions,  that nothing insolent and imperious is to be 
expected from  them : and  there is  reason  to think 
that,  if  men were better instructed themselves,  they 
would be less imposing on others. 
Probability  $ 5. But to return to the grounds of 
is either of  assent,  and the several degrees of it ;  we 
matter  are to take notice,  that the propositions 
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we receive upon inducements of probabi-  fact or spe- 
lity  are of  two sorts; either  concerning  culation. 
some particular existence,  or,  as it is usually termed, 
matter of fact, which falling under observation, is ca- 
pable of  human testimony;  or else concerning things 
which, being beyond the discovery of  our senses,  are 
not capable of any such testimony. 
S 6.  Concerning the first of  these,  viz.  Theeoncur-  particular matter of fact.  rent expe- 
First,  where any particular thing, con-  rience of all 
sonant to the constant observation of our-  men 
with ours  selves and others in the like case,  comes  produceras- 
attested by the concurrent  reports  of  all  ,ur,nce  ap- 
that mention it, we receive it as easilv. and  proaching  - 
build as firmly upon it,  as if  it we& cer-  io 
tain knowledge ;  and  we  reason  and act  ledge. 
thereupon with as little doubt as if it were perfect de- 
monstration.  Thus, if  all Englishmen, who  have  oc- 
casion  to mention it,  should  affirm  that it froze in 
England the last winter,  or that there were swallows 
seen there in the summer; I think a man could almost 
as little doubt of  it as that seven and four are eleven. 
The first, therefore,  and highest degree of probability 
is, when the general consent  of  all men,  in  all ages, 
as far as it can be known,  concurs with  a man's  con- 
stant and never-failing  experience  in  Iike  cases,  to 
confirm the truth of any particular matter of  fact at- 
tested by fair witnesses :  such  are all the stated con- 
stitutions  and properties  of  bodies,  and the regular 
proceedings of causes and effects in the ordinary course 
of nature.  This we call an argument from the nature 
of  things themselves.  For what our own and other 
men's constant observation has found always to be after 
the same manner,  that we with reason conclude to be 
the effect of  steady and regular causes,  though they 
come not within the reach of  our knowledge.  Thus, 
that fire warmed a man, made lead fluid, and changed 
the colour  or consistency in  wood  or charcoal;  that 
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and the like propositions about particular facts, being 
agreeable to our constant experience,  as often as we 
have to do with these matters,-and  being generally 
spoke of (when mentioned by others) as things found 
constantly to be so, and therefore not so much as con- 
troverted by any body,-we  are put past doubt, that a 
relation affirming any such thing to have been, or any 
predication  that  it will  happen  again  in  the  same 
manner, is very true.  These probabilities rise so near 
to certainty,  that they govern our thoughts  as abso- 
lutely,  and influence  all our actions  as fully,  as the 
most evident  demonstration;  and,  in what concerns 
us,  we make little or no difference between them and 
certain knowledge.  Our belief,  thus grounded,  rises 
to assurance. 
Unquestion-  5 7. Secondly,  the next degree of pro- 
able testi-  bability is,  when I find by my own expe- 
monv and  rience, and the agreement of all others that 
d. 
experience  mention it, a tGna  to be,  for  the  most 
foi  most  part, so ;  and thatihe particular instance  part pro- 
duce con-  of  it is attested by many and undoubted 
fidence.  witnesses,  v. g. history giving us such an 
account of  men in all ages,  and my own 
experience, as far as I had an opporhnity to observe, 
confirming  it,  that  most  men  prefer  their  private 
advantage to the public;  if  all historians that write 
of  Tiberius say that Tiberius did so,  it is  extremely 
probable.  And in this case  our assent has a sufficient 
foundation to  raise itself to a degree which we may call 
confidence. 
5 8.  Thirdly, in things that haypen in- 
Fairtesti-  differently,  as that a bird should fly this 
mony, and 
the nature  or that Gay ; that it should thundei on a 
.ftl,,  thing  man's  right  or left  hand,  &c. lwhen  any 
indifferent.   articular matter of fact is vouched by the 
'  L 
Producealso  concurrent testimony of unsuspected wit- 
confident 
belief.  nesses,  there  our  assent is also unavoid- 
able.  Thus, that there is such a city in 
Italy as Rome ;  that, about one thousand 
seven hundred years ago, there lived in it a man called 
Julius  C~sar;  that  he  was  a  general,  and that he 
won  a battle against  another,  called  Pompey : this, 
th~ugh  in  the nature of  the thing there be nothing 
for nor against it,  yet being related  by historians of 
credit, and contradicted by no one writer, a man can- 
not avoid believing it,  and can as little doubt of it as 
he does of the being and actions of his own acquaint- 
ance, whereof he himself is a witness. 
9.  Thus far the  matter  goes easy 
Experiences  enough.  Probability upon such grounds  and tes- 
carries  so much  evidence with it, that it  timonies 
naturally determines the judgment,  and  clashing in- 
leaves us as little liberty to believe or dis-  finitely vary 
the degrees  believe, as a demonstration does whether 
of probabi-  we will  know or be ignorant.  The diffi-  fity. 
culty is, when testimonies contradict com- 
mon experience, and  the reports  of  history and wit- 
nesses  clash with  the ordinary course of  nature,  or 
with one another; there it is where  diligence, atten- 
tion,  and  exactness  are  required,  to  form  a  right 
judgment,  and to proportion  the assent  to the dif- 
ferent evidence  and  probability of  the thing; which 
rises  and falls  according  as those two foundations of 
credibility, viz. common observation in like cases, and 
particular  testimonies  in  that  particular  instance, 
favour or contradict it.  These are liable to so great 
variety  of  contrary observations,  circumstances,  re- 
ports, different qualifications,  tempers, designs, over- 
sights, kc.  of the reporters,  that it is  impossible  to 
reduce to precise  rules the various  degrees wherein 
men give their assent.  This only may be  said in ge- 
neral, that as the arguments and proofs pro  and con, 
upon  due examination,  nicely weighing  every parti- 
cular  circumstance,  shall to any  one  appear,  upon 
the whole  matter, in a greater or less  degree to pre- 
ponderate  on  either  side ;  so they are fitted  to pro- 
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call belief, conjecture, guess, doubt, wavering, distrust, 
disbelief, &c. 
Traditional  10.  This is what concerns  assent in 
testimonies,  matters wherein testimony is made use of: 
the farther  concerning which, I think,  it may not be 
'.empvedr  .  amiss to &ke notice of a rule observed in 
the less their 
proof.  the law of England ;  which is, that though 
the  attested  copy of  a  record  be  good 
proof, yet  the copy of  a copy ever so well attested, 
and bv ever so credible witnesses, will not be admitted 
as a  proof  in judicature.   his is  so  generally ap- 
proved as reasonable,  and suited to the wisdom  and 
caution to be used in our inquiry after material truths, 
that I never  yet heard  of  any  one  that blamed  it. 
This practice,  if  it be  allowable in the decisions  of 
right  and wrong, carries this  observation  along with 
it, viz.  that any testimony,  the farther  off it is from 
the original  truth,  the less  force  and  proof  it has. 
The being and existence of the thing itself is what I 
call the original truth.  A credible man vouching his 
knowledge of it  is a good proof: but if another equally 
credible do witness  it from his  report, the testimony 
is weaker;  and a third that attests the hearsay of an 
hearsay,  is  yet less considerable.  So that,  in  tradi- 
tional  truths,  each  remove weakens the force of  the 
proof:  and the more hands the tradition has success- 
ively passed through, the less  strength and evidence 
does it receive from them.  This I thought necessary 
to be  taken notice  of,  because I find  amongst  some 
men  the  quite  co~ltrary  commonly  practised,  who 
look on opinions to gain force by growing older; and 
what a thousand  years  since would not, to a rational 
man,  contemporary with  the first  voucher,  have  ap- 
peared  at all probable, is now urged as certain beyond 
all question,  only  because  several  have  since,  from 
him,  said it one  after  another.  Upon  this  ground, 
propositions,  evidently  false  or  doubtful enough in 
tkeir first beginning, come, by an inverted rule of pro- 
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bability, to pass for authentic truths ;  and those which 
found  or  deserved  little  credit  from  the mouths  of 
their first  authors are thought to grow venerable by 
age, and are urged as undeniable. 
§ 11. I would  not be thought  here to 
Yet history  lessen the credit and use of  history :  it is  is ofgeat 
all the light we have  in many cases, and 
we  receive  from it a  great  part of  the 
useful  truths we  have,  with  a  convincing evidence. 
I think  nothing  more valuable  than the records  of 
antiquity :  I wish we had more of them, and more un- 
corrupted.  But this  truth  itself  forces  me  to say, 
that  no  probability  can  arise  higher  than its first 
original.  What has no other evidence than the single 
testimony of one only witness,  must  stand or fall by 
his only testimony, whether good, bad, or indifferent; 
and  though cited  afterwards by hundreds of  others, 
one after another, is so far from receiving any strength 
thereby, that it is only the weaker.  Passion, interest, 
inadvertency, mistake of his meaning, and a thousand 
odd  reasons,  or capricios,  men's  minds  are acted by 
(impossible  to  be  discovered)  may  make  one  man 
quote another  man's  words or  meaning wrong.  He 
that has  but ever  so  little examined the citations of 
writers cannot doubt how little  credit the quotations 
deserve, where the originals are wanting;  aud conse- 
quently how much  less  quotations of  quotations can 
be relied  on.  This is  certain,  that what in one  age 
was  affirmed  upon  slight  grounds,  can  never  after 
come to be  more valid in future ages by being often 
repeated.  But the farther still it is from the original, 
the less valid it is,  and  has  always  less force  in  the 
mouth or writing of him that last made use of it  than 
in his from whom he received it. 
§ la. The  probabilities we have hitherto  I,  things 
mentioned are only such as concern matter  which sense 
of fact, and such things as are capable of  mnnot clip- 
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logy is the  mains  that other sort,  concerning which 
great rule of  men  entertain  opinions  with  variety  of 
probability.  assent, though the things  be  such  that, 
falling not under the reach of our senses, they are not 
capable  of  testimony.  Such  are,  1.  The existence, 
nature,  and  operations of  finite  immaterial  beings 
without  us;  as spirits,  angels,  devils,  &c. or the ex- 
istence  of  material  beings,  which,  either for  their 
smallness in themselves,  or remoteness  from  us,  our 
senses cannot take notice of; as whether there be any 
plants,  animals,  and  intelligent  inhabitants in  the 
planets, and other mansions  of the vast universe.  2. 
Concerning the manner of operation in most parts of 
the works of nature :  wherein though we see the sen- 
sible  effects,  yet their  causes  are unknown,  and we 
perceive not the ways and manner how they are 
duced.  We see  animals  are generated,  nouris irO;  ed 
and move ;  the loadstone draws iron ;  and the parts of 
a candle,  successively  melting,  turn into flame,  and 
give us both light  and heat.  These and the like ef- 
fects we see and know ;  but the causes that operate, 
and the manner they are produced  in, we can only 
guess and probably conjecture.  For these  and the 
like, coming not within the scrutiny of human senses, 
cannot be examined by them,  or be  attested  by any 
body ;  and therefore can appear more or less probable, 
only as they  more  or  less  agree to truths that are 
established in our minds, and as they hold proportion 
to other parts of  our  knowledge  and observation. 
Analogy in these  matters is  the only help we have, 
and it is from that alone we draw all our grounds of 
probability.  Thus observing that the bare rubbing 
of  two bodies  violently  one  upon  another produces 
heat,  and very  often  fire itself,  we  have  reason  to 
think  that what we  call heat  and  fire  consists  in a 
violent agitation of the imperceptible minute parts of 
the burning  matter : observing  likewise that the dif- 
ferent refractions  of  pellucid  bodies  produce  in our 
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eyes the different appearances of  several colours, and 
also that the different ranging and laying the super- 
ficial  parts  of  several  bodies,  as  of  velvet,  watered 
silk, &c.  does  the like, we think it probable that the 
colour and shining of  bodies is in them  nothing but 
the different  arrangement and refraction of their mi- 
nute and insensible  parts.  Thus finding in all parts 
of  the creation,  that fall  under  human  observation, 
that there is a gradual connexion of one with another, 
without any great or discernible gaps between, in all 
that  great variety  of  things  we  see in  the world, 
which are so closely linked together, that in the seve- 
ral  ranks  of  beings  it is  not  easy  to discover  the 
bounds betwixt them ;  we have reason to be persuaded, 
that  by  such  gentle steps things  ascend  upwards 
in  degrees  of  perfection.  It  is a hard matter to say 
where sensible and rational begin, and where insensi- 
ble and irrational end:  and who is there quick-sighted 
enough to determine precisely  which  is  the  lowest 
species of  living  things,  and which the first of  those 
which  have  no  life 2  Things,  as far  as we  can ob- 
serve,  lessen  and augment as the quantity does in a 
regular cone ;  where, though there be a manifest odds 
betwixt  the bigness of  the diameter  at a remote  di- 
stance, yet the difference  between the cpper and un- 
der, where they touch one another, is  hardly discern- 
ible.  The  difference  is  exceeding  great  between 
some men  and some animals ;  but if we will compare 
the  understanding  and  abilities  of  some  men  and 
some brutes, we shall find  so  little difference, that it 
will be  hard  to say, that that of  the m'm  is  either 
clearer  or  larger.  Observing,  I  say, such  gradual 
and gentle descents  downwards in those  parts of the 
creation that are beneath  man,  the rule  of  analogy 
may make it probable, that it is so also in things above 
us and  our  observation;  and that there are several 
ranks  of  intelligent  beings,  excelling  us  in  several 
degrees of perfection, ascending upwards towards the 
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differences, that are every one  at no great distance 
from the next to it.  This sort of  probability, which 
is the best conduct of  rational experiments,  and  the 
rise of hypothesis, has also its use and influence ;  and 
a wary reasoning  from  analogy  leads  us  often  into 
the discovery of truths and useful  productions which 
would otherwise lie concealed. 
S 13.  Though the common experience 
One case 
where con-  and the ordinary course  of  things  have 
trary expe-  justly a mighty influence on the minds of 
rience les-  men. to make them  give  or refuse credit 
Sens  the  to any thing proPosea to their belief; yet 
testimony.  there is one case, wherein the strangeness 
of the fact lessens  not  the assent to a fair testimony 
given of it.  For where such supernatural events are 
suitable to ends aimed at by him, who has the power 
to change the course  of  nature,  there, under  such 
circumstances,  they may be the fitter  to procure be- 
lief, by how much the more they are beyond  or con- 
trary to ordinary  observation.  This is  the proper 
case of miracles, which well attested do not only find 
credit  themselves,  but give  it also  to other truths, 
which need such confirmation. 
The bare  §  14. Besides  those  we  have  hitherto 
testimony of  mentioned,  there is one  sort of  proposi- 
revelation is  tions that challenge the highest degree of 
the highest  our assent upon  bare testi&ony,  whether 
certainty.  the thing proposed agree or disagree with 
common experience, and the ordinary course of things, 
or no.  The reason whereof is, because the testimony 
is of such an one as cannot deceive,  nor  be deceived, 
and that is of  God himself.  This carries with it an  - 
assurance beyond  doubt, evidence  beyond  exception. 
This is called by a peculiar name, revelation ;  and our 
assent to it, faith :  which as absolutely determines our 
minds, and as perfectly excludes all wavering,  as our 
knowledge itself;  and we  may as well  doubt of our 
own  being  as  we  can  whether any  revelation  from 
God be true.  So that faith is a settled and sure prin- 
ciple of  assent and  assurance, and leaves  no manner 
of  rooin  for doubt  or hesitation.  Only we  must  be 
sure that it be a divine revelation, and that we under- 
stand it right: else we  shall expose ourselves  to all 
the extravagancy of  enthusiasm, and all the error of 
wrong  principles,  if  we  have  faith and assurance in 
what is not divine revelation.  And therefore in those 
cases, our assent can be rationally no higher than the 
evidence of its being a revelation, and that this is the 
meanifig of the expressions it is delivered  in.  If  the 
evidence of  its being  n  revelation,  or  that this is its 
true sense,  be  only  on  probable  proofs;  our  assent 
can reach no higher than an .assurance or diffidence, 
arising from the more or less apparent probability of 
tlie proofs.  But of faith, and the precedency it ought 
to have before other arguments of  persuasion, I sElnll 
speak more hereafter, where I treat of  it,  as it is or- 
dinarily placed, in contradistinction to reason ;  though 
in truth it be  nothing else but an assent founded on 
the highest reason. 
CHAPTER XVII. 
Of  Reason. 
§  I.  THE  word rcason  in  tlie  English  ~ario~ls  sig- 
Iangunge  has  difTerent  significations :  nifications of 
sometimes  it is taken for true and clear  ~-~l'~~ 
principles ; sometimes for clear  and fair  reason. 
deductions from those principles ;  and so~netirnes  for 
the cause, and particularly the final cause.  But tlie 
consideration I shall have of  it here is in a  significa- 
tion different from all these ; and that is, as it stands 
for  a  faculty in  man,  that faculty  whereby  man is 
supposed to be distinguished from beasts, and wherein 
it is evident he much surpasses them. 
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Wherein  tj 2. If general knowledge, as has been 
reasoning  shown,  consists  in  a  perception  of  the 
consists.  agreement or  disagreement  of our  own 
itleas;  and  the  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  all 
tirings without us (except only of a God, whose exist- 
ence every man may certainly know and demonstrate 
to himself from his own existence) be had only by our 
senses:  what  room  is there  for  the exercise  of  any 
other  faculty,  but outward  sense  and  inward  per- 
ception ?  What need is there of reason ?  Very much ; 
both for the enlargement  of  our knowledge, and re- 
gulating our assent: for it hath to do both  in  know- 
ledge and opinion,  and is necessary  and assisting to 
all our  other  intellectual  faculties,  and indeed con- 
tains two of them, viz. sagacity and illation.  By the 
one,  it finds out; and by the other,  it so orders the 
intermediate  ideas,  as  to  discover  what  connexion 
there is  in  each link of  the chain,  whereby the ex- 
tremes are held together; and thereby, as it were, to 
draw  into view  the truth sought for,  which  is  that 
which  we  call  illation  or  inference,  and consists  in 
nothing but the perception of  the connexion there is 
between  the ideas,  in  each  step of  the  deduction, 
whereby  the  mind  comes  to see  either  the certain 
agreement  or disagreement of  any  two ideas,  as in 
demonstration, in which it arrives at knowledge ; or 
their probable connexion, on which it gives or with- 
holds  its assent,  as  in opinion.  dense and intuition 
reach but a very little way.  The greatest part of our 
knowledge depends upon deductions and intermediate 
idease and in those cascs, where we  are fain to sub- 
stitute assent instead  of  knowledge,  and take pro- 
positions  for true, without  being certain they are so, 
we have need  to find  out, examine,  and compare the 
grounds  of  their  probability.  In  both  these  cases, 
the faculty which  finds  out the means,  and rightly 
applies them to discover certainty in the one, and pro- 
bability  in  the  other,  is  that which  we  call  reason. 
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For as reasoil perceives the necessary and indubitable 
connesion of all the ideas or proofs one to another, in 
each step of  any demonstration  that produces  know- 
ledge ;  so it likewise perceives the probable coilnexion 
of  all  the ideas  or  proofs  one  to  another,  in  every 
step of a cliscourse, to which  it will think assent due. 
This is the lowest degree of  that which can  be  truly 
called reason.  For where the mind does not perceive 
this probable  connexion,  where  it does  not  discern 
whether  there he  any such connexion  or no; there 
men's  opinions are not  the product  of  judgment,  or 
the consequence of  reason,  but the effects of  chance 
and hazard, of  a mind floating at  all adventures, with- 
out choice and without direction. 
§ 3. So that we may in reason consider 
these four degrees; the first and highest is 
the discovering and finding out of truths; 
the second, the regular and methodical disposition of 
them,  and  laying  them  in  a  clear and fit order,  to 
make their connexion and  force be plainly and easily 
perceived ;  the third is the perceiving their connexion ; 
and the fourth, a making a right conclusion.  These 
several degrees may be observed in any mathematical 
demonstration;  it being  one thing to perceive  the 
connexion of  each part, as the demonstration is made 
by another;  another,  to perceive  the  dependence  of 
the conclusion on all the parts ; a third, to make out 
a  demonstration  clearly  and  neatly  one's  self;  and 
something different froin all these, to have first founrl 
out these intermediate ideas or proofs by which  it is 
made. 
§ 41. There is one  thing more, which I  ~~l~~~i~,,~  shall desire to be considered  concerning  nottllrgrcnt 
reason ; and  that is,  whether  syllogism,  inqtrnlncnt 
as is generally thought, be the proper in-  of rC"Sorl. 
strument of  it,  and the usefullest way of  cxcrcisin~ 
this faculty.  The cnuscs I have to doubt are these : 
First, becnlise  syllogism  serves  our rrnson  but in 
oue  only of  the  forcirlclltioned  parts of  it; and  that 
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is, to show the connexion of the proofs in any one in- 
stance, and no more:  but in this it is of no great use, 
since the mind can  conceive such connesion where it 
really is, as easily, nay perhaps better, without it. 
If we will  observe the actings of  our own  minds, 
we shall find  that we  reason best and clearest  when 
we only observe the connexion of  the proof,  without 
reducing our thoughts to any rule of syllogism.  And 
therefore we  may take notice,  that there  are many 
men  that  reason  exceeding  clear  and  rightly,  who 
know  not how  to make  a  syllogism.  He that will 
look  into many parts of Asia  and America,  will  find 
men reason there perhaps as acutely as himself, who 
yet never  heard of  a  syllogism,  nor  can  reduce  any 
one argument to those  forms:  and I believe  scarce 
any one makes syllogisms in reasoning within himself. 
Indeed,  syllogism  is made use of  on occasion, to dis- 
cover  a  fallacy hid  in a  rhetorical  flourish,  or  CLIII- 
ningly wrapt up in a smooth  period ;  and,  stripping 
an absurdity of the cover of wit and good  language, 
show it in its naked deformity.  Rut the weakness or 
fallacy  of  such  a  loose  discourse  it shows,  by  the 
artificial form it is put into,  only to those who  have 
thoroughly studied mode and figure, and have so ex- 
amined  the many ways  that three propositions may 
be put together, as to know which of  them does cer- 
tainly conclude right, and which not, and upon what 
grountls it is that they do so.  All who have  so far 
considered syllogism, as to see the reason why in three 
propositions laid together in one form the conclusion 
will  be certainly right, but in  another, riot  certainly 
so; I grant are certain of  the conclusion they draw 
from the premises  in the allowed modes and figures. 
But they who have not so far looked into those forms, 
are not sure, by virtue of syllogism, that the conclusion 
certainly follows from the premises ;  they only take it 
to he so by an implicit  filith  in thcir teaclicrs,  and a 
confidence in those forms of argumentation ; but this 
is still but believing,  not  being certain.  Now if,  of 
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all  mankind, those who can make syllogisms are ex- 
tremely few in comparison of those who cnrunot ;  and 
if, of those  few who have been  taught logic,  there is 
but a very small number  who do any more than be- 
lieve that syllogisms in the allowed modes and figures 
do conclude  right,  without  knowing  certainly  that 
they do so ; if  syllogisms must be  taken for the only 
proper  instrument  of  reason  and  rneans  of  know- 
ledge;  it will follow, that before Aristotle there was 
not  one  man that did  or could  know  any thing by 
reason;  and  that since the invention  of  syllogisms 
there is not one of ten thousand that doth. 
But God has not been so sparing to men to make 
them  barely  two-legged  creatures,  and  left  it to 
Aristotle  to make  them  rational,  i.  e.  those  few  of 
them that he could get so to examine the grounds of 
syllogisms,  as to see, that in above  threescore ways, 
that three propositions  may be  laid together,  there 
are but about fourteen wherein one may be sure that 
the conclusion is right, ; and upon what grounds it is, 
that in these few the conclusion is certain, and in the 
other not.  God has been more bountiful to mankind 
than so.  He has given them a mind that can reason, 
without  being  instructed in  methods of  syllogizing : 
the understanding is  not taught to reason  by  these 
rules ;  it has a native faculty to perceive the coherence 
or incoherence of its ideas, and can range them right, 
without  any such perplexing  repetitions.  I say not 
this  any way to lessen Aristotle, whom I look  on as 
one of the greatest men amongst the ancients ;  whose 
large views,  acuteness,  and penetration  of  thought, 
and strength of judgment,  few  have  equalled : and 
who in this very invention of forms of argumentation, 
wherein  the conclusion  may be shown  to be  rightly 
inferred, did great service against those who were not 
ashamed to deny any thing.  And I readily own, that 
a11  right reasoning  may be  reduced to his  farms  of 
syllogism.  But yet I think, without  any diminution 
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nor the best way of  reasoning, for the leading of those 
into truth who  are willing  to find  it, and  desire  to 
make the best  use  they may of  their reason,  for  the 
attainment of knowledge.  And he himself, it is plain, 
found out some  forms to be  conclusive,  and  others 
not, not by the forms themselves,  but by the original 
way of knowledge,  i.  e.  by  the visible  agreement of 
ideas.  Tell a country gentlewoman that the wind is 
south-west,  and the weather louring, and like to rain, 
and she will easily understand it is not safe for her to 
go abroad thin clad, in such a day, after a fever : she 
clearly sees the probable  connexion of  all these, viz. 
south-west  wind,  and  clouds,  rain,  wetting,  taking 
cold, relapse, and danger of death, without tying them 
together in those artificial and cumbersoine fetters of 
several  syllogisms,  that  clog  and  hinder  the  mind, 
which proceeds from one part to another quicker and 
clearer without them ;  and the probability which she 
easily perceives  in  things  thus in  their  native  state 
would  be quite lost,  if this argument were managed 
learnedly, and proposed  in mode and figure.  For it 
very  often  confounds  the  connexion:  and, I think, 
every one will  perceive  in  mathematical demonstra- 
tions,  that  the  knowledge  gained  thereby  comes 
shortest and clearest without syllogisms. 
Inference is looked on as the great act of the rational 
faculty, and so it is when it is rightly made ; but the 
mind,  either very desirous to enlarge its knowledge, 
or very apt to favour the sentiments it has once  im- 
bibed,  is very forward  to make inferences, and there- 
fore often makes too much haste,  before it perceives 
the connexion  of  the  ideas that must hold  the ex- 
tremes together. 
To  infer is nothing but, by virtue of one proposition 
laid down as true, to draw in another as true, i. e.  to 
see or suppose such a connexion of  the two ideas of 
the inferred  proposition, u. g.  Let this be the pro- 
positioil laid down,  '<  men shall be punished in another 
world," and from thence be inferred this other, "  the11 
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men can deter~ine  themselves."  The question now is 
to know whether  the mind has  made this inference 
right or no; if  it has  made it by finding out the in- 
termediate ideas, and taken a view of the connexion 
of  them,  placed  in  a  due  order,  it has  proceeded 
rationally,  and  made  a  right  inference.  If  it  has 
done it without such a view, it has not so much made 
an inference that will  hold,  or  an inference of  right 
reason,  as show11  a  willingness  to have it be,  or  be 
taken for such.  But in  neither case  is  it syllogism 
that discovered those ideas, or showed  the connexion 
of  them,  for they must be both found out,  and the 
connexion  every  where  perceived,  before  they  can 
rationally be made use of  in syllogism ; unless it can 
be said, that any idea, without considering what con- 
nexion  it hath with the two other, whose agreement 
should  be  shown  by  it,  will  do  well  enough  in  a 
syllogism,  and  may  be  taken  at a  venture for  the 
meclius  ternzinus,  to prove  any conclusion.  But this 
nobody will  say,  because  it is by virtue of  the per- 
ceived  agreement of  the intermediate idea with  the 
extremes, that the extremes are concluded to agree ; 
and therefore each intermediate idea must  be  such 
as in the whole chain hath a visible  connexion  with 
those two it has been placed between, or else thereby 
the conclusion  cannot  be  inferred  or drawn in:  for 
wherever  any link of  the chain is loose, and without 
connexion, there the whole strength of  it is lost, and 
it hath no force to infer or draw in any thing.  In the 
instance above-mentioned, what is it shows the force 
of the inference, and consequently the reasonableness 
of it, but a view of the connexion of  all the interme- 
diate ideas that draw in the conclusion or proposition 
inferred ?  v. g. men shall be punished-  God the 
punisher-  just  punishment-the  punished 
guilty-  could  have  done  otherwise-free- 
dom-self-determination :  by which chain of ideas 
thus visibly linked  together in train,  i.  e. each inter- 
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is immediately placed between, tlie  ideas of  men and 
self-determination  appear to be connected, i.  e. this 
proposition, men  can determine themselves,  is drawn 
in, or inferred  from this, that they shall be punished 
in the other world.  For here tlle mind seeing the con- 
nexion there is between the idea of men's punishment 
in tlie other world and  the idea  of  God  punishing; 
between God punishing and the justice of the punish- 
ment ; between justice of the punishment and guilt ; 
between guilt and a power to do otherwise ;  between 
a power to do otherwise and freedom;  and between 
freedom and self-determination;  sees the connexion 
between men and self-determination. 
Now I ask whether the connexion of  the extremes 
be not more  clearly seen in this simple  and naiilral 
disposition,  than  in  tlle  perplexed  repetitions  and 
jumble of five or six syllogisms? I must beg pardon for 
calling it jumble,  till somebody shall put these  ideas 
into so many syllogisms,  and then  say, that they are 
less jumbled, and their connexion  more visible, when 
they are transposed and repeated, and spun out to a 
greater length in artificial forms, than in that short and 
natural plain order they are laid down in here, wherein 
every one may see it ; and wherein they must be seen 
before they can be put into a train of syllogisms.  For 
the natural order of  the connecting ideas must direct 
the order of  the syllogisms,  and a man must see the 
connexion of each intermediate idea with those that it 
connects, before he can with reason make use of it in 
a syllogism.  And when all those syllogisms are made, 
neither  those  that are,  nor  those  that are not logi- 
cians will see the force of the argumentation, i. c. the 
connexion of the extremes, one jot the better.  [For 
those that are not men of  art, not  knowing the true 
forms of  syllogism,  nor the reasons  of  them,  cannot 
know whether they are made in right arid conclusivo 
mocles and figures or no, and so are not at all helped 
by the f'0l.m~  they are put into ; though by them tho 
natural order, wllcrcin  the mind could judgc ol  their 
respective  connexion,  being  disturbed,  renders  the 
illation  much  more  uncertain  than  without  them.] 
And as for the logicians themselves, they see the con- 
nexioil of  each intermediate idea with those it stands 
between (on which the force of the inference depends) 
as well  before as after the syllogism is made,  or else 
they do not  see it at all.  For  a  syllogism  neither 
shows nor strengthens the connexion of any two ideas 
immediately put together, but only by the connexion 
seen in them shows what connexion the extremes have 
one with another.  But what connexion the interme- 
diate has with either of the extremes in that syllogism, 
that no syllogism does or can show.  That the mind 
only doth or can perceive as they stand there in that 
juxta-position  only  by  its  own  view,  to which  the 
syllogistical form it happens to be in gives no help or 
light at all; it only shows that if  the intermediate 
idea agrees with those it is on both sides immediately 
applied  to,  then those two  remote ones,  or  as they 
are called extremes, do certainly agree, and therefore 
the immediate  connexion of  each idea to that which 
it is applied to on each side, on which the force of the 
reasoning depends, is as well seen before as after the 
syllogism is made, or else he that makes the syllogism 
could  never see it at all.  This, as has been  already 
observed,  is  seen only by the eye,  or the perceptive 
faculty  of  the mind,  taking a view  of  them laid to- 
gether in a juxta-position ; which view of  any two it 
has equally, whenever they are laid together  in  any 
proposition, whether that proposition  be  placed  as a 
major, or a minor, in a syllogism or n,p. 
Of  what use  then are syllogisms ?  I answer,  their 
chief and main use  is  in the schools, where  men  are 
allowed  without  shame  to  deny  tlle  agreement  of 
ideas that do manifestly agree; or out of the schools, 
to those who from thence have learned without shame 
to deny the connexion  of  ideas, which  even to them- 
selves is visible.  But to an ingenuous searcher after 
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need  of  any  such form to force  the allowing of  the 
inference :  the truth and reasonableness of it is better 
seen in ranging of  the ideas  in a  simple  and plain 
order:  and  hence it is,  that men,  in  their own in- 
quiries after truth, never use  syllogisms  to convince 
themselves, [or in teaching others to instruct willing 
learners.]  Because, before they can put them into a 
syllogism,  they must  see  the connexion  that is be- 
tween the intermediate idea and the two other ideas 
it is set between and applied to, to show their agree- 
ment; and when they see that, they see whether the 
inference be good or no,  and so syllogism comes too 
late to settle it.  For to make use again of the former 
instance ;  I ask whether the mind, considering the idea 
of justice, placed as an intermediate idea between the 
punishment of men and the guilt of the punished, (and, 
till it does so consider  it, the mind  cannot make use 
of it as a lnedius terminus) does not as plainly see the 
force  and  strength of  the inference  as when  it is 
formed into a syllogism?  To show it in a very plain 
and  easy  example;  let animal  be the intermediate 
idea or medius terminus that the mind  makes use  of 
to show  the connexion  of  homo  and vivens:  I  ask, 
whether the mind does not more readily and plainly 
see that connexion  in the simple and proper position 
of the connecting idea in the middle ;  thus, 
Homo  Animal  Vivens, 
than in this perpIexed one, 
which is the position  these ideas have in a syllogism, 
to show the connexion between  homo  and vivens by 
the intervention of animal. 
Indeed, syllogism is thought to be of necessary use, 
even to the lovers of truth, to show them the fallacies 
that are often concealed  in florid, witty,  or involved 
discourses.  Eut that this  is  a  mistake  will  appear 
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if we  consider,  that the reason why sometimes men, 
who sincerely aim at truth, are imposed upon by such 
loose, and as they are called rhetorical discourses,  is, 
that their  fancies being struck with some lively me- 
taphorical representations, they neglect to observe, or 
do not easily perceive, what are the true ideas upon 
which the inference depends.  Now to show such men 
the weakness of  such an argumentation, there needs 
,  no more but to strip it of the superfluous ideas, which, 
blended and confounded with those on which the in- 
ference  depends,  seem  to  show  a connexion  where 
there is none ;  or at least do hinder the discovery of 
the want of  it; and then to lay the naked ideas,  on 
which  the force  of  the argumentation depends,  in 
their due order, in which  position  the mind, taking a 
view of them,  sees what connexion they have, and so 
is able to judge of  the inference without any need of 
a syllogism at all. 
J grant that mode and figure is commonly made use 
of in such cases, as if the detection of the incoherence 
of  such  loose  discourses  were  wholly  owing to the 
syllogistical form ;  and so I myself formerly thought, 
till upon a stricter examination I now find, that lay- 
ing the intermediate ideas naked in their due order 
shows  the incoherence  of  the argumentation  better 
than syllogism; not only as subjecting each link of 
the chain  to the immediate view  of  the mind in its 
proper place, whereby its connexion is best observed; 
but also because syllogism shows the incoherence only 
to those (who are not one of ten thousand) who per- 
fectly  understand  mode  and figure,  and  the reason 
upon which  those forms  are established: whereas  a 
due and orderly  lacing of  the ideas upon which the 
inference is made makes  every one, whether logician 
or not logician, who understands the terms, and hath 
the faculty to perceive  the agreement  or  disagree- 
ment of such ideas (without which, in or out of syllo- 
gism,  he cannot perceive  the strength or weakness, 
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want of connexion in the argumentation,  and the ab- 
surdity of the inference. 
And thus I have  known a man unskilful in syllo- 
gism,  who at first hearing  could perceive the weak- 
ness  and inconclusiveness  of  a  long,  artificial,  and 
plausible  discourse,  wherewith  others better  skilled 
in syllogism have  been  misled.  And I believe there 
are few of  my readers who do not know such.  And 
indeed if  it were not so, the debates of most princes' 
counsels,  and the business of  assemblies, would be in 
danger to be mismanaged,  since those who are relied 
upon,  and have usually  a great stroke in  them,  are 
not always such  who  have  the good luck to be  per- 
fectly knowing in the forms of  syllogism, or expert in 
mode and figure.  And if syllogism were the only, or 
so much  as the surest way to detect the fallacies of 
artificial discourses,  I do not think that all mankind, 
even  princes  in matters  that  concern  their  crowns 
and dignities, are so much in love with falsehood and 
mistake, that they would every where have neglected 
to bring  syllogisln  into  the  debates of  moment,  or 
thought  it ridiculous  so  much  as  to offer  them  in 
affairs of  consequence;  a plain evidence to me,  that 
men of  parts and penetration,  who were not idly to 
dispute  at their ease,  but  were to act according to 
the result of  their debates,  and often  pay  for  their 
mistakes  with  their  heads  or  fortunes,  found  those 
scholastic forms were of little use to discover truth or 
fallacy, whilst both  the one  and  the other might be 
shown, and better shown, without them, to those who 
would not refuse to see what was visibly shown them. 
Secondly,  another  reason  that  makes  me  doubt 
whether  syllogism be the only proper  instrument of 
reason in the discovery of  truth is,  that of whatever 
use mode and figure is pretended to be in the laying 
open  of  fallacy  (which  has been  above  considered) 
those scholastic forms of  discolirse are not less liable 
to fallacies than the plainer ways of  argumentation ; 
and for this I appeal to cornnlon  observation, which 
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has always found these artificial methods of reasoning 
Inore adapted to catch and entangle the mind,  than 
to instruct and inform the understanding.  And hence 
it is that men, even when they are baffled and silenced 
in this scholastic way, are seldom or never convinced, 
and so  brought  over  to  the conquering  side:  they 
perhaps acknowledge their adversary to be the more 
skilful  disputant, but rest  nevertheless persuaded of 
,  the truth on their side ;  and go away, worsted as they 
are, with the same opinion  they brought with them, 
which they could not do if this way of argumentation 
carried light and conviction with it, and made men 
see where the truth lay.  And therefore syllogism has 
been thought more proper for the attaining victory in 
dispute, than for the discovery or confirmation of truth 
in fair  inquiries.  And if  it be certain  that fr~llncies 
can be couched in syllogism, as it cannot be denied ; 
it must  be  something  else,  and  not  syllogism,  that 
must discover them. 
I have  had experience  how  ready some  men  are, 
when all the use which they have been wont to ascribe 
to any thing is not allowed,  to cry out, that I am for 
laying it wholly aside.  But,  to prevent such unjust 
and groundless imputations,  I tell them,  that I am 
not for taking away any helps to the understanding, in 
the attainment of knowledge.  And if men skilled in, 
and used  to syllogisms,  find them  assisting to their 
reason in  the discovery of  truth, I think  they ought 
to make use of them.  All that I aim at is,  that they 
should  not ascribe more to these forms than belongs 
to them; and think that inen have no use,  or not so 
full an use  of  thejr  reasoning  filculty without  them. 
Some eyes want spectacles  to see things clearly and 
distinctly:  but let not those that use them  therefore 
say, nobody can see clearly without them : those who 
do so will be thought in favour of art (which perhaps 
they are beholden to) a little too much to depress and 
discredit nature. d  Reason,  by  its  own  penctmtion, 
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and clearcr without syllogism!,  If use of those  spec- 
tacles has so dimmed its sight that it cannot without 
then?  see  consequences  or  inconsequences  i11  argu- 
mentation, I am not so unreasonable as to be against 
the using them.  Every one knows what best fits his 
own sight.  But let him  not thence conclude  all in 
the dark,  who  use  not just  the same helps that he 
finds a need of. 
Helps little  $ 5. But however it be in knowledge, I 
in demon-  think I may truly say, it is of far less, or 
stration,less  no  use  at all  in probabilities.  For,  tllc 
in pro-  assent  there being  to be determined  by 
bability.  the preponderancy, after due weighing of 
all the proofs, with all circumstances  on both sides, 
nothing  is  so  unfit  to  assist  the  mind  in  that  as 
syllogism;  which  running  away with  one  assumed 
probability,  or  one  topical  argument,  pursues  that 
till it has led the mind quite out of sight of the thing 
under consideration ;  and forcing it upon some remote 
difficulty, holds it fast there, entangled perhaps, and 
as it were manacled in the chain of  syllogisms, with- 
out allowing it the liberty, much less affording it the 
helps, requisite to show on which side, all things con- 
sidered, is the greater probability. 
$ 6. But let it help us (as perhaps may 
Serves not 
to increase  he said) in convincing men of their errors 
know-  and mistakes :  (and yet I would fain see the 
ledge, but  man that was forccd out of his opinion by 
fence with  dint of syllogism) yet still it fails our rea- 
it.  son in that part, which, if  not its highest 
perfection, is yet  certainly its hardest task,  and that 
which we most need its help in; and that is the find- 
ing out of proofs, and making new discoveries.  The 
rules of syllogism serve not to furnish the mind with 
those intermediate ideas that may show the connexion 
of remote ones.  This way of  reasoning discovers no 
new proofs, but is the art of marshalling and ranging 
the old ones we have already.  Thc forty-seventh pro- 
position  of  the first book  of  Euclid is very true ; but 
the discovery of it, I think, not owing to any rules of 
common  logic.  A  man knows  first,  and  then  he is 
able to prove syllogistically.  So that syllogism comes 
after knowledge, and then a nlan has little or no need 
of it.  But it is chiefly by the finding out those ideas 
that show the connexion of distant ones, that our stock 
of knowledge is increased,  and that useful  arts and 
sciences are advanced.  Syllogism at best is but the 
art of fencing with the little knowledge we have, with- 
out making any addition to it.  And if a man should 
employ his reason  all this way, he will  not do much 
otherwise than he, who having got some iron out of 
the bowels of the earth,  should have it beaten up all 
into swords,  and put it into his  servants'  hands  to 
fence with, and bang one another.  Had the king of 
Spain  employed  the  hands  of  his  people,  and  his 
Spanish iron so, he had  brought to light but little of 
that treasure that lay so long hid in the entrails of 
America.  And I am apt to think,  that he who shall 
employ all the force of his reason only in brandishing 
of syllogisms, will discover very little of  that mass of 
knowledge which  lies yet concealed in the secret re- 
cesses of nature ;  and which, I am apt to think, native 
rustic reason (as  it formerly has  done) is likelier  to 
open a way to, and add to the common stock of man- 
kind,  rather than any  scholastic  proceeding by  the 
strict rule of mode and figure. 
$ 7 I doubt not, nevertheless, but there  Other I,elps 
are ways to be found out to assist our rea-  should bc 
son in this most useful part ;  and this the 
judicious  Hooker encourages me to say,  who  i11  his 
Eccl. Pol. 1.  I. $ 6,  speaks thus : "  If there might bc 
added the right helps of true art and learning (which 
helps,  I must  plainly confess,  this age of  the world, 
carrying the  name'  of  a  learned  age,  doth  neither 
much know,  nor generally regard)  there would  un- 
doubtedly be  almost as much  difference  in maturity 
of judgment between men therewith inured, anti that which  men  now  arc,  as  between  men  that are now 
and innocents."  I do not pretend to have  found, or 
discovered here any  of  those right helps of  art, this 
great n~an  of deep thought mentions ;  but this is plain, 
that syllogism, and the logic now in use,  which were 
as well  known in his days,  can be none  of  those he 
means.  It  is sufficient for me,  if  by a discourse, per- 
haps something out of  the way,  I am sure as to me 
wholly new  and unborrowed,  I shall have  given  oc- 
casion  to others to cast  about  for  new  discoveries, 
and to seek  in  their  own  thoughts  for  those  right 
helps of  art, which will  scarce be found, I fear,  by 
those  who  servilely  confine  themselves  to the rules 
and dictates of  others.  For beaten  tracks lead this 
sort  of  cattle,  (as  an  observing  Roman  calls  them) 
whose  thoughts  reach  only  to imitation,  non  qziu 
eundum est, sed  quo itur.  But I  can be bold  to say, 
that this age is adorned with some men of that strength 
of judgment,  and largeness of con~prehension,  that, if 
they would employ their thoughts on this subject, could 
open new and undiscovered ways to the advancement 
of  knowledge. 
$ 8.  Having here had  an occasion  to 
We reason  speak of syllogism in general, and the use 
about par- 
ticulars.  of  it in reasoning,  and the improvement 
of our knowledge,  it is fit,  before I leave 
this subject, to take notice of one manifest mistake in 
the rules of syllogism, viz. that no syllogistical reason- 
ing can be right and conclusive, but what has at least 
one general proposition  in  it.  As  if  we  could  not 
reason,  and  have  knowledge  about  particulars : 
whereas, in truth, the matter rightly considered,  the 
immediate object of all our reasoning and knowledge 
is nothing but particulars.  Every man's reasoning and 
knowledge is only about the ideas existing in his own 
mind, which are truly,  every one of  them,  particular 
existences ;  and our knowledge and reason about other 
things is  only  as  they correspond with those of  our 
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particular ideas.  So that the perception of the agrcc- 
ment  or  disagreement of  our particular ideas  is  the 
whole  and  utmost  of  all  our  knowledge.  Univer- 
sality is but accidental to it,  and consists only in this, 
that the particular  ideas about which  it is  are such, 
as  more  than  one  particular  thing  can  correspond 
with, and be represented by.  But the perception of the 
agreement or disagreement  of  any two ideas,  conse- 
quently our own knowledge,is equally clear and certain, 
whether either,  or both, or neither  of  those ideas be 
capable of representing more real beings than one, or 
no.  One thing  more  I  crave  leave  to  offer  about 
syllogism,  before  I  leave  it,  viz.  may  one  not  upon 
just ground inquire, whether the form syllogism now 
has is that which in reason it ought to have? For the: 
medius tern~inzls  being  to join  the extremes,  i. e.  the 
intermediate  idea  by  its  intervention,  to  show  the 
agreement or  disagreement  of  the  two in question; 
would  not  the position  of  the  medius  terminus  bc 
more natural,  and show  the  agreement or  disagree- 
ment of  the extremes  clearer  and better,  if  it were 
placed in the middle  between  them? which might bc 
easily done by transposing the propositions, and making 
the rnedius ternzinzu the predicate of the first, and thc 
subject of the second.  As thus, 
'(  Omnis homo est animal, 
Oinne animal est vivens, 
Ergo omnis homo est vivens." 
"  Omne corpus est extensum et solid~~n~, 
Nullum extensum et solidum est pura extensio, 
Ergo corpus non est pura extensio." 
I need not trouble my  reader  with instances in  syl- 
logisms, whose conclusions are particular.  The same 
reason holds for the same form in them, as well as in 
the general. 
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1. Reason  $ 9.  Reason,  though it penetrates into 
fails us hr  the depths of  the sea and earth, elevates 
want of  our thoughts  as high as the  stars,  and 
ideas.  leads us through the vast spaces and large 
rooms of  this mighty fabric,  yet it comes far short of 
the real extent of even corporeal being ;  and there are 
many instances wherein it fails us : as, 
First,  it perfectly fails us where our ideas fail.  It 
neither does, nor  can extend itself  farther than they 
do.  And therefore wherever we  have  no  ideas,  our 
reasoning stops,  and we are at an end of our reckon- 
ing : and if at any time we reason about words, which 
do not  stand for  any  ideas,  it is  only  about  those 
sounds, and nothing else. 
2. Because  $  10.  Secondly,  our  reason  is  often 
of obscure  puzzled and at a loss,  because of  the ob- 
and imper-  scurity,  confusion,  or imperfection of  the 
fect ideas.  ideas it is employed about; and there we 
are involved in difficulties and contradictions.  Thus, 
not having any perfect idea of the least extension of 
matter nor of infinity, we are at a loss about the &vi- 
sibility  of  matter ; but  having  perfect,  clear,  and 
distinct ideas of number,  our reason meets with none 
of those inextricable difficulties in numbers,  nor finds 
itself involved in any contradictions about them.  Thus, 
we having but imperfect ideas of the operations of our 
minds,  and of  the beginning  of  motion  or  thought, 
how the mind produces either of them in us, and much 
imperfecter  yet of  the operation  of  God; run into 
great difficulties  about  free  created  agents,  which 
reason cannot well extricate itself out of. 
$  11. Thirdly, our reason is often at a 
3. For want 
of  interme-  stand, because it perceives not those ideas 
diate ideas.  which could  serve to show the certain or 
probable  agreement or  disagreement of 
any other two ideas : and in this some men's  faculties 
far outgo others.  Till algebra, that great instrument 
and instance of human sagacity, was discovered, men, 
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with amazement, looked on several of  the deinonstrn- 
tions of ancient mathematicians, and could scarce for- 
bear to think the finding several of those proofs to be 
something more than hunian. 
$  14.  ~ourthl~,  the mind,  by proceed- 
ing upon false principles, is often engaged  :i:?rgSe 
in absurdities and difficulties, brought into  r,rincinles. 
straits and contradictions, without know- 
ing how to free itself; and in that case it is in vain to 
implore the help of reason, unless it be to discover the 
falsehood  and  reject  the  influence  of  those  wrong 
principles.  Reason  is  so  far  from  clearing the dif- 
ficulties  which  the building  upon  false  foundations 
brings a man into,  that if  he will  pursue  it,  it en- 
tangles  him  the more,  and  engages  him  deeper  in 
perplexities. 
$ 13. Fifthly, as obscure and iniperfect  5. Becar~sc 
ideas  often involve  our reason,  so, upon  of doubtful 
the same ground, do dubious words,  and 
uncertain signs, often in discourses and arguings, when 
not warily attended to, puzzle men's reason, and bring 
them to a nonplus.  But these two latter are our fault, 
and not the fault of reason.  But yet the consequences 
of them are nevertheless obvious ;  and the pcrplexitics 
or errors they fill men's  minds with  are every wllero 
observable. 
$ 14.  Some of the ideas that are in the  Our 
mind are so there,  that they can  be  by  degree of 
themselves immediately compared one with  knowledge 
another :  and in these the mind is able to  :ikz;i~,",-t-t 
perceive  that they agree or  disagree as  so,,;,g. 
clearly as that it  has them.  Thus the mind 
perceives that an arch of a circle is less than the whole 
circle, as clearly as it does the idea of  a circle ;  and this 
therefore, as has been said, I call intuitive knowledge, 
which is certain, beyond all doubt, and needs no pro- 
bation, nor can have any ;  this being tlie highest of all 
human certainty.  In this consists the evidence of all 
those maxims, which nobody has any doubt about, but 
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every man  (does not,  as is  said,  only assent to, but) 
knows to be true as soon as ever they are proposed to 
his understanding.  In the discovery of, and assent to 
these truths, there is no use of  the discursive faculty, 
no need of  reasoning,  but they are known by  a  su- 
perior and higher degree of evidence.  And such, if I 
may guess at things unknown, I am apt to think that 
angels have now,  and  the spirits of  just  men made 
perfect shall have,  in  a future state, of  thousands of 
things,  which  now  either  wholly  escape our  appre- 
hensions,  or  which,  our  short-sighted  reason having 
got some  faint  glimpse  of,  we,  in the dark,  grope 
after. 
~1,~  next is  €J  15.  But though we  have,  here  and 
demonstra-  there,  a  little  of  this  clear  light,  some  "  - 
tiOnbyrca-  sparks  of  bright  knowledge;  yol  the 
soning.  greatest part of  our ideas are such,  that 
we  cannot Zscern  their  agreement  or disagreement 
by an immediate comparing them.  And in all these 
we  have  need of  reasoning,  and must,  by  discourse 
and inference,  make our discoveries.  Now  of  these 
there are two sorts, which I shall take the liberty to 
mention here again. 
First, those whose agreement or disagreement, though 
it cannot  be  seen by an immediate putting them to- 
gether,  yet may be  examined  by the intervention of 
other ideas which  can  be  compared with them.  In 
this case, when the agreement or disagreement of  the 
intermediate idea, on both sides wit11 those which we 
would compare, is plainly discerned, there it amounts 
to a demonstration, whereby knowledge is produced ; 
which,  though it be certain,  yet it is not so easy nor 
altogether so clear as intuitive knowledge.  Because 
in that there is barely one simple intuition,  wherein 
there is no room for any the least  mistake or doubt; 
the truth is seen all perfectly at once.  In demonstra- 
tion,  it is true, there is  intuition  too,  hut not  alto- 
gether at once ; for there must be a remembrance of 
the intuition of  the agreement of  the medium,  or in- 
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termediate idea, with that we con~pared  it with before, 
when we compare it with the 'other; and where there 
be many mediums, there the danger of the mistake is 
the greater.  For each agreement or disagreement of 
the ideas must be  observed and seen in each  step of 
the whole train, and retained in the memory just as it 
is ;  and the mind must be sure that no part of what is 
necessary to make up the demonstration is omitted or 
overlooked.  This makes  some  demonstrations  long 
and perplexed,  and too hard for those who have not 
strength of  parts distinctly to perceive,  and exactly 
carry, so many particulars orderly ill their heads.  And 
even those who are able to master such intricate spe- 
culations  are fain  sometimes to go over  them again, 
and there is need of more than one review before they 
can arrive at certainty.  But yet where the mind clearly 
retains the intuition it had  of  the  agreement of  any 
idea with another, ancl that with a third, and that with 
a fourth, &c. there the agreement of the first and the 
fourth is a demonstration, and produces certain know- 
ledge, which may be called rational knowledge, as the 
other is intuitive. 
8  16.  Secondly, there are other ideas,  TO  Supply 
whose agreement or disagreement can no  the narrow- 
otherwise be judged of but by the  inter-  ness of this, 
vention of  others, which  have  not a  cer-  g!~;",~' 
tain agreement with the extremes, but an  judgment 
usual or likely one :  and in these it is that  up011  pro- 
 he judgment is properly exercised, which  bab!erea, 
is  the acquiescing of  the mind,  that any  sonlng. 
ideas  do agree,  by  comparing  them with  such  pro- 
bable mediums.  This,  though  it  never  ainounts to 
knowledge, no not to that which is the lowest degree 
of it; yet  sometimes  the intermediate ideas tie  the 
extremes so firmly together, and the probability is so 
clear and strong, that assent as  necessarily follows it 
as knowledge does demonstration.  The great excel- 
lency and use of the judgment is to observe right, and 
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probability ; and then,  casting them up all right to- 
gether, clroose that side which has the overbalance. 
Intuition,  $  17.  Intuitive knowledge is  the per- 
demonstma-  ception of  the certain  agreement or dis- 
tion, judg-  agreement of  two ideas immediately com- 
ment.  pared together. 
Rational knowledge is the perception of the certain 
agreement or disagreement of any two ideas,  by the 
intervention of one or more other ideas. 
Judgment is  the thinking or taking two ideas to 
agree or disagree, by the intervention of  one or more 
ideas,  whose certain agreement or disagreement with 
them it does not perceive,  but hath observed  to be 
frequent and usual. 
$  IS. Though the deducing one propo- 
Conse- 
quences of  sition from another,  or making inferences 
words, and  in words,  be  a great part of  reason,  and 
conse-  that which it is usually employed about ; 
guenceaof  yet the principal  act  of  ratiocination  is 
ideas.  the finding  the  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment of  two  ideas  one  with  another,  by the inter- 
vention of  a  third.  As  a  man,  by a  yard,  finds two 
houses to be of the same length, which  could not be 
brought  together to measure their equality by juxta- 
position.  Words have their consequences, as the signs 
of such ideas: and things agree or disagree,  as really 
they are ;  but we observe it only by our ideas. 
Pour sorts of  $ 19. Before  we  quit  this  subject,  it 
may be worth our wliile a little to reflect 
on four  sorts of  arguments that men,  in 
their reasonings with others, do ordinarily make use of 
to prevail on their assent; or at least so to awe them, 
. 
as to silence their opposition. 
1. Ad  vere-  First,  the first is to allege the opinions 
cundiam.  of  men, whose parts, learning,  eminency, 
vower,  or some other cause has gained a 
name,  and  iettled their  reputation in the common 
esteem writ11  some kind of  authority.  When men are 
established  in any  kind  of  dignity,  it is  thought  a 
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breach  of  modesty  for  others  to derogate  any  way 
from it, and question the authority of men who are in 
possession of it.  This is apt to be censured, as carry- 
ing with it too much of  pride, when a man does not 
readily yield to the determination of approved authors, 
which  is wont to be  received  with respect  and  sub- 
mission by others;  and it is looked upon as insolence 
for a man to set  up and  adhere to his own  opinion, 
against the current stream of  antiquity ;  or to put it 
in the balance against that of some learned doctor, or 
otherwise approved writer.  Whoever backs his tenets 
with such authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry 
the cause,  and is ready to style it impudence i11  any 
one who shall stand out against them.  This, I think, 
may be called argumenturn ad verecundiam. 
$ 10. Secondly,  another way that men  2. Ad  igno- 
ordinarily use  to drive  others,  and force 
them to submit their judgments,  and re- 
ceive the opinion  in debate,  is to require the adver- 
sary to admit what they allege as a proof, or to assign 
a better.  And this I call arzunzentum ad ignoruntium.  " 
$ 2 1.  Thirdly, a third way is  to press 
3. Ad homi-  a man with consequences drawn from his  nem. 
own  vrinciples  or  concessions.  This  is 
already kniwn under  the name  of  argurnenttcrz1  ad 
hominem. 
FJ  22.  Fourthly, the fourth is the using  4. Adjudi- 
of  proofs drawn from any of  the founda-  ci~ 
tions of knowledge or probability.  This I call argu- 
mentum adjudicium.  This alone, of all the four, brings 
true instruction with it, and advances us in our way to 
knowledge.  For,  1.  It  argues  not  another  man's 
opinion to be right, because I, out of  respect, or any 
other consideration  but that of  conviction,  will  not 
contradict him.  2.  It proves not another man to be 
in the right way,  nor that I ought to take the same 
with him, because I know not a better.  3.  Nor does 
it follow that another man is in the right way, because 
he has shown me that I am in the wrong.  I may be 136  Reason.  Book 4. 
modest,  and therefore not oppose another man's  per- 
suasion : I may be ignorant,  and not be  able to yro- 
duce a better: I may be in an error, and another may 
show me that I am so.  This may dispose me, perhaps, 
for the reception  of  truth,  but helps me not  to it; 
that must come from proofs and arguments, and light 
arising from the nature of things themselves,  and not 
from my shamefacedness, ignorance, or error. 
Above,  5 23.  By what has been before said of 
trary, and  reason, we may be able to make some guess 
at the distinction of things into those that  to reason.  are according to,  above,  and contrary to 
reason.  1. According to reason are such propositions, 
whose truth we can discover by examining and tracing 
those ideas we have from sensation and reflection,  and 
by natural deduction find  to be true or probable.  2. 
Above  reason  are such propositions,  whose truth or 
probability we  cannot  by  reason  derive from  those 
principles.  3.  Contrary to reason are such proposi- 
tions,  as are inconsistent with,  or  irreconcilable to, 
our clear and distinct  ideas.  Thus the existence  of 
one God is according to reason ;  the existence of  more 
than one God contrary to reason; the resurrection of 
the dead  above  reason.  Farther,  as  above  reason 
may be taken in a double sense, viz. either as signify- 
ing above  probability,  or above certainty ; so in that 
large sense  also,  contrary  to reason,  is,  I  suppose, 
sometimes taken. 
Reason and  5 24. There is another use of the word 
faith no  top-  reason,  wherein  it is  opposed  to faith ; 
pcsite.  which  though it be  in itself  a  very im- 
proper way of speaking,  yet common  use has so  au- 
thorized it, that it would  be folly either to oppose or 
hope to remedy it: only I think  it may not be amiss 
to take notice, that however faith be opposed to rea- 
son, faith is nothing  but a firm  assent  of  the mind : 
which  if  it be  regulated,  as  is  our duty, cannot be 
afforded to any thing but upon good reason ;  and so 
cannot be opposite to it.  He that believes, without 
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having any reason  for believing,  may be in love with 
his own fancies ; but neither seeks truth as he ought, 
nor pays the obedience due to his Maker, who would 
have him use those discerning faculties he has given 
him, to keep him out of  mistake and error.  He that 
does  not  this  to  the  best  of  his  power,  however 
he sometimes lights on truth, is  in the right but by 
chance ; and I know not whether the luckiness of the 
accident will excuse the irregularity of his proceeding. 
This at least is certain,  that he must be accountable 
for whatever mistakes he runs into: whereas he that 
makes  use  of  the light  and faculties God has given 
him,  and  seeks  sincerely to discover  truth by  those 
helps and abilities he has, may have this satisfaction in 
doing his duty as a rational creature, that, though he 
should miss truth, he will not miss  the reward of it. 
For he governs  his  assent  right, and places  it as he 
should,  who,  in any case  or  matter  whatsoever, be- 
lieves or disbelieves,  according as reason directs him. 
He that doth otherwise, trarisgresses against his  own 
light, and misuses those faculties which were given to 
him  to  no  other  end  but to search  and follow  the 
clearer evidence and greater probability.  But since 
reason and faith are by some men opposed, we will so 
consider them in the following chapter. 
CHAPTER  XVIII. 
OJ  E'critlr  and Reason,  and their distinct Proui~lces. 
$  1.  IT has been above shown,  1.  That  N ,,,,, a,y 
we  are of  rlecessity ignorant,  and want  to know 
knowledge  of  all  sorts,  where  we  want  their 
ideas.  8. That we are ignorant, and want  boundaries. 
rational knowledge,  where we want proofs.  3.  That 
we want certain knowledge  and  certainty,  as far as 
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we want  probability to direct our assent  in matters 
where we have neither knowledge of our own, nor tes- 
timony of other men, to bottom our reason upon. 
From these things thus premised, I think we may 
come to lay down  the measures  and boundaries be- 
tween  faith  and reason ;  the want whereof  may pos- 
sibly have been the cause,  if not  of  great disorders, 
yet at least of great disputes, and perhaps mistakes in 
the world.  For till it be resolved how far we are to 
be guided by reason, and how far by faith, we shall in 
vain dispute, and endeavour to convince one  another 
in matters of religion. 
Faith and  § 2. I find every sect, as far as reason 
reasonwl~at,  will help them, make use of it gladly :  and 
as contra-  where it fails them they cry out, it  is mat- 
tlistin- 
guished.  ter of faith, and above reason.  And I do 
not see how they can argue with any one, 
or ever convince a  gainsayer who  makes  use  of  the 
same  plea,  without  setting  down  strict boundaries 
between faith and reason; which ought to be the first 
ooint established in all questions, where faith has any 
ihing to do. 
- 
Reason  therefore  here,  as contradistinguished  to 
faith, I take to he the discovery  of  the certainty or 
probability of such propositions  or truths, which the 
mind  arrives at by deduction  made from  such ideas 
which it  has got by the use of its natural faculties, viz. 
by sensation-or  rdection. 
Faith,  on the other side, is the assent to any pro- 
position,  not  thus  made  out  by  the  deductions  of 
reason;  but upon the credit of  the proposer, as corn- 
ing from God, in  some extraordinary way of commu- 
nication.  This way of  discovering truths to men we 
call revelation. 
N~ new nim.  8 3.  First then I say,  that  no man in- 
nle idea can  sDired by God can by any revelation  -  .-  com- 
beconveyed  $unicatl  to others iny new simple ideas, 
' 
by traditi- 
onal revcla-  which they had not before from sensation 
tion.  or reflection.  For whatsoever impressions 
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he himself may have from the immediate hand of God, 
this revelation, if it be of new simple ideas, cannot be 
conveyed  to  another,  either  by  words  or any other 
signs.  Because words, by their immediate operation on 
us, cause no  other ideas but of  their natural sounds : 
it is by the custom of using them for  signs,  that 
they excite and revive in our minds latent ideas ; but 
yet only such ideas as were there before.  For words 
seen or heard recal to our thoughts  those ideas only 
which to us they have been wont  to be signs of; but 
cantlot introduce any perfectly new, and formerly un- 
known simple ideas.  The same holds in all other signs, 
which  cannot signify to us  things of which we  have 
before never had any idea at all. 
Thus whatever things were discovered to St. Paul, 
when he was rapt up into the third heaven,  whatever 
new ideas his mind there received,  all the description 
he can make to others of  that place is only this, that 
there are such things,  cc as eye hath not seen, nor ear 
heard, nor hnth it entered into the heart of man to  con- 
ceive."  And supposing God should discover to any one, 
supernaturally,  a species of  creatures inhabiting, for 
example, Jupiter  or Saturn,  (for that it is possible there 
may be such nobody can deny) which had six senses ; 
and imprint on his mind the ideas conveyed  to theirs 
by that sixth sense ;  he could no more, by words, pro- 
duce in the minds of  other men those ideas,imprlnted 
by that sixth sense,  than one of us could convey the 
idea of any colour by the sounds of words into a man, 
who, Laving the other four senses perfect, had always 
totally wanted the fifth of seeing.  For our simple idem 
then, which are the foundation and sole matter of all 
our notions and knowledge, we must depend wholly on 
our reason, I mean our natural faculties ;  and can by 
no means receive them, or any of them, from traditional 
revelation ;  I say, traditional revelation, in distinction 
to original revelation.  By the one, I mean  that first 
impression, which is made immediately by God, on the 
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and by the other, those impressions delivered over to 
others in words,  and the ordinary ways of  conveying 
our conce~tions  one to another.  .-.-  --  L 
$4. Secondly, I say, that the same truths 
Traditional 
revelation  may be  discovered,  and  conveyed  down 
from revelation, which are discoverable to 
us itnow  US by reason,  and  bv  those ideas we na- 
propositions  turaily may have.  56 God might, by re- 
knowable 
also by rea-  velation, discover the truth of any proposi- 
son, but not  tion in  Euclid;  as  well  as  men,  by  the 
with the  natural use  of  their  faculties,  come  to 
Same  cer-  make  the  discovery  themselves.  In all 
tainty that 
reason doth.  things of this kind, there is little need or 
use  of  revelation,  God  having. furnished 
us  with natural  and  surer  means  to  arrive  at the 
knowledge of  them.  For whatsoever truth we  come 
to the clear  discovery  of,  from  the knowledge  and 
contemplation  of  our own  ideas,  will  always be cer- 
tainer to us than those  which  are conveyed  to us by 
traditional revelation.  For the knowledge we  have, 
that this revelation came at first from God, can never 
be so sure,  as the knowledge we  have from the clear 
and distinct perception of the agreement or disagree- 
ment of our own ideas ;  a. g.  if it were revealed some 
ages since,  that the three  angles of  a triangle were 
equal to two right ones.'I  might  assent to the truth 
of that proposition,  upon the credit of  the tradition, 
that it was  revealed;  but  that would never amount 
to so great a certainty as the knowledge of  it, upon 
the comparing and measuring  my own ideas of  two 
right angles, and the three angles of a triangle.3 The 
like holds  in matter of fact, knowable by our senses ; 
v. g. the history of  the deluge is  conveyed to us by 
writings which had their original from revelation :  and 
yet nobody,I thiiik,will say he  has as certain and clear a 
knowledge  of the flood as Noah that saw it; or that 
he himself would have had, had he then been alive and 
seen it.  For he has no greater assurance than that of 
his senses  tliat it is writ  in  the book  sl~pposeil  writ 
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by Moses inspired ; but he has not so great an assur- 
ance  that Moses  writ  that book  as  if  he  had  seen 
Moses write it.  So that the assurance of its being a 
revelation is less still than the assurance of his senses. 
9 5.  In propositions  then,  whose  cer- 
Revelation  tainty is built upon  the clear  perception  b, 
of the agreement  01.  disagreement of  our  admitted 
ideas, attained either by immediate intui-  against the 
tion, as in self-evident propositions, or by 
~~~~ee~~.-  evident deductions of reason in demonstra- 
tions, we need  not the assistance of reve- 
lation, as necessary to gain our assent, and introduce 
them  into our minds.  Because  the natural ways  of 
knowledge  could  settle them  there,  or had  done it 
already; which is  the greatest assurance we can pos- 
sibly have of any thing, unless where God immediately 
reveals it to us:  and there too our assurance can be 
no greater than our Itnowledge is, that it is a revelation 
from God.  Hut yet nothing, I think, can, under that 
title,  shake  or  over-rule  plain  knowledge ; or ra- 
tionally prevail with any man to admit it for true, in a 
direct contradiction to the clear evidence of his own 
understanding.  For since no evidence of our faculties, 
by which we  receive such  revelations,  can exceed,  if 
equal,  the certainty of our intuitive knowledee,  we 
can never receive for a truth any thing that is directly 
contrary to our clear and distinct knowledge : v.g. the 
ideas of one body, and one place, do so clearly agree, 
and  the mind  has  so  evident  a  perception  of  their 
agreement, that we can never assent to a proposition, 
that affirms the same body to be in two distant places 
at  once, however it should pretend to the authority of a 
divine revelation :  since the evidence, first, that we de- 
ceive not ourselves,  in ascribing it to God ; secondly, 
that we understand it right ; can never be so great as 
the evidence of our own intuitive knowledge, whereby 
we discern it impossible for the same body to be in two 
places at once.  And therefore no proposition can be 
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to  all such, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive 
knowledge.  Because  this would  be  to subvert the 
principles  and  foundations  of  all  knowledge,  evi- 
dence, and assent whatsoever:  and there would be left 
no difference between  truth and  falsehood,  no mea- 
sures  of  credible  and  incredible  in  the  world,  if 
doubtful propositions shall take place before self-evi- 
dent,  and what we  certainly know give way to what 
we  may  possibly  be  mistaken  in.  In propositions 
therefore  contrary  to  the  clear  perception  of  the 
agreement or disagreement of any of  our ideas, it will 
be in vain  to urge them as  matters of  faith.  They 
cannot  move  our  assent  under  that or  any  other 
title whatsoever.  For faith can never convince us of 
any thing that contradicts our  knowledge.  Because 
though  faith  be  founded  on  the testimony  of  God 
(who cannot lie) revealing any proposition to us ;  yet 
we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being 
a divine revelation greater than our own linowledge : 
since  the  whole  strength  of  the certainty depends 
upon our knowledge that God revealed  it ;  which in 
this  case,  where  the proposition  supposed  revealed 
contradicts our knowledge or reason, will always have 
this objection hanging to it,  viz.  that we cannot tell 
how to conceive that to come from ~odsthe  bountiful 
Author of our being, which, if received  for true, must 
overturn all the principles  and foundations of know- 
ledge he has given us;  render  all our faculties use- 
less;  wholly destroy the most excellent  part of  his 
workmanship, our understandings ;  and put a man in 
a  condition,  wherein  he  will  have  les  light,  less 
conduct, than the beast  that perishet d For if the 
mind of man  can never have a clearer  (and perhaps 
not so clear) evidence of any thing to be a divine reve- 
lation, as it has of the principles of  its own reason, it 
can never have a ground to quit the clear evidence of 
its reason, to give a place to a proposition, whose reve- 
lation has not a greater evidence than those principles 
have. 
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5 6.  Thus far a man has use of reason,  Traditional 
and ought to hearken to it, even in imme-  revelation 
diate  and original  revelation,  where it is  much less* 
supposed to be made to himself: but to all those who 
pretend not to immediate revelation,  but are required 
to pay obedience, and to receive  the truths revealed 
to others, which by  the tradition of writings, or word 
of  mouth, are conveyed down to them ;  reason  has a 
great deal more to do, and is that only which can in- 
duce us  to receive  them.  For matter of faith being 
only divine revelation, and nothing else ;  faith, as we 
use the word, (called  commonly divine faith)  has  to 
do with no propositions but those which are supposed 
to be  divinely revealed.  So that I do not  see  how 
those, who  make  revelation  alone  the sole  object of 
faith, can say, that it is a matter of faith, and not  of 
reason,  to believe  that such or such a proposition, to 
be found in such or such a book, is of  divine  inspira- 
tion ;  unless it be revealed,  that that proposition,  or 
all in that book, was communicated by divine inspira- 
tion.  Without such  a  revelation,  the  believing  or 
not believing that proposition or book to be of divine 
authority  can  never  be  matter  of  faith,  but matter 
of  reason;  and such as I must come to an assent to 
only by the use of my reason, which can never require 
or enable me to believe  that which is contrary to it- 
self:  it being impossible for  reason  ever  to procure 
any assent to that, which to itself  appears unreason- 
able. 
In all things,  therefore,  where we have clear evi- 
dence from our ideas,  and those  principles of  know- 
ledge I have  above-mentioned,  reason  is  the proper 
judge ;  and revelation,  though it may in consenting 
with it confirm  its dictates, yet cannot in  such cases 
invalidate its decrees :  nor can we  be  obliged, where 
we have the clear and evident sentence of reason, to 
quit it for the contrary opinion, under a pretence that 
it is  matter of  faith; which  can have  no  authority 
against the plain and clear dictates of reason. 1 44  PnidJr  nnd Renson.  Book 4. 
$  7.  But,  thirdly,  there  being  nlany 
Tilings 
above  things,  wherein  we  have  very  imperfect 
reason,  notions, or none at all ; and other things, 
of  whose  past,  present,  or  future exist- 
tence,  by  the  natural  use  of  our  faculties,  we  call 
have no knowledge at all ;  these, as being beyond the 
discovery of  our natural faculties, and above  rcason, 
are, when revealed, the proper matter of faith.  Thus, 
that part of  the  angels  rebelled  against  God,  and 
thereby lost their first happy state ;  and that the dead 
shall rise, and  live  again: these,  and the like, being 
l~eycnd  the discovery of reason, are purely matters of 
faith, with which  reason has directly nothing to do. 
or not con-  $8.  But since God in giving us the light 
trary to re&-  of reason has not thereby tied up his own 
son, if' re-  hands from  affording us, when he tl~il>!is 
fit, the light of  revelation in arp of those 
matter of 
faith.  matters wherein our natural faculties are 
able to give a probable determination ;  re- 
velation, where God has been pleased to give it, must 
carry it against  the probable  conjectures  of  reason. 
Because  the mind  not  being  certain  of the truth of 
that it does not evidently kvow,  but only yielding to 
the probability that appears in it, is bound to give up 
its assent  to such a testimony ;  which, it is  satisfied, 
comes from one who cannot err, and will not deceive. 
But yet it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth 
of its  being a revelation,  and of  the  signification  of 
tlic  ~vords  wherein  it is  delivered.3  Indeed,  if  any 
thing shall be  thonght  revelation which  is contrary 
to the  plain  principles  of  reason,  and  the evident 
knowledge the mind has of its own clear and distinct 
ideas; there  reason  must  be  hearkened  to,  as  to  a 
matter  within  its province:  since  a  man  can  never 
have so certain a knowledge, that a proposition, which 
coiitradicts  the clear  principles  and  evidence  of  his 
01211  Iiriowlcdge, was divinely revealctl, or that he un- 
clcrstantls tlic words  rightly wlicrciil  it is  clclivcrctl; 
as lic  has, that tlic contrary is truc:  and  so is boulltl 
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to consider and judge of it as a matter of reason,  and 
not  swallow  it, without  examination,  as a matter  of 
faith. 
9 9.  First, whatever  proposition  is  re-  Revelation  vealed, of whose truth our mind, by its na-  in matters 
tural faculties and notions,  cannot iudae:  where rea- 
that is purely matter of faith,  anduab:vd  ?:G::''t 
reason. ;  probably, 
Secondly, all  propositions,  whereof the  oug~~t  to l,e 
mind, by the use  of  its natural faculties,  hearkened. 
can come  to determine and judge  from 
naturally acquired  ideas,  are matter of  reason ;  with 
this  difference still, that in those concerning which it 
has but an uncertain evidence, and so is persuaded of 
their  truth only upon  probable grounds, which  still 
admit a possibility of the contrary to be true, without 
doing violence  to  the  certain  evidence  of  its own 
knowledge,  and overturning the principles of its own 
reason ;  in such probable propositions, I say, an evident 
revelation ought to determine our assent even against 
probability.  For where the principles of reason have 
not  evidenced  a proposition  to be  certainly  true or 
false,  there  clear  revelation,  as  another  principle of 
truth, and ground of assent, may determine ;  and so it 
may be  matter of faith,  and be  also  above  reason. 
Because reason, in that particular  matter, being able 
to reach  no higher  than probability, faith gave the 
determination, where reason came short ;  and revela- 
tion discovered on which side the truth lay. 
$  10.  Thus far the dominion  of  faith 
In matters  reaches, and that without any violence or  where rea-  hinderance to  reason ;  which is not injured  son can af- 
or disturbed, but assisted  and improved,  ford certain 
by new discoveries  of  truth coming from  ~~~f~f~e 
the eternal fountain  of  all  knowledge.  hearkened 
Whatever God hath revealed, is certainly  to. 
true ; no doubt can be made of it.  This 
is  the proper  object  of  faith:  but whether  it be  a 
divine  revelation  or no,  reason  must judge ; which 
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can never permit the mind to reject a greater evidence 
to embrace what is less evident, nor allow it to enter- 
tain probability in  opposition to knowledge and cer- 
tainty.  There can  be  no  evidence  that  any  tradi- 
tional revelation is of divine original, in the words we 
receive it, and in the sense we  understand it, so clear 
and so certain  as  that of  the principles  of  reason : 
and therefore  nothing that is contrary to, and incon- 
sistent with, the clear and self-evident dictates of rea- 
son, has a right to be urged or assented to as a matter 
of faith, wherein  reason  hath nothing to do.  What- 
soever is divine  revelation  ought to over-rule  all our 
opinions, prejudices, and interest, and hath a right to 
be  received  with full  assent.  Such a .submission  as 
this, of  our reason to faith, takes not away the land- 
marks of knowledge : this shakes not the foundations 
of reason, but leaves  us that use of  our faculties for 
which they were given us. 
If the boun-  § 11. If the provinces of faith and rea- 
dariesbenot  son are not kept distinct by these bounda- 
set between  ries, there will, in  matters of  religion, be 
faith and  no room for reason  at all ;  and those ex- 
reason, no 
enthusiasm  travagant  opinions  and ceremonies  that 
or  are to be found in the several religions of  . .  ~  .  .~  .. 
gancy in re-  the world will  not deserve to be Yblamed. 
figion can be  For to this  crying  up of faith, in opposi- 
contradict-  tion to reason,  we  may, I think, in  good  ed. 
measure ascribe those absurdities that fill 
almost all the relig-ions which possess and divide man- 
kind.  For men having been principled with an opinion, 
that they must not  consult reason  in  the  things  of 
religion, however apparently contradictory to common 
sense, and the very principles of  all their knowledge, 
have let looss their fancies and natural superstition; 
and have been by them led into so  strange opinions, 
and extravagant  practices  in  religion,  that a consi- 
derate man  cannot  but stand amazed at their follies, 
and judge them so far from  being  acceptable  to the 
great and wise  God,  that  he cannot  avoid  thinking 
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them  ridiculous,  and.  offensive to a sober  good  man. 
So that, in effect, religion, which  should most  distin- 
pish us  from  beasts,  and ought most  peculiarly to 
elevate us,  as rational creatures, above brutes, is that 
wherein inen often  appear most  irrational and more 
senseless  than  beasts  themselves.  "Credo,  quia im- 
possibile  est ;" I  believe,  because  it  is  impossible, 
might in a good man pass for a sally of zeal ;  but would 
prove a very ill rule for men to choose their opinions 
or religion by. 
CHAPTER XIX. 
Of  Enthusiasm. 
$  1. HE that wo~~ld  seriously set upon  L,,, 
the search of truth, ought,in the first place,  truth neces- 
to prepare his mind with a love of it.  For  sary. 
he that loves it not mill not take much pains to get it, 
nor be much concerned when he misses it.  There is 
nobody in the common~vealth  of  learning who  does 
not profess himself a lover of truth;  and there is not 
a rational creature that would not take it amiss to be 
thought otherwise of.  And yet, for  all this, one may 
truly say, that there  are very few lovers of truth for 
truth-sake, even  amongst  those who  persuade them- 
selves that they are so.  How a man may know whe- 
ther he be so in earnest, is worth inquiry :  and I think 
there is  one  unerring mark  of  it, viz. the not enter- 
taining  any  with  greater assurance than 
the proofs  it is built  upon  will warrant.  W-hoever 
goes  beyond  this  measure  of  assent, it is plain,  re- 
ceives not truth in the love of  it ; loves  not truth for 
truth-sake, but for some  other  by-end.  For the evi- 
dence that any propositiorl is true (except such as are 
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self-evident)  lying only in the proofs a man has of it, 
whatsoever degrees of assent he affords it beyond the 
degrees  of  that evidence, it is plain that all the sur- 
plusage of assurance is owing to some other affection, 
and not to the love of truth: it being  as  impossible 
that the love  of  truth should carry my assent above 
the evidence there is to me that it is true, as that the 
love of truth should make me assent to any proposi- 
tion for the sake of  that evidence,  which it has  not, 
that it is true ;  which  is in effect to love it as a truth 
because it is possible  or  probable that it may not be 
true.  In any truth that gets not  possession  of  our 
minds by the irresistible  light of  self-evidence, or by 
the force of  demonstration,  the arguments that gain 
it assent are the vouchers and gage of its probability 
to us;  and we can  receive it for no  other than  such 
as they deliver  it to our  understandings.  Whatso- 
ever  credit  or  authority we  give to any proposition, 
more than it receives from the principles  and proofs 
it supports itself  upon, is  owing to our inclinations 
that way,  and is so far a derogation from the love of 
truth as such; which,  as it can  receive  no  evidence 
from our passions or interests, so it should receive no 
tincture from them. 
A forward-  § 2. The assuming an authority of dic- 
ness to dic-  tating to  others,  and a  forwardness  to 
tate, fron1  prescribe to their  opinions,  is a constant 
whence.  concomitant of this bias and corruption of 
our judgments.  For how almost can it be otherwise, 
but that  he should  be  ready to impose on another's 
belief, who  has  already imposed  on  his own ?  Who 
can reasonably expect arguments and conviction from 
him, in  dealing with  others, whose  ~lnderstanding  is 
not accustomed to them in his  dealing with  himself? 
Who does  violence  to his  own  faculties,  tyrannizes 
over his own mind,  and usurps  the prerogative that 
belongs  to  truth alone, which is to command  assent 
by only its own  authority, i. e. by and  in  proportion 
to that evidence which it carries with it. 
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$ 3. Upon this occasion I shall take the 
Force of ell-  liberty to consider a third  ground  of  as-  thusiasmm 
sent, which with  some men has the same 
authority,  and is  as confidently  relied  on as either 
faith or reason ;  I mean enthusiasm :  which, laying by 
reason, would set up revelation without it.  Whereby 
in effect  it takes away  both  reason  and revelation, 
and substitutes in the room of it the ungrounded fan- 
cies  of  a man's  own  brain,  and assumes  them for a 
foundation both of opinion and conduct. 
$4. Reason is natural revelation, where- 
Reason 
by the eternal Father of  light, and foun-  revelation. 
tain  of  all  knowledge, communicates  to 
mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within 
the reach of their natural faculties :  revelation  is na- 
tural  reason  enlarged by  a  new  set  of  discoveries 
communicated  by  God  immediately,  which  reason 
vouches the  truth of, by the testimony and proofs it 
gives  that  they come  from  God.  So that he that 
takes  away reason,  to make way for revelation, puts 
out the light of both,  and  does much-what the same 
as if he would  persuade  a  man  to put out his eyes, 
the better to receive  the  remote light of an invisible 
star hy a telescope. 
§ 5. Immediate revelation being a much  Rise of en- 
easier way for men to establish their opi-  thusiasm. 
nions,  and  regulate  their  conduct,  than 
the tedious and not always successful labour of strict 
reasoning, it is no wonder that some have been very 
apt to pretend to revelation,  and to persuade  them- 
selves that they are under  the peculiar  guidance of 
heaven  in  their  actions  and  opinions,  especially  in 
those of them which  they cannot  account for by  the 
ordinary  methods  of  knowledge,  and  principles  of 
reason.  Hence we see that in all ages men,  in whom 
melancholy has mixed with  devotion, or whose  con- 
ceit of themselves has raised  them into an opinion of 
a greater familiarity with God,  and a  nearer  admit- 
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often  flattered  themselves  with  the  persuasion  of 
an  immediate  intercourse  with the Deity,  and fre- 
quent communications from the Divine Spirit.  God, 
I own, cannot be denied to be able to enlighten the 
by a  ray darted into the mind imme- 
diately from  the fountain of  light ;  this  they under- 
stand  he has promised  to do, and who then  has  so 
good a title to expect it as those who are his peculiar 
people,  chosen by him, and depending on him ? 
Enthusiasm.  $ 6.  "Their minds being thus  prepared, 
whate  d  er  groundless  opinion  comes  to 
settle itself strongly upon their fancies, is an illumina- 
tion from  he  spirit  of God,  and  presently of divine 
authority l  and whatsoever  odd  action  they  find  in 
themselves a strong inclination to do, that impulse is 
concluded to be a call or  direction from heaven,  and 
must be obeyed ;  it is  a  commission from above, and 
they cannot err in executing it. 
$ 7.  This I take to be properly enthusiasm, which, 
though founded  neither on reason nor  divine revela- 
tion, but rising from the conceits of a warmed or over- 
weening brain, works yet, where it once gets footing, 
more  powerfully on  the persuasions  and  actions  of 
men than either of those two, or both together : men 
being most  forwardly obedient  to the impulses they 
receive from  themselves ;  and  the whole  man is sure 
to  act  more  vigorously,  where  the  whole  man  is 
carried  by  a  natural  motion.  For  strong  conceit, 
like a new principle,  carries all easily with  it, when 
got above common sense, and freed from all restraint 
of  reason,  and check  of  reflection,  it is  heightened 
into a divine authority, in concurrence with our own 
temper and inclination. 
Enthusiasm  $ 8. Though the odd opinions and ex- 
mistaken for  travagant actions enthusiasm has run men 
seeing and  into were  enough to warn  them against 
feeling.  this wrong principle,  so  apt to misguide 
them both in their belief and conduct ;  yet the love of 
something extraordinary, the ease  and glory it is  to 
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be  inspired, and be  above the common  and  natura! 
ways of knowledge,  so flatters many men's  laziness, 
ignorance,  and vanity,  that when  once they are got 
into this way of immediate revelation, of illumination. 
without search,  and  of certainty without proof, and 
without examination,  it is a hard matter to get them 
out of it.  Reason is lost  upon them ;  they are above 
it :  they see the light infused  into their understand- 
ings, and cannot be  mistaken;  it is clear  and visible 
there, like the light, of  bright sunshine ;  shows itself, 
and needs no other proof but its own evidence:  they 
feel the hand  of  God moving  them within,  and the 
impulses  of  the spirit,  and  cannot  be  mistaken  in 
what they feel.  Thus they support themselves,  and 
are sure reason  hath nothing to do with what they 
see and feel in themselves :  what they have a sensible 
experience  of admits no  doubt, needs  no  probation. 
Would  he not be  ridiculous, who  should  require tb 
have it proved to him that the light shines, and that 
he sees it?  It is its own proof,  and can have no other. 
When the spirit brings light into our minds, it dispels 
darkness.  We see  it,  as we  do that  of the sun  at 
noon, and need not the twilight of reasoil to show it 
us.  This  light  from  heaven  is  strong,  clear,  and 
pure, carries its own  demonstration with it; and we 
may  as naturally take a  glow-worm  to assist  us to 
discover the sun, as to examine the celestial tay by 
our dim candle, reason. 
$ 9. This is the way of talking of these  Enthusiasm 
men:  they  are  sure,  because  they  are  ~~?'~~~d. 
sure :  and their persuasions are right, be- 
cause they are strong in them.  For, when what they 
say is stripped of the metaphor of seeing and feeling, 
this is a11  it amounts to :  and yet these similes so im- 
pose on  them, that they serve them  for  certainty in 
themselves,  and demonstration to others. 
§ 10. But to examine  a little soberly  this internal 
light, and this  feeling  on which  they build so much. 
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they have  awakened sense,  and they feel : this can- 
not,  they are sure,  be  disputed them.  For when a 
man says he sees  or feels,  nobody can  deny it him 
that he does so.  But here let me ask: this seeing, is 
it the perception of the truth of the proposition, or of 
this, that it is a  revelation  from God ?  This feeling, 
is  it a perception  of  an  inclination or fancy  to  do 
something,  or of  the spirit  of God  moving  that in- 
clination ?  These are two very different perceptions, 
and must be carefully distinguished, if we would not 
impose upon ourselves.  I may perceive  the truth of 
a proposition, and yet not perceive  that it is an im- 
mediate  revelation  from  God.  I  may  perceive  the 
truth of a proposition in Euclid, without its being, or 
my perceiving it to be, a revelation : nay, I may per- 
ceive I came not by this knowledge in a natural way, 
and so may conclude  it revealed, without perceiving 
that it is  a  revelation from God ;  because  there be 
spirits,  which, without  being  divinely commissioned, 
may excite those  ideas  in me, and lay them in such 
order before my mind, that I may perceive their con- 
nexion.  So that the knowledge  of  any proposition 
coming into my mind, I know not how, is not a per- 
ception that it is  from God.  Much less  is a strong 
persuasion that it is true, a perception that it is from 
God, or so  much as true.  But however  it be called 
light and seeing, I suppose it is at most but belief and 
assurance :  and the proposition taken for a revelation 
is not such  as they know to be true, but take to be 
true.  For where a  proposition is known to be true, 
revelation is needless :  and it is hard to conceive how 
there can be a revelation to any one of what he knows 
already.  If therefore it be a  proposition which they 
are persuaded, but do not know, to be true, whatever 
they may call it, it is not seeing, but believing.  For 
these  are two ways, whereby  truth  comes  into the 
mind,  wholly  distinct,  so  that  one is  not  the other. 
What I see, I know to bc  so by the evidence  of  the 
thing itself: what I believe., I take to be  so upon the 
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testimony of another :  but this testimony I must know 
to be given, or else what ground have I of believing? 
I must see  that it is God that reveals this  to me, or 
else I see  nothing.  The question  then here is, how 
do I know that God is the revealer of this to me; that 
this  impression  is made  upon  my mind  by his Holy 
Spirit,  and  that therefore I ought to obey it? If I 
know riot this, how great soever the assurance is that 
I am possessed with, it is groundless ;  whatever light 
I pretend to, it is but enthusiasm.  For whether the 
proposition  supposed to be revealed be in  itself evi- 
dently true,  or  visibly  probable,  or by  the natural 
ways  of  knowledge  uncertain,  the proposition  that 
must be well grounded, and manifested to be true, is 
this, that God is the revealer  of  it, and that what I 
take to be a revelation is  certainly put into my mind 
by him, and is not  an illusion  dropped in by some 
other spirit,  or raised  by  my  own  fancy.  For if I 
mistake not,  these men  receive  it for true,  because 
they presume God revealed it.  Does it  not then stand 
them  upon,  to examine  on what  grounds they pre- 
sume  it  to be  a revelation  from  God? or  else  all 
their confidence is mere presumption : and this light, 
they  are  so  dazzled  with,  is  nothing  but  an ignis 
fatuus, that leads them constantly round in this circle; 
it is a revelation,  because  they firmly believe  it, and 
they believe it, because it is a revelation. 
$ 11. In  all that is of divine revelation,  Enthusiasm 
there is need of no other proof but that it  f~~c~~~~- 
is  an inspiration  from  God : for he  can  the proposi. 
neither deceive nor be deceived.  But how  tion is from 
shall it be known that any proposition in  God. 
our minds is a  truth infused by God ; a 
truth that is revealed to us by him, which he declares 
to us,  and therefore we  ought  to believe ?  Here it is 
that enthusiasm  fails  of  the  evidence  it pretends to. 
For men thus ~ossessed  boast of a light whereby they 
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ledge of  this  or that truth. J~ut  if they know it to 
be a truth, they must know it to be  so, either by its 
own self-evidence to natural reason, or by the rational 
proofs  that make  it out to be s0.J  If they see  and 
know it to be  a truth, either  of these two ways, they 
in vain suppose it to be a revelation.  For they know 
it to be  true the same way that any other man na- 
turally may know that it is so without the help of re- 
velation.  For thus all the truths, of what kind soever, 
that men uninspired are enlightened with, came into 
their  minds,  and  are established  there.  If they say 
they  know it to be  true,  because  it is  a revelation 
from God, the reason is good: but then it will be de- 
manded  how they know  it to be  a  revelation  from 
God.  If  they  say,  by  the light  it brings  with  it, 
which shines  bright in  their  minds, and they cannot 
resist : I beseech  them to consider  whether  this  be 
any more than what we have taken notice of already, 
viz. that it is  a  revelation, because they strongly be- 
lieve it to be true.  For all the light they speak of is 
but a strong, though ungrounded, persuasion of their 
own minds, that it is a  truth.  For rational grounds 
from proofs that it is a truth, they must acknowledge 
to have none ;  for then it is not received as  a  revela- 
tion, but upon the ordinary grounds that other truths 
are received : and if  they believe  it to be  true, be- 
cause it is a  revelation, and have no other reason for 
its being a revelation, but because they are fully per- 
suaded, without any other reason, that it is true ;  they 
believe it to be a revelation only because they strongly 
believe it to be a  revelation ; which is a very unsafe 
ground to proceed  on,  either  in our  tenets  or  ac- 
tions.  And what  readier way  can  there  be  to run 
ourselves into the most  extravagant  errors and mis- 
carriages,than thus to set up fancy for our supreme and 
sole pide, and to believe any proposition to be true, 
any action to be  right,  only because we believe it to 
bc so? The strength of our persuasions is no evidence 
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at all of their own rectitude :  crooked things may be 
as stiff and inflexible  as straight: and men may be as 
positive and peremptory in error as in truth.  How 
come else the untractable zealots in different and op- 
posite parties ? For if the light, which every one thinks 
he has in his mind, which  in this case  is nothing but 
the strength of  his  own  persuasion,  be an  evidence 
that it is from God, contrary opinions have  the same 
title  to  inspirations ;  and God will  be  not  only  the 
father  of  lights,  but  of  opposite  and contradictory 
lights, leading men contrary ways ;  and contradictory 
propositions  will  be  divine  truths, if an ungrounded 
strength  of  assurance  be an evidence that  any pro- 
nosition is a divine revelation. 
tj 12.  This cannot be  otherwise, whilst  of  firmness of persuasion is  made  the cause  D,r,,a,~on 
of  believini, and confidence  of being  in  ;lo proof 
the right ismade an argument of truth.  that 
proposition  St. Paul himself believed he did well, and  from God. 
that he had a call to it when  he perse- 
cuted the Christians, whom he confFdently thought in 
the  wrong:  but yet  it was  he,  and  not  they,  who 
were mistaken. d~ood  men  are men  still,  liable to 
mistakes;  and  are  sometimes  warmly  engaged  in 
errors, which  they take for  divine  truths, shining in 
their minds with the clearest 1inht.d 
13. Light, true light,  in txe mind is  Light in 
or can be nothing else but the evidence of  what. 
the truth of anv provosition ;  and if it be 
.A 
not a self-evident  propositioh', all the light it has,  dr 
can have, is from the  clearness  and validity of those 
proofs  upon  which  it is  received.  To talk of  any 
other light in the  understanding, is to put ourselves 
in the dark, or in the power ofthe Prince of dsrkness, 
and by our own  consent  to give  ou~selves  up to de- 
lusion, to believe a lie.  For if strength of persuasion 
be the light,  which must  guide us; I ask  how shall 
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and the inspirations of the Holy Ghost ? He  can trans- 
form himself into an angel of light.  And they who 
are led by this son of  the morning are as fully satis- 
fied  of  the illumination,  i.  e.  are  as  strongly  per- 
suaded that they  are  enlightened  by  the spirit  of 
God, as any one who is so :  they acquiesce and rejoice 
in it, are acted by it :  and nobody can be  more sure, 
nor more in the right (if their own strong beliefmay 
be judge) than they. 
Revelation  5  14. He therefore  that will  not give 
must be  himself up to all the extravagancies of de- 
judged of  lusion and error, must bring this guide of  -  - 
leason.  his light within to the trial;  God,  when 
he makes the prophet, does not unmake the man.  He 
leaves all his faculties in the natural state, to enable 
him to judge  of his  inspirations,  whether  they be  of 
divine original or no.  When he illuminates the mind 
with  supernatural light, he does  not extinguish that 
which is natural.  If he would have us assent to the 
truth of any proposition, he either evidences that truth 
by the usual methods of natural reason, or else makes 
it known to be  a truth which he would have us assent 
to, by his authority; and convinces us that it is from 
him, by some marks which reason cannot be mistaken 
in.  Reason  must  be  our  last judge  and  guide in 
every thing.  I do not mean  that  we  must  consult 
reason, and examine whether  a  proposition revealed 
from God  can be  made  out by  natural principles, 
and if it cannot, that then we may reject it :  but con- 
sult it we  must, and by  it examine whether it be a 
revelation from God or no.  And if reason finds it to 
be revealed from God, reason  then declares for  it as 
much as for any other truth, and makes it one of her 
dictates.  Every conceit that thoroughly  warms our 
fancies must pass  for an inspiration, if  there be no- 
thing but the  strength  of our persuasions,  whereby 
to judge  of our persuasions : if reason  must not  ex- 
amine  their  truth  by  something  extrinsical to the 
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persuasions  themselves,  inspirations  and  delusions, 
truth and falsehood, will have the same measure,  and 
will not be possible to be distinguished. 
5 15. If this internal light,  or  any pro- 
Belief no  position which  under  that title we  take  proof of  re- 
for inspired, be  conformable  to the prin-  velation. 
ciples of  reason, or  to the word  of  God, 
which is attested revelation, reason warrants it, and 
we may safely receive  it for  true, and  be guided by 
it in our belief and actions:  if it receive no testimony 
nor evidence from  either  of  these  rules, we cannot 
take it for a revelation, or so much as for true, till we 
have some other mark that it is  a revelation besides 
our believing  that  it is  so,  Thus we see  the holy 
men  of  old,  who  had  revelations  from  God,  had 
something else besides that internal light of assurance 
in their  own minds,  to testify to them  that it was 
from God.  They  were  not  left  to their  own  per- 
suasions alone, that those persuasions were from God; 
but had outward signs to convince them  of  the au- 
thor of  those  revelations.  And when  they were  to 
convince  others,  they  had  a  power  given  them  to 
justify  the truth of  their  commission  from  heaven, 
and by visible signs to assert the divine authority of 
a message they were sent with.  Moses saw the bush 
burn without being  consumed, and heard a voice out 
of  it.  This was  something besides  finding  an  im- 
pulse upon his mind to go to Pharaoh, that he might 
bring his brethren out of Egypt: and yet he thought 
not  this enough  to authorise him  to go with  that 
message, till God, by another miracle of his rod turned 
into a serpent, had  assured him of a power to testify 
his mission, by the same miracle repeated before them, 
whom he was sent to.  Gideon was sent by an angel 
to deliver Israel from  the Midianites, and yet he de 
sired a sign to convince him that this commission was 
from God.  These, and several  the like instances to 
be found among the prophets of  old, are enough to 
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suasion of their own  minds,  without any other proof, 
a sufficient evidence that it was from God ;  though the 
scripture does not every where mention their demand- 
ing or having such proofs. 
$ 16. In what I have  said I am far from  denying 
that  God  can  or  dot11  sometimes  enlighten  men's 
minds in the apprehending of certain truths, or excite 
them to good actions  by the immediate influence and 
assistance of  the Holy Spirit,  without  any extraordi- 
nary signs accompanying it.  But in such cases, too, 
we have reason and scripture, unerring rules to know 
whether it be from God or no.  Where the truth em- 
braced is consonant  to the revelation  in the written 
word of God, or the action conformable to the dictates 
of right reason or holy writ,  we may be assured that 
ure run no risk  in  entertaining it as such;  because 
though perhaps  it be  not  an immediate  revelation 
from  God,  extraordinarily  operating  on  our  minds, 
yet we  are sure it is  warranted  by  that revelation 
which  he has  given  us  of  truth.  But it is not the 
strength  of  our  private persuasion  within  ourselves 
that can  warrant  it to  be  a  light  or  motion  from 
heaven ;  nothing can do that but the written word of 
God without us,  or that. standard  of  reason which is 
common to us with a11  men.  Where reason or  scrip- 
ture is express for any opinion or action,  we may re- 
ceive  it as  of  divine  authority ; but  it is  not  the 
strength of  our own  persuasions which can by itself 
give it that stamp.  The bent of our own minds may 
favour it as much as we please ; that may show it to 
be a fondling of our own, but will by no means prove 
it to be an offspring of heaven,  and of divine original. 
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CHAPTER XX. 
$1. KNOWLEDGE  being to be had only 
Causes of  of  visible  and certain truth, error  is not ,,,  a fault of  our knowledge,  but a mistake 
of  our judgment,  giving assent to that which  is not 
true. 
But  if  assent  be  grounded  on  likelihood,  if  the 
proper object and motive of our assent be probability, 
and that probability consists in what is laid down in 
the foregoing chapters, it will be demanded how men 
come  to give  their  assents  contrary  to probability. 
For there is nothing more  common  than  contrariety 
of opinions ;  nothing more obvious than that one man 
wholly disbelieves what another only doubts of,  and a 
third stedfastly believes  and firmly adheres to.  The 
reasons  whereof,  though they may be  very various, 
yet I suppose may all be reduced to these four : 
1. Want of proofs. 
2.  Want of  ability to use them. 
3.  Want of will to use them. 
4.  Wrong measures of probability. 
$j 2.  First,  by want of  proofs, I do not 
I.want  mean only the want of those proofs which  proofa, 
are nowhere  extant,  and so are nowhere 
to be had; but the want even of  those  proofs which 
are in being,  or might be  procured.  And thus met1 
want proofs who have not the convenience or oppor- 
tunity to make experiments  and observations  them- 
selves  tending  to the proof  of  any proposition;  nor 
likewise the convenience  to inquire into and collcct 
the testimonies of  others:  and  in  this  state arc the 
greatest part of mankind, who are given up to labour, 
and enslaved to the necessity of their Inearl condition, 
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living,  These men's  opportunities of knowledge and 
inquiry are commonly as narrow as their fortunes ;  and 
their understandings  are but little instructed,  when 
all their whole  time  and pains is laid out to still the 
croaking of  their  own  bellies,  or  the cries  of  their 
children.  It is not to be expected that a man, who 
drudges on all his life in a  laborious trade, should be 
more knowing in the variety of  things  done in the 
world  than  a  pack-horse,  who  is  driven  constantly 
forwards and backwards in  a narrow lane and dirty 
road only to market,  should be  skilled  in  the geo- 
graphy of the country.  Nor is it at all  more possible, 
that he who wants leisure, books, and languages, and 
the  opportunity of  conversing  with  variety of  men, 
should be in a condition  to collect those testimonies 
and observations which  are in being,  and are neces- 
sary to make out many,  nay most of  the propositions 
that, in the societies of men, are judged of the greatest 
moment; or to find out grounds of assurance so great 
as the belief of  the points he would build on them is 
thought necessary.  So that a great part of  mankind 
are, by the natural and unalterable state of  things in 
this world, and the constitution of  human affairs, un- 
avoidably given  over to invincible ignorance of  those 
proofs on which others build, and which are necessary 
to establish those opinions :  the greatest part of men, 
having much to do to get the means of living, are not 
in a condition to look after those of learned and labo- 
rious inquiries.  * 
Obj.  What  5 3.  What shall we say then? Are the 
shall be-  greatest part of mankind, by the necessity 
come of  of  their condition,  subjected  to unavoid- 
thosewho  able ignorance in those things which are 
want t'lern  of  greatest importance to them  ?  (for of  answered.  these it is obvious to inauire.)  Have the 
bulk  of  mankind  no  other guide Gut  accident  and 
blind  chance to conduct then1 to their happiness or 
misery ?  Are the current opinions and licensed guides 
of  every country sufficient  evidence  and  security to 
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every man to venture his great concernments on, nay, 
his everlasting happiness or misery? Or can those be 
the  certain  and  infallible  oracles  and  standards  of 
truth,  which  teach  one  thing  in  Christendom  and 
another in Turkey 4  Or shall a  poor countryman be 
eternally happy for  having  the chance to be born in 
Italy ;  or a day-labourer be unavoidably lost,  because 
he  had  the ill luck  to  be  born  in  England? How 
ready some men may be to say some of  these things 
I will not here examine :  but this I am sure, that men 
must allow one or other of  these to be true (let them 
choose which they please),  or else grant that God has 
furnished men with faculties sufficient to direct them 
in the way they should take, if they will but seriously 
empIoy them that way, when their ordinary vocations 
allow them the leisure.  No man is so wholly taken up 
with the attendance on the means of living as to have 
no spare time at all to think of  his soul, and inform 
himself in matters of  religion.  Were men  as intent 
upon this as they are on things of lower concernment, 
there are none  so enslaved  to the necessities of  life 
who  might not  find  many vacancies  that  might  be 
husbanded to this advantage of their knowledge.  "  5 4. Besides those whoseimprovemcnts 
People Iiin-  and informations  are  straitcned  by  the  dered fi.o,lr 
narrowness  of  their  fortunes,  there  are 
1  i 
others whose  largeness of  fortune would 
plentifully enough supply books  and other requisites 
for clearing of  doubts and discovering of  truth : but 
they are cooped in close by the laws of their countries, 
and the strict guards of  those whose interest it is to 
keep them ignorant, lest, knowing more,  they should 
believe the less in them.  These are  as  far,  nay far- 
ther  from  the  liberty  and  opportunities  of  a  fair 
inquiry,  than  these  poor  and wretched labourers we 
before spoke of.  And,  however they may seen1 high 
and great, are confined to narrowness of  thought, and 
enslaved  in  that which  should be  the  freest part of 
man, their understandings.  This is generally the casc 
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of  all those who live  in  places  where care is taken 
to  propagate  truth  without  knowledge ;  where 
men are forced, at a  venture,  to  be  of  the  religion 
of  the  country;  and  must therefore  swallow  down 
opinions,  as  silly  people  do  empirics' pills,  without 
knowing what  they  are made  of,  or  how  they will 
work, and having nothing to do but believe that they 
will do the cure :  but in this are much more miserable 
than they,  in that they are not  at liberty to refuse 
swallowing what perhaps  they had rather let alone ; 
or to choose  the physician  to whose  conduct  they 
would trust themselves. 
2. Want of  5 5. Secondly, those who want skill to 
skill to use  use  those evidences  they have  of  proba- 
them.  bilities,  who cannot carry a train of  con- 
sequences in their  heads,  nor weigh ex- 
actly the preponderancy  of  contrary proofs and testi- 
monies, making every circumstance its due allowance, 
may be easily misled  to assent  to positions that are 
not  roba able.  There are some men of  one, some but 
of two syllogisms,  and no more;  and others that can 
but advance one  step farther.  These cannot always 
discern that side on which the strongest proofs lie; 
cannot constantly follow  that which  in  itself  is the 
more probable opinion.  Now that there is such a dif- 
ference between men,  in respect of  their understand- 
ings, I think nobody, who has had any conversationwith 
his neighbours, will question ;  though he never was at 
Westminster-hall or the Exchange, on the one hand ;  or 
at Alms-houses or Bedlam, on the other :  which great 
difference in men's intellectuals, whether it rises  from 
any defect in the  organs  ofthe  body,particularly adapted 
to thinking ; or,  in the dulness or untractableness of 
those faculties for want of  use ;  or,  as some think, in 
the natural differences of  men's  souls themselves ; or 
some or  all of  these together, it matters not here to 
examine :  only this is evident, that there is a difference 
of  degrees in  men's  understandings,  apprehensions, 
and reasonings,  to so great a latitude,  that one may, 
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without doing injury to mankind, affirm, that there is 
a greater distance  between  some  men  and  others, 
in  this  respect,  than  between  some  men  and some 
beasts.  But how this comes about is  a  speculation, 
though of great consequence, yet not necessary to our 
present parpose. 
$ 6.  Thirdly,  there are another sort of  3. m~~~~  of 
people that want proofs, not because they  will to use 
are out of  their reach,  but because  they  them. 
will not use them ;  who, though they have riches and 
leisure enough, and want neither parts nor other helps, 
are yet never the better for them.  Their hot pursuit 
of pleasure, or constant drudgery in business, engages 
some men's thoughts elsewhere :  laziness and oscitancy 
in general,  or a particular aversion for books,  study, 
and meditation, keep others from any serious thoughts 
at all: and some out of fear that an impartial inquiry 
would not favour those opinions which best suit their 
prejudices,  lives,  and  designs,  content  themselves, 
without  examination,  to take upon trust what they 
find convenient and in fashion.  Thus most men, even 
of those that might do otherwise, pass their lives tvith- 
out an acquaintance with, much less a rational assent 
to,  probabilities they are concerned to know,  though 
they lie so much within  their  view,  that to be  con- 
vinced  of  them  they need  but turn their  eyes  that 
way.  We  know some men will not read a letter which 
is supposed to bring ill news ;  and many men forbear 
to cast up their accounts,  or so much as think  upon 
their estates, who have reason  to fear their affairs are 
in no very good posture.  How men, whose plentiful 
fortunes allow them  leisure  to improve  their  under- 
standings, can satisfy themselves with a lazy ignorance, 
I cannot tell:  but methinks they have a low opinion 
of  their souls,  who  lay out all their  incomes  in pro- 
visions for the body, and employ none of it to procure 
the means and heips of  knowledge ;  who  take great 
care to appear  always in  a  neat and  splendid  out- 
side,  and would  think themselves miserable in coarse 
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clothes, or a patched coat,  and yet contentedly suffer 
their minds to appear abroad in  a pie-bald  livery of 
coarse patches and borrowed  shreds,  such as it has 
pleased  chance or  their  country  tailor  (I  mean  the 
common opinion  of  those they have  conversed  with) 
to clothe them in.  I will  not here mention how un- 
reasonable this is for men that ever think of  a future 
state, and their concernment in it, which  no rational 
man can avoid to do sometimes ;  nor shall I take notice 
what a shame and confusion it is, to the greatest con- 
temners of knowledge, to be found ignorant in things 
they are concerned to know.  But this at  least is worth 
the consideration of those who call themselves gentle- 
men,  that however  they  may think  credit,  respect, 
power, and  authority, the concomitants of their birth 
and fortune, yet they will  find  all these  still carried 
away from them by men of lower condition, who sur- 
pass  them  in knowledge.  They who  are blind will 
always be led by those that see, or else fall into the 
ditch: and he is certainly the most subjected, the most 
enslaved, who is so in his understanding.  In the fore- 
going instances, some of  the causes have been shown 
of wrong assent,  and how it comes to pass,  that pro- 
bable  doctrines  are  not  always  received  with  an 
assent proportionable to the reasons which are to be 
had for their probability:  but hitherto we have con- 
sidered only such probabilities whose proofs do exist, 
but do not appear to him who embraces the error. 
4.  Wrong  $7. Fourthly, there remains yet the last 
measures of  sort, who, even where the real probabilities 
probability;  appear, and are plainly laid before them, 
whereof,  do not admit of  the conviction,  nor yield 
unto manifest  reasons,  but do either ;~;XEIY,  suspend 
their assent,  or give it to the less probable opinion : 
and to this danger are those exposed who have taken 
up wrong measures of probability; which are, 
1. Propositions that are not  in themselves certain 
and  evident,  but  doubtful  and  false,  taken up  for 
principles. 
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2. Received hypotheses. 
S. Predominant passions or inclinations. 
4.  Authority. 
$ 8.  First, the first and firmest ground  ~~~b~f~~ 
of probability is the conformity any thing  propositions 
has to our own knowledge, especially that  taken for 
part of  our  knowledge  which  we  have  principles* 
embraced  and  continue  to  look  on  as  p~inciples. 
These  have  so  great  an  influence  upon  our  opi- 
nions,  that it is usually by them we judge  of  truth, 
and measure probability  to  that degree,  that what 
is  inconsistent  with  our  principles  is  so  far  from 
passing for  probable  with  us,  that it  will  not  be 
allowed possible.  The reverence borne to these prin- 
ciples is so  great,  and  their  authority so  paramount 
to all other, that the testimony not only of other men, 
but the evidence of our own senses are often rejected, 
when they offer to vouch any thing contrary to these 
established rules.  How much the doctrine of  innate 
principles, and that principles  are not to be  proved 
or questioned, has contributed to this, I will not here 
examine.  This I readily  grant, that one  truth can- 
not contradict another: but withal I take leave also 
to say, that every one ought very carefully to beware 
what he admits for a principle,  to examine it strictly, 
and  see whether he certainly knows it to be true of 
itself  by its own  evidence,  or whether he does  only 
with assurance believe it  to be so upon the authority  of 
others.  For he hath a strong bias put into his under- 
standing, which will  unavoidably misguide his assent, 
who hath imbibed wrong principles,  and has blindly 
given himself  up to the authority of  any opinion  in 
itself not evidently true. 
§ 9.  There  is  nothing  more  ordinary  than  chil- 
dren's  receiving  into  their minds propositions  (espe- 
cially about matters  of  religion)  from their parents, 
nurses,  or those about them : which being insir~uated 
into their unwary, as well as unbiassed understandings, 
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true or false)  riveted there by long custom and edu- 
cation, beyond all possibility ofbeing ~ulled  out again. 
For men,  when  they are grown  up,  reflecting  upon 
their opinions,  and  finding  those of  this  sort to  be 
as ancient in their minds as their very memories, not 
having observed  their early insinuation,  nor by what 
means they got them, they are apt to reverence them 
as sacred things,  and not  to suffer them to be  pro- 
faned, touched,  or questioned :  they look  on them as 
the Urim and Thummim set up in their minds imme- 
diately by God himself, to be the great and unerring 
deciders of truth and falsehood, and the  judges to  which 
they are to appeal in all manner of controversies. 
t$  10.  This opinion of  his  principles  (let them be 
what  they will)  being  once  established in any one's 
mind, it  is easy to be imagined what reception any pro- 
position shall find, how clearly soever proved, that shall 
invalidate their authority,  or at all thwart with these 
internal oracles;  whereas the grossest absurdities and 
improbabilities, being but agreeable to such principles, 
go  down glibly, and are easily digested.  The great ob- 
stinacy that is to be found in men firmly believing quite 
contrary opinions, though many times equally absurd, 
in the various religions  of  mankind,  are as evident a 
proof, as they are an unavoidable consequence, of this 
way of reasoning from received traditional principles, 
So that men will  disbelieve their own eyes, renounce 
the evidence of their senses, and give their own expe- 
rience  the lie,  rather  than  admit of  any thing dis- 
agreeing with these sacred tenets.  Take an intelli- 
gent Romanist, that, from the first  dawning  of  any 
notions in his understanding, hath had  this principle 
constantly  inculcated,  viz.  that  he must  believe  as 
the church (i. e.  those  of  his  communion)  believes, 
or that the pope  is  infallible;  and this he never so 
much as heard  questioned,  till at forty or fifty years 
old he met with  one  of other principles : how  is  lie 
prepared easily to swallow, not only against all yro- 
bability,  but even  the clear  evidence  of  his  seiiscs, 
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the doctrine of transubstantiation!  This principle has 
such an  influence on  his mind, that he will believe that 
to be flesh which he sees to be bread.  And what way 
will you take to  convince a man of any improbable opi- 
nion he holds,  who,  with some philosophers,  kath laid 
down this as a foundation of  reasoning, that he must 
believe his reason  (for so men  improperly call argu- 
ments drawn from their principles) against his senses 2 
Let an enthusiast beprincipled, that he or his teacher 
is inspired, and acted by an  immediate cammunication 
of'  the divine spirit, and you in vain bring the evidence 
of dear reasons against his doctrirw.  Whoever thers- 
fore have imbibed wrong principles, are not, in things 
inconsistent with these principles, to be moved by  the 
most apparent and convincing  probabilities,  till they 
are so candid  and ingenuous  to themselves as to be 
persuaded to examine even those very principles, which 
rnanv never sufEer  themselves to do. 
$ ii. Secondly, next to these are men  2. 
whose  understandings  are  cast  into  a  hJp,,t~pjCs. 
mould, and fashioned iust to the size of  a  " 
received  hypothesis.  The difference  between  these 
and  the  foriner  is,  that  they will  admit  of  matter 
of fact, and agree with dissenters  in that; but differ 
only in assigning of reasons, and explaining the man- 
ner of operation.  These are not at that open defiance 
with their senses with the former :  they can endure to 
hearken to their  information a little more patiently; 
but  will by no  means  admit of  their  reports  in  the 
explanation of  things;  nor  be  prevailed on  by  pro- 
babilities, which would convince them that things are 
not brought about just  after the same  manner that 
they  have  decreed  within themselves  that they  are. 
Would it not  be  an insufferable thing for  a learned 
professor,  and that which  his  scarlet would blush at, 
to have his authority of forty years standing, wrought 
out of hard rock Greek and Latin, with no small ex+ 
pense of  time and  candle, and confirmed  by general 
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turned by an upstart novelist?  Can any one  expect 
that he should be made to confess, that what he taught 
his scholars thirty years  ago was  all  error and mis- 
take ;  and that he sold them hard words and ignorance 
at  n very dear rate? What ~robabilities,  I say, are snf- 
ficient to prevail in such a case? And who ever, by the 
most cogent arguments, will be prevailed with to dis- 
robe himself at once of all his  old opinions, and pre- 
tences to knowledge  and  learning, which with  hard 
study he hath all his  time been  labouring for ; and 
turn himself  out stark naked, in quest afresh of new 
notions?  All the arguments that can be used will be 
as little able to prevail,  as the wind did with the tra- 
veller to part with his  cloak, which he held  only the 
faster.  To  this of wrong hypothesis may be reduced 
the errors  that may  be occasioned  by  a true hypo- 
thesis, or right principles, but not rightly understood. 
There  is  nothing  more  familiar than this.  The in- 
stances  of  men  contending  for  different  opinions, 
which  they  all derive  from  the  infallible  truth  of 
the scripture, are an undeniable  proof of it.  All that 
call  themselves Christians  allow the text, that says, 
p~tavotk,  to carry in it the obligation to a very weighty 
duty.  But yet how very erroneous will one  of  their 
practices  be,  who,  understanding  nothing  but  the 
French,  fake this  rule  with  one  translation  to be 
repentez vous,  repent;  or with the other, faitiex  pe- 
nitence, do penance ! 
3. Predo-  $ la. Thirdly, probabilities, which cross 
minant  men's  appetites  and prevailing passions, 
passions*  run the same fate.  Let ever so much pro- 
bability hang on one  side  of  a  covetous  man's  rea- 
soning, and money on the other;  it is easy to foresee 
which will outweigh.  Earthly minds, like mud-walls, 
resist  the strongest  batteries : and though  perhaps 
sometimes the force  of  a  clear argument may make 
some impression, yet they nevertheless stand firm, and 
keep out the enemy truth,  that would  captivate or 
disturb them.  Tcll a man,  passionately in love, that 
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he  is jilted;  bring  a  score  of witnesses of  the false- 
hood of  his mistress,  it is ten to one  but three kind 
words  of  hers  shall invalidate all  their  testimonies. 
Qz~od  uolz~nzzrc.,  jacile credimzu;  what suits our wishes 
is forwardly believed;  is,  I suppose,  what  every one 
hath more than once experimented : and though men 
cannot always  openly  gainsay or resist  the  force of 
manifest  probabilities  that  make  against  them,  yet 
yield they not  to the argument.  Not  but that it is 
the nature  of  the understanding  constantly to close 
with the more probable  side ; but yet a man hath a 
power  to suspend  and restrain its inquiries, and not 
permit a  full  and  satisfactory examination, as far as 
the matter in question is capable, and will bear it to 
be made.  Until that be done,  there will  be always 
these  two  ways  left of  evading  the  most  apparent 
probabilities. 
$ 13. First,  that the arguments being  Themeans 
(as for the most part they are) brought in  of evading 
words,  there may be  a  fallacy  latent in  probabili- 
them :  and the consequences  being, per-  ~~~~~1-~~~- 
haps, many in train, they may be some of  lacy. 
them incoherent.  There are very few dis- 
courses so short,  clear, and consistent, to which most 
men may not, with satisfaction enough to themselves, 
raise this doubt ;  and from whose conviction they may 
not,  without  reproach  of  disingenuity or  unreason- 
ableness,  set  themselves  free  with  the  old  reply, 
?ton persuadebis,  etiarnsi  petsuaseris;  though I can- 
not answer, I will not yield. 
$ 14.  Secondly,  manifest  probabilities  2,  SulJposcd 
may be evaded,  and the assent withheld  arguments 
upon this suggestion, that I know not yet  for the con- 
all that may be said on the contrary side.  trary- 
And therefore though I be beaten, it is not necessary 
I should  yield,  not knowing what forces there are in 
reserve behind.  This is a refuge against conviction so 
open and so wide, that it is hard to determine when  rr 
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What pro-  § 15. But yet there is  some end of it ; 
babilities  and a man havin6 carefully inquired into 
determine  all the grounds of  probability and unlike- 
the assent.  liness, done his utmost to inform himself in 
all  fairly, and cast up the sum total on both 
sides,  may in most cases come to acknowledge, upon 
the whole matter, on which side the probability rests ; 
wherein some proofs  in matter of  reason,  being sup- 
positions upon universal experience, are so cogent and 
clear,  and some  testimonies  in matter of fact so uni- 
versal,  that lie cannot refuse  his  assent.  So that, I 
think, we may conclude,  that in  propositions,  where 
though the proofs in view  are of  most  moment,  yet 
there are sufficient  grounds  to suspect that there is 
either fallacy in words,  or certain proofs  as consider- 
able to be produced on the contrary side ;  there assent, 
suspense, or dissent, are often voluntary actions :  but 
where the proofs are such as make it highly probable, 
and there is not sufficient ground to suspect that there 
is either fallacy of words (which sober and serious con- 
sideration may discover)  .nor equally valid proofs, yet 
undiscovered, latent on the other side (which also the 
nature of the thing may, in some cases, make plain to 
a considerate  man);  there,  I think,  a  man  who  has 
weighed them, can scarce refuse his assent to the side 
on which the greater probability appears.  Whether it 
be  probable  that a  promiscuous jumble  of  printing 
letters should  often  fall  into  a  method  and order, 
which should  stamp on paper  a  coherent discourse; 
or that a  blind  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms,  not 
guided by an understanding agent, should frequently 
constitute  the  bodies  of  any species  of  animals :  in 
these,  and the  like cases, I think nobody  that con- 
siders them can be one jot  at a stand which side to 
take,  nor  at all waver  in  his  assent.  Lastly,  when 
there can be no supposition (the thing in its own na- 
ture indifferent,  and wholly depending upon the tes- 
timony of  witnesses)  that there  is as fair testimony 
against as  for the matter of  fact attested ;  which by 
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inquiry is to be  learned,  V. g.  whether there was one 
thousand seven hundred years ago such a man at  Ronle 
as Julius Caesar : in all such cases, I say, I think it is 
not in any rational man's  power to refuse his assent; 
but  that it necessarily  follows,  and closes with  such 
probabilities.  In other less  clear cases, I think it is 
in man's  power to suspend  his  assent ; and perhaps 
content himself with the proofs he has, if they favour 
the opinion that suits with his inclination or interest, 
and  so  stop from  fhrther  search.  But that a  man 
should  afford his assent to that side on which the less 
probability appears to  him,  seems to me  utterly im- 
practicable,  and as impossible as it is to believe  the 
same thing probable and improbable at the same time. 
$ 16.  As  knowledge is  no more  arbi-  where it ;, 
trary than perception ; so, I think, assent  in our ~ower 
is no more in our power than knowledge.  to suspend 
When  the  agreement  of  any  two ideas 
it. 
appears to our minds, whether immediately,  or by the 
assistance of reason, I can no more refuse to perceive, 
no  more avoid  knowing it,  than I can avoid  seeing 
those objects which I turn my eyes to, and look on in 
daylight:  and what upon full examination I find the 
most  probable,  I cannot  deny  my  assent  to.  But 
though we cannot hinder our knowledge, where the 
agreement is once perceived, nor our assent, where the 
probability manifestly appears upon due consideration 
of  all the measures  of  it; yet  we  can hinder  both 
knowledge  and assent, by stopping our inquiry, and 
not employing our faculties in the search of  any truth. 
If it were not so, ignorance,  error, or infidelity cocld 
not in any case be  il  fault.  Thus in solme  cases we 
can prevent or suspend om asseTlt  : but can a  man, 
versed  in  modern  or tlnr.ient  history,  doubt whether 
there 1s  such a place as  Ilon~e,  or whether  there was 
such  a man as  Julius Czsar  ?  Indeed, there are mil- 
l'ons  of truths  that a man is not,  or may not think 
llilnself  concerned  to  know ; as  whether  our  king 
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Roger  Bacon  was  a  mathematician,  or  a  magician. 
In these and such like cases,  where the assent  one 
way or other is  of  no  importance to the interest  of 
any one ;  no action, no concernment of his, following 
al: depending thereon;  there it is  not  strange  that 
the mind should give itself up to the common opinian, 
or render  itself  to the first comer.  These and the 
like  opinions  are  of  so  little weight  and  moment, 
that, like motes in the sun, their tendencies are very 
rarely taken notice of.  They are there, as it were, by 
chance, and the mind lets them float at libert .  But 
where the mind judges that the proposition i  as con- 
cernment in it ;  where the assent or not assenting is 
thought to draw consequences of moment after it, and 
good and evil to depend on choosing or refusing the 
right side;  and the mind  sets itself  seriously  to in- 
quire and examine the probability ; there, I think, it 
is not in our choice to take which  side we please, if 
manifest odds appear on either.  The greater proba- 
bility, I think, in that case will determine the assent: 
and a man can no more avoid  assenting, or taking it 
to be true, where he perceives the greater probability, 
than he can avoid knowing it to be true, where he 
perceives the agreement or disagreement of  any two 
ideas. 
If this  be  so,  the foundation  of  error will  lie in 
wrong measures of  probability ; as the foundation of 
vice in wrong measures of good. 
4,Authority.  $17. Fourthly, the fourth and last wrong 
measure of probability I shall take notice 
of, and which keeps in ignorance or error more people 
than all the other together, is that which I mentioned 
in the foregoing chapter ;  I mean, the giving up our 
assent to the common received opinions, either of our 
friends  or  party,  neighbourhood  or  country.  How 
many  men  have  no  other  ground  for  their  tenets 
than the supposed honesty, or learning, or number, of 
those of the same profession ! As if honest or bookish 
men could not err, or truth were to be established by 
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the vote  of  the multitude:  yet this,  with most men, 
serves the turn.  The tenet has had the attestation of 
reverend antiquity,  it comes to me with the passport 
of former ages, and therefore I am secure in the re- 
ception I give it :  other men have been, and are of the 
same opinion (for that is all is  said), and therefore it 
is reasonable for me to embrace it.  A man may more 
justifiably  throw up cross  and pile  for his  opinions, 
than take them up by such measures.  All men are 
liable to error, and  most men are in many points, by 
passion  or  interest,  under  temptation  to it.  If we 
could  but see the secret motives  that influenced  the 
men  of  name  and  learning  in  the  world,  and  the 
leaders of parties, we should not always find that it 
was  the embracing of  truth  for  its  own  sake that 
made  them  espouse  the doctrines  they  owned  and 
maintained.  This at least is certain,  there is not an 
opinion so absurd, which a man may not receive upon 
this  ground.  There is no error to be  named, which 
has  not  had  its professors:  and a  man  shall  never 
want crooked paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is 
in the right way,  wherever  he has  the footsteps  of 
others to follow. 
$  18.  But notwithstanding  the  great  M~~  not in 
noise is made in the world  about errors  so many 
and  opinions,  I  must  do mankind  that  errors as 
right as to say there are not so many men  imagined. 
in  errors and wrong  opinions  as is  comrnonly  sup- 
posed.  Not  that  I  think  they  embrace  the truth; 
but,  indeed,  because concerning those doctrines they 
keep  such  a  stir  about they  have  no  thought,  no 
opinion  at all.  For if  any one should a little cate- 
chise the greatest part of the partizans of most of the 
sects in the world, he would not find, concerning those 
matters they are so zealous for, that they have  any 
opinions of their own :  much less tvould he have rea- 
son to think, that they took them upon  the esamina- 
tion  of  arguments,  and  appearance  of  probability. 
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or interest has engaged them in ; and there, like the 
coininon  soldiers of  an army, show their courage and 
warmth as their leaders direct, without ever examining 
or so much as knowing the cause they contend for.  If 
n man's  life shows that he has no serious regard  for 
religion,  for  what  reason  should  we  think  that he 
beats his  head  about the opinions of  his church,  and 
troubles himself to examine the grounds of this or that 
doctrine? It is enough for him to obey his leaders, to 
have his  hand  and  his tongue  ready for the support 
of the common cause, and thereby approve himself to 
those who  can give  him  credit, preferment,  or  pro- 
tection in that society.  Thus men become professors 
of, and combatants for, those opinions they were never 
convinced  of,  nor proselytes to; no,  nor ever had  so 
much  as  floating in  their  heads:  and  though  one 
cannot say, there are fewer improbable or erroneous 
opinions in the world  than  there are; yet it is  cer- 
tain,  there  are  fewer  that actually  assent to them, 
and mistake them for truth, than is imagined. 
CI-IAPTER XXI. 
(? f  t11c Divisiotz qf  the Sciences. 
Three sorts.  $  1.  ALL that  can  fall  within  thc 
compass  of  human  undkrstanding being 
either, first, the nature of things, as they are in thcin- 
selves, their relations, aiid their inanner of operation ; 
or, secondly, that which  man hiinself  ought to do, as 
n rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of 
any end, especially happiness : or,  thirdly, the ways 
and means  ~vlie~cby  thc knowledge  of  both  the one 
and the other of  these 1s  attained and communicated : 
I think  science  may  be  divided  properly  into these 
three sorts. 
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$ 2.  First, the knowledge of things, as 
I. PhJaicn.  they are in their own proper beings, their 
constitution,  properties,  and  operations ; whereby  I 
mean  not  only  matter  and  body,  but  spirits  also, 
which  have  their  proper  natures,  constitutions,  and 
operations, as well  as bodies.  This, in a little more 
enlarged sense of  the word,  I call  Gva~x<, or natural 
philosophy.  The end of this is bare speculative truth ; 
and whatsoever can afford the mind of man any such, 
falls  under  this  branch,  whether it be  God himself, 
angels,  spirits, bodies,  or  any of  their affections,  as 
number, and figure, &c. 
$ 3. secondly, IT~~X~IX~,  the skill of right  2. Pracrica. 
applying our own powers and actions for 
the attainment of things good and useful.  The most 
considerable  under th& hvead  is ethics,  which  is the 
seeking  out  those  rules  and  measures  of  human 
actions  which  lead  to  happiness,  and the means  to 
practise them.  The end of this is not bare specula- 
tion,  and the knowledge of  truth; but right,  and a 
conduct suitable to it. 
$ 4. Thirdly, the third branch may be  3.  ZI~~EIW- 
called  C~~EIWYIX<,  or the doctrine of signs,  frx<. 
the most usual whereof being words, it is aptly enough. 
termed also Acyrx<, logic ;  the business whereof is to 
consider the nature of  signs the mind  makes  use  of 
for  the  understanding  of  things,  or  conveying  its 
knowledge to others.  For since the things the 111i11d 
contemplates are none of them, besides itself, prcsent 
to the understanding, it is necessary that something 
else, as a sign or representation of  the thing it con- 
siders,  should be  present  to it: and these  are ideas. 
And because the scene of ideas that makes one n~an's 
thoughts cannot be laid open to the immediate view 
of another, nor laid up any where but in the memory, 
a no very sure repository ;  therefore to communicate 
our thoughts to one another, as well as record  then1 
for our own use, signs of our ideas are also necessary. 
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therefore generally make use of, are articulate sounds. 
The consideration  then  of  ideas  and  words,  as the 
great instruments of knowledge, makes no despicable 
part of  their  contemplation  who  would  take a view 
of human knowledge in the whole extent of  it.  And 
perhaps if they were distinctly weighed, and duly con- 
sidered, they wo~lld  afford us another sort of logic and 
critic than what  we  have been  hitherto acquainted 
with. 
tj 5. This seems to me the first and most  This is the 
first  division  general, as well as natural division of the 
of the ob-  objects of our understanding.  For a man 
jects of  cA  employ  his  thoughts about nothing, 
knowledge.  but  either  the  contemplation  of  things 
themselves  for  the discovery  of  truth; or  about the 
things in  his own  power, which  are his own  actions, 
for the attainment of  his own ends; or the signs the 
mind  makes  use  of  both  in  the one and the other, 
and  the right  ordering  of  them  for  its  clearer in- 
formation.  All which three, viz. things as  they  are 
in themselves  knowable;  actions  as they depend  on 
us, in order to happiness ; and the right use of signs, 
in order to knowledge, being toto calo different,  they 
seemed to me to be the three great provinces of  the 
intellectual world,  wholly  separate  and distinct one 
from another. 
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THE  candid author of the late Essay upon Personal 
Identity cannot justly be  offended with  any attempt 
to explain and vindicate Mr. Locke's  hypothesis, if it 
is carried  on in the same spirit, though it should be 
attended with the overthrow of some of his  own fa- 
vourite  notions;  since  he owns  that it is  of  conse- 
quence to form  right opinions on this point:  which 
was indeed once deemed an important one, how little 
soever  such  may  be regarded  now-a-days.  I  shall 
proceed  therefore, without farther apology, to settle 
the terms  of  this  question,  and endeavour  to state 
it so  as  to bring matters to a  short  and  clear  de- 
termination. 
Now the word person,  as is well observed  by Mr. 
Locke (the distinguishing excellence of whose writings 
consists in sticking close  to the point in  hand,  and 
striking out all foreign  and  impertinent  considera- 
tions)  is  properly  a  forensic  term,  and  here  to  be 
used in the strict forensic sense, denoting some such 
quality or modification  in man as denominates him a 
moral agent, or an accountable creature ;  renders him 
the proper  subject of  laws,  and a true object of  re- 
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wards  or  punishments.  When we  apply it to any 
man, we do not treat of him absolutely, and in gross; 
but under a particular relation or precision :  we do not 
comprehend or concern ourselves about the several in- 
herent properties which accompany him in real exist- 
ence, which  go to the making up the whole complex 
notion of  an active and intelligent being;  but arbi- 
trarily abstract one single quality or mode from all 
the rest,  and view  him under  that distinct precision 
only which  points out the idea above-mentioned,  ex- 
clusive of every other idea that may belong to him in 
any other view, either as substance, quality, or mode. 
And  therefore the consideration of  this same quality, 
or qualification, will  not  be altered  by any others of 
which  he  may  be  possessed;  but remains  the same 
whatever lie shall consist of besides :  whether his soul 
be a material or immaterial substance, or no substance 
at all,  as may appear from examining the import of 
these  pronouns,  I, thou,  he,  &c.  [the  grammatical 
meaning  of  such words  generally pointing  out the 
true origin of  our ideas primarily annexed to them] 
which  both  in  their  original sense  and common  ac- 
ceptation are purely personal terms, and as such lead 
to no  farther consideration  either  of  soul or body; 
nay, sometimes are distinguished from both,  as in ths 
following line, 
Linquebant dukes amimes, aut egra trahebant 
Corpora*. 
An inquiry after the identity of  such person will  be, 
whether  at different times  he is,  or how  he can be, 
and know himself  to be the satne  in that respect, or 
equally subjected to the very same relations and con- 
sequent obligations which he was under formerly, and 
in  which  he  still  perceives  himself  to  be  involved, 
whenever  he reflects  upon  himself  and them.  This 
* See Locke  on  1 Cor,  xv. 53. 
we  shall  find  to  consist  in  nothing  niore  than  his 
becoming  sensible  at different  times of what he  had 
thought or done before ; and being as fully convinced 
that he  then  thought  or did it,  as he  now  is of  his 
present thoughts, acts, or existence. 
Beyond  this we  neither can  nor need go for  eri- 
dence in  any thing;  this,  we  shall  soon  see,  is  the 
clear and only medium through which  distant things 
can be discovcred and compared together;  which at 
the same time  sufficiently  ascertains  and establishes 
their several natures and realities respectively, so far 
as they relate to o~lrselves  and  to each other: or  if 
this should not be esteemed sufficient to that end, we 
shall find,  in the last place, that there is nothing else 
left  for  it.  This distinct consciousness  of  our past 
actions,  froin whence  arise all the ideas of merit and 
demerit, will most undoubtedly be regarded with the 
strictest exactness in foro  divino;  and  indeed has its 
due weight in jbro hz~mano,  whenever  it can be witlr 
certainty  determined : wherever  this  appears to be 
wanting, all judicial proceedings are at an end.  How 
plain  soever  any criminal  act were,  the man would 
now-a-days  be  acquitted  from  guilt in  the  commis- 
sion of it, and discharged from the penalties annesed 
to such fact, could  it at the same time be as plainly 
made out, that he was incapable of  knowing what he 
did, or is now under a like incapacity of  recollecting 
it.  And it would be held a sufficient reason for such 
acquittal, that the punishment,  or prosecution  of  a 
creature in these circumstances, could not answer the 
end proposed  by society in  punishment, viz. the pre- 
vention  of  evil,  the only end  that I know  of, which 
can  justify  punishments  in  any  case.  The  reason 
then  why  such  a  plea  has  usually  so  small regard 
paid  to it in courts of  justice, is, I apprehend, e~ther 
the difficulty of  having this  incapacity  proved  with 
the same clearness that the fact itself  is established ; 
or the common maxim that one crime, or criillinal in- 
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as in cases of  drunkenness, violent passion, killing or 
maiming men by mistake when  one is engaged in an 
unlawful pursuit, &c.  Or in some of these cases per- 
haps men are punished  for the murders, &c. not be- 
cause they possibly may be conscious of them, and yet 
that consciousness  not  appear;  but that such evils 
may be  more effectually prevented by striking at the 
remoter cause, i. e.  exciting a salutary terror of those 
confessedly evil practices and habits, which are often 
found  to terminate in such fatal effects.  A kind of 
injustice is here indeed committed by  society, which 
we  have  no  reason  to  suppose will  be  admitted  in 
foro  divino, and some worse instances may be seen in 
our statute books.  By the 23 of  Hen. 8.  a man be- 
coming lunatic after an act of  treason shall be liable 
to  be arraigned, tried, and executed.  But Hale * in his 
P. C. says, That if a traitor becomes non compos before 
conviction,he shall not be arraigned; if after conviction, 
he shall not be executed :  and Hawkins t observes the 
same concerning those who have committed any capital 
offences. 
In  human courts, which cannot always dive into the 
hearts of men and discover the true springs of action, 
nor consequently weigh the effects and operations of 
each in an equal balance,  in this state of  ignorance 
and uncertainty, such a notorious indisposition as that 
of drunkenness ;  v. g. being generally a great fault in 
itself, is seldom allowed in extenuation of such others 
as are committed under its influence ;  nor indeed does 
it, I believe,  often produce  any new,  materially dif- 
ferent trains of  thinking, or totally obliterate the old 
ones; but where  this  is  really  so,  the Deity would 
make just abatement for such  defect or disability, as 
was at the time both unconquerable and unavoidable; 
nor can we properly impute  actions consequent upon 
any real disorder of  the rational faculties, howsoever 
that disorder might have been contracted ;  and there- 
* Hale, P. C.  10.  + Hawk. P. C. c. 
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fore all animadversions  upon  them must be in vain : 
nor is a man punishable for any thing beside the bare 
act of  contracting such disorder,  or  for  the original 
cause of this disability,  how great or durable soever ; 
the dangerous consequences of which he did, or mi~ht 
foresee.  As is the case in some other confirmed habits, 
vie.  that of  swearing,  &c.  which  often  operate  me- 
chanically and unperceived,  and  in  which  therefore 
all the  moral turpitude (or  what  is  so  accounted) 
arising from them, never can reach beyond  the foun- 
tain-head  from  whence  they  are derived,  and  from 
which all the effects of  them naturally, and even  ne- 
cessarily  flow.  We must  therefore  coriclude  in ge- 
neral, that a person's  guilt is estimated  according to 
his past and present consciousness of  the offence, and 
of his having been the author of it.  Nor is it merely 
his  having forgotten the thing, but his having so far 
lost the notion  of  it out of  his mind,  that how  fre- 
quently soever,  or in what forcible manner soever, it 
may be presented to him again, he lies under an utter 
incapacity of  becoming sensible and satisfied  that he 
was ever privy to it before, which is affirmed to render 
this thing really none of his, or wholly exculpate him 
when called to answer for it.  Suppose this same con- 
sciousness to return, his accountableness (call  it per- 
sonality, or what you please) will  return along with 
it: that is,  the infliction  of  evil  upon him  will  now 
answer some purpose, and therefore he must be con- 
sidered as now liable to it.  Thus some wholly lose 
the use of  their intellectual faculties for a time,  and 
recover  them  at intervals.  In such  cases  they  are 
considered as punishable by laws, and so declared by 
juries,  in proportion to the probability of  their being 
conscious of the fact.  Others lie under a partial de- 
privation of some one faculty for certain periods, while 
they continue to enjoy the rest in tolerable perfection. 
1 knew a learned man, who was said to recollect with 
ease subjects upon which he had written, or ally others 
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years;  could  reason freely,  and readily  turn to the 
authors he had read upon them;  but take him into 
the latter part of  his life,  and all was  blank;  when 
any late incidents were  repeated  to him,  he would 
only stare at you, nor could  he be  made sensible of 
any one modern occurrence,  however  strongly repre- 
sented to him.  Was this man equally answerable for 
all transactions  within the last period  of  his  life,  as 
for those in the first ?  Or if he could have been made 
sensible of  the latter part, but had irrecoverably lost 
the former;  could that former part have been in like 
manner imputed to him?  Surely not.  And the rea- 
son plainly is, because society could find no advantage 
from considering him  as accountable in  either case. 
Which shows  personality to be solely  a  creature of 
society, an abstract consideration of man,  necessary 
for the mutual benefit of  him and his fellows ; i. e. a 
mere forensic term ; and to inquire after its criterion 
or  constituent,  is  to inquire  in  what  circumstances 
societies  or  civil  combinations  of  men  have  in  fact 
agreed  to inflict  evil  upon  individuals,  in  order  to 
prevent  evils  to the whole  body  from  any irregular 
member.  Daily experience shows, that they always 
make consciousness  of  the fact a necessary requisite 
in such punishment, and that all inquiry relates to the 
probability of  such consciousness.  The execution of 
divine justice must proceed in the same manner.  The 
Deity inflicts  evil with  a settled view  to some end; 
and no end worthy of him can be answered by inflict- 
ing it as a punishment, unless to prevent other evils. 
Such end  may  be  ans~vered,  if  the patient  is  con- 
scious,  or can  be made conscious of  the fact, but not 
otherwise.  And whence  then does this difference  in 
any one's  moral capacity  arise,  but from that plain 
diversity in his natural one? from his  absolute irre- 
trievable want of  consciousness  in one case,  and not 
in the other? Suppose now  that one  in  the former 
condition  kills a man ; that he, or some part of what 
we call him,  was ever  so notoriously the instrument 
or  occasion  of  that death ;  yet if  he was either then. 
insensible of the fact, or afterwards became so, and so 
continued :  would  he  be  any more  guilty of murder, 
than  if  that death had  been  occasioned  by another 
person ?  since  at that time he was truly such,  or  at 
least  is  so  now,  notwithstanding  that  most  people 
might  be  apt to judge  him  still  the  same,  from  a 
sameness in outward circumstances, (which generally 
supply the best means men have of judging) from his 
shape, mien, or appearance ;  though these often differ 
widely from the internal constitution, yet are as often 
mistaken  for  it; and  this  accordingly  thought  and 
spoke of with little more philosophical propriety than 
when we, in the vulgar phrase, describe a man's  con- 
dition by saying, We would not be in his coat. 
Suppose one then in the situation above-mentioned ; 
could any pains, think  you,  inflicted  on him suit the 
idea, or answer  the ends of  punishment, either with 
regard to himself, or others, farther  than  mere  show 
and  delusion?  Rewards  and  punishments  are evi- 
dently instituted for the benefit of society, for the en- 
couragement of virtue, or  suppression  of  vice, in the 
object thus  rewarded  or  punished, and in the rest of 
the community ;  but what tendency to the above pur- 
poses  can  either  of  these  have,  if  dispensed  to one 
who is not  so far  himself  as  to become  conscious of 
having done any thing to deserve it  ?  What instroc- 
tion is conveyed  to  him ?  What admonition to such 
others as are duly acquainted with the whole  of  the 
case, and see every circumstance thus  grossly misap- 
plied?  And  as in  these  cases  laws only can  define 
the circumstances in which a man shall be treated as 
accountable, they only can create guilt, i.  e. guilt, also 
is a forensic  term,  or a mode  of  considering  any ac- 
tion, which in its essence implies knowledge of a law, 
offence against  that law,  and  a sense  of  having  of- 
fended  against it; i. e. an  after-consciousness  of  the 
fact ; without which  after-consciousness,  punishment 
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guard the man himself against a like delinquency, nor 
tend to the warning of others, who by such inflictions 
would openly perceive that they might chance to suffer 
pain, without  being  able to assign a reason for it.- 
Thus may personality be extended or contracted, and 
vary in various respects, times, and degrees, and there- 
by become  liable to great confusion, in our applying 
it to various subjects ;  yet is the ground and founda- 
tion of it fixed ;  and when once discovered, its conse- 
quences are not less so, both before God and man. 
Abstract, general ideas (of which this is an eminent 
one) are alone productive of certain, uniform, and uni- 
versal  knowledge.  Thus qualities of a certain kind, 
when abstracted, or taken apart from nature, and set 
up for common  standards, are so far independent  as 
to become  absolute,  unmixed,  or  perfect  in  them- 
selves *,  however different they may be found in their 
respective  concretes.  Thus goodness,  justice,  guilt, 
merit, &c. in general, are ever the same goodness, &c. 
all the world over, however imperfectly they may ap- 
pear in any particular subjects, times, and places.  Tn 
a Ion  the same manner as a line, or the abstract consider  t' 
of length without thickness or breadth ;  the considera- 
tion  of  surface,  i.  e.  length  and  breadth  without 
thickness, must be the same, in all intelligent beings 
of like faculties with us, though the natural substances 
which  suggest them may differ with  an endless va- 
riety.  Let personality answer  to a line  or  surface; 
let the substances it is predicated of, like the infinite 
variety of  solids  in  nature,  (with  their  appendages, 
heat, cold, colour,  &c.) in which  length and breadth 
are found, vary as you please ;  still the abstract ideas 
of line and surface, and therefore of  person, will  re- 
main invariable.  And  thus  propositiolls formed out 
of these general ideas contain certain truths, that are 
in one sense eiernal and immutable, as depending on 
no  precarious  existences  whatever.  Being  merely 
what we  ourselves  make  them,  they  must  continue 
the same while the same number  of  such ideas con- 
tinue joined  together,  and appear the same to every 
intelligent being that contemplates them *.  They do 
not  stand in  need (I say) of  an objective  reality, or 
the existence of any external things in full conformity 
to them,  since  we  here  consider  things  no farther 
than as coming  up to these  original  standards,  set- 
tled in the minds of men ; or as capable of  being  in- 
cluded in  such  measures as are applied to determine 
their  precise  quantity,  quality,  &c.  we  are ranking 
them  under  a  certain  species  or  sort, hence  called 
their  essence,  which  entitles them  to the name  de- 
scriptive  of  it,  as  is  sufficiently  explained  by  Mr. 
Locke.  They want  therefore  nothing  more to esta- 
blish  their  reality,  than  to be consistently put toge- 
ther, so as may distinguish them from others that are 
merely chimerical, and qualify them for the admission 
of  any real beings that may occur.  Thus,  not  only 
the instance  of a triangle  so frequently used by Mr. 
Locke, but every theorem in  Euclid,  may be  ranked 
among the abstract considerations  of  quantity, apart 
from all real existence, which seldom comes np to it: 
as it may be justly questioned whether  any triangle 
or circle, as defined by him,  ever  existed in  nature, 
i. e.  existed so that all the lines of  the triangle were 
right ones, or all the lines drawn from  the centre to 
the circumference equal.  These ideas  presuppose t 
no  one  being in particular, they imply nothing more 
than a proper subject  of  inquiry (as was said above) 
or  some  such  creature as is either actually endowed 
with, or at  least susceptible of, these specific qualities, 
or modes, which furnish matter for the whole tribe of 
abstractions daily made and preserved by such terms 
as usually serve to denote them ;  whether appellatives, 
in  order  to distinguish  men  in their several stations 
* Note 10. to Iqing's Origin of Evil. Rem. k. 
* See the first note to A. B. King's Origin of Evil. 
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and  relations,  private  or  public;  to describe  their 
character or  conduct,  office,  &c.  as  parent,  patriot, 
king, &c. or such more general, technical ones, as pa- 
ternity, patriotism, kingship, &c. the nature, end, and 
use, of all which  abstractions, with  their  names,  are 
well  enough  understood,  and  would  not  easily  be 
mistaken in affairs of  common life, which are happily 
less liable to such kind of  subtile refinements, as have 
brought metaphysical speculations into that contempt 
under which  they have  long laboured.  In short,  of 
these same abstractions consist all general terms  and 
theorems  of  every  science;  and  the truth  and  cer- 
tainty contained in them, when applied  to morals  or 
theology, is no less determinate than in other sciences ; 
it is equally capable  of  strict demonstration,  as Mr. 
Locke observes, and equally applicable to full as use- 
ful  and  important  purposes.  The  great  general 
truths, I say, arising out of  these general essences, or 
entities, (as they are sometioles  called)  are all clear, 
constant,  and  invariable  in  themselves,  though  the 
names in which  such a collectio~l  of  ideas  should  be 
preserved  are often,  through the poverty and imyer- 
fection  of  language,  rendered  extremely  vague  and 
uncertain  in  each  writer  or  speaker,  and  the ideas 
formed  by  them in  other  men's  minds  (which  are 
their  proper  archetypes,  and  a  conformity to which 
alone  makes  them  right  or wrong, truly or  untruly 
applied) tlicreby become  no less frequently confused 
and indeterminate.  Thus, in the case  before us, the 
word person is often used to signifj the whole aggre- 
gate of  a rational being, including both the very im- 
perfect idea, if it be any idea at all, of substance, and 
its several  properties,  [as  is  the  common  way]  or 
taking  all the  essential  qualities  together,  [which 
properly constitute the substance of any thing *] wit11 
several of  tlieir  modes.  As  when  speaking  of  any 
one,  we  include  soul,  body,  station,  and  other  cir- 
+ Scc tlrc first note to King, al;d the nutl~ors  tllcrc cited. 
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~umstances,  and accordingly style him a wise, worthy 
person ;  a tall,  comely; a rich,  great one,  &c. where 
person  in a lax,  popular  sense  signifies as much  as 
man.  In which popular sense Mr. Locke manifestly 
takes the word,  when he says, it "stands  for a think- 
ing intelligent being, that has  reason  and  reflection, 
and  can  consider  itself  as  itself,  the same  thinking 
being,  in  different  times  and places."  B.  2. c. 27. 9 
9.  But when the term is  used  more  accurately and 
it stands for one especial property of 
that thing or  being,  separated from all the rest that 
do or may attend it in  real  existence,  and set apart 
for  ranging  such  beings  into  distinct  classes,  (as 
hinted above) and considering them under distinct re- 
lations and connexions, which are no less necessary to 
be  determined  in  life,  and  which  should  therefore 
have their proper  and peculisr  denomination.  And 
thus sameness  of  person  stands  to denote, not what 
constitutes the same rational agent, though it always 
1s  predicated of such ; but we consider his rationality 
so far only, as it makes him crpable of knowing what 
he does and suffers, and on what account, and thereby 
renders him amenable to justice for  his  behaviour, as 
above-mentioned, 
Whatever ingredients therefore  of  different  kinds 
go to the composition, what  other particulars, whe- 
ther mental or corporeal, contribute to the formation 
of this  intelligent  being,  these  make  no  part of our 
inquiry ;  which, I beg leave to repeat it again, is not 
what enters into the natural constitution of a thing, 
but what renders it so far a moral one, and is the sine 
qud non of  its being justly chargeable with any of its 
past  actions,  here  or  hereafter : or,  in other words, 
it  does  not  affect  the reality or  the permanency of 
such intelligent beings, but only regulates and retains 
those  beings  under  such a moral  relation,  as makes 
them properly accountable to some superior for their 
course of  action.  It  is  an artificial  distinction,  yet 
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man,  who  must  have  many  other  essential  powers 
and properties to subsist as man, and even to support 
this in question;  but  none  other,  we  say, that can 
affect, or in anywise  alter his condition in the above- 
named  respect,  and  therefore  none  that  come with 
propriety into the present consideration. 
This is  all  the mystery  of  the matter, which has 
puzzled so rnany ingenious writers, and been so mar- 
vellously mistaken by such as are not  sufficiently ac- 
quainted with the doctrine of abstractions, or are mis- 
led by terms of art, instead of  attending to the pre- 
cise ideas which  these  ought  to convey,  and  would 
always convey if they were but carefully and steadily 
applied ;  for want  of which  proper  application,  men 
of  genius  and good sense have fallen into such egre- 
gious trifling *  as serves  only to disturb this beyond 
most other parts of science, and has filled  the above 
celebrated  question  with  a  multitude  of  quibbles, 
* An  extraordinary instance  of  this  kind  is to be met with in 
Bishop Berkeley, which he callsa demonstration of the point ;where 
the supposed union of A and C,  not with the wllole of B,  but with 
some  different parts  of  which B consists, will  hardly make  them 
one with each other :-But  this  famous  demonstration  may be 
ranked  among some others of  the same  sort,  and safely trusted 
with the reader :  a  Let us suppose that a person hath ideas, and is 
conscious during a certain space of time, which we will divide into 
three equal parts, whereof the latter terms are marked by the let- 
ters A,  B,  C.  In the first part  of  time the person gets a certain 
number of ideas, which are retained in A :  during the second part 
of time  he retgins  one  half  of his old ideas, and loseth the other 
half, in place of which  he ac uires as many new ones:  so that in  1  B his ideas are half  old  and  alf new.  And in the third part we 
suppose him  to lose  the remainder  of  the ideas acquired in the 
first, and to get new ones in  their  stead, which are retained in C, 
together  with  those  acquired  in  the second  part  of  time.-The 
persons in A and B are the same, being conscious of common ideas 
by the supposition.  The person in B is (for the same reason) one 
and the same with the person in C.  Therefore the person in A is 
the same with  the person  in  C,  by that undoubted  axiom,.qum 
conveniunt  uni  tertio  conveniunt  inter  se.  But the  person  In  C 
hath no idea in common with the person in A.  Therefore personal 
identity doth  not  consist in  consciousneas."  Alciphron,  v. 2. p. 
160. 
which Mr.  Locke's  clear  and copious answers to his 
several oppor~ents  might, one would have hoped, have 
most effectually prevented ; but which  are subsisting 
to this very day, to the no small mortification  of  all 
sincere lovers of truth, and admirers of that able  de- 
fender  of  it.  And  I have  been  the  larger  on this 
head of general words and notions, which have so close 
a connexion  with  each other,  and  with  the present 
question, as the subject perhaps is not sufficiently ex- 
~lained  by Mr. Locke in any one place of his admira- 
ble  essay, though it occurs pretty often;  and since 
the several properties or attributes of these same abs- 
tract ideas are still so miserably misunderstood as to 
have their very existence  disputed? probably because 
he has been pleased to set it forth in a manner  some- 
what  paradoxical.  Though this word existence also 
is a term often misapplied, as if  nothing  could really 
exist which was not  an object of the senses :  whereas 
in these, and several  other ideas,  as has  been  often 
observed, their esse is percipi. 
Again, we are often misled  on the other hand  by 
imagining  what  things  are  in  themselves  (as  we 
usually term it) or in their internal essences ;  instead 
of considering them as they appear, and stand related 
to us; or  according to the ideas  that are obviously 
suggested  by them ;  which  ideas only should  be the 
objects of our contemplation, (since we really perceive 
nothing else) and ought always  to regulate  our in- 
quiry into things, as these  are the sole foundation of 
a11  our  knowledge  concerning  them,  of all that can 
with safety direct, or be of service to us. 
But to return to our author.  That property then, 
or quality, or whatever  he chooses  to call it, which, 
in  his  own words,  renders men  "sensible  that they 
are the same"  in  some  respects,  is  in  Mr.  Locke's 
sense, in the legal, and in common  sense,  that which 
so far makes them such, or brings them into the same 
relative capacity of being ranked among moral, social 
creatures,  and of  being  treated accordingly, for  se- 198  A  Defeelzce  of  Mr. Locke's Opinion 
veral obvious purposes in social life.  This conscious- 
ness, I say, of being thus far ourselves, is what, in Mr. 
Locke's  language,  makes  us  so.  In this case, as in 
some  other ideal  objects,  to be,  and be perceived,  is 
really the same, and what this  author  calls  the sign 
coincides with the  thing  signified.  Whether any in- 
telligent being is at  present what he is in every respect, 
wants no proof; of  this  he  has  self-evident  intuitive 
knowledge *,  and can go no higher.  And whether he 
now is what he was once  before, in this single article 
of  personality,  can  only  be  determined by  his  now 
being  sensible  of  what  he then  thought  and  did, 
which  is  equally  self-evident;  and  thus  again,  con- 
sciousness at the same time, and by the same  means, 
that it convinces  him of this, does likewise constitute 
him such to all ends and purposes whatsoever. 
Well then, having examined a little into the nature, 
and enumerated some few properties  of  an abstract 
idea  in  general, and shown that this particular one 
before us can be  nothing more, we  may find perhaps 
that however  fluctuating and changeful  this account 
may be judged  to render personality;  how much so- 
ever it may fall short  of  some sublime systems about 
purely immaterial  substances, and perfectly indepea- 
dent principles of thought; yet there is no help for these 
changes in the seat of  personality ;  since,  i11  the last 
place, we know of  nothing  more  stable and perma- 
nent in our constitution that has the least pretence to 
settle  and  support it.  All parts of the body are to a 
certain degree in perpetual flux, nor is any one of them, 
that we are acquainted with, concerned in the present 
case more than  anbther.  As to the mind, both its co- 
gitative  and  active  powers  are suspended  (whether 
they be so  or not is  a  matter  of  fact,  in which  ex- 
perience only, and not suhtile argumentations drawn 
from the nature of  an unknown,  perhaps imaginary, 
essence ought  to decide) during sound  sleep : nay, 
* Sec note 10. to King.  Item. a. 
every drowsy nod  (as Mr. Locke  expresses  it) must 
shake their doctrine, who maintain that these powers 
are incessantly employed.  Call then a  resuscitation 
or revival  of  these  powers,  when we  awake, another 
beginning of  their  existence,  a  new  creation;  and 
argue against the possibility of any such interruption 
or annihilation  of  them, as  long as you  please ;  yet 
that it is matter  of fact, and nightly experience, and 
capable of as  good  proof  as a  negative  proposition 
will  admit, is  made  out  sufficiently  by  the  above- 
named excellent writer.  This, if properly attended to, 
and pursued through its genuine consequences, would 
go a great way towards  unfolding the true nature of 
the human mind, which  many thoughtful men  seem 
yet very little acquainted with, and very inuch afraid 
to examine".  And  while  this  disposition  holds,  we 
*Will not the  least hint of this  doctrine,  say they, give great 
offence, by appearing to  undermine the settled distinction between 
soul and body, which is  so much countenanced and confirmed in 
scripture?-Does  it not tend to disturb  common  apprehensions, 
and confound both the sense and language of man1;ind  ? 
dnsw  1. If this doctrine be true, and a  truth of some import- 
ance,  it will surely stand  the test, and  ought to  be  supported, 
against  all  such inconclusive  argumentations  as are drawn fronl 
consequences, and common prejudices,  and can only serve to ob- 
struct all kinds ~Cimprovernent  in any science~~~llatsocvcr. 
Answ. 2,  The two great constituents of our frame  frequently nl- 
luded to in  scripture, and to wliich  [as  to other popular  notions 
and rcceived fornis of expression]  it usually nccoinmodates itself; 
are here no more confounded,  than when St. Paul  introduces  a 
third as no less essential to the whole of our colnposition : ('  I pray 
God your whole spirit, and soul, and body, bc preserved  blameless 
unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ."  1  Tllcss. v.  53. 
So far is elther the true sense of scripture, or tlie real nature of 
things, fronl being  confined  to the logical  armngcnlerit of then1 
under their established genera or species ;  so little concerned eitlier 
in our  or metaphysical distinctions of them, u. g. into ani- 
mal and vegetable,  material  and immaterial,  substance  and pro- 
perty, &c. nor is  its languagc  more  confounded, or its autl~ority 
shaken, by such a  new  syste~n  of pneumatology, than it was  by 
the late one of Copernicds concerlllllg each of the plallctary mo- 
tions ;  which proved,  that strictly and  pliilosopliical!y  speaking, 
neither does the sun ride, nor  tlie earth stand upon pillars, kc,  or 
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can  never  expect  to ,come  at the  original  core  of 
all those  corruptions that have  infected  this branch 
of philosophy,  and extended themselves to some other 
Darts of  science.  Nor  are the several  ~roofs,  or. if  ,  , 
$ou please, probabilities, that I was  not lthihinking  all 
the last night, sufficiently answered by the old excuse 
that I may forget  all such  thoughts  immediately as 
soon as ever I awake: for  setting aside the areat im-  "  u 
probability of  this happening  so very constantly, for 
so  long a time,  it must  appear to any one who  un- 
derstands what he savs,  that whosoever,  or whatso- 
ever, was  thus  ernplo$ed,  it could  not possibly be I 
who  was  all  this  while  busily  engaged  in  such 
thoughts, since they never  bore the least share in my 
series  of  consciousness,  never  were  connected  with 
the chain of my waking thoughts, nor therefore could 
any more belong to me, than if you suppose them (as 
you might full  as well, for  argument's  sake,  and  to 
salve an hypothesis) to be the working of some secret 
mechanism,  or kept up in the watch that was  lying 
by  me.  Something like  this,  I  presume,  would  be 
by Newton's principles of gravity and vacuum (for whose supposed 
innovations  his  French  commentators  lately thought themselves 
still  obliged  to enter  their  caveat,  and  make  apology to the 
church) ;  or Locke's  more  hardy doctrine of '' no innate ideas ;" 
of which this doctrine of ours is a necessary consequence; since if 
the mind was once a mere rma tabula,  it will soon appear not only 
from  whence  it received  all  its  furniture,  but also  where that 
is lodged-(See  Esq. Search's account of what he terms the mind's 
internal organs.  Light of Nat. pursued,  c. 7, 8)-all  which were 
once equally dangerous  and offensive positions;  but would  such 
surmiges, as have been advanced about thern, be admitted in any 
other case? would even a Romish or any other inquisition now be 
found  weak or wicked enough to proceed upon them ?  and if at 
last an author shall incur the odium theologicum,  and be traduced 
by the name of Sadducee, Socinian,  semipagan, &c. for his  inno- 
cent, as he thinks, perhaps laudable intentions ;-if  offence will be 
taken, as it often happens, where no just cause of offence is given; 
he  must patiently submit to his  hard  fate, and only beg leave to 
inquire whether there be not some room for suspending our judg- 
ment awhile,  till it more fully appears where the fault of all this 
chiefly lies, and who is really answerable for it. 
the plea which all the advocates for this lame system 
would offer in their own defence, were any one so in- 
jurious as to charge them with things done or said in 
their  sleep.  The same  observation  may  be  urged 
against that absurd, self-repugnant hypothesis of  our 
having been  in  a  pre-existent  state :  for whatsoever 
was  done  there,  it can  be  nothing  to us,  who  had 
never the least notice or conception of it. 
To the difficulties so often objected, of this being a 
"new  creation,"  and  making the  same  thing have 
two  beginnings  of  existence ;"-we  may  observe, 
that it would  indeed  be an absurdity to suppose two 
beginnings of existence, if the identity of a substance, 
being, or man were  inquired  into ;  but when the in- 
quiry is made into the artificial abstract idea of  per- 
sonality,  invented  for  a  particular  end,  to  answer 
which  consciousness  only is required, beginning  and 
end of existence are quite out of  the question,  being 
foreign to any consideration of  the subject.-It  may 
be farther observed, that in fact we  meet with  some- 
thing of  the same  kind  every morning  after a total 
interruption of  thought (and I hope  we may by this 
time in one  sense  be  allowed  to term  it so)  during 
sound  sleep:  nay,  if  we  search the thing narrowly, 
and may in our  turn enter into such  minutiae,  thus 
much will be  implied  in  the successive  train  of  our 
ideas, even in each hour of the day ;  that same article 
of successioil including  some  degree of  distance  be- 
tween  each of  them,  and consequently at evcry suc- 
cessive step there is a new production, which may with 
equal reason be styled an interruption of thought, or n 
new exertion of the thinking power.-But  enough of 
these nugw dificiles.  Such changeable, frail creatures 
then are we through life ;  yet safe in the hand of that 
unchangeably just, wise, good, and all-powerful Being, 
who  perfectly understands our frame, and will  make 
due allowances for each defect or disorder incident to 
it; who at first created  us  out of  nothing,  and  still 
preserves us tllrougli cach sliifting scene, be the rcvo- 
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lutioi~s  in it never so frequent and rapid, and will at 
length  most  assuredly  conduct  us  to immortality. 
Though in every respect we  are here "  fleeing as it 
were a shadow,  and never  continuing in  one  stay," 
and at last  suffer a short seeming pause * in our ex- 
istence, which  is  in  scripture termed  the "sleep  of 
death ;" yet will he again raise us "out  of the dust ;" 
restore us to ourselves,  and  to our friends t ;  revive 
our consciousness of each past act or habit, that may 
prove of  the least  moral import ;  cause the "  secrets 
of all hearts to be laid open,"  and either reward or 
punish every one according to his works done in  the 
body. 
Nor does it imply a plurality of persons in any man 
at any time given to charge him with various  actions 
or omissions ; since he may become guilty of a plura- 
lity of crimes, as often as he is induced  or enabled lo 
reflect  upon  them,  though  these  cannot be crowded 
into his  mind  altogether,  any more than  they could 
have  been  so  committed.  Nor  therefore  need  all 
past  actions  become  at once  present  to the mind; 
which is utterly inconsistent with our frame, as it now 
*  a'.  e.  a pause in the opinion and sight of other sentient beings 
existing after our  departure, but not a pause strictly so called  to 
the person himself,  in which there will be ail  unbroken  thread of 
consciousness  or continued  personality;  time  u~iperceived  being 
no time,  time absolute a fiction, and no idea intervening between 
the moments of his falling asleep and waking again, these will be 
to him coincident:  which shows, that personality cannot have two 
beginnings of existence, though the substance in which it is found 
may be  perpetually varied, and though sometimes a less number of 
facts rise up to his remembrance. 
t To  one  who has not seen and  felt the unhappy effects of human 
prejudice  and partial judgment  in such  cases,  it might appear 
strange that so many wise and able men should still  continue ig- 
norant of this, after all the fullest information given us in the follow- 
ing express declaration of that great and good apostle St. Paul : 
"  I would not have you to be ignorant, brethren, concerning them 
which are asleep, that ye sorrow not even as others which have no 
hope.  For if we believe that Jesus  died and rose  again, even so 
them also which sleep in Jesus  will God bring wit11 him.-Where- 
fore comfort one another with these words."  1 Thess. iv. 19, 
and perhaps with that of every other created 
being ;  nor is there a necessity for any one idea being 
always actually in view, which is equally so ;  but only 
for a capacity of havin~  such brought to mind again, 
together  with  a  consciousness  of  their  having  been 
there before,  (which distinguishes them from entirely 
new ones)  or a possibility of  recognizing  them upon 
occasion,  at  least whenever  we  are to account for 
them, as has been frequently observed.  So far as any 
such recognition  reaches,  such person  is  the same; 
when this faculty varies, that must vary also ;  and he 
become the same, or not, at different times  and in di- 
vers  respects,  as observed  likewise;  at least his  ac- 
countableness must vary in proportion,  call this  per- 
sonality, or what you think fit.  Nor does it properly 
lie in a power of causing a return of  the same  idea ; 
but rather in the capacity of receiving it, of re-admit- 
ting  the  same  consciousness  concerning  any  past 
thought,  action,  or  perception.  Nor  is  it merely a 
present  representation of any such  act; but a repre- 
sentation of it as our own, which entitles us to it; one 
person may know or become conscious of the deeds of 
another, but this is  not  knowing that he himself was 
the author  of  those  deeds, which is n contradiction; 
and  to treat  him  as  such  upon  that account only 
would be inverting all rules of right and wrong ;  and 
could  not  therefore  be  practised  by  either  God or 
man, since no end could possibly be answered by such 
treatment, as observed above. 
To dwell  upon those surprising consequences that 
might attend the transferring the same consciousness 
to different beings, or giving the same being very dif- 
ferent ones,  is  merely puzzling  and perp!exing  the 
point, by introducing such confusions as never really 
existed,  and would  not  alter  the  true state of  the 
question, if they did. 
Such  fairy  tales  and  Arabian  transfo~mations, 
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fancy, without any solid imformation to the judgment. 
These flights of  mere  imagination  Mr.  Locke  gene- 
rally avolds, though he was here tempted  to indulge 
a fctv such, in playing  with  the wild  suppositions of 
his  adversaries,  [v. g.  a  change  of  souls  between 
Socrates and the mayor  of  Queenborough, kc.]  pro- 
bably  to enliven u dry  subject, and  render  it more 
palatable to the bulk of his readers. 
Nor are those cases of a disordered  imagination in 
lunacy, or vapours, where persons are for a time beside 
tllelnselves  (as we  usually term it)  and may believe 
such chimerical  alterations to befall them, any more 
to the purpose. 
But it were  endless  to unravel  all the futile so- 
phisms and false suppositions, that have  been  intro- 
duced into the present question ;  I: have endeavoured to 
obviate such as appeared most  material, and account 
for them:  and  at the same  time  to inculcate a doc- 
trine,  which,  though  common  enough,  seemed  not 
enough attended to ;  yet is fundamentally requisite to 
a right understallding of this intricate  subject.  And 
if that which is Inid down above be a true state of the 
case,  all the rest  of  our author's  plan,  [of  placing 
personal identity in a continuation of thought "1 will 
drop of course.  I trust the reader will make allow- 
ance for some repetitions, which were left to render 
things as plain  as  possible,  and prevent future sub- 
terfuges of  the like  kind;  and if  the substance  of 
these few hasty observations on the first  part of  this 
ingenious  writer's  essay  prove  in the  least  degree 
satisfactory to himself, or have a tendency to enlarge 
general knowledge, and guard against popular errors, 
1 must rely upon  his  candour for  excusing the man- 
* \.Vhicl~  disposition, could it be made out, would never answer 
the intent ot'aocicty, or help to direct us in our duty, thc two grand 
objects which first gave birth to personality; i. c. to a very partial 
c.oll(incd conbidcrat~on  of' that complcx iclca, substance, or being, 
cLillcd  man, 
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ner in which they are thrown out; and shall take the 
liberty of  closing  them in the form  of  a  syllogism, 
which is submitted to his consideration. 
Quo  posito  ponitur  persoriae identitas, et quo sub- 
lato tollitur, id personalem identitatcm constituit : 
Sed positA conscienti$  kc. 
Ergo. 
APPENDIX. 
A  friend,  well  acquainted  with the szlllject  of  thesfire 
going  sheets,  having  conznzunicated  to nae  sonle  ob- 
servations  concerning  the  use  of  the ruorcl  Ycrson, 
which came too  late  to  be  inserted  in tlteir proper. 
place,  1  must take  the  liberty  'If' a?ztzc.~'ing  thcnl, 
Ihou6h  they occasion  some  more  rcdundnnczes al~d 
repetztions, in  order  to  throw as  much  light as  is 
possible on this very obscure and  long  controverted 
question. 
As Mr. Locke's definition of the term person, (chap. 
xxvii.  tj  9) may  possibly  create  some  difficulty,  it 
will be proper to examine into the scnse which shoul(1 
be put upon this word, whenever we inquirc after tlie 
identity of any man's  person ;  which  may perhaps  at 
once  lead us 00 a just  conception  of  tlie whole.  In 
the  aforementioned  section  Mr.  Locke  says,  that 
person stands for "a thinking  intelligent  being, that 
has  reason  and  reflection,"  &c. whereas  I  should 
imagine  the expression would  have  been  more just, 
had he said that the word person stands for an sttri- 
bute, or quality, or character of a thinking intelligent 
being ; in the same  sense as Tully uses it, Orat. pro 
Syll. $3.  <'  Hanc mihi tu  si, propter res meas gcstas, 
imponis in omili vitt nieg  personarn, Toryuate, vchc- 
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rum; crudelem  nec  pakria,  nec  natura  esse  voluit : 
denique istam ipsam personam vehementem et acrem, 
quam mihi tum tempus  et respublica  imposuit,  jam 
voluntas et natura ipsa  detraxit."  It came at  last to 
be confounded with, and  stand for homo  gerens per- 
sonana, (Taylor, Civ. L. p.  247,248) and in this sense 
Locke has incautiously defined the word.  It is attri- 
buted also to more intelligent beings than one ;  as by 
the Jesuits in their  declaration  prefixed to the third 
book  of  Newton, alienam coacti sumus gerere perso- 
nam.  The word  person  then,  according  to the re- 
ceived  sense  in  all  classical  authors,  standing for a 
certain guise,  character,  quality, i. e.  being  in fact a 
mixed  mode,  or  relation,  and  not  a  substance;  we 
must next inquire, what particular character or qua- 
lity it stands for in this place, as the same man may 
bear  many characters  and relations  at the same  or 
different  times.  The answer  is,  that here it stands 
for that particular  quality or character, under which 
a man is  considered when he is treated as an intelli- 
gent being, subject to government and laws,  and ac- 
countable for  his  actions:  i.  e. not  the man himself, 
but an abstract  consideration  of  him,  for  such  and 
such particular ends :  and to inquire after its identity 
is to inquire,  not  after  the  identity  of  a  conscious 
being, but after the identity of a quality or attribute 
of such a conscious being.  All difficulties that relate 
to a man's  forgetting some  actions,  &c. now  vanish, 
when person  is considered  as a  character,  and not a 
substance,  or  confounded  with  homo  gerens  perso- 
nam:  and it amounts to no more than saying a man 
puts on a mask-continuing  to wear it for some time 
--puts  off  one mask  and takes another, i.  e.  appears 
to  have  consciousness-to  recollect  past  conscious- 
nesses-does  not recollect them, &c.  The  impropriety 
consists in saying, a man is the same person with him 
who  did such a  fact ;  which  is the same as to say, a 
man is blackness, guilt, &c. i. e.  a mixed mode is pre- 
dicated  of  a substance;  wl~ercas  it ought  to  be,  in 
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strict propriety of  speech, the person of the man who 
did such a fact is  the same with  the person  of  him 
who now stands  before  us;  or,  in plainer terms, the 
man who now stands before the court is conscious of 
the former facts,  and is therefore the proper object of 
punishment.  It  may be observed, that the word per- 
sonality is really an absurd expression :  since  person 
itself  stands  for  the mixed  mode  or  quality ;-and 
personality therefore may be  ranked  amonq  the old 
scholastic terms of corporeity, egoity, tableity, &c. or 
is even yet more harsh ;  as mixed modes, such as gra- 
titude, murder, and therefore person,  cannot be thus 




OF  THE 
UNDERSTANDING. 
Quid tarn  temerarium tamque  indignum sapientis gravitate  atque 
constantia,  quam  aut  falsum  sentire,  aut  quod  non satis ex- 
plorat2  erceptum  sit,  et cogniturn,  sine ulli dubitatione  de- 
fendere 7-C~C.  de Nafura  Dco~un,  I&.  1. 
$1. THE  last resort a man has recourse  Introduc- 
to,  in the conduct of  himself,  is his  un-  tion. 
derstanding : for  though we  distinguish 
the faculties of the mind,  and give the supreme com- 
mand  to the will,  as to an agent;  yet the truth is, 
the man, who is the agent, determines himself to this, 
or that voluntary action, upon some precedent know- 
ledge,  or  appearance  of  knowledge,  in  the under- 
standing.  No man ever sets himself about any thing 
but upon some view or other, which serves him for a 
reason  for what he does :  and whatsoever faculties he 
employs, the understanding, with such light as it has, 
well  or  ill  informed,  constantly leads;  and by  that 
light,  true  or  false,  all  his  operative  powers  are 
directed.  The will  itself, how  absolute  and uncon- 
trollable soever it may be thought,  never fails in its 
obedience to the dictates of the understanding.  Tem- 
ples  have their sacred  images, and we  see what in- 
fluence they  have  always had  over  a  great part  of 
mankind.  But,  in  truth,  the ideas  and  images  in 
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govern them ; and  to these  they  all universally pay 
a ready submission.  It is,  therefore,  of  the  highest 
concernment  that great care  should be taken of  the 
understanding, to conduct it right  in  the  search of 
knowledge, and in the judgments it makes. 
The logic, now in  use,  has  so long possessed  the 
chair,  as the only art taught in the schools,  for  the 
direction  of  the  mind,  in the  study of  the arts and 
sciences, that it would perhaps be thought an affecta- 
tion of novelty to suspect, that rules, that have served 
the learned world these two or three thousand years, 
and which,  without  any  complaint  of  defects,  the 
learned have rested in, are not sufficient to guide the 
understanding.  And  I should  not  doubt  but  this 
attempt would be censured as vanity or presumption, 
did not the great lord Verulam's authority justify it; 
who, not servilely thinking learning could not be ad- 
vanced beyond what it was, because for many ages it 
had not been,  did not  rest  in  the  lazy approbation 
and applause of  what was,  because  it was ;  but en- 
larged his mind to what it might be.  In his preface 
to his  Novum  Organum,  concerning  logic,  he pro- 
ilounces thus : "  Qui summas dialecticae partes tribue- 
runt, atque inde fidissinla scientiis praesidia comparari 
puthunt,  verissimtr  et optimi? viderunt  intellectum 
humanum, sibi permissum, meritb suspectum esse de- 
bere.  Verum infirmior omninb  est malo medicina ; 
nec ipsa mali  expers.  Siquidem  dialectica,  qua: re- 
cepta est, licet ad civilia  et artes, qu~  in sermone et 
opinione  positae  sunt, rectissimi? adhibeatur; natur~ 
tamen subtilitatem longo intervallo  non  attingit,  et 
prensando quod non  capit,  ad  errores potius stabili- 
endos et quasi figendos,  quam ad viam veritati aperi- 
endam valuit." 
"  They,"  says he, "  who attributed so much to logic, 
perceived very well and truly, that it was not safe to 
trust the understanding to itself without the guard of 
any rules.  But the remedy reached not the evil, but 
became a part of  it : for the logic, which took place, 
though it might do well enough in civil affairs,  and 
the  arts,  which  consisted  in talk  and  opinion;  yet 
comes  very  far  short  of  subtlety,  in  the  real  per- 
formances of nature ;  and, catching at what it  cannot 
reach,  has  served  to  confirm  and  establish  errors, 
rather than to open a way to truth."  And therefore a 
little after he says, '(  That it is absolutely necessary 
that a  better  and perfecter  use  and  employment  of 
the mind  and understanding should be introduced." 
"  Necessarib requiritur ut  melior et perfectior mentis et 
intellectds humani usus et adoperatio introducatur." 
$ 2. There is,  it  is visible, great variety 
parts.  in men's understandings, and their natural 
constitutions put so wide  a difference between  some 
men, in this respect, that art and industry would never 
be able to master ;  and their very natures seem to want 
a foundation to raise on it that which other men easily 
attain unto.-Amongst  men of equal education there is 
great inequality of parts.  And the woods of America, 
as well as the schools of Athens, produce men of several 
abilities in the same kind.  Though this be  so,  yet I 
imagine most men come very short of what they might 
attain unto,  in their several degrees, by a neglect of 
their understandings.  A few rules of logic are thought 
sufficient, in this case,  for  those who pretend to the 
highest  improvement;  whereas I think  there  are  a 
great many natural defects in  the understanding, ca- 
pable of amendment; which are overlooked and wholly 
neglected. And It iseasy to perceive, that  men are guilty 
of a great many faults in the exercise and improvement 
of this faculty of the mind, which hinder them in their 
progress,  and keep them in  ignorance and error  all 
their  lives.  Some  of  them I  shall  take  notice  of, 
and  endeavour  to point  out proper remedies  for,  in 
the following discourse. 
$ 3.  Besides  the want  of  determined 
ideas, and of sagacity, and exercise in find-  Reasoning. 
ing out, and laying in order, intermediate ideas ;  there 
are three miscarriages that men  are guilty of, in re- 
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dered in them from that service it might do, and was 
designed for.  And he,  that reflects upon the actions 
and discourses  of  mankind, will  find their defects in 
this kind very frequent, and very observable. 
1.  The first is  of those who  seldom reason  at all, 
but do and think according to the example of others, 
whether  parents,  neighbours,  ministers, or who  else 
they are pleased to make choice of to have an implicit 
faith in,  for  the saving of  themselves  the pains and 
trouble of thinking and examining for themselves. 
2. The second is  of  those who put passion in the 
place of reason, and, being resolved that shall govern 
their  actions and arguments,  neither  use their own, 
nor hearken to other people's  reason,  any farther than 
it suits their humour, interest, or party; and these one 
may observe commonly content themselves with words 
which have no distinct ideas to them, though, in other 
matters, that they come with an unbiassed indifferency 
to, they want not  abilities  to talk  and hear reason, 
where they have  no  secret inclination  that hinders 
them from being intractable to it. 
3.  The third sort is  of  those who readily and sin- 
cerely follow  reason;  but,  for want  of  having  that 
which one  may call large, sound, round-about sense, 
have not a full view of  all that relates  to the ques- 
tion, and may be of moment to decide it.  We are all 
short-sighted,  and very often  see but one side  of  the 
matter; our views are not extended to all that has a 
connexion with it.  From this defect I think no man 
is  free.  We see  but  in part,  and we  know but in 
part,  and therefore it is  no wonder we conclude not 
right from our partial  views.  This might instruct 
the proudest esteemer of  his  own parts, how  useful 
it is to  talk and consult with others, even such as come 
short of him in capacity, quickness,  and penetration : 
for, since no one  sees  all,  and we generally have dif- 
ferent prospects  of  the same thing,  according to our 
different, as I may say, positions to it; it is not incon- 
gruous to think, nor beneath any man to try, whether 
another may not have notions  of  things,  which  have 
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escaped him, and which his reason would  make use of 
if they came into his  mind.  The faculty of reasoning 
seldom  or never  deceives  those who  trust to it; its 
consequences,  from what it builds on, are evident and 
certain ; hut that which it oftenest, if not  only, mis- 
leads us in  is, that the principles from which we con- 
clude,  the grounds  upon  which we  bottom  our rea- 
soning,  are but  a  part, something is left out, which 
should  go into the reckoning,  to make  it just  and 
exact.  Here we  may imagine s  vast  and almost in- 
finite advantage that angels and separate spirits may 
have over us ; who,  in their several degrees of eleva- 
tion above us,  may be  endowed with more  compre- 
hensive faculties : and some of them, perhaps, having 
perfect and exact views  of all finite beings that come 
under  their  consideration,  can,  as  it  were,  iu  the 
twinkling of  an eye,  collect  together  all  their  scat- 
tered and almost boundless relations.  A mind so fur- 
nished,  what  reason  has  it to acquiesce  in  the cer- 
tainty of its conclusions ! 
In this we  may  see  the reason why  some men  of 
study and thought, that reason right, and are lovers of 
truth, do make no great advances in their discoveries 
of it.  Error and truth are uncertainly blended in their 
minds ;  their decisions are lame and defective, and they 
are very often mistaken  in their judgments : the rea- 
son whereof is, they converse but with one sort of men, 
they read but one sort of books, they will not come in 
the hearing but of  one sort of  notions : the truth is, 
they canton out to themselves  a little Goshen, in the 
intellectual world, where light shines, and, as they con- 
clude, day blesses them ;  but the rest of that vast ex- 
Pansum  they give up to night  and darkness,  and so 
avoid coming near it.  They have a pretty traffic with 
known  correspondents,  in some  little creek; within 
that they confine themielves,  and are dexterous ma- 
nagers  enough  of  the wares  and  products  of  that 
corner, with which  they content themselves,  but will 
not venture out into the great ocean of knowledge, to 
Survey the riches that nature hath stored other parts 
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with, no less genuine, no less solid, no less useful, than 
what has fallen to their lot in the admired plenty and 
sufficiency of their own little spot, which to them con- 
tains whatsoever is good in the universe.  Those who 
live thus mewed up  within their own contracted terri- 
tories,  and will  not  look  abroad beyond  the bound- 
aries that chance, conceit, or laziness, has set to their 
inquiries ;  but live  separate from  the  notions,  dis- 
courses, and attainments of the rest of mankind; may 
not amiss  be  represented  by  the inhabitants of  the 
Marian  islands,  who,  being  separated,  by  a  large 
tract of  sea,  from  all communion wit11  the habitable 
parts of the earth, thought themselves the only people 
of the world.  And though the straitness of the conve- 
niencies of life amongst them had never reached so far 
as to the use of  fire till the Spaniards, not many years 
since,  in  their  voyages  from  Acapulco  to Manilla, 
brought it amongst them, yet, in the want and igno- 
rance of almost all things, they  looked upon themselves, 
even  after that the Spaniards had  brought  amongst 
them the  notice of  variety of  nations,  abounding in 
sciences, arts, and conveniencies of life, of which they 
knew nothing ;  they looked upon themselves, I say, as 
the happiest and wisest people of  the universe.  But, 
for all that, nobody, I think, will imagine them deep 
naturalists, or solid metaphysicians; nobody will deem 
the quickest-sighted  amongst them to have very en- 
larged views  in ethics,  or politics;  nor  can any one 
allow  the  most  capable  amongst  them  to  be  ad- 
vanced  so far in  his  understanding  as to have any 
other knowledge but of  the few  little  things  of  his 
and the neighbouring islands, within his commerce ; 
but far enough from that comprehensive enlargement 
of  mind,  which  adorns a  soul  devoted  to  truth, 
assisted with  letters,  and  a  free  generation  of  the 
several views  and sentiments of  thinking men of  all 
sides.  Let not  men,  therefore,  that  would  have  a 
sight of  what  every one  pretends to be  desirous  to 
have a  sight of.  truth in its full extent, narrow and 
blind their ow11  nrospect.  Let not men think there is 
no truth but in the sciences that they study, or books 
that they read.  To prejudge otlier men's  notions, be- 
fore we have  looked  into them,  is  not to show their 
darkness, but to put out our own eyes. "  Try  all things, 
hold fast that which is good,"  is a divine rule, coming 
from the Father of light and truth ; and it is hard to 
know what  other way nlen can come at truth, to lay 
hold of it, if they do not  dig and search for it as for 
gold and hid treasure ; but he that does so must have 
much earth and rubbish, before he gets the pure metal: 
sand, and pebbles, and dross usually lie blended with 
it ;  but the gold is nevertheless gold, and will enrich 
the man that employs his pains to seek and separate it. 
Neither is there any danger he should be deceived by 
the mixture.  Every man carries  about him a touch- 
stone,  if he will make use  of  it,  to distinguish  sub- 
stantial gold from  superficial  glitterings,  truth from 
appearances.  And,  indeed,  the  use  and benefit  of 
this  touchstone,  which  is  natural  reason,  is spoiled 
and  lost  only  by  assumed  prejudices,  overweening 
presumption,  and narrowing our minds.  Tlie  want 
of  exercising  it, in  the full extent  of  things intel- 
ligible,  is that which  weakens  and extinguishes  this 
noble  faculty in  us.  Trace  it,  and see  whether  it 
be  not  so.  The  day-labourer  in  a  country-village 
has  commonly  but  a  small  pittance  of  knowledge, 
because his ideas and notions  have  been  confined to 
the narrow  bounds  of  a  poor  conversation  and ein- 
ployment : the low mechanic  of  a country town does 
somewhat out-do him : porters and cobblers of  great 
cities surpass them.  A country gentleman who, leaving 
Latin and learning in the university,  removes thence 
to his mansion-house, and associates with neighbours of 
the same strain, who relish nothing but hunting and a 
bottle; with those alone he spends his time, with those 
alone  he converses,  and can away with  no company 
whose discourse goes beyond what claret and dissolute- 
ness inspire :-such  a patriot, formed in this happy way 
of improvement, cannot fail, as we see, to give notable 
decisions upon the bench, at  quarter-sessions, and emi- 
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nent proofs of his skill in politics, when the strength of 
his purse and party have advanced him to a more con- 
spicuous station.  To such a one,  truly,  an ordinary 
coffee-house gleaner  of  the  city is  an  arrant states- 
man,  and 8s much  superior to,  as a man conversant 
about Whitehall and the court is to an ordinary shop- 
keeper.  To carry this  a  little farther :  here  is  one 
muffled up in the zeal and infallibility of his own sect, 
and will not touch a book  or enter into debate with 
a person that will question any of those things which 
to him are sacred.  Another  surveys  our  differences 
in religion with an eql~itable  and fair indifference, and 
so  finds,  pobably,  that none  of  them  are in  every 
thing unexceptionable.  These divisions  and systems 
were made by men,  and carry the mark of  fallible on 
them ; and in those whom he differs from, snd, till he 
opened his eyes,  had a general prejudice  against,  he 
meets with more  to be said for a great many things 
than before he was aware of, or could have imagined. 
Which of these two, now, is most likely to judge right 
in our religious controversies,  and  to be  most stored 
with truth, the mark all pretend to aim at?  All these 
men, that I have instanced in, thus unequally furnished 
with truth, and advanced in knowledge, I suppose of 
equal natural parts ; all  the odds between them has 
been the different scope that has been given to their 
understandings to range in,  for  the gathering up of 
information, and furnishing their heads with ideas and 
notions  and  observations,  whereon  to employ  their 
mind and form their understandings. 
It will possibly be  objected, "  who is  sufficient for 
all this ?"  I answer, more than can be imagined.  Every 
one knows what his proper business is,  and what,  ac- 
co~ding  to the  character  he  makes  of  himself,  the 
world may justly expect of him ;  and, to answer that, 
he will find he will have time and opportunity enough 
to furnish himself, if he will not deprive himself,  by a 
narrowness of  spirit,  of  those helps that are at hand. 
I do not  say,  to be  a good geographer, that  a man 
should visit every  mountain,  river,  p~nmontory,  and 
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creek,  upon  the  face of  the  earth,  view  the  build- 
ings,  and  survey  the  land  every  where,  as  if  he 
were going to make  a  purchase;  but yet  every one 
must allow that he shall know  a country better,  that 
makes often sallies into it, and traverses up and down, 
than he that, like a mill-horse,  goes still round in the 
same track,  or keeps within the narrow bounds of  a 
field or two that delight him.  He that will inquire out 
the best books in every science, and inform himself of 
the most material authors of  the several sects of  phi- 
losophy and religion,  will  not find it an infinite work 
to acquaint himself  with the sentiments of  mankind, 
concerning the most weighty and comprehensive sub- 
jects.  Let him exercise the freedom of  his reason and 
understanding in such a latitude as this, and his mind 
will  be  strengthened,  his  capacity  enlarged,  his  fa- 
culties improved ;  and the light, which the remote and 
scattered parts of  truth will give to one another, will 
so assist his judgment,  that he will seldom be widely 
out, or miss giving proof  of  a clear head and a com- 
prehensive knowledge.  At least, this is the only way I 
know to give the understanding its due improvement 
to the full extent of  its capacity* arid  to distinguish 
the two most different  things I know in the world, a 
logical chicaner from a man of reason.  Only he, that 
would thus give the mind its flight,  and send abroad 
his inquiries into all parts after truth, must be sure to 
settle in his head determined ideas of  all that he em- 
ploys his thoughts about, and never fail to  judge him- 
self,  and judge  unbiassedly,  of  dl that he  receives 
from  others,  either in  their  writings  or  discourses. 
Reverence  or prejudice  must not be suffered to give 
beauty or deformity to any of their opinions. 
$ 4..  We are born  with  faculties  aiid  Of 
Powers capable almost of  any thing, such  habits. 
at least  as  would  carry  us  farther  tlian 
can easily be imagined:  but it is only the exercise of 
those  powers which  gives  us ability and skill in any 
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A  middle-aged  ploughman  will  scarce  ever  be 
brought to the carriage and language of a gentleman, 
though his  body  be  as  well  proportioned,  and  his 
joints  as supple, and his natural parts not any way iq- 
ferior.  The legs of a dancing-master,  and the fingers 
of  a  musician,  fall  as  it were  naturally,  without 
thought or pains, into regular and admirable motions. 
Bid  them  change  their  parts,  and they will  in vain 
endeavour to produce like motions in the members not 
used to them,  and it will require length of  time and 
long practice  to attain but some  degrees of  a  like 
ability.  What incredible and astonishing actions do 
we find rope-dancers and tumblers bring their bodies 
to ! Not but that sundry,  in almost all manual arts, 
are as wonderful;  but I name those which the world 
takes notice of for such, because on that very account 
they give money to see them.  All these admired mo- 
tions,  beyond the reach and almost conception of un- 
practised spectators, are nothing but the mere effects 
of  use  and industry in men,  whose  bodies  have  no- 
thing peculiar  in  them  from  those  of  the  amazed 
lookers on. 
As it is in the body,  so it is in the mind;  practice 
makes  it what  it is,  and most  even of  those  excel- 
lencies,  which  are looked on as natural endowments, 
will be found, when examined into more narrowly, to 
be the product of  exercise,  and to be raised to thqt 
pitch  only  by repeated  actions.  Some men  are re- 
marked for  pleasantness  in raillery; others for apo- 
logues and apposite diverting stories.  This is apt to 
be taken for  the effect of  pure  nature,  and that the 
rather,  because it is not got by rules,  and those who 
excel in either of them never purposely set themselves 
to the study of  it,  as an art to be learnt.  But yet it 
is  true that at first some lucky hit,  which  took with 
somebody, and gained him commendation, encouraged 
him to try again, inclined his thoughts and endeavours 
that way,  till at last he insensibly got a facility in it, 
without perceiving how ;  and that is attributed wholly 
to nature which was much more tfie effect of  use and 
practice.  I do not deny that natural. disposition may 
often give the first rise to it,  but that never carries a 
man far, without use and exercise ;  and it is practice 
alone that brings the powers of  the mind,  as well as 
those of  the body,  to their perfection.  Many a good 
poetic vein  is  buried  under  a  trade,  and never pro- 
duces any thing for  want of  improvement.  We see 
the ways of discourse and reasoning are very different, 
even concerning the same matter, at court and in the 
university.  And  he  that will  go  but  from  West- 
minster-hall  to  the Exchange,  will  find  a  different 
genius and turn in their ways of talking ;  and yet one 
cannot  think that all whose  lot fell in the city were 
born with different  parts from those who were bred 
at the university  or inns of court. 
To what purpose all this,  but to show that the dif- 
ference,  so  observable  in  men's  understandings  and 
parts,  does  not arise so much from their  natural fa- 
c~~lties  as acquired habits.  He would be laughed at, 
that should go about to make a fine dancer  out of  a 
country hedger,  at past fifty.  And  he will not have 
much better success, who shall endeavour, at  that age, 
to make a nlan reason well, or speak handsomely, who 
has  never  been  used  to it, though  you  should  lay 
before  him  a  collection  of  all  the  best  precepts  of 
logic or oratory.  Nobody is made any thing by hear- 
ing of rules, or laying them up in his memory ;  prac- 
tice must settle the habit of doing, without reflecting 
on  the rule;  and you  may as well  hope  to make  a 
good painter or musician extempore, by a lecture and 
instruction in the arts of music and painting,  as a co- 
herent thinker, or a strict reasoner,  by a set of rules, 
showing him wherein right reasoning consists. 
This being so,  that defects and weakness in men's 
understandings,  as well as other faculties, come from 
want of a right use of  their own minds ; I am apt to 
think the fault is generally mislaid upon nature,  and 
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fault  lies  in  want  of  a due  improvement  of  them. 
We see men frequently dexterous and sharp enough in 
making a bargain, who, if you reason with them about 
matters of religion, appear perfectly stupid. 
Ideas.  $ 5. I will not here,  in what relates to 
the right conduct and improvement of the 
understanding, repeat again the getting clear and de- 
termined ideas, and the employing our thoughts rather 
about them  than about  sounds put for them ; nor of 
settling the signification of  words, which we use with 
ourselves in  the search  of  truth,  or  with others,  in 
discoursing about it.  Those hinderances of our under- 
standings in  the  pursuit  of  knowledge  I have  suf- 
ficiently enlarged upon in another place ;  so that no- 
thing more needs liere to be said of  those matters.  " 
Principles.  $ 6.  There is another  fault that stops 
or  misleads  men  in  their  knowledge, 
which  I  have  also  spoken  something of,  but 
necessary to mention here again, that we may examine 
it to the bottom, and see the root it springs from; and 
that is a custom of taking up with principles that are 
not self-evident, and very often  not so much as true. 
It is not unusual to see men rest their  opinions  upon 
foundations that have  no more certainty and solidity 
than the propositions built on them, and embraced for 
their sake.  Such foundations are these and the like, 
viz.-the  founders or  leaders of  my party are good 
men,  and therefore their  tenets  are true ;-it  is the 
opinion of a sect that is erroneous, therefore it is false : 
-it  hath been long received in the world, therefore it 
is true ;  or-it  is new, and therefore fal~e. 
These, and  many the like,  which are by no means 
the measures of truth and falsehood, the generality of 
men make the standards by which they accustom tlieir 
understanding to judge.  And thus,  they falling into 
a habit of determining of truth and falsehood by such 
wrong measures, it is no wonder they should embrace 
error for certainty, and be very positive in tliiiigs they 
have rio ground for. 
There is not any, who pretends to the least reason, 
but, when any of  these his false maxims are brought 
to the test, must acknowledge them to be fallible, and 
such  as  he will  not  allow in  those  that differ  from 
him ; and yet,  after he is convinced of this, you shall 
see him go on in the use of  them,  and, the very next 
occasion  that  offers,  argue  again  upon  the  same 
grounds.  Would one not be ready to think that men 
are willing  to impose  upon  themselves  and  mislead 
their own understandings,  who conduct them by such 
wrong measures,  even  after they see  they cannot be 
relied on? But yet they will not appear so blamable 
as may be  thought at first  sight; for  I  think there 
are a great many that argue thus in earnest,  and do 
it not to impose on  themselves  or others.  They are 
persuaded of what they say, and think there is weight 
in it, though in a like case they have been  convinced 
there is none ;  but men would be intolerable to them- 
selves, and contemptible to others, if  they should.  em- 
brace opinions  without  any ground,  and hold  what 
they could give no manner of reason for.  True or false, 
solid or sandy, the mind  must have  some foundation 
to  rest itself upon ;  and, as I have remarked in another 
place,  it no sooner entertains  any proposition,  but it 
presently hastens to some hypothesis to bottom it on; 
till then it is unquiet and unsettled.  So much do our 
own very tempers dispose us to a right use of our un- 
derstandings,  if  we would  follow,  as  we  should, the 
inclinations of  our nature. 
In some matters of  concernment,  especially those 
of religion, men are not permitted to be always waver- 
ing and  uncertain;  they must embrace and profess 
some tenets or other ;  and it would be a shame, nay a 
contradiction too heavy for any one's  mind to lie con- 
stantly under,  for him to pretend seriously to be per- 
suaded of  the truth of any religion,  and yet not to be 
able to give  any reason  of  his  belief,  or  to say any 
thing for his preference of this  to any other opinion : 
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or other, and those can be no oilier than such as they 
have  and can manage;  and to say  they are not  in 
earnest  persuaded  by  them,  and do not  rest  upon 
those they make use of, is contrary to experience, and 
to allege tliat tliey are not misled when we complain 
tliey are. 
If tliis bc so, it will be urged, why then do they not 
make use of sure and unquestionable principles, rather 
than rest on such grounds as may deceive them,  and 
will,  as is visible,  serve to support  error  as well as 
trutli  ? 
To tliis I answer, the reason why they do not make 
use  of  better  and  surer principles  is  because  they 
canriot :  but this inability proceecls  not  from want of 
natural parts (for those few, whose case illat is, are to 
be excused), but for want of  use  and exercise.  Few 
rneri are,  from their youth,  accustoined to strict rea- 
soning, and to trace tlie dependence of  any truth, in a 
long train of  consequences, to its remotest principles, 
aiid to observe its connexion ;  and lie that by frequent 
practice has not been used to this employnient of  his 
uiiclerstanding,  it is no more wonder  that he should 
riot, when he is grown into years, be able to bring his 
mind to it,  than that he should not be,  on a sudden, 
able to grave or design, dance  on  the ropes or write 
a good hand, who has never practised either of  them. 
Nay,  the rnost of  men  are so wholly strangers to 
this, that they do not so much as perceive their want 
of  it; they  despatch  the ordinary  business  of  their 
callings by rote,  as we say,  as they have  learnt it; 
and  if  at any time they miss success,  they impute it 
to ;my thing  rather  than want  of  thought  or  skill; 
tliat they conclude (because they know no better) tliey 
have in  1)erf'cction  : or,  if  there be  any subject that 
interest or f'rtiicy has recomlnended to their thoughts, 
tlicir rcasonilig tll~out  it is still after their own fashion; 
be it l~ctter  or worse,  it serves their turns, and is tlie 
lwst tl~cy  arc accjuai~itcd  .cvitll ; and,  tliercforc,  wlien 
they  til.c  lctl  by it illto  niistakcs,  and  tlicir  business 
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succeeds accordingly,  they impute it to any cross ac- 
cident or default of  others,  rather than to their own 
want of understanding ;  that is what nobody discovers 
or  complains  of  in  himself.  Whatsoever  made  his 
business to miscarry, it was not want of right thought 
and judgment in himself:  he  sees no  such defect in 
himself, but is satisfied tliat he carries on his designs 
well enough by his own reasoning,  or at least should 
have done,  had it not been for unlucky traverses  not 
in  his  power.  Thus,  being  content  with  this short 
aiid very imperfect use of his understanding, he never 
troubIes himself to seek o~it  methods of improving his 
mind, and lives all his life without any notion of close 
reasoning, in a continued connexion of  a long train of 
consequences  from  sure  foundations;  such  as  is re- 
quisite for the making out  and clearing most of  the 
speculative truths most  men own to believe,  and are 
most co~~cerned  in.  Not to mention here, what 1 shall 
have occasion to insist on,  by and by,  more fully,  viz. 
that in many cases it is not one series of consequences 
will serve the turn,  but many digerent  aud opposite 
deductions must be examined and laid together, before 
a man  can come  to make  a  right judgment  of  the 
point in question.  What then can be expected from 
men  that neither  see  the  want of  any such kiiid  of 
reasoning  as  this;  nor,  if  they do,  know how to set 
about it, or  could perform it? You may as well set a 
countryman, who scarce knows the figures, and never 
cast  up a  sum  of  three particulars,  to  state a mer- 
chant's long account,  and find the ti-ue balance of  it. 
What then shonld  be done  in tlie case ?  I answer, 
we should always  remember what I said  above, that 
the faculties of  our souls are improved and inade use- 
" - 
ful to us just  after  the  same manlier  as our bodies 
are.  Would you  have  a  man write  or paint, dance 
or fence well, or perform any other manual operatiort 
dexterously  and  with  ease ; let  hiin  have  ever  so 
nluch vigour and activity, suppleness aiid address na- 220  Conduct of tie Understunding. 
turally, yet nobody expects this from  him, unless he 
has been used to it, and has employed time and pains 
in fashioning and forming his hand, or outward parts, 
to these motions.  Just so  it is in  the mind:  would 
you have a man reason well,  you  must use  him to it 
betimes, exercise his mind in observing the connexion 
of ideas, and following them  in train.  Nothing does 
this better than mathematics, which, therefore, I think 
should be taught all those who have the time and op- 
portunity;  not  so  much  to  make  them mathema- 
ticians,  as  to make them  reasonable  creatures;  for 
though we  all  call  ourselves so, because we are born 
to it,  if  we  please;  yet we  may  truly  say,  nature 
gives us but the seeds of  it: we are born to be, if we 
please, rational  creatures; but it is  use  and exercise 
only that make us  so, and we are, indeed,  so no far- 
ther than industry and  application have  carried  us. 
And, therefore, in ways of  reasoning,  which men have 
not been used to, he that  will observe the conclusions 
they take up, must be satisfied they are not all rational. 
This  has  been  the less taken  notice  of,  because 
every one,  in  his  private  affuirs,  uses  some  sort  of 
reasoning  or other,  enough to denominate him rea- 
sonable.  But the mistake  is, that he that is  found 
reasonable  in one thing is concluded  to be so in all, 
and  to think  or  to say otherwise is thought  so un- 
just an affront,  and  so  senseless  a censure,  that no- 
body ventures to do it.  It looks like the degradation 
of a man below the .dignity of his nature.  It  is true, 
that he that reasons well in any one thing has a mind 
naturally capable of reasoning well  in  others, and to 
the same degree of strength and clearness, and pos- 
sibly much greater, had his understanding been so em- 
ployed.  But it is as true that he who can reason well 
to-day, about one sort of matters, cannot at all reason 
to-day about others,  though perhaps a year hence he 
may.  But wherever  a  man's  rational  faculty  fails 
him, and will not serve llinl  to reason, there we can- 
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not say he is rational, how capable soever he may be, 
by time and exercise, to become so. 
Try in men of low and  mean education, who  have 
never elevated their thoughts above the spade and the 
plough, nor looked  beyond the ordinary drudgery of 
a day-labourer.  Take the thoughts of such  an one, 
used for many years to one track, out of that narrow 
compass,  he  has  been  a11  his  life  confined  to,  you 
will  find  him  no  more  capable  of  reasoning  than 
almost a perfect  natural.  Some one or two rules,  on 
which their conclusions immediately depend, you will 
find in most men  have  governed  all their tho~~ghts  ; 
these, true or false,  have been  the maxims they have 
been guided by:  take these from them, and they are 
perfectly at a loss, their  compass  and pole-star  then 
are gone,  and their  understanding  is  perfectly at a 
nonplus;  and  therefore  they either  immediately re- 
turn to their old maxims again, as the foundations of 
all  truth to them, notwithstanding  all  that  can  be 
said to show their weakness ;  or if they give them up 
to their  reasons,  they, with  them, give up  all  truth 
and farther inquiry, and  think there is no such thing 
as certainty.  For if you would enlarge their thoughts, 
and settle them  upon  more  remote  and surer  prin- 
ciples, they either cannot easily apprehend them ;  or, 
if they can, know not what use to make of them ;  for 
long deductions from remote principles are what they 
have not been used to, and cannot manage. 
What then, can grown  men never be improved, or 
enlarged in their understandings ?  I say not so ; but 
this I think I may say, that it will  not be done with- 
out industry and application, which will require more 
time  and  pains  than  grown  men,  settled  in  their 
course of life, will allow to it, and therefore very sel- 
dom is done.  And this very capacity of  attaining it, 
by  use  and  exercise only,  brings  us  back  to that 
which I laid down before, that it is only practice tlint 
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materials of knowledge, and exercised in all the ways 
of reasoning.  To which I answer, that it is a shame 
for  those  that have time,  and the means  to  attain 
knowledge, to want any helps  or assistance, for  the 
improvement of  their  unde~standings,  that are to  be 
got ;  and to such I would  be  thought here chiefly to 
speak.  Those methinks  who,  by  the industry  and 
parts of their  ancestors,  have  been  set  free  from  a 
constant  drudgery to their  backs  and  their  bellies, 
should bestow some of their spare time on their heads, 
and open  their  minds,  by some  trials and  essays, in 
all the sorts and matters of  reasoning.  I have before 
mentioned  mathematics, wherein  algebra  gives  new 
helps and views to the understanding.  If I propose 
these,  it is  not,  as  I  said,  to  make  every  man  a 
thorough  mathematician, or  a  deep  algebraist ; but 
yet I think the study of them is  of  infinite use, even 
to grown  men ; first,  by  experimentally  convincing 
them,  that  to make  any one  reason well,  it is  not 
enough to have  parts wherewith  he  is  satisfied, and 
that serve him well enough in his ordinary course.  A 
man in those  studies will  see, that however good  he 
may think his understanding, yet in many things, and 
those very visible, it may fail him.  This would take 
off that presumption  that most  men  have  of  them- 
selves in this part ; and they would  not be so  apt to 
think their  minds wanted  no helps  to enlarge them, 
that there could  be  nothing  added  to the acuteness 
and penetration of their understandings. 
Secondly,  the  study  of  mathematics would  show 
them the necessity there is  in reasoning, to separate 
all the distinct ideas, and  see  the habitudes  that all 
those concerned  in the present  inquiry have  to one 
another, and to lay by those which  relate not to the 
proposition in hand,  and wholly to leave them out of 
the reckoniug.  This is that which, in other subjects, 
besides quantity, is what is absolutely requisite to just 
reasoning, though in them it is not so easily observed, 
nor so  carefully practised.  In those  parts of know- 
ledge where it is thought demonstration has nothing 
to do,  men  reason  as it were  in the lump;  and if, 
upon a summbry and confused view, or upon a partial 
consideration, they can raise the appearance of a pro- 
bability, they usually rest coriteirt ; especially if it be 
in a dispute where every little  straw is  laid hold on, 
and every thing that can but be drawn-in any way to 
give colour to the argument is  advanced with osten- 
tation.  But that mind  is  not  in  a posture  to find 
the truth, that does  not distinctly take all  the parts 
asunder, and, omitting what is not at all to the point, 
draw a  conclusion from  the result  of  all  the parti- 
culars which any way influence it.  There is another 
no less  useful  habit  to be  got  by an  application  to 
mathematical  demonstrations,  and that is,  of  using 
the mind  to  a long train of consequences ;  but hav- 
ing mentioned  that  already, T sball not  again  here 
repeat it. 
As to men whose  fortunes  and time are narrower, 
what may suffice them is  not  of  that vast  extent as 
may be imagined, and so comes not within the objec- 
tion. 
Nobody is under an obligation to Itnow every thing. 
Knowledge  and  science  in  general  is  the  business 
only of those who are at  ease ancl leisure.  Those who 
have particular  callings  ought to understand  them; 
and it is no unreasonable  proposal, nor inlpossible to 
be compassed, that they shoulcl think and reason right 
about ~httt  is their daily employment.  This one cnn- 
not think  them incapable  of, without  levelling them 
with the brutes, and charging them with a  stupidity 
below the rank of rational creatures. 
$ 8.  Besides  his  particular  calling for  Religion.  the support of this  life,  every one has a 
concern in  a  future liik, which he  is  bound to look 
after.  This engages his  thouglits in  religion ; and 
here  it  mightily  lies  upon  him  to understand  and 
reason  right.  Men,  therefore,  cannot  be  excused 
from understanding  the words,  and framing  the ge- 
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neral notions  relating  to religion,  right.  The one 
day of seven, besides other days of rest, allows in the 
christian world  time  enough for  this  (had  they  no 
other idle hours) if they would but make use of these 
vacancies  from  their  daily  labour,  and  apply thein- 
selves to an improvement of knowledge with as much 
diligence  as they  often  do to  a  great many  other 
things that are useless, and had but those that would 
enter them  according to their  several capacities in a 
tight way to this knowledge.  The original make of 
their minds is like that of other men, and they would 
be found not to want understanding fit to receive the 
knowledge of religion, if they were a little encouraged 
and helped in it, as they should be.  For there are in- 
stances  of very  mean  people, who  have  raised  their 
minds to a great sense and understanding of religion: 
and though these have not been  so frequent as could 
be wished ;  yet they are enough to clear  that condi- 
tion of life  from a  necessity of gross ignorance,  and 
to show that more  might be brought to be  rational 
creatures  and  christians  (for  they  can  hardly  be 
thought  really  to be  so,  who,  wearing  the  name, 
know not so much as the very principles of that reli- 
gion) if due care were taken of them.  For, if I mis- 
take not,  the peasantry lately  in France  (a rank of 
people  under a  much  heavier  pressure of want  and 
poverty than  the day-labourers  in  England)  of  the 
refromed religion  understood  it  much  better,  and 
could say more for it, than those of a higher condition 
among us. 
But if it shall be  concluded  that the meaner sort 
of people must give thenlselves up to brutish stupidity 
in the things  of their  nearest  concernment, which I 
see no reason for, this excuses not those of a freer for- 
tune and education, if they neglect their understand- 
ings, and take no care to employ them as they ought, 
and set them right in  the knowledge of those things 
for which principally they were given them.  At least 
those, whose plentiful fortunes allow them the oppor- 
tunities  and helps  of improvements, Me  not  so few, 
but that it might be hoped great advancements miglit 
be made in knowledge of all kinds, especially in that 
of  the greatest  concern  and largest  views,  if  men 
would make a right  use of their  faculties, and study 
their own understandings. 
$  9.  Outward corporeal  objects, that  Ideas. 
constantly importune our senses and cap- 
tivate our  appetites, fail not to fill  our  heads with 
lively and lasting ideas of that kind.  Here the mind 
needs not to be set upon getting greater store ; they 
offer themselves  fast enough, and  are usually enter- 
tained in  such plenty, and lodged  so  carefully, that 
the mind wants, room or attention for  others that it 
has more use and need of.  To fit the understanding, 
therefore,  for  such  reasoning  as I have been  above 
speaking of, care should be taken to fill it with moral 
and more abstract ideas ;  for these not offering them- 
selves  to the senses, but being to be  framed to the 
understanding, people  are generally so neglectful of 
a faculty they are apt to think wants nothing, that I 
fear most men's minds are more unfurnished with such 
ideas than  is  imagined.  They often  use the words, 
and how can  they be  suspected  to want the ideas? 
What I have said in the third book of my Essay will 
excuse me from  any other answer  to this  question. 
But to convince people of what moment it is to their 
understandings  to be  furnished with  such  abstract 
ideas, steady and settled in  them, give  me  leave  to 
ask, how any one  shall be  able  to know whether he 
be obliged to be just, if he has not established ideas 
in his mind of obligation and  of justice ;  since know- 
ledge consists in nothing but the perceived agreement 
or disagreement of those ideas ?  and so of  all  others 
the like, which concern our lives and manners.  And 
if  men  do find a difficulty to sce  the agreement or 
disagreement  of  two angles,  which  lie  before  their 
eyes,  unalterable  in a  diagram; how utterly impos- 
sible will  it be to perceive  it in  ideas  that have no 
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other sensible object  to represent them  to the mind 
but sounds ;  with which they have no m Inner of con- 
formity, and therefore  had need to be clearly settled 
in the mind themselves,  if we would  make  any clear 
judgment about them.  This, therefore, is one of the 
first things the mirid  should be  employed  about, in 
the right conduct of the understanding, without which 
it is impossible it should be capable of reasoning right 
about  those  matters.  But  in  these,  and  all  other 
ideas, care must be taken that they harbour no incon- 
sistencies,  and that they have a  real existence where 
real existence is supposed ;  and are not mere chimeras 
with a supposed existence.  - - 
Prejudice.  10. Every one is forward to complain 
of the prejudices that mislead  other mcn 
or  parties,  as if  he w'ere  free,  and had  none  of  his 
own.  This being objected  on  all sides,  it is agreed 
that it is  a  fault  and an hinderance  to knowledge. 
What now is the cure ?  No other but this, that every 
man should let alone others' prejudices, and examine 
his  own.  Nobody is convinced of  his by the accusa- 
tion  of  another;  he recriminates  by the same rule, 
and is  clear.  The only  way  to  remove  this  great 
cause of  ignorance  and error  out of the world is, for 
every one  impartially to examine himself.  If others 
will not deal fairly with their own minds,  does thzt 
make my  errors truths? or ought it to make me in 
love with them, and willing to impose on myself? If 
others love cataracts in their eyes, should that hinder 
me from couching of  mine  as  soon as I can  Every 
one declares against blindness,  and yet who almost is 
not fond of that which dims his sight, and keeps the 
clear light out of his mind, which should lead him into 
truth and  knowledge ?  False  or  doubtful  positions, 
relied upon  as unquestionable maxims,  keep those in 
the ddrk  from truth who  build  on  them.  Such are 
usually the prejudices imbibed from education, party, 
reverence,  fashion,  interest,  &c.  This  is  the  mote 
which  every orie  sees  in  his brother's  eye,  hut never 
regards the beam in his own.  For who is there almost 
that is  ever brought fairly to examine his  own prin- 
ciples, and see whether they are such as will bear the 
trial? But yet this should  be  one of  the first things 
every one should set about, and be scrup~~lous  in, who 
would rightly conduct his understanding in the search 
of truth and knowledge. 
To those who  are willin6 to get rid  of  this great 
hinderance of knowledge, (for to such only I write) to 
those who would  shake off  this great and dangerous 
impostor,  prejudice, who dresses up falsellood in the 
likeness of truth, and so dexterously hoodwinks men's 
minds, as to keep them in the darki with a belief that 
they are more  in the light than any that do not see 
with their eyes,-I  shall offer this one mark whereby 
prejudice may be known.  He that is strongly of any 
opinion  must suppose (unless  he be self-condemned) 
that his  persuasion is built upon good  grounds ;  and 
that his assent is no greater than what the evidence of 
the truth he holds  forces him to; and that they are 
arguments, and not inclination, or fancy, that make him 
so confident and positive in his tenets.  Now if,  after 
all his profession, he cannot bear any opposition to his 
opinion, if  he cannot so much as give a patient hear- 
ing, much less examine and weigh  the arguments on 
the other side, does he not plainly confess it is pre- 
judice  governs him? and  it is  not  the evidence  of 
truth, but some lazy anticipation, some beloved  pre- 
sumption, that he desires to rest undisturbed in.  For, 
if what he holds be,  as he gives out, well fenced with 
evidence, and he sees it to be true, what need he fear 
to put it to the poof? If his opinion  be settled upon 
a firm foundation, if the arguments that support it, 
and have obtained his assent, be clear, good, and con- 
vincing, why should he be shy to have it tried whether 
they be proof  or not? He whose assent goes beyond 
this evidence,  owes this excess of  his  adherence ollly 
to prejudice, and does in  effect own  it, when  he re- 
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thereby that it is not evidence he seeks, but the quiet 
enjoyment of the opinion he is fond of, with a forward 
condemnation of all that may stand in opposition to it, 
unheard and pnexamined ; which, what is it but pre- 
judice ?  qui eqzlum  statuerit,  parte  inauditd  alterd, 
etiamsi quum  statuerit, haud @pus  fuerit,  He that 
would acquit himself in this case as a lover of  truth, 
not  giving  way  to any  pre-occupation  or bias  that 
may mislead him,  must do two things  that are not 
very common, nor very easy. 
Indifferency.  tj.11. First, he must not be in love with 
any opinion, or wish it to be true, till he 
knows it to be so, and then he will  not need to wish 
it: for  nothing that  is  false can  deserve  our  good 
wishes, nor a desire that it should have the place and 
force of truth ;  and yet nothing is more frequent than 
this.  Men are fond of  certain tenets upon  no other 
evidence but respect and custom, and think they must 
maintain them, or all is gone ;  though they have never 
examined the ground they stand on,  nor  have ever 
made them out to themselves, or can make them out 
to others :  we should contend earnestly for the truth, 
butlwe should first be sure that it is truth, or else we 
fight against God, who is the God of truth, and do the 
work of  the devil, who  is the father and propagator 
of  lies;  and our zeal, though ever so warm, will not 
excuse us,  for this is plainly prejudice. 
Examine.  $  12. Secondly, he must do that which 
he  will  find  himself  very  averse  to,  as 
judging the thing unnecessary,  or himself  incapable 
of  doing it.  He must try whether his  principles be 
certainly true, or not, and how far he may safely rely 
upon them.  This, whether fewer have the heart or the 
skill to do, I shall not determine ;  but this, I am sure, 
is that which every one ought to do, who professes to 
love truth, and would not impose upon himself; which 
is a  surer way to be made  a fool of  than by  being 
exposed to the sophistry of others.  The disposition 
to Put  any  cheat upon  ourselves  works  constantly, 
and we are pleased with it, but are impatient of being 
bantered  or misled  by others.  The inability I here 
speak of  is  not  any natural defect that makes men 
incapable of examining their own principles.  To such, 
rules of  conducting their understandings  are useless ; 
and that is the case af very few.  The great number 
is of those whom the ill habit of never exerting their 
thoughts has disabled ;  the powers of their minds are 
starved by disuse, and have lost that reach and strength 
which  nature  fitted  them  to receive  from  exercise. 
Those who are in a condition  to learn the first rules 
of plain arithmetic,  and could be brought to cast up 
an ordinary sum, are capable of  this, if  they had but 
accustomed their minds to reasoning :  but they that 
have  wholly  neglected  the exercise  of  their  under- 
standings in this way, will  be very far,  at first, from 
being able to  do it, and as unfit for it as one unpractised 
in figures to cast up a shop-book, and, perhaps, think 
it as strange to be set about it.  And yet ~t must never- 
theless Le  confessed to be a wrong use of  our under- 
standings, to build our tenets (in things where we are 
concerned to hold the truth) upon principles that may 
lead us  into error.  We take our  principles  at hap- 
hazard, upon trust, and without ever having examined 
them,  and then believe  a whole  system, upon a pre- 
sumption that they are true and solid ;  and what is all 
this, but childish, shamef~il,  senseless credulity? 
In these two things, viz.  an equal indifferency for 
all truth; I mean the receiving  it, the love of  it, as 
truth, but not loving it for any other reason,  before 
we know it to be true ;  and in the examination of our 
principles,  and not  receiving  any for such, nor build- 
ing on them, till we  are fiilly convinced,  as rational 
creatures, of their solidity, truth, and certainty ;  con- 
sists that freedom of  the understanding which  is ne- 
cessary to a rational creature, and without which it is 
not truly an understanding.  It  is conceit, fancy, ex- 
travagance, any thing rather than understanding, if it 
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opinions by the authority of any thing but their own, 
not fancied, but perceived, evidence.  This was rightly 
called  imposition,  and  is of  all other the worst  and 
most dangerous sort of it.  For we impose upon our- 
selves, which is the strongest imposition of  all others; 
and we impose upon ourselves in that part which ought 
with the greatest care to be  kept free from all im- 
position.  The world  is  apt to cast great blame on 
those who have an indifferency for opinions, especially 
in religion.  I fear this is the foundation of great error 
and worse consequences.  To be indifferent which of 
two opinions is true, is the right temper of  the mind 
that preserves it from being imposed on, and disposes 
it to examine with that indifferency, till it has done 
its best to find the truth, and this is the only direct 
and safe way to it.  But to be indifferent whether we 
embrace falsehood or truth, is the great road to error. 
Those who are not indifferent which  opinion  is true, 
are guilty of  this ; they suppose, without examining, 
that what they hold is true, and then think they ought 
to be zealous for it.  Those, it is plain by their warmth 
and eagerness,  are not indifferent  for their own opi- 
nions, but methinks are very indifferent whether they 
be true or false ;  since they cannot endure to have any 
doubts raised, or objections made against them ; and 
it is visible they never have made any themselves,  and 
so,  never  having  examined them,  know not, nor  arc 
concerned,  as they should  be, to know whether they 
be true or false. 
These are the common  and most general miscar- 
riages which I think men should avoid,  or rectify, in 
a right conduct of  their understandings,  and should 
be  particularly  taken  care  of  in  education.  The 
business whereof,  in respect of  knowledge, is not,  as 
I think,  to perfect  a learner in all or any one of  the 
sciences, but to give his  mind that freedom, that dis- 
position,  and  those  habits,  that may  enable  him  to 
attain any part of  knowledge he shall apply himself 
to, or stand in need of in the future course of his life. 
This, and this only, is well principling, and not the 
instilling a reverence  and veneration  for certain dog- 
mas, under the specious title of  principles, which  are 
often so remote from  that truth and  evidence which 
belongs to principles,  that they ought to be rejected, 
as false and erroneous ; and often cause  men so edu- 
cated, when they come abroad into the world, and find 
they cannot maintain the principles so  taken up and 
rested in,  to cast off  all principles,  and turn perfect 
sceptics, regardless of knowledge and virtue. 
There are several  weaknesses  and  defects  in  the 
understanding, either from the natural temper of the 
mind, or ill habits taken up, which hinder it in its pro- 
gress to knowledge.  Of  these,  there  are as  many, 
possibly,  to be  found,  if  the mind  were  thoroughly 
studied, as there are diseases of the body, each whereof 
clogs ancl disables the understanding to some degree, 
and therefore deserves  to be looked after and cured. 
I shall set down some few to excite men,  especially 
those  who  make  knowledge  their  business,  to look 
into themselves,  and observe whether they do not in- 
dulge some  weaknesses,  allow  some  miscarriages  in 
the management of their intellectual faculty, which is 
prejudicial to them in the search of truth. 
§ 13. Particular matters of fact are the 
Observa-  undoubted foundations on which our civil  tions. 
and natural knowledge is built :  the benefit 
the understanding makes  of  them  is  to draw  from 
them  conclusions, which may be as standing rules of 
knowledge,  and consequently of practice.  The mind 
often makes not that benefit it should of the informa- 
tion it receives  from the accounts of  civil or natural 
historians, by being too forward or too slow in making 
observations on the particular facts recorded in them. 
There are those who are very assiduous in reading, 
and yet do not much advance their knowledge by it. 
They are delighted with the stories that are told, and 
perhaps  can tell them again, for they make all they 
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fleeting on it,  not making to themselves observations 
from what they read, they are very little improved by 
all that crowd of particulars, that either pass through, 
or lodge themselves  in their  understandings.  They 
dream on in a constant course of reading and cramming 
themselves;  but not digesting any thing, it produces 
nothing but a heap of crudities. 
If their memories  retain well,  one  may say,  they 
have the materials of knowledge;  but, like those for 
building, they are of no advantage, if there be no other 
use made of  them but to let them lie heaped up to- 
gether.  Opposite to these, there are others who lose 
the improvement they should ,make of matters of fact 
by a q;lite  contrary Eondoct.  They are apt to draw 
general conclusions, and raise axioms from every par- 
ticular  they  meet with.  These make  as  little true 
benefit of history as the other ;  nay, being of  forward 
and active spirits,  receive more harm by it ; it being 
of  worse  consequence to steer  one's  thoughts  by  a 
wrong rule, than to have none at all ;  error doing to 
busy  men  much  more  harm than ignorance  to the 
slow and sluggish.  Between these, those seem to do 
best, who taking material and useful hints, sometimes 
from single matters of fact, carry them in their minds 
to be judged of, by what they shall find in history, to 
confirm or reverse these imperfect observations; which 
may be established into rules fit to be relied on, when 
they are justified  by a sufficient and wary  induction 
of particulars.  He that makes no such reflections on 
what he reads,  only loads his  mind with a rhapsody 
of tales, fit, in winter-nights,  for the entertainment of 
others: and he that will improve every matter of  fact 
into a maxim,  will abound in contrary observations, 
that can be of no other use but to perplex and pudder 
him,  if he compares them ;  or else to misguide him, if 
he gives himself up to the authority of that, which for 
its novelty, or for some other fancy, best pleases him. 
Bias.  $ 14. Next to these, we may place those 
who suffer their own natural tempers and 
passions  they are possessed  with  to  influence  their 
judgments,  especially of  men  and things,  that may 
any  way  relate  to  their  present  circumstances  and 
interest.  Truth is all simple,  all pure, will  bear no 
mixture of any thing else with it.  It  is rigid and in- 
flexible to any by interests.  and so should the under- 
standing be, whose use and excellency lies in conform- 
ing itself to it.  To think of every thing just  as it is 
in itself is the proper business of the understanding, 
though it be not that which men always employ it to. 
This all men, at first hearing,  allow is the right use 
every one should make of his understanding.  Nobody 
will be at such an open defiance with common  sense 
as to profess  that we  should not endeavour to know 
and think of  things  as they are in themselves;  and 
yet there is  nothing  more  frequent than  to do the 
contrary;  and men  are  apt to excuse  themselves ; 
and think they have reason to do so, if they have but 
a pretence that it is for God,  or a good cause ; that 
is, in effect, for themselves,  their own persuasion, or 
party: for  those  in their  turns the several sects of 
men, especially in matters of religion, entitle God and 
a good cause.  But God requires not men to wrong or 
misuse their faculties for him, nor to lie to others, or 
themselves,  for  his  sake;  which they purposely  do, 
who will not suffer their understandings to have right 
conceptions of  the things proposed to them,  and de- 
signedly restrain themselves from having just thoughts 
of every thing, as far as they are concerned to inquire. 
And as for a good cause, that needs not such ill helps ; 
if it be good, truth will support it, and it has no need 
of fallacy or falsehood. 
5  15.  Very  much of  kin to this is the  Arguments. 
hunting  after  arguments to make  good 
one side of a question,  and wholly  to neglect and re- 
fuse those which favour the other side.  What is this 
but wilfully to misguide the understanding, and is so 
far from giving truth its due value, that it wholly de-  . 
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their  power,  profit,  or  credit,  and then seek  argu- 
ments  to support  them?  Truth lit upon  this way 
is of no more avail to us than error ; for what is so 
taken up by us may be false as well as true, and he 
has not done his duty who has thus sturilbled upon 
truth in his way to preferment. 
There is  another,  but more innocent way of  col- 
lecting arguments, very familiar among bookish men, 
which is  to furnish  themselves  with  the arguments 
they meet with  pro and  con in the questions  they 
study.  This helps them not to judge right, nor argue 
strongly,  but only to talk  copiously  on  either  side, 
without being steady and settled in their own judg- 
ments:  for  such  arguments,  gathered  from  other 
men's  thoughts,  floating  only  in  tlle  memory,  are 
there ready, indeed, to supply copious talk with some 
appearance of reason, but are far from helping us to 
judge right.  Such variety of arguments only distract 
the understanding  that relies  on them, unless it has 
gone farther than such a superficial way of examining; 
this is to quit truth for appearance, only to serve our 
vanity.  The sure and only way to get true know- 
ledge is to form in our minds clear settled notions of 
things, with names annexed to those determined ideas. 
These we are to consider, with their several relations 
and habitudes, and not amuse ourselves with floating 
names, and words of indetermined signification, which 
we can use in several senses to serve a turn.  It is in 
the perception of the habitudes and respects our ideas 
have  one  to another  that real knowledge  consists; 
and when a  inan once perceives  how far  they agree 
or disagree one with another, he will be able to  judge 
of what other people say, and will not need to be led 
by the arguments of  others, which are many of them 
nothing but plausible sophistry.  This will teach him 
to state the question right, and see whereon it turns; 
and thus he will  stand upon his own legs, and know 
by  his  own understanding.  Whereas  by  collectilig 
and lcarniilg arguniciits  by  llec~rt,  he  will  be  but a 
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retainer to others; and when  any one questions the 
foundations they arc built upon, he will be at a oon- 
~lus,  and be fain to give up his implicit knowledge. 
§ 16. Labour for lsbour-sake is agaillst  Haste. 
nature.  Tlle understancling, as well as all 
the other faculties, chooses  always the shortest way 
to its end, would presently obtain the knowledge it is 
about, and then set upon some new inquiry.  But this, 
whether laziness or haste, often misleads it, and makes 
it content  itself with  improper ways of  search,  and 
such as will  not serve  the turn: sometimes  it rests 
upon testimony, when testimony of  right has nothing 
to  do, because it is easier to believe than to be scientifi- 
cally instructed :  sometimes it contents itself with one 
argument, and rests satisfied with that, as it were a 
demonstration, whereas the thing under proof is not 
capable of demonstration, and therefore must be sub- 
mitted to the trial of  probabilities,  and  all  the ma- 
terial arguments pro and con be examined and brought 
to a  balance.  I11  some cases the mind  is determined 
by probable topics in inquiries where demonstration 
'nay  be  had.  All  these,  and  several  others which 
laziness,  impatience, custom, and want of use and at- 
tention lead men into, are misapplications of  the un- 
derstanding in the search of truth.  In every question 
the nature and manner of the proof it is  capable of 
should be  considered,  to make oilr inquiry such as 
it should be.  Tliis would  save a  great deal of  fre- 
quently  misemployeci  pains,  and lead  us  sooner  to 
that discovery and possession of truth we are capable 
of.  The multiplyirlg variety of arguments, especially 
frivolous ones, such as are all that are merely verbal, 
is not only lost laboilr,  but cumbers the memory to 
no purpose, and serves only to hinder it from seizing 
and holding of the truth in all those cases which arc 
capable  of  demonstratioll.  In such a  way of  proof 
the truth and certainty is  seen,  and the mind  fillly 
possesses itself of it ; ~vhcn  in the other way of asscnt 
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In this superficial  way,  indeed, the mind  is capable 
of more variety of plausible talk, but is not enlarged, 
as it should be, in its knowledge.  It is to this same 
haste and impatience of the mind also, that a not due 
tracing of  the arguments to their true foundation is 
owing ;  men see a little, presume a greet deal, and so 
jump to the conclusion.  This is a short way to fancy 
and conceit,  and (if firmly embraced) to opinioaatry, 
but is certainly the farthest way about to knowledge. 
For he that will  know, must by the connexion of  the 
proofs  see the truth,  and the ground it stands on; 
and therefore, if he has for haste skipped over what 
he should have examined, he must begin and go over 
all again, ar else he will never come to knowledge. 
Desultory.  $17. Another fault of as ill consequence 
as this, which proceeds also from laziness, 
with  a  mixture  of  vanity,  is  the skipping from one 
sort of knowledge to another.  Some  men's  tempers 
are quickly weary of any one thing.  Constancy and 
assiduity is what  they cannot bear : the same  study 
Tong continued in is as intolerable to them as the ap- 
pearing  long in the same  clothes, or fashion, is to rt 
court-lady. 
Smattering.  $ 18. Others, that they may seem uni- 
versally knowing,  get a little  smatterifig 
in every thing.  Both these may fill their  heads with 
superficial notions of things, but are very much out of 
the way of attaining truth or knowledge. 
Universality.  $ 19.  I do not here  speak against the 
taking a taste of every sort of knowledge ; 
it is certainly very useful  and necessary to form  the 
mind ;  but then it must be  done in a different way, 
and to a different  end.  Not f~r  talk and vanity to 
fill the head with  shreds  of  all kinds, that he who is 
possessed  of  such a  frippery may be  able  to match 
the discourses of all he shall meet with, as if  nothing 
could come amiss to him ; and his  head was so well 
stored  a magazine,  that nothing  could  be  proposed 
which he was not master of, and was readily furnished 
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to entertain  any one  on.  This is  an excellency, in- 
deed,  and a great one  too,  to have a real  and true 
knowledge in all, or most of the ol~jects  of contempla- 
tion.  But it is what the  mind of  one  and the same 
man can hardly attain unto ;  and the instances are so 
few of  those who  have,  in  any measure,  approached 
towards it,  that I know not whether  they are to be 
proposed as exatnples  in the ordinary conduct of  the 
understanding.  For  a  man  to understand  fully the 
business of his particular calling in the commonwealth, 
and of religion, which is his calling as he is a man in 
the world,  is  usually  enough  to take up  his  whole 
time;  and  there  are few that inform  themselves  in 
these, which is every man's  proper and peculiar busi- 
ness,  so  to  the  bottom  as  they  should  do.  But 
though  this  be  so,  and there are very few men that 
extend their thoughts towards universal  knowledge ; 
yet I do not doubt, but if  the right way were taken, 
and  the methods  of  inquiry  were  ordered  as they 
should  be,  men  of  little  business  and  great leisure 
might  go a great deal farther in  it than is  usually 
done.  To turn to the business in hand ;  the end and 
use  of a little  insight  in those parts of  knowledge, 
which are not a man's proper business, is to accustom 
our minds to all sorts of ideas, and the proper ways of 
examining their habitudes and relations.  This gives 
the  mind  a freedom,  and the exercising  the under- 
standing in the several ways of inquiry and reasoning, 
which the most skilful have made use of, teaches the 
mind sagacity and wariness, and a suppleness to apply 
itself more closely and dexterously to the bents and 
turns  of  the matter  in  all its researches.  Besides, 
this universal  taste  of  all the sciences, with an indif- 
ferency before the mind is possessed with any one in 
particular,  and  grown  into love  and  admiration  of 
what is  made  its darling, will  prevent  another evil, 
very  commonly  to  be  observed  in  those  who  have 
from the beginning  been  seasoned  only by one part 
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templation  of  one  sort  of  knowledge,  and that will 
become  every  thing.  The mind  will  take  such  a* 
tincture  from  a  familiarity  with  that  object,  that 
every thing else, how  remote  soever, will be brought 
under  the  same  view.  A  metaphysician  will  bring 
plowing  and  gardening  immediately  to  abstract 
notions :  the history of nature shall signify nothing to 
him.  An  alchemist,  on  the  contrary,  shall  reduce 
divinity to the maxims of  his laboratory; explain mo- 
rality by  sal,  sulphur, arid  mercury;  and allegorise 
the scripture itself, and the sacred inysterics thereof, 
into the  philosopher's  stone.  And  I  heard  once  a 
man,  who  had  a  more  than  ordinary  excellency  in 
music, seriously accoinmodate Moses's  seven  days of 
the first week to the notes of music, as if from thence 
had been taken the measure and method of the crea- 
tion.  It is  of  no  small  consequence  to  keep the 
mind from  such  a  possession,  which  I  think is  best 
done by kiviilg it a fair  and  equal view of the whole 
intellectual world, wherein it may see the order, rank, 
and beauty of  the whole,  and  give a just  allowance 
to the distinct provinces of  the several sciences in the 
due order and usefulness of each of them. 
If this be that which old men will not think neces- 
sary, nor be easily brought to ;  it is fit, at least, that 
it should be practised in the breeding  of  the young. 
The business of education, as I have already observed, 
is not, as I think, to make them perfect in any one of 
the sciences, but so to open  and  dispose their minds, 
as  may best  make thein  capable of  any, when  they 
shall  apply themselves to it.  If men  are, for a long 
time,  accustoined  only  to  one  sort  or  method  of 
thoughts, their  minds  grow  stiff  in  it,  and  do not 
readily turn to another.  It  is, therefore, to give them 
this freedom, that I think they should be made to look 
into all sorts of knowledge, and exercise their under- 
stanclings in so wide a variety and stock of knowledge. 
But I  do not  propose  it  as  a  variety and  stock  of 
knowledge, but a variety and freedom of thinking, as 
an increase of  the powers  and  activity of  the mind, 
not as an enlargement of its ~ossessions.  --  -  ~ 
$ 20. This iithat which 1'think  great  Reading. 
readers are apt to be mistaken in.  Those 
who have  read of  every thing, are thought to under- 
stand  every  thing  too;  but  it  is  not  always  so. 
Reading  furnishes  the mind  only with  materials of 
knowledge ; it is thinking makes what we read  ours 
We are of the ruminating  kind, and it is not enough 
to cram ourselves  with  a great load of  collections; 
unless we chew them over again, they will not give us 
strength  and  nourishment.  There  are,  indeed,  in 
some writers visible instances of deep thoughts, close 
and acute reasoning,  and ideas well  pursued.  The 
light these would give would be of great use, if their 
reader would observe  and  imitate then1 ; all the rest 
at best are but particulars fit to be turned into know- 
ledge ;  but that can be done only by our own medita- 
tion, and examining the reach, force, and coherence of 
what  is  said;  and then, as far as we  apprehend  and 
see the connexion  of  ideas, so far it is ours ;  without 
that, it is but so  much  loose  matter floating  in  our 
brain.  The memory may be stored, but the judgment 
is little better,  and  the stock  of  knowledge  not  in- 
creased,  by  being  able  to repeat  what  others  have 
said,  or  produce  the  arguments we  have  found  in 
them.  Such a knowledge  as  this  is  but knowledge 
by hearsay,  and the ostentation  of  it is at best  but 
talking by rote, and very often upon weak and wrong 
principles.  For  all that  is  to be found  in books  is 
not built  upon  true foundations,  nor  alwaj~s  rightly 
deduced  from  the  principles  it is  pretended  to be 
built on.  Such an examen as is requisite to discover 
that,  every  reader's  mind  is  not  forward  to make; 
especially in those who have given themselves up to a 
party, and only hunt for what they can  scrape  toge- 
ther,  that may favour  and  support  the tenets of  it. 
Such  men  wilfully  exclucle  themselves  from  truth, 
and from  all true benefit to be received by reading. 
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Others of more indifferency often want attention and 
industry.  The mind  is  backward in itself  to be at 
the pains to trace every argument to its original, and 
to see upon what basis it stands, and how firmly ;,but 
yet it is this that gives so much the advantage to one 
man more than another in reading.  The  mind should 
by severe rules  be  tied  down to this,  at first, uneasy 
task ; use  and exercise will give it facility.  So that 
those  who  are accustomed to it readily,  as it were 
with one cast of the eye, take a view of the argument, 
and  presently,  in most cases,  see  where it  bottoms. 
Those who  have  got this faculty, one may say, have 
got the true key of  books, arid the clue to lead them 
through the mizmaze  of variety of  opinions and au- 
thors to truth and certainty.  This young beginners 
should  be  entered  in,  and  showed the use  of,  that 
they might profit  by their  reading.  Those who are 
strangers to it will be apt to think it too great a clog 
in the way of  men's  studies,  and they  will  suspect 
they shall make but small progress,  if,  in the books 
they read, they must stand to examine  and  unravel 
every argument, and follow it step by step up to its 
original.- 
I answer,  this is  a  good  objection,  and  ought to 
weigh with those whose reading is designed for much 
talk and little knowledge, and I have nothing to say 
to it.  But I am here inquiring  into the conduct  of 
the understanding in its progress towards knowledge ; 
and to those who aim at that, I may say, that he who 
fair and softly goes  steadily forwaid in-a course that 
points right, will  sooner be at his journey's  end than 
he that runs  aftier  every  one  he meets,  though  he 
gallop all day full-speed. 
To  which let me add, that this way of thinking on, 
and profiting  by, what we  read, will  be  a clog and 
rub to any one only in  the beginning :  when custom 
and exercise have made it  familiar,it will bedespatched, 
on most occasions, without resting or interruption in 
the course of our reading.  The motions and views of 
a  mind  exercised  that way  are wonderfully quick; 
and  s man used  to such  sort of  reflections  sees  as 
much at  one glimpse as wo'uld require a long discourse 
to lay before another, and make out in an entire and 
gradual deduction.  Besides that, when the first diffi- 
culties are over, the delight and sensible advantage it 
brings  mightily encourages and enlivens the mind in 
reading, which without  this is very improperly called 
study. 
5 21. As an help to this, I think it may  Interme- 
be proposed, that for the saving the long  diateprinci- 
progression ofthe thoughts to remote and  pies. 
first principles in every case, the mind should provide 
it several  stages ; that is to say, intermediate  princi- 
ples, which it might have  recourse to in the examin- 
ing those  positions  that come  in  its way.  These, 
though they are not self-evident principles, yet if they 
have  been  made  out from  them by a wary  and un- 
questionable  deduction,  may be  depended on as cer- 
tain and infallible truths, and serve as unquestioriable 
truths to prove other points depending on them by a 
nearer  and  shorter  view  than remote  and general 
maxims.  These may serve as land-marks to show what 
lies  in the direct way of truth, or is quite besides  it. 
And thus mathetnaticians do, who do not in every new 
problem  run  it back to the first  axioms, through all 
the whole train of intermediate propositions.  Certain 
theorems, that they have settled  to themselves  upon 
sure  demonstration,  serve to resolve  to them  multi- 
tudes of propositions which depend on them, and are 
as firmly made out from thence  as if  the mind went 
afresh over  every link  of  the whole  chain  that ties 
them to first  self-evident  principles.  Only in  other 
sciences great care is to be taken, that they establish 
those  intermediate  principles with as much  caution, 
exactness, and indifferency,  as mathematicians use in 
the settling any of their great theorems.  When this 
is not done, but men take up the principles in this  or 
that science upon  credit,  inclination,  interest, &c. in 
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haste, without due examination, and most unquestion- 
able proof,  they  lay a  trap for  themselves,  and,  as 
much as in them  lies, captivate their  understandings 
to mistake, falsehood, and error. 
Partiality.  $92.  As there is a partiality to opinions, 
which, as we have already observed, is apt 
to mislead the understanding ;  so there is often a par- 
tiality to studies, which  is  prejudicial  also  to know- 
ledge  and improvement.  Those sciences which men 
are particularly versed  in they are apt to value  and 
extol,  as  if  that part of  knowledge which every one 
has  acquainted  himself  with  were  that alone which 
was worth the having,  and all the rest were idle and 
empty amusements,  comparatively  of  no  use  or  im- 
portance.  This is  the effect of  ignorance,  and  not 
knowledg?;  the being  vainly puffed  up with a flatu- 
lency aris~ng  from a weak and narrow comprehension. 
It  is not amiss that every one should relish the science 
that he  has  made his  peculiar  study;  a view  of  its 
beauties,  and a sense of  its usefulness,  carries a man 
on with the more  delight and warmth in the pursuit 
and improvement of it.  But the contempt of  all other 
knowledge, as if it were nothing in comparison of law 
or physic, of astronomy or chemistry, or perhaps some 
yet meaner part  of knowledge, wherein I have got some 
smattering, or am somewhat advanced, is not only the 
mark of  a vain  or  little mind ;  but does  this preju- 
dice in the conduct of the understanding, that it coops 
it up within narrow bounds,  and hinders it from look- 
ing  abroad  into  other  provinces of  the intellectual 
world, more beautiful possibly and more fruitful than 
that which  it had,  till  then,  laboured in ; wherein it 
might  find,  besides  new  knowledge,  ways  or  hints 
whereby it might  be enabled  the better to cultivate 
its own. 
Theology.  $ 23. There is,  indeed, one science (as 
they are now distinguished) incomparably 
above all the rest, where  it is not by corruption nar- 
rowed into a  trade  or  faction,  for  mean  or ill. ends, 
slid secular  interests; I mean  theology,  which, con- 
taining the knowledge of  God and his creatures,  our 
duty to him and  our fellow-creatures,  and  a view of 
our present and future state, is the comprehension of 
all other knowledge directed to its true end ; i. e. the 
honour  and  veneration  of  the Creator,  and the hap- 
piness of mankind.  This is that noble study which is 
every man's duty,  and every one that can be called a 
rational creature is capable of.  The works of nature, 
and the words of  revelation,  display it to mankind in 
characters so large and visible, that those who are not 
quite blind may in them read and see the first prin- 
ciples and most necessary parts of it ;  and from thence, 
as they have time and industry, may be enabled to go 
on to the more abstruse parts of it, and penetrate into 
those infinite depths filled  with the treasures of  wis- 
dom and knowledge.  This is that science which woulc! 
truly enlarge men's  minds,  were  it studied.  or  per- 
mitted to be studied, every where, with that freedom, 
love of  truth, and charity which it teaches, and were 
not made, contrary to its nature, the occasion of strife, 
faction, malignity, and narrow impositions.  T shall say 
no more here of this, but that it is undoubtedly a wrong 
use of my understanding, to make it the rule and mea- 
sure of another man's ;  a use which it is neither fit for, 
nor capable of. 
§ 24.  This partiality,  where  it is  not 
permitted an authority to render all other 
studies insignificant or contemptible, is often indulged 
so far as to be relied upon, and made use of  in  other 
parts of knowledge, to which it does not at all belong, 
and wherewith it  has no manner of affinity.  Some men 
have so used their heads to mathcmatical figures, that, 
giving a  preference  to the methods of  that science, 
they introduce lines and tliagrams into their study of 
divinity,  or  politic  inquiries,  as if  nothing  coulcl  he 
known without them; and otllers,  accuston~ed  to re- 
tired speculations, run natural philosopl~y  into ineta- 
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and  how  often may one meet with religion and mo- 
rality treated of  in the terms of  the laboratory,  and 
thought to be  improved by the methods and notions 
of chemistry ! But he that will take care of  the eon- 
duct of  his  understanding,  to direct it right  to the 
knowledge of things, must avoid those undue mixtures, 
and not,  by a fondness for what  he has found useful 
and  necessary in  one,  transfer it to another science, 
where it serves only to perplex and confound the un- 
derstanding.  It is  a  certain  truth,  that res  nolunt 
malt? administrari;  it is no less certain resnolunt malt? 
nteii Things themselves  are to be considered as 
they are in themselves,  and then they will show us in 
what way  they are to be understood.  For to have 
right conceptions about them, we must bring our un- 
derstandings to the inflexible natures and unalterable 
relations of  things, and not endeavour to bring things 
to any preconceived notions of our own. 
There  is  another  partiality  very  commonly  ob- 
servable in men of  study, no less prejudicial nor ridi- 
culous than the former ;  and that is a fantastical and 
wild attributing all knowledge to the ancients alone, 
or to the moderns.  This  raving  upon  antiquity  in 
matter  of  poetry,  Horace has  wittily described  and 
exposed in one of his satires.  The same sort of mad- 
ness may be found in reference to all the other sciences. 
Some  will  not  admit an  opinion not  authorised  by 
men of  old,  who were  then all giants  in knowledge. 
Nothing  is  to be  put into the treasury  of  truth or 
knowledge which  has  not  the stamp of  Greece  or 
Rome upon it; and since their days will scarce allow 
that men have been able to see, think, or write.  Others, 
with a like extravagancy, contemn all that the ancients 
have left us, and, being talren with the modern inven- 
tions and discoveries, lay by all that went before,  as if 
whatever is called  old  must  have  the decay of  time 
upon it, and truth, too, were liable to mould and rot- 
tenness.  Men, I think, have been much the same for 
natural endowments in all times.  Fashion, discipline, 
and education,  have  put eminent  differences in  the 
ages of several  countries,  and  made  one generation 
much differ  from another  in  arts and  sciences:  but 
truth is always the same ; time alters it not,  nor is it 
the better  or worse  for  being  of  ancient or  modern 
tradition.  Many were eminent in former ages of  the 
world for their discovery and delivery of it ;  but though 
the knowledge they have left us be worth our study, 
yet  they exhausted not all its treasure;  they  left  a 
great deal for the industry and sagacity of  after-a~es, 
and so shall we.  That was once  new to them wh~ch 
any one now receives with veneration for its antiquity, 
nor was it the worse for appearing as a novelty ; ancl 
that which  is now embraced  for  its newness will  to 
posterity be old,  hut not thereby be  less true or less 
genuine.  There is no occasion,  on this  account,  to 
oppose the ancients and the moderns to one another, 
or to be  squeamish on  either  side.  He that wisely 
conducts  his  mind in the pursuit of  knowledge will 
gather what lights, and get what helps he can,  from 
either of them, from whom they are best  to be  had, 
without adoring the errors,  or  rejecting  the  truths, 
which he may find mingled in them. 
Another  partiality  may  be  observed,  in  some  to 
vulgar,  in others to heterodox tenets:  some  are apt 
to conclude that what is the common opinion cannot 
but be true; so  many men's  eyes they think cannot 
but see right; so  many men's  understandings  of  all 
sorts cannot be deceived ;  and, therefore, will not ven- 
ture to look beyond the received notions of  the place 
and age, nor  have  so  presumptuous  a thought as to 
be wiser than their neighbours.  They are content to 
go with the crowd, and so go easily, which they think 
is going right,  or  at least  serves them as well.  Rut 
however uox populi  vox Dei has prevailed  as a maxim, 
yet I  do not remember where ever God delivered his 
oracles by the multitude, or nature truths by the herd. 
On the other  side,  some fly all common  opinions  as 
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beast is a sufficient  reason to them to conclude  that 
no truths of  weight  or  consequence  can  be  lodged 
there.  Vulgar  opinions  are  suited to vulgar  capa- 
cities,  and adapted to the ends of  those that govern. 
He  that will know the truth of things must leave the 
common and beaten track, which none but weak and 
servile minds are satisfied to trudge along continually 
in.  Such nice  palates relish nothing but strange no- 
tions quite out of the way : whatever is commonly re- 
ceived,  has the mark  of  the beast  on it ; and  they 
think it a lessening to them to hearken to it, or receive 
it; their mind runs only after paradoxes ; these they 
seek, these they embrace, these alone they vent;  and 
so,  as they  think,  distinguish  themselves  from  the 
vulgar.  But common or uncommon are not the marks 
to distinguish truth or falsehood, and therefore should 
not be any bias to us in our inquiries.  We should not 
judge of things by men's  opinions,  but of opinions by 
things.  The multitude reason but ill,  and therefore 
may be well suspected,  and cannot be relied  on, nor 
should be followed as a sure guide ;  but philosophers, 
who have  quitted  the orthodoxy of  the community, 
and the popular doctrines of their countries, have fallen 
into as extravagant  and as  absurd  opinions as ever 
common reception countenanced.  It  would  be mad- 
ness to refuse to breathe the common  air,  or quench 
one's thirst with water,  because  the rabble use  them 
to these  purposes;  and if  there are conveniencies of 
life which common use reaches not, it is not reason to 
reject  them  because they are not grown into the or- 
dinary fashion of the country, and every villager doth 
not know them. 
Truth, whether in or out of  fashion, is the measure 
of knowledge, and the business of the understanding ; 
whatsoever is besides that, however authorised by con- 
sent, or recommended  by rarity, is nothing but igno- 
rance, or something worse. 
Another sort of partiality there is, whereby men im- 
pose upon  themselves,  and  by it make their reading 
little useful to themselves ; I mean the making use of 
the opinions of  writers,  and  laying stress upon  their 
authorities,  wherever  they find  them to favour their 
own opinions. 
There is  nothing  almost has  done  more  harm to 
men dedicated to letters than giving the name of study 
to reading, and making a man of  great reading to be 
the same with a man of  great knowledge,  or at least 
to be a title of  honour.  All that can be recorded in 
writing  are only  facts  or reasonings.  Facts  are of 
three sorts ; 
1. Merely of  natural agents,  observable in the or- 
dinary operations of bodies one upon another, whether 
in the visible  course  of  things  left to themselves,  or 
in  experiments made  by them,  applying agents and 
patients to one another, after a peculiar and artificial 
manner. 
2.  Of voluntary agents, Inore especially the actions 
of men in society, which makes civil and moral history. 
3. Of  opinions. 
In these three consists, as it seems to me, that which 
commonly has the name of learning ;  to which perhaps 
some  may  add  a  distinct  head  of  critical  writings, 
which indeed at bottom is nothing but matter of fact ; 
and resolves itself into this, that such a man, or set of 
men, used such a word, or phrase, in such a sense ;  i. e. 
that they made such sounds the marks of such ideas. 
Under reasonings I comprehend  all the discoveries 
of  general  truths made  by  human  reason,  whether 
found  by  intuition,  demonstration,  or  probable  de- 
ductions.  And this is that which is, if not alone know- 
ledge,  (because the truth or probability of  particular 
propositioris may be known too) yet is, as may be sup- 
posed, most properly the business  of  those  who pre- 
tend to improve their understandings, and make them- 
selves knowing by reading. 
Books and reading are looked upon to be the great 
helps of the understanding, and instruments of know- 
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beg leave to question whether these do not prove an 
hinderance  to many,  and keep  several bookish men 
from attaining to solid and true knowledge.  This, I 
think, I may be permitted to say, that there is no part 
wherein the understanding needs  a more careful and 
wary conduct than in the use of books ;  without which 
they will prove rather innocent amusements than pro- 
fitable employments of our time,  and bring but small 
additions to our knowledge. 
There is  not seldom  to be  found,  even  amongst 
those who aim at knowledge,  who with an unwearied 
industry employ their whole time in books, who scarce 
allow themselves time to eat or sleep,  but read,  and 
read, and read on, yet make no great advances in real 
knowledge,  though there be no  defect in their intel- 
lectual faculties, to which their little progress can be 
imputed.  The mistake here is, that it is usually sup- 
posed  that  by  reading,  the  author's  knowledge  is 
transfused into the reader's understanding;  and so it 
is,  but not by bare reading,  but by reading and un- 
derstanding  what  he  writ.  Whereby  I  mean,  not 
barely comprehending  what  is  affirmed  or denied in 
each proposition  (though  that great readers  do not 
always think themselves  concerned  precisely  to do), 
but to see and follow the train of  his  reasonings,  ob- 
serve the strength and clearness of  their  connexion, 
and examine upon what they bottom.  Without this a 
man may read the discourses of a very rational author, 
writ in a language,  and in propositions,  that he very 
well understands,  and yet acquire not one jot of  his 
knowledge;  which  consisting  only in the perceived, 
certain, or probable connexion  of the ideas made use 
of  in his  reasonings,  the  reader's  knowledge  is  no 
farther increased than he perceives that; so much as 
he sees of  this connexion,  so  much  he knows  of  the 
truth or probability of that author's opinions. 
All that he relies  on,  without  this  perception,  he 
takes upon trust, upon the author's credit, without any 
knowledge of it at all.  This makes me not at all won- 
der to see some men so abound in citations, and build 
so much upon authorities, it being the sole foundation 
on which  they bottom most of  their  own tenets;  so 
that,  in effect, they have  but a  second-hand,  or im- 
plicit knowledge ;  i. e.  are in the rig%t, if such an one 
from whom they borrowed it were in the right in that 
opinion which  they took  from him ; which  indeed is 
no knowledge at all.  Writers of  this or former ages 
may be good witnesses of  matters of  fact which they 
deliver,  which we may do well to take upon their au- 
thority;  but their credit can go no farther than this ; 
it cannot  at all  affect  the  truth  and  falsehood  of 
opinions which have no other sort of  trial but reason 
and proof, which they themselves made use of to make 
themselves knowing, and so must others too, that will 
partake in their knowledge.  Indeed, it is an advantage 
that they have been at the pains to find out the proofs, 
and lay them in that  order that may show the truth 
Or  probability of  their  conclusions ; and  for this  we 
owe them  great acknowledgments for  saving us  the 
pains in searching out those  proofs which they have 
collected for us, and which possibly, after all our pains, 
we  might  not  have  found,  nor  been  able  to have 
set them in  so  good a light as  that which the  left  Y  them us in.  Upon  this account we are rrighti y be- 
holden to judicious  writers of  all ages,  for those dis- 
coveries and discourses they have left behind them for 
our instruction,  if we know how to make a right use 
of them; which is not to run them over in  an hasty 
perusal,  and perhaps  lodge  their  opinions  or  some 
remarkable passages in our memories ;  but to ente~ 
into their reasonings,  examine their proofs,  and then 
judge of the truth or falsehood, probability or impro- 
bability of what they advance, not by any opinion we 
have entertained of  the  author,  but by the evidence 
he produces,  and  the conviction he affords us,  drawn 
from things themselves.  Knowing is seeing, and if it 
be so, it is madness  to persuade ourselves that we do 
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words to tell us  that what he asserts is very visible. 
Till we ourselves see it with  our own eyes,  and per- 
ceive it by our own  understandings,  we  are as much 
in the dark and as void  of  knowledge  as  before,  let 
us believe any learned author as much as we will. 
Euclid and Archimedes are allowed to be knowing, 
and  to have  demonstrated what  they  say;  and yet 
whoever  shall read  over  their writings without per- 
ceiving the connexion of their proofs, and seeing what 
they show, though he may understand all their words, 
yet he is not  the more  knowing : he may believe, in- 
deed, but does not know what they say; and so is not 
advanced  one jot in  mathematical  knowledge, by all 
his reading of those approved mathematicians. 
Haste.  5 85. The eagerness and strang bent of 
the mind  after  knowledge, if  not warily 
regulated, is often an hinderance to it.  It still presses 
into farther discoveries  and new objects, and catches 
at  the variety of knowledge ;  and therefore often stays 
not long enough on what  is before  it, to look into it 
as it should, for  haste  to pursue what is yet out of 
sight.  He that rides post through a country may  be 
able, from the transient view, to tell how in  general 
the parts lie, and may be  able to give some loose de- 
scription of here a mountain, and there a plain ;  here 
a morass,  and  there  a river ; woodland  in  one  part, 
and savannahs in another.  Such superficial ideas and 
observations as these he may collect in galloping over 
it: but  the  more  useful  observations  of  the  soil, 
plants,  animals,  and  inhabitants,  with  their several 
sorts  and  properties,  must  necessarily  escape  him; 
and it is  seldom  men  ever  discover  the rich  mines 
without some digging.  Nature commonly lodges her 
treasure and jewels  in  rocky ground.  If the matter 
be  knotty, and  the  sense  lies deep,  the mind  must 
stop and buckle  to it, and  stick upon  it with labour 
and tllo~igllt,  and close contemplation ;  and not leave 
it till  it  has  mastered  the  difficulty,  and  got pos- 
bcssioii  of  truth.  But hcrc  care must  bc  taken  to 
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avoid  the  other  extreme:  a  man  must not stick  at 
every  useless nicety,  and expect mysteries of science 
in  every  trivial  question,  or  scruple,  that he  may 
raise.  He that will  stand to pick  up and  examine 
every pebble that  comes in  his way is as unlikely to 
return enriched  and loaden with jewels,  as  the other 
that travelled full speed.  Truths are not the better 
nor the worse  for their  obviousness or diEculty, but 
their value is to be measured  by their usefulness and 
tendency.  Insignificant observations should not take 
up  any of  our  minutes,  and those  that enlarge our 
view, and give light towards farther and  useful  dis- 
coveries, should  not  be  neglected, though they stop 
our course, and spend some of our time in a fixed at- 
tention. 
There is  another haste  that does  often,  and  will 
mislead the mind  if  it be  left to itself,  and its  own 
conduct.  The understanding  is  naturally  forward, 
not  only  to  learn its  knowledge  by  variety (which 
makes it skip over one to get speedily to another part 
of knowledge) but also eager to enlarge its views, by 
r~nning  too fast into general observations  and con- 
clusions,  without  a  due  examination  of  particulars 
enough whereon to found those general axioms.  This 
seems to enlarge their  stock, but it is of fancies, not 
realities ;  such theories built upon narrow foundations 
stand but weakly, and, if they fall not of themselves, 
are at least very hardly to  be supported against  the 
assaults of opposition.  And thus men being too hasty 
to  erect  to  themselves  general  notions  and  ill- 
grounded theories, find  themselves  deceived in  their 
stock of knowledge, when they come to examine their 
hastily assumed maxims  themselves, or to have them 
attacked  by  others.  General  observations  drawn 
from particulars  are the jewels  of knowledge,  com- 
prehending great store in a little room ;  but they are 
therefore to be rnacle with  the greater care  and cau- 
tion, lest, if we take counterfeit for true, our loss and 
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vere scrutiny.  One or  two particulars may suggest 
hints of inquiry, and they do well to take those hints; 
but if they turn them  into  conclusions,  and  make 
them presently  general rules,  they  are forward  in- 
deed, but it is only to impose on  themselves  by pro- 
positions assumed  for  truths without  sufficient war- 
rant.  To make  such  observations  is,  as  has  been 
already remarked, to make  the head a  magazine  of 
materials, which can hardly be called knowledge ; or 
at  least it is but like  a  collection  of lumber  not  re- 
duced  to use  or  order;  and  he that  makes  every 
thing an observation, has the same useless plenty and 
much more  falsehood  mixed with it.  The extremes 
on both sides are to be  avoided, and he will  be able 
to give the best account  of  his studies who keeps his 
understanding in the right mean between them. 
$ 26. Whether it  be a love of that which 
-4nticipa-  brings the first light and information to 
tion,  their  minds, and want  of vigour and  in- 
dustry to inquire ;  or else that men content themselves 
with any appearance of knowledge,  right or wrong; 
which, when they have once got, they will hold fast : 
this is visible, that many men  give  themselves up to 
the  first  anticipations of their  minds,  and  are very 
tenacious of the opinions that first possess them; they 
are often as fond of their first conceptions as of  their 
first-born, and will by no means recede from the  judg- 
ment they have once made, or any conjecture or con- 
ceit which they have once entertained.  This is a fault 
in the conduct  of the understanding, since this firm- 
ness or rather stiffness of the mind is not from an ad- 
herence to truth,  but  a  submission  to prejudice.  It 
is  an unreasonable  homage  paid  to prepossession, 
whereby we  show a reverence,  not  to (what we pre- 
tend to seek) truth, but what by hap-hazard we chance 
to light on, be it what it will.  This is visibly a pre- 
posterous  use  of  our  faculties,  and is  a  downright 
prostituting of the mind  to resign it thus, and put it 
under the power of the first comer.  This can never 
be allowed, or ought to be followed, as a  right way 
to knowledge, till the understanding (whose business 
it is to conform itself  to what it finds  in the objects 
without) can, by its own opiuionatry, change that, and 
make the unalterable nature  of  things  comply with 
its  own hasty  determinations, which  will  never  be. 
Whatever we  fancy,  things keep  their  course ;  and 
the habitudes,  correspondencies,  and relations, keep 
the same to one another. 
$ 27. Contrary to these, but by a like  Resignam 
dangerous excess, on the other side,  are  tion. 
those who  always  resign  their judgment  to the last 
man  they  heard  or  read.  Truth never  sinks  into 
these  men's  minds,  nor gives  any tincture  to them ; 
but,  cameleon-like,  they take  the colour of what  is 
laid before them, and as soon lose and resign it to the 
next that happens to come in their way.  The order 
wherein opinions  are proposed, or received by  us, is 
no rule of their rectitude, nor ought to be a cause of 
their preference.  First or last, in this case,is the ef- 
fect of  chance, and not the measure of truth or false- 
hooJ.  This  every  one  must  confess, and  therefore 
should, in the pursuit of  truth,  keep his  mind  free 
from the influence of any such accidents.  A man may 
as reasonably draw cuts for  his  tenets, regulate  his 
persuasion by the cast  of  a  die,  as take it up for its 
novelty, or  retain  it because it had  his first  assent, 
and he was  never  of  another  mind.  Well-weighed 
reasons  are  to determine  the judgment ; those  the 
mind should be  always ready to hearken and submit 
to,  and by their testimony and suffrage entertain or 
reject any tenet indifferently, whether it be a perfect 
stranger, or an old acquaintance. 
$28.  Though the faculties of the mind  Practice.  are improved  by exercise, yet  they must 
not  be put to a  stress beyond their strength.  Qt~id 
aaleu?zt humeri, pzlid ferre  reczuent,  must  be  made 
the measure of every one's understanding, who has a 
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vigour  of  his  faculties; and not  to balk  his  under- 
standing by what is  too hard  for it.  The mind, by 
being engaged in a task beyond its strength, like the 
body, strained by lifting at a weight  too  heavy, has 
often its force broken, and thereby gets an unaptness, 
or  an  aversion,  to any vigorous  attempt ever  after. 
A sinew cracked seldom recovers its former strength, 
or at least the tenderness of the sprain remains a good 
while after, and the memory of it longer, and leaves 
a  lasting  caution  in  the man,  not  to put the  part 
quickly again to any robust employment.  So it fares 
in  the mind  once  jaded  by  an  attempt  above  its 
power;  it either  is disabled for  the future,  or  else 
checks  at any vigorous  undertaking  ever  after;  at 
least, is very hardly brought to exert its force  again 
on any subject that requires thought and meditation. 
The understanding should be brought to the difficult 
and knotty parts of knowledge, that try the strength 
of  thought, and a full bent of the mind, by insensible 
degrees ;  and in such a gradual proceeding notliing is 
too hard  for it.  Nor let it be  objected, that such a 
slow progress will  never  reach  the extent  of  some 
sciences.  It  is not to be imagined how far constancy 
will carry a man ;  however, it  is better walking slowly 
in a rugged way, than to break a leg and be a cripple. 
He that begins with the calf may carry the ox ;  but 
he that will at first  go to take up an ox, may so dis- 
able himself as not to be  able  to lift up a calf after 
that.  When  the  mind,  by  insensible  degrees,  has 
brought itself to attention and close thinking, it will 
be  able  to cope with  difficulties,  and  master  them 
without any prejudice  to itself, and then  it may go 
on roundly.  Every abstruse problem,  every intricate 
question, dl  not baffle, discourage, or break it.  But 
though  putting  the mind  unprepared  upon  an un- 
usual stress, that may discourage or  damp it for the 
future, ought to be avoided ;  yet this must not run it, 
by  an  over-great  shyness  of  difficulties, into  a lazy 
sauntering  about  ordinary and  obvious  things,  that 
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demand no thought or application.  This debases and 
enervates the understanding, makes it weak and unfit 
for labour.  This is a sort of hovering about the sur- 
face of things, without  any insight into them or pe- 
netration ;  and  when  the mind  has  been  once habi- 
tuated to this lazy recumbency and satisfaction on the 
obvious surface of things, it is in danpr to rest satis- 
fied there, and  go no  deeper; since  ~t cannot  do it 
without  pains  and  digging.  He that has  for some 
time accustolned himself to take up with what easily 
offers itself at first  view,  has  reason to fear  he shdi 
never reconcile himsell to the fatigue of  turning and 
tumbling things in his  mind,  to discover  their more 
retired and more valuable secrets. 
It is not  strange that methods  of  learning which 
scholars have been  accustomed to in their beginning 
and entrance upon the sciences, should iniiuence them 
all their  lives,  and be  settled in  their  minds  by an 
overruling  reverence;  especially  if  they be  such  as 
universal use has established.  Learners must at first 
be  believers,  and  their  masters'  rules  having  been 
once  made  axioms  to them,  it is  no  wonder  they 
should keep that dignity, and, by the authority they 
have once got, mislead those who think it sufficient to 
excuse them,  if they go out of  their way in  a well- 
beaten track. 
8 29. I have copiously enough spoken 
words,  of the abuse of words in another place, and 
therefore shall upon this reflection,  that the sciences 
are full of them, warn those that would conduct their 
understandings  right not  to take any term,  howso- 
ever authorised by the  language  of  the schools,  to 
star~d  for any thing till they have  an  idea of  it.  A 
word may be of frequent use, and great credit, with 
several authors, and be  by them  made use  of as if it 
stood for some real  being ; but yet,  if he that reads 
cannot frame any distinct idea of that being, it is cer- 
tainly to  him a mere empty sound without a meaning; 
and he learns no more by all  that is said of  it, or  at- 
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tributed  to it, than if  it were  affirmed  only of  that 
bare  empty  sound.  They  who  would  advance  in 
knowledge,and  not deceive and swell themselves with 
a  little articulated  air,  should  lay down  this  as  a 
fundamental rule, not  to take words  for  things,  nor 
suppose that names in books  signify real entities in 
nature, till they can frame clear and distinct ideas of 
those  entities.  It will  not perhaps be  allowed,  if I 
should set down "  substantial forms" and "  intentional 
species,"  as such that may justly  be suspected to be of 
this kind of  insignificant terms : but this I am sure, 
to one  that  can form  no  determined ideas of what 
they stand  for,  they signify  nothing at all ; and all 
thai; he thinks he knows  about  them  is to him  so 
much knowledge about nothing, and amounts at most 
but to be a learned ignorance.  It  is not without all 
reason  supposed  that  there  are many  such  empty 
terms to be found  in  some learned writers, to which 
they had  recourse  to etch out their  systems, where 
their  understandings  could  not  furnish  them  with 
conceptions from things.  But yet I believe  the sup- 
posing of  some  realities in  nature,  answering those 
and the like words, have  much  perplexed some, and 
quite misled  others  in the  study of  nature.  That 
which in any discourse signifies,  '<  I know not what," 
should be  considered " I know  not when."  Where 
men have any conceptions, they can, if they are never 
so abstruse or abstracted, explain them, and the terms 
they use  for them.  For our conceptions  being  no- 
thing but ideas,  which  are all  made up of  simple 
ones:  if  they  cannot  give  us  the ideas  their words 
stand for, it is plain  they have none.  To  what pur- 
pose can it be  to hunt after his  conceptions who has 
none,  or none  distinct? He that knew not what  he 
himself  meant  by  a  learned term  cannot  make  us 
know any thing by his use of it, let us beat our heads 
about it never so long.  Whether we are able to com- 
prehend all the operations of nature, and the manners 
of them, it matters not to inquire ;  but this is certain, 
that we can  comprehend  no  more  of  them than  we 
can  distinctly  conceive;  and  therefore  to obtrude 
terms where we  have  no  distinct  conceptions,  as if 
they did contain  or rather conceal something, is but 
an artifice  of learned  vanity to cover  a defect  in an 
hypothesis  or  our  understandings.  Words  arc not 
made to conceal, but to declare and show something; 
where  they  are by  those,  who  pretend  to instruct, 
otherwise used,  they conceal  indeed something ; but 
that that they conceal  is  nothing but the ignorance, 
error, or sophistry of the talker ;  for there is, in truth, 
nothing else under them. 
$ 30.  That there is a constant succes- 
sion and flux of ideas in our minds, I have 
observed  in the former part of this Essay ;  and every 
one may take notice of it in himself.  This, I suppose, 
may deserve some part of our care in the col~duct  of 
our understandings ; and I think  it may be of  great 
advantage, if  we can by use get that power over our 
minds, as to be able to direct that train of  ideas, that 
so,  since  there will  new  ones  perpetually come  into 
our thoughts by a constant succession, we may be able 
by choice  so to direct  them,  that none may come in 
view but such as are pertinent to our present inquiry, 
and in such order as may be most  useful  to the dis- 
covery we are upon ; or at least,  if some foreign and 
unsought ideas will offer themselves, that yet we might 
be able to reject  them,  and keep  them  from taking 
off  our  minds  from  its  present  pursuit,  and hinder 
them  from  running  away  with  our  thoughts quite 
from the subject in  hand.  This is not, I suspect, so 
easy  to be  done  as perhaps may  be  imagined;  and 
yet,  for aught I know,  this  may be,  if  not the chief, 
yet one  of  the  great  differences that carry  some 
men in  their  reasoning  so  far beyond  others, where 
they seem to be naturally of  equal parts.  A proper 
and effectual remedy for this wandering of  thoughts 
I would be glad to find.  He that shall propose such 
an one, would do great  service  to the studious and 
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contemplative part of mankind, and perhaps help un- 
thinking men  to become thinking.  I must acknow- 
ledge that hitherto I have discovered no other way to 
keep our thoughts  close  to  their  business,  but the 
endeavouring  as  much  as we  can,  and  by  frequent 
attention and application, getting the habit of atten- 
tion and application.  He that will observe children 
will find, that even when they endeavour their utmost, 
they cannot keep their minds  from straggling.  The 
way to cure it, I am satisfied, is not angry chiding or 
beating,  for  that presently fills  their  heads with all 
the ideas that fear, dread,  or confusion can offer to 
them.  To  bring back gently their wandering thoughts, 
by leading them into the path, and going before them 
in the train they should pursue, without  any rebuke, 
or so much as taking notice (where it can be avoided) 
of their roving, I suppose would sooner reconcile and 
inure them to attention than all those rougher methods 
which more distract their thought, and, hindering the 
application they would promote, introduce a contrary 
habit. 
5 31.  Distinction and division  are (if I 
mistake not the import of the words) verv  .  . 
different  things;  the one bein'p  the perception  of  a 
difference that nature has placed in things ;  the other, 
our making a division  where  there is yet  none ;  at 
least, if  I may be permitted  to consider them  in this 
sense,  I think I may say of them,  that one of them 
is the most necessary and conducive to true knowledge 
that can be ;  the other, when too much  made use of, 
serves only to puzzle and confound the understanding. 
To  observe every the least difference that is in things 
argues a quick  and clear  sight; and this keeps the 
understanding steady, and  right  in its way to know- 
ledge.  But  though  it be  useful  to  discern  every 
variety that is to be found in nature, yet it is not con- 
venient  to consider every difference that is in things, 
and divide them into distinct classes under every such 
difference  This will  run us,  if  followed,  into parti- 
culars (for every individual has something that differ- 
ences it from another), and we shall be able to establish 
no general truths, or else at least shall be apt to per- 
plex the mind about them.  The collection of several 
things into sevcral classes gives the mind more gene- 
ral and larger views;  but we must take care to unite 
them only in that, and so far as, they (lo agree, for so 
far they may be united  under the consideration : for 
entity itself,  that comprehends all things,  as general 
as it is,  may afford us clear and rational conceptions. 
If we would weigh and keep in  our  minds what  it is 
we are considering, that would best instruct us when 
we should or  should  not branch into farther distinc- 
tions, which are to be talien only from a due contem- 
plation  of  things;  to which  there  is  nothing  more 
opposite than the art of  verbal  distiactions, made at 
pleasure  in  learned  and  arbitrarily invented  terms, 
to be applied at a venture, without compreheriding or 
conveying  ally  distinct  notions;  and  so  altogether 
fitted to artificial talk, or empty noise in dispute, with- 
out any clearing  of difficulties, or advance  in Itnowledge. 
Whatsoever subject we examine and would get know- 
ledge in, we should, I think, make as  general and as 
large as it will bear;  nor can there be any danger of 
this, if  the idea of  it be settled and determined :  for 
if that be so,  we  shall easily distinguish it from any 
other  idea,  though  comprehended  under  the  same 
name.  For it is  to fence against the entanglements 
of  equivocal words,  and  the great  art of  sophistry 
which lies in them,  that distinctions have been multi- 
plied,  and their use  thought so necessary.  But had 
every  distinct abstract idea  a  distinct known  name, 
there would  be little need  of  these  multiplied scho- 
lastic distinctions, though there would be nevertheless 
as much need still of  the mind's  observing  the differ- 
ences  that  are  in  things,  and  discriminating  them 
thereby one  from  another.  It is  not,  therefore, the 
right way to knowledge,  to hunt  after  and  fill  the 
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stinctions, wherewith learned men's writings are often 
Alled :  we sometimes find what they treat of so divided 
and subdivided, that the mind of  the most attentive 
reader loses the sight of it, as it is more than probable 
the writer himself did ;  for  in things  crumbled into 
dust it is in vain to affect  or pretend order, or expect 
clearness.  To avoid  confusion,  by too  few  or  too 
many divisions,  is a great skill in thinking as well as 
writing, which is but the copying our thoughts ;  but 
what  are the boundaries of  the mean  between  the 
two vicious  excesses  on  both hands, I think is hard 
to set down  in words :  clear and distinct  ideas is all 
that I yet know able to regulate it.  But as to verbal 
distinctions received  and applied to common terms, 
i. e. equivocal words, they are more properly, I think, 
the business of criticisms and dictionaries than of real 
knowledge and philosophy ;  since they,  for the most 
park, explain the meaning of words,  and give us their 
several  significations.  The dexterous  management 
of terms, and being able to fend and prove with them, 
I know has  and does  pass in the world  for a great 
part of  learning;  but  it is  learning  distinct  from 
knowledge ;  for knowledge consists only in perceiving 
the habitudes and relations of  ideas one to another, 
which  is done without words ;  the intervention  of a 
sound  helps  nothing to it.  And  hence we see that 
there is least  use of distinctions where there is most 
knowledge ; I mean in mathematics, where men have 
determined ideas, without known names to them ;  and 
so there being no room for equivocations, there is no 
need of distinctions.  In arguing,  the opponent  uses 
as comprehensive and equivocal  terms as he can, to 
involve his adversary in the doubtfulness of his expres- 
sions: this is expected, and therefore the answerer on 
his  side makes it his play to distinguish  as much as 
he can, and thinks  he can never do it too ~nuch  ;  nor 
qan he indeed in that way wherein victory may be had 
without truth and without  knowledge.  This seems 
to me to he the art of disputing.  Use your words as 
captiously as you can in your arguing on one side, and 
apply distinctions  as much  as you can on the other 
side to every term, to nonplus your opponent ;  so that 
in this sort of scholarship,  there being no bounds set 
to distinguishing,  some men have  thought all  acute- 
ness to have lain in it ; and therefore in a11  they have 
read or thought on  their great business has been  to 
amuse themselves with  distiiictions,  and multiply to 
themselves divisions;  at least,  more  than the nature 
of the thing required.  There seems to me, as I said, 
to be no other rule for this, but a due and right con- 
sideration of  things  as  they are  in  themselves.  He 
that has  settled in  his  mind determined  ideas, with 
names affixed  to them,  will  be  able both  to discern 
their  differences  one  from  another,  which  is  really 
distinguishing;  and,  where  the  penury  of  words 
affords not  terms answering every distinct idea, will 
be  able  to apply proper  distinguishing terms to the 
comprehensive  and equivocal  names  he is forced to 
make use of.  This is all the need  I know  of  distin- 
guishing terms ; and in such verbal distinctions, each 
term of the distinction, joined  to that whose significa- 
tion it distinguishes,  is but a  distinct name  for a di- 
stinct idea.  Where  they are so, and men have clear 
and distinct conceptions that answer their verbal di- 
stinctions, they are right, and are pertinent  as far as 
they serve to clear any thing in the subject under con- 
sideration.  And  this is  that which  seems  to me the 
proper and only measure of distinctions and divisions; 
which  he that will  conduct  his  understanding right 
must not look for in the acuteness of invention, nor the 
authority of writers, but will find only in the consider- 
ation of things themselves, whether he is led into it by 
his own meditations, or the information of  books. 
An aptness to jumble things together, wherein can 
be found any likeness, is a fault in the un(lerstai1~1ilig 
on the other side, which will not fail to n~islencl  it, and 
by thus lumping of things hinder  the mind  from  (!is 
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tj 32. To  which let me here add another 
Similes.  near of kin to this,  at least in name,  and 
that is letting the mind, upon the suggestion of any new 
notion,  run  irnmediatcly after similes  to make it the 
clearer to itself; which, though it may be a good way, 
and  useful in the explaining our thoughts to others; yet 
it  is by no means a right method to settle true notions 
of any thing in ourselves, because similes always fail in 
some part, and come short of that exactness which our 
conceptions should have to things, if we would think 
aright.  This indeed makes men plausible talkers; for 
those  are always  most  acceptable  in  discourse  who 
have  the way to let their  thoughts  into other men's 
minds  with  the greatest  ease  and facility;  whether 
those thoughts are well  formed  and correspond with 
things,  matters not; few  men  care to be  instructed 
but at an easy rate.  They,who in their discourse strike 
the fancy,  and take the hearers'  conceptions  along 
with  them  as  fast  as their  words  flow,  are the ap- 
plauded  talkers, and go for  the only men  of  clear 
thoughts.  Nothing contributes  so  much  to this  as 
similes,  whereby  men  think  they themselves  under- 
stand better,  because they are the better understood. 
But it is one thing to think right, and another thing to 
know the right way to lay our thoughts before others 
with advantage and clearness, be they right or wrong. 
Well-chosen similes, metaphors,  and allegories, with 
method and order,  do this the best of any thing, be- 
cause being taken from objects  already known,  and 
familiar  to the understanding, they are conceived as 
fast as spoken;  and the correspondence  being  con- 
cluded, the thing they are brought to explain and elu- 
cidate is thought to be  understood  too.  Thus fancy 
passes for knowledge, and what is prettily said is mis- 
taken for solid.  I say not this to decry metaphor, or 
with design to take away that ornament of speech; nly 
business here is not with rhetoricians and orators, but 
with philosophers and lovers of truth; to  whom 1 would 
beg leave to give this one rulc whereby to try whether, 
the application oftheir thoughts to any thing for the 
improvement of their knowledge, they do in truth com- 
prehend the matter before them really such as it is in 
itself.  The way to discover this is to observe whether, 
in the laying it  before themselves or others, they make 
use only of borrowed representations, and ideas foreign 
to the things which are applied to it by way of accom- 
rnodation, as  bearing some proportion or imagined like- 
ness to the subject under consideration.  Figured and 
metaphorical  expressions  do well  to illustrate more 
abstruse and unfamiliar ideas which the mind is not yet 
thoroughly accustomed to; but  then they must be made 
use of to illustrate ideas that we already have, not to 
paint to us those which we yet have not.  Such bor- 
rowed  and allusive  ideas  may follow  real and  solid 
truth, to set it off when found ;  but must by no means 
be set in its place, and taken for it.  If all our search 
has yet reached no farther than simile and metaphor, 
we may assure ourselves we rather fancy than know, 
and have not yet penetrated into the  inside and reality 
of the thing,  be it what it will, but content ourselves 
with  what our imaginations,  not  things themselves, 
furnish us with. 
$  33.  In the whole conduct of the un-  Assent,  derstanding there is nothing of more mo- 
ment than to know when and where,  and how far to 
give assent ;  and possibly there is nothing harder.  It  is 
very easily said, and nobody questions it, that giving 
and withholding  our assent,  and  the degrees  of  it, 
should  be  regulated  by the  evidence which  things 
carry  with  them; and yet  we see men  are not the 
better for  this  rule:  some firmly embrace  doctrines 
upon slight grounds, some.upon no grounds, and some 
contrary to appearance : some admit of certainty, and 
are not to be moved in what they hold : others waver 
in every thing, and there want  not those that reject 
all as uncertain.  What then  shall  a  novice,  an in- 
quirer, a stranger do in the case?  I answcr,  use his 
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ment and disagreement in ideas,  discernible  in very 
different degrees,  and there  are eyes in  men  to see 
them, if they please :  only their eyes may be dimmed 
or dazzled, and the discerning sight in them impaired 
or lost.  Interest and passion  dazzles ; the custom of 
arguing on any  side,  even  against  our persuasions, 
dims the understanding, and makes it by degrees lose 
the faculty  of  discerning  clearly between  truth and 
falsehood, and so of  adhering to the right side.  It is 
not safe to play with error, and dress it up to ourselves 
or others in the shape of truth.  The  mind by degrees 
loses its natural relish  of real solid  truth, is  recon- 
ciled insensibly to any thing that can be dressed up 
into any faint  appearance of  it ;  and if the fancy be 
allowed  the place  of  judgment  at first  in  sport,  it 
afterwards comes by use to usurp it; and what is re- 
commended  by  this  flatterer  (that  studies  but to 
please), is received for good.  There are so many ways 
of  fallacy,  such arts of  giving colours,  appearances, 
and resemblances by this court-dresser, the fancy, that 
he who is not wary to admit nothing but truth itself, 
very careful not to make his  mind subservient to any 
thing else, cannot but be caught.  He that  has a mind 
to believe, has half assented already;  and he that, by 
often arguing against his own sense, imposes falsehood 
on  others,  is  not  far from  believing  himself.  This 
takes away the great distance  there is betwixt truth 
and falsehood;  it brings  them almost together,  and 
makes  it no  great odds,  in  things that approach so 
near, whicli you  take ; and when things  are brought 
to that pass, passion  or interest, &c. easily and with- 
out  . .  being  perceived,  determine  which  shall be  the 
right. 
Indiffer-  3.1,.  I have said above, that we should 
ency.  keep n perfect indifferency for all opinions, 
not wish any of them true, or try to make them appear 
so; but being intliffercnt,  receive  aiitl embrace them 
according as evidmce,;~nd  that alonc, gives the attesta- 
tion of truth.  TIicy that do thus, i. c. keep their minds 
indifferent to opinions, to be determined only by evi- 
dence, will always find  the  understanding has  perception 
enough to distinguish  between  evidence  and no evi- 
dence, betwixt plain and doubtful ;  and if they neither 
give nor refuse their assent but by that measure, they 
will  be safe in the opinions they have.  Which being 
perhaps but few, this caution will have also this good 
in it, that it  will put  them upon considering, and teach 
them the necessity of  examining more than they do ; 
without which the mind  is  but a receptacle of incon- 
sistencies, not the store-house of truths.  They that do 
not keep up this indifferency in themselves for all but 
truth, not supposed, but evidenced in themselves, put 
coloured  spectacles  before  their  eyes,  and  look  on 
things  through  false  glasses,  and  then think  them- 
selves  excused  in  following  the  false  appearances 
which they themselves put upon them.  I do not ex- 
pect that by this way the assent should in every one 
be proportioned to the grounds  and clearness where- 
with every truth is capable to be  made out; or that 
men should  be  perfectly  kept  from  error:  that is 
more  than human  nature  can  by any means be ad- 
vanced to ; I aim  at no such unattainable privilege ; 
I am  only  speaking  of  what  they  should do,  who 
would deal fairly with  their own  minds,  and make a 
right use of their faculties in the pursuit of truth; we 
fail them a great deal more  than they fail us.  It  is 
mismanagement more than want of abilities that men 
have  reason to complain  of,  and which they actually 
do complain of in those that differ from them.  He  that 
by iridifferency for  a11  but truth suffers not his assent 
to  go faster than his evidence, nor beyond it,  will learn 
to examine, and examine fairly instead of presuming, 
and nobody will be at a loss,  or in danger for want of 
embracing those truths which are necessary in his sta- 
tion and circumstances.  In any other way but this, all 
the world are born to orthodoxy;  they imbibe at first 
the allowed opinions of their country and party, and so 
never questioning their truth, riot  one of  an liundrcd 
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they are in the right.  He that eonsiders is a foe to 
orthodoxy, because possibly he may deviate'from some 
of the received doctrines there.  And thus men,  with- 
out any industry or acquisition of  their  own,  inherit 
local truths (for it is not the same every where)  and 
are inured to assent without evidence.  This influences 
farther than is thought ;  for what one of an hundred of 
the zealous  bigots in  all parties  ever examined the 
tenets he is so stiff in, or ever thought it his business or 
duty so to do  ?  It is  suspected  of  lukewarmness to 
suppose it necessary,  and a tendency to  apostasy to 
go about it.  And if  a  man  can bring his mind once 
to  be positive and fierce for positions whose  evidence 
he has never  once examined,  and that in matters of 
greatest concernment  to him; what shall keep  him 
from this short and easy way of  being in the right in 
cases of less moment?  Thus we are taught to clothe 
our minds as we  do our bodies,  after the fashion  in 
vogue,  and it is  accounted fantasticalness,  or  some- 
thing worse, not to do so.  This custom (which  who 
dares oppose ?)  makes  the short-sighted  bigots,  and 
the warier sceptics, as far as it  prevails :  and those that 
break from it are in danger of heresy:  for taking the 
whole world, how much of it doth truth and orthodoxy 
possess together? Thoughit  is by the  last alone (which 
has the good luck to be  every where) that error and 
heresy  are  judged  of:  for  argument and evidence 
signify nothing in the case,  and excuse nowhere, but 
are sure to be borne down in all societies by the in- 
fallible orthodoxy of  the place.  Whether this be the 
way to truth and right assent, let the opinions, that 
take place and prescribe in the several habitable parts 
of the earth, declare.  I never saw any reason yet why 
truth might not be trusted on its own evidence :  I am 
sure if that be not able to support it, there is no fence 
against error;  and then truth and falsehood are but 
names that stand for the same things.  Evidence there- 
fore is that by which alone every man is  (and should 
be) taught to regulr~te  his assent, wlio is then, and then 
only, in the right way, when he follows it. 
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Men deficient in knowledge are usually in  one of 
these  three  states;  either  wholly  ignorant,  or  as 
doubting  of  some proposition  they  have  either  em- 
braced  formerly,  or  are  at present inclined  to;  or 
lastly, they do with assurance hold and profess with- 
out ever  having examined,  and  being  convinced  by 
well-grounded  arguments. 
The first of these are in the best state of the three, 
by  having  their  minds  yet  in  their  perfect  freedom 
and  indifferency;  the  likelier  to  pursue  truth  the 
better, having no bias yet clapped on to mislead them. 
9 35. For ignorance, with an indifferency for truth, 
is nearer to it than opinion  with ungrounded inclina- 
tion,  which  is  the great source of  error:  and  they 
are more in  danger to go out of  the way  who are 
marching under  the conduct of  a guide, that it is an 
hundred  to one  will  mislead  them, than he that has 
not yet taken a step, and is likelier to be prevailed on 
to inquire after the right way.  The last of the three 
sorts are in the  worst condition of  all;  for if a man 
can be persuaded  and fully assured of any thing for 
a truth, without having examined, what is there that 
he  may  not  embrace for truth? and if he has given 
himself  up to believe  a lie, what means  is there left 
to recover  one who  can be  assured without examin- 
ing?  To the other two this I crave leave to say, that 
as he that is ignorant is in the best state of the two, 
so he should pursue truth in a method suitable to that 
state;  i.  e. by  inquiring directly  into the nature  of 
the thing itself, without minding the opinions of others, 
or troubling himseIf  with their questions or disputes 
about it; but to see  what  he himself  can, sincerely 
searching  after  truth,  find  out.  He  that proceeds 
upon other ~rinciples  in his inquiry into any sciences, 
though he be resolved to examine them and judge of 
them freely, does yet at  least put himself on that side, 
and post himself in a party which he will not quit till 
he be  beaten  out; by  which  the inind  is insensibly 
engaged to  make what defence it can, and so is un- %'o  ContZ~tct  of  /he U~zderstat~tling. 
awares biassed.  I do not say but a man should em- 
brace  some  opinion  when  he has  examined, else  he 
examines to no  purpose;  but the surest  and safest 
way is to have no opinion at all till he has examined, 
and that without any the least regard to the opinions 
or systems of other men about it.  For example, were 
it my  business  to understand  physic, would not the 
safe and readier way be to consult nature herself, and 
inform  myself  in  the  history  of  diseases  and their 
cures; than espoosing the principles of the dogmatists, 
methodists, or chemists, to engage in all the disputes 
concerning  either of  those systems, and suppose it to 
be true,  till I  have  tried wllat  they can say to beat 
me out of it? Or, supposing that Hippocrates, or any 
other book, infallibly contains the whole art of physic ; 
would not the direct way be to study, read, and con- 
sider that booli, weigh and compare the parts of  it to 
find the truth, rather than espouse the doctrines of any 
party ?  who, though they acknowledge his authority, 
have already interpreted  and wire-drawn all his text 
to their own sense ;  the tincture whereof, when I have 
imbibed, I am more in danger to misunderstand his 
true meaning, than if I had come to him with a mind 
unprepossessed  by  doctors  and commentators of my 
sect ; whose reasonings, interpretation, and language, 
which I have  been  used  to,  will  of  course make  all 
chime  that way, and make another, and perhaps the 
genuine meaning of  the author seem harsh, strained, 
and uncouth to me.  For words having naturally none 
of  their  own,  carry that signification  to the hearer 
that he  is  used  to put upon them, whatever be  the 
sense of him that uses them.  This, I think, is visibly 
so ; and if  it be, he that begins to have any doubt of 
any of  his  tenets, which  he  received  without  exa- 
mination,  ought,  as  much  as he can, to put himself 
wholly into this state of  ignorance in reference to that 
question ;  and throwing  wholly by all his former no- 
tions,  and  the  opinions  of  others,  examine,  with  a 
perfect indifferency, the question in its source ;  with- 
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out any inclination to either side, or any regard to his 
or others' unexamined opinions.  This I own is no easy 
thing to do ; but I am not inquiring the easy way to 
opinion,  but the right way to truth; which they must 
follow  who  will  deal  fai~ly  with  their  own  under- 
standings and their own souls. 
$ 36.  The indifferency  that I here  pro- 
pose will also enable them to state the ques-  Question. 
tion  right,  which  they  are in doubt about, without 
which they can never come to  a fair and clear decision 
of it. 
$ 37.  Another  fruit from this indiffer- 
Perseve-  ency, and the considering]  things in them-  rance. 
selves abstract from our own opinions and 
other men's  notions  and  discourses on them, will be, 
that each man will pursue his thoughts in that method 
which  will  be  most  agreeable  to the nature  of  the 
thing, and to his apprehension of  what it suggests to 
him ; in  which  he ought to proceed with regularity 
and constancy, until he come to a well-grounded re- 
solution wherein he inay acquiesce.  If it be objected 
that this will  require every man to be a scholar, and 
quit all his other business, and betake himself wholly 
to study; I answer,  I propose  no  more  to any one 
than he has time for.  Some men's state and condition 
requires no great extent of knowledge ;  the necessary 
provision  for  life s~vallows  the greatest part of  their 
time.  But one man's  want of leisure is no excuse for 
the oscitancy  and ignorance of  those who have time 
to spare ;  and every one has enough to get as much 
knowledge  as is  required  and expected of  him,  and 
he that does not that, is in love with ignorance, and 
is accountable for it. 
5  38.  The  variety  of  distempers  in 
Presump-  men's  minds  is  as  great as of  those in 
tion.  their bodies; some are epidemic, few scape 
them; and every one too, if  he would look into him- 
self, would  find some defect of his particular genius. 
There is  scarce  any  one  without  some idiosyncrasy 
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that they  will  not  fail him  at time of  need;  and so 
thinks  it superfluous labour  to make  any provision 
before-hand.  His  understanding  is to him like For- 
tunatus's  purse, which is always to furnish him, with- 
out ever putting any thing into it before-hand;  and 
so he sits still satisfied, without endeavouring to store 
his  understanding  with  knowledge.  It is the spon- 
taneous  product  of  the country,  and  what  need  of 
labour in tillage ?  Such men may spread their native 
riches  before  the ignorant; but they  were  best not 
come to stress and trial with the skilful.  We are born 
ignorant of  every  thing.  The superficies  of  thin6s 
that surround them  make  iinpressions on  the negll- 
gent, but nobody  penetrates into the inside without 
labour,  attention,  and industry.  Stones and timber 
grow of  themselves, but yet there is no uniform pile 
with  symmetry  and convenience to lodge in without 
toil and  pains.  God has made the intellectual world 
harmonious  and  beautiful  without  us;  but it will 
never come into our heads all at  once; we must bring 
it home  piecemeal,  and there set it up by  our own 
industry, or else  we shall have nothing but darkness 
and a chaos within, whatever order and light there be 
in things without us. 
$39. On the other side, there are others 
Despond-  that depress their own minds, despond at 
ency.  the first difficulty,  and conclude that the 
getting an insight in  any of  the sciences, or making 
any progress  in  knowledge farther than serves their 
ordinary  business,  is  above  their  capacities.  These 
sit still, because they think they have not legs to go ; 
as the others I last mentioned do, because they think 
they have  wings  to fly, and can soar  on high when 
they please.  To these latter one may for answer ap- 
ply the proverb, "  Use legs and have legs:'  Nobody 
knows what strength of parts lie has till he has tried 
them.  And of the understanding one may most truly 
say, that its force is greater generally than it thinks, 
till it is put to it.  Viresque acqzbirit eundo. 
Asd therefore the proper remedy here is but to set 
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the mind to work, and apply the thougllts vigorously 
to the business;  for  it holds in the struggles of  the 
mind  as  in  those  of  war,  tc  Durn putant se  vincere 
vic&re;"  a  persuasioll  that  we  shall overcome  any 
difficulties  that we  meet with in the sciences, seldonl 
fails  to carry us  through them.  Nobody knows the 
strength of  his mind, and the force of steady and re- 
gular application, till he has tried.  This is certain, 
he  that  sets  out upon  weak  legs  will  not  only  go 
farther, but grow stronger too, than one who, with a 
vigorous constitution and firm limbs, only sits still. 
Something of kin to this men may observe in them- 
selves, when the mind  frishts itself  (as it often does) 
with any thing reflected on in gross,  and  transiently 
viewed  cor~fusedly,  and at a distance.  Things thus 
offered to the mind  carry the show  of  nothlng  but 
difficulty in them, and are thought to be rvrapt up in 
impenetrable obscurity.  But the truth is,  these arc! 
nothing but spectres that the understanding raises to 
itself  to flatter its own laziness.  It sees  nothing di- 
stinctly in things remote, and in a huddle ;  and there- 
fore concludes too faintly, that there is nothing nlore 
clear to be discovered in them.  It  is but to approach 
nearer, and that mist of our own raising tliat envelopcct 
them will  remove;  and those  tliat in  that mist  ap- 
peared  hideous  giants not  to be  grappled with, will 
be found  to be of  the ordinary and natural size and 
shape.  'IC'liings,  tlint  in a remote and confused view 
seem very obscure, must be approachrtct by gentle rcnd 
regular  steps;  ant1 what  is  most  visible,  easy, and 
obvious  in tliein  first considered.  Reduce them into 
their distinct p:~rts  ;  and then in their duo order bring 
all that should be linown concerning every one of those 
parts into plain and simple questions ; and then what 
was tl~ou~ht  ol~sc~~re,  perplesed, and too hard for our 
weak parts, will  Jay itself open to the understanding 
in a fair view, and let the mind into that which bcfore 
it was  awed  with,  and kept  at a distance  from,  as 
wholly mgsterious.  I appeal  to my reader's  esperi- 
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ence, whether  this has never happened to him, espe- 
cially when,  busy on  one  thing, he has  occasionally 
reflected on another.  I ask him whether he has never 
thus  been  scared with a  sudden  opinion  of  mighty 
difficulties,  which  yet  have  vanished,  when  he  has 
seriously and methodically applied himself to the con- 
sideration of  this seeming terrible subject ;  and there 
has been  no other matter of  astonishment  left,  but 
that he amused himself  with so discouraging a pros- 
pect, of  his own raising,  about a matter which in the 
handling was found to have nothing in it  more strange 
nor intricate than several other things which he had 
long since and with ease mastered ?  This experience 
would  teach  us  how  to  deal  with  such  bugbears 
another time, which should rather serve to excite our 
vigour than enervate our industry.  The surest way 
for a learner in  this,  as in all other  cases,  is not to 
advance  by jumps  and large strides ;  let that which 
he sets himself to learn next be indeed the next ;  i.  e. 
as nearly conjoined with what he knows already as is 
possible;  let it be  distinct but not remote from it: 
let it be new, and what  he did not know before, that 
the understanding may advance ;  but let it be as little 
at  once as may be,  that its advances may be clear and 
sure.  All the ground  that  it gets this way it will 
hold.  This distinct gradual growth in knowledge is 
firm and sure ;  it carries its own light with it in every 
step of  its progression  in an easy and  orderly train; 
than which there is nothing of more use to the under- 
standing.  And though this perhaps may seem a very 
slow and lingering way to knowledge, yet I dare con- 
fidently affirm, that whoever will  try it in himself, or 
any one he will teach, shall find the advances greater 
in this method than they would  in the same space of 
time  have  been in  any other  he  could  have  taken. 
The greatest part of true knowledge lies in a distinct 
perception of things in i.heinselves distinct.  And some 
men give more clear light and knowledge by the bare 
distinct stating of  a question,  than others by talking 
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of  it in  gross whole  hours together.  In this,  they 
who so state a question do na  more but separate and 
disentangle the parts of  it one from another, and lay 
them, when so disentangled, in their due order.  This 
often,  without any more ado,  resolves the doubt, and 
shows the mind where the truth lies.  The a  reement 
or disagreement of  the ideas  in question, w  'I: en  they 
are once  separated  and  distinctly  considered,  is,  in 
many  cases,  presently  perceived,  and  thereby  clcar 
and  lasting knowledge  gained ; whereas  things  in 
gross taken up together, and so lying together in con- 
fusion, can produce in the mind but n confused, whicli 
in effect is no, knowledge;  or at least, when it corncs 
to be examined and made use of, will prove little bet- 
ter than none.  I therefore take the liberty to repeat 
here again what I have said elsewhere, that in learning 
any thing as little should  be proposed to the mind at 
once as is possible;  and,  that being  understood  and 
fully mastered,  to proceed to the next adjoining part 
yet unknown; simple, unperplexed proposition belong- 
ing to the matter in hand, and tending to the clearing 
what is ~rinci~allv  designed. 
§ 40. '~nal& >s of kreat use  to the 
mind in many cases, especially in natural 
philosophy;  and that part of  it chiefly which consists 
in  happy and successful experinients.  But here we 
must  take  care  that we  keep  ourselves  within  that 
wherein the analogy consists.  For example, the acid 
oil of vitriol is found to be good in such a.  case, there- 
fore the spirit of  nitre or vinegar may be used  in the 
like case.  If the good effect of it be owing wholly to 
the acidity of it, the trial may 1)e jnstified ;  but if there 
be  something  else  besitlcs  the acidity in  the oil  of 
vitriol which producrs tl~e  good .cvc desire in the case, 
we mistake  that for analogy .c\l~ich  is not, nncl  suffer 
our understanding  to bc n~isguiclccl by  n wrong sup- 
position of analogy \vherc tl~ere  is none. 
8 4 1. Thong11 I lu~re,  in the scconrl book  dsaociaion.  of  my Essay concerni~ig  IIuinan  Under- 
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standing, treated of the association of ideas; yet having 
done it there historically,  as giving a view of the un- 
derstanding in this as well as its several other ways of 
operating, rather than designing there to inquire into 
the remedies  that ought to be applied  to it; it will, 
under this latter consideration,  afford other matter of 
thought to those who have a mind  to instruct them- 
selves thoroughly in the right way of conducting their 
understandings ;  and that the rather,  because this, if 
I mistake not,  is as frequent a cause of  mistake and 
error  in  us  as perhaps  any  thing  else  that  can be 
named,  and  is a disease  of  the mind  as hard  to be 
cured as any; it being a very hard thing to convince 
any one that things are n~t  so,  and naturally so,  as 
they constantly appear to him. 
By this one easy and unheeded  miscarriage of  the 
understanding  sandy and loose  foundations  become 
infallible principles,  and will  not suffer themselves to 
be touched or questioned ;  such unnatural connexions 
become by custom as natural to the mind as sun and 
light,  fire and warmth go together,  and  so seem to 
carry with them as natural an evidence as self-evident 
truths themselves.  And  where  then shall one with 
hopes of  success  begin  the cure ?  Many men  firmly 
embrace falsehood  for  truth,  not  only  because  they 
never  thought  otherwise,  but  also  because,  thus 
blinded as they have been  from  the beginning,  they 
never could think otherwise, at least without a vigour 
of mind able to contest the empire of habit, and look 
into its own principles ;  a freedom which few men have 
the notion of in themselves, and fewer are allowed the 
practice  of  by  others;  it  being  the great  art and 
business of  the teachers and guides  in most  sects to 
suppress, as much as they can, this fundamental duty 
which every man owcs himself, and  is the first steady 
step towards right and truth in the whole train of his 
actions ant1 opinions.  This woulcl give one reason to 
suspect  that  such  teachers  are  conscious  to them- 
selves of the falsehood  or weakness of the tenets they 
profess, since they will not suffer the grounds whereon 
they  are built  to be  examined;  whereas  those  who 
seek  truth only,  and  desire  to own  and  propagate 
nothing else, freely expose their principles to the test; 
are pleased  to have them examined ; give men leave 
to reject them if  they can ;  and if there be any thing 
weak and unsound in them, are willing to have it de- 
tected, that they themselves, as well as others, may not 
lay any stress upon  any received  proposition beyond 
what the evidence of its truths will warrant and allow. 
There is, I know,  a great fault among all sorts of 
people of principling their children and scholars, which 
at last, when looked  into,  amounts  to no more  but 
making them imbibe their teacher's notions and tenets 
by  an implicit  faith,  and  firmly to adhere  to  them 
whether true or false.  What colours may be given to 
this, or of  what  use  it may be when practised upon 
the vulgar,  destined  to labour, and given up to the 
service of  their bellies,  I will  not here inquire.  But 
as to the ingenuous part of  mankind, whose condition 
allows them  leisure,  and  letters,  and  inquiry  after 
truth,  I can  see  no  other  right way  of  priiicipling 
thern, but to take heed,  as  much as may be,  that in 
their tender years ideas that have no natural cohesion 
come not to be united in their heads ;  and that this rule 
beoften inculcated to them to  be  their guide in the  whole 
course of  their lives and studies, viz.  that they never 
suffer  any ideas to be joined  in their understandings 
in any other or stronger combination than what their 
own nature and correspondence  give them, and that 
they often examine those that they find linked together 
in their minds,  whetlier  this  association of  ideas be 
from the visible agreement that is in the ideas tliem- 
selves, or from the habitual and prevailing custom of 
the mind joining them thus together in thinking. 
This is  for  caution against this evil,  before  it be 
thoroughly riveted  by custom  in the understanding ; 
but he that would cure it when habit  has established 
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perceptible motions of the mind in its habitual actions. 
What I have said  in another place about  the change 
of the ideas of  sense into those of  judgment,  may be 
proof of  this.  Let any one not skilled in pjinting be 
told,  when  he  sees  bottles,  and  tobacco-p~pes,  and 
other things  so  painted  as they are in  some  places 
shown,  that he does  not see protuberances, and you 
will not convince him but by the touch: he will  not 
believe that,  by an instantaneous legerdemain of  his 
own thoughts,  one  idea  is  substituted  for  another. 
How frequent instances may one meet with of this in 
the arguings of  the learned, who not  seldom,  in two 
ideas that they have been accustomed to join  in their 
minds, substitute one for the other;  and, I am apt to 
think, often without perceiving  it themselves !  This, 
whilst they are under  the deceit of  it,  makes  them 
incapable of conviction, and they applaud themselves 
as zealous  champions for  truth, when,  indeed,  they 
are  contending  for  error.  And  the  confusion  of 
two different  ideas, which  a customary connexion of 
them in their minds  hath made to them almost one, 
fills their head with false views,  and their reasonings 
with false consequences. 
Fallacies.  § 49.  Right understanding consists  in 
the discovery and adherence to truth, and 
that in the perception of the visible or probable agree- 
ment or  disagreement of  ideas,  as they are affirmed 
and denied  one of  another.  From whence  it is evi- 
dent,  that the right use  and  conduct  of  the under- 
standing, whose  business is purely truth and nothing 
else,  is,  that the mind  should  be  kept  in a perfect 
indifferency,  not  inclining  to either side, any farther 
than  evidence settles it by  knowledge,  or the over- 
balance of probability gives it the turn of assent ancl 
belief;  but yet  it is  very hard to meet with any dis- 
course wherein  one may not perceive  the author not 
only  maintain  (for  that  is  reasonable  and  fit)  but 
inclined and biassed  to one side of the question, with 
marks of a desire that that should  be true.  If' it be 
asked me, how authors who have such a bias and lean 
to it may be discovered ?  I answer, by observing how 
in  their writings  or  arguings they are often led  by 
their inclinations to change the ideas of  the question, 
either by changing the terms, or by adding and joining. 
others to them, whereby the ideas under consideration 
are so varied  as to be more  serviceable  to their pur- 
pose,  and  to be  thereby  brought  to an  easier  and 
nearer agreement,  or more visible  and remoter disa- 
greement one with another.  This is plain and direct 
sophistry ; but I am far from thinking that wherever 
it is found it is made use of with design to deceive and 
mislead  the readers.  Tt  is visible  that men's  preju- 
dices and inclinations by this way impose often upon 
themselves ;  and  their affection for truth, under their 
prepossession in Favour of  one side,  is the very thing 
that leads  them from it.  Inclination  suggests and 
slides into their discourse favourable terms, which in- 
troduce favourable ideas ; till at last,  by this means, 
that is concluded clear and evident,  thus dressed up, 
which,  taken  in  its native  state,  by making use  of 
none but the precise determined ideas, would find no 
admittance at all.  The putting these glosses on what 
they affirm; these,  as  they are thought,  handsome, 
easy, and  graceful explications of what  they are dis- 
coursing on, is so much the character of what is called 
and esteemed writing  well,  that it is very  hard to 
think  that authors will  ever  be persuaded  to leave 
what serves  so well  to propagate their opinions,  and 
procure themselves  credit  in the world,  for  a  more 
jejune and dry way of writing, by keeping to the same 
terms precisely  annexed to the same ideas;  a sour 
and blunt stiffness, tolerable in mathematicians  only, 
who force their way, and  make truth prevail by irre- 
sistible demonstration. 
But yet if authors cannot be prevailed with to quit 
the looser, though more insinuating ways of writing; 
if they will  not  think  fit  to keep close to truth and 
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cated arguments;  yet it concerns  readers not to be 
imposed  on  by fallacies, and the prevailing ways  of 
insinuation.  To  do this, the surest and most effectual 
remedy is to fix in the mind  the clear  and distinct 
ideas c.f the question stripped of words ;  and so like- 
wise  in the  train of argumentation,  to take up the 
author's  ideas,  neglecting  his  words,  observing how 
they connect or separate  those in the question.  He 
that does this will be able to cast off all that is super- 
fluous; he will see what is pertinent, what coherent, 
what is direct to, what slides by, the question.  This 
will  readily  show him  all  the foreign  ideas in  the 
discourse, and where they were brought in; and though 
they perhaps dazzled the writer, yet he will perceive 
that they give no light nor strength to his reasonings. 
This, though it be the shortest and easiest way of 
reading books with profit, and keeping oile's self from 
being misled  by great names or plausible discourses; 
yet it being hard and tedious to those who  have not 
accustomed themselves to it, it is not to be expected 
that every one (amongst those few who really pursue 
truth) should this way guard his understanding from 
being  imposed  on by  the wilful,  or  at least  unde- 
signed sophistry, which creeps into most of  the books 
of  argument.  They,  that write  against  their  con- 
viction, or that, next to them, are resolved to  maintain 
the tenets of a party they are engaged in, cannot be 
supposed to reject any arms that may help to defend 
their cause, and  therefore such should  be read with 
the  greatest caution.  And they, who write for opinions 
they are sincerely persuaded of, and believe to be true, 
think  they may so  far allow  themselves  to indulge 
their  laudable affection  to truth, as to permit their 
esteem of it to give  it the best colours, and set it off 
with the best expressions and dress they can, thereby 
to gain it the easiest entrance into the minds of their 
readers, and fix it deepest there. 
One of those being the state of mind we may justly 
suppose most writers to be  in, it is fit  their readers, 
who apply to them for instruction, should not lay by 
that caution which becomes a sincere pursuit of truth, 
and should make them always watchful against what- 
ever might conceal  or misrepresent it.  If they have 
not the skill of representing to themselves the author's 
sense by pure ideas separated from sounds, and there- 
by divested of the false lights and deceitful ornaments 
of speech ;  this yet they should do, they should keep 
the precise  question steadily in their minds, carry it 
along  with  them  through  the whole  discourse,  and 
suffer not the least alteration in the terms, either by 
addition, subtraction, or substituting any other.  This 
every one  can do who has a mind to it; and he that 
has not a mind to it, it is plain, makes his understand- 
ing  only the warehouse  of  other  men's  lumber;  I 
mean false and unconcluding  reasonings, rather than 
a  repository  of  truth for  his  own  use ; which  will 
prove  substantial, and stand him  in  stead, when  he 
has  occasion for it.  And whether such an one deals 
fairly by his own mind, and conducts his own under- 
standing right, I leave to his  own understanding to 
iudpe. 
"  g43. The mind of man being very nar- 
Fundamen-  row, and so slow in making acquaintance  tal  with  things,  and  taking  in  new  truths, 
that no G1i  man is  c&able.  in  a  much  loncer  life 
I  U 
than ours,  to know  all truths; it becomes  our pru- 
dence, in our search after knowledge, to employ our 
thoughts about fundamental and material  cluestions, 
carefully  avoiding  those  that are trifling,  and  not 
suffering ourselves to be diverted from our innin even 
purpose,  by those that a.re merely incidental.  How 
much  of many young men's  time is thrown away in 
purely logical inquiries, I need not mention.  This is 
no better  than if  a  man, who was  to be  a  painter, 
should spend all his time in examining tlie threads of 
the several cloths he is to paint upon, and counting 
the hairs of each pencil  and brush he intends to use 
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than for a young painter to spend his  apprenticeship 
in such useless  niceties;  for he, at the end of all his 
pains to no purpose, finds that it is not painting, nor 
any help to it, and so is really to no purpose: whereas 
men designed for scholars have  often their  heads  so 
filled and warmed with disputes on logical questions, 
that they take those airy useless  notions for real and 
substantial knowledge,  and think  their  understand- 
ings so  well  furnished with  science,  that they need 
not look  any farther into the nature of things, or de- 
scend to the mechanical drudgery of experiment and 
inquiry.  This is so obvious a mismanagement of the 
understanding, and that in the professed way to  know- 
ledge, that it could not be passed by; to which might 
be joined  abundance  of  questions,  and the way  of 
handling ofthem in the schools. What faults in particu- 
lar of this kind everyman is, or may be guilty of, would 
be infinite to enumerate; it  suffices to have  shown 
that superficial and slight discoveries and observations 
that contain nothing of  moment  in themselves,  nor 
serve  as  clues  to lead  us  into  farther  knowledge, 
should not be thought worth our searching after. 
There are fundamental truths that  lie at  the bottom, 
the basis upon which a great mariy others rest, and in 
which they have their consistency.  These are teem- 
ing truths, rich in store, with which  they furnish the 
mind,  and,  like  the lights  of  heaven,  are not  only 
beautiful  and  entertaining  in  themselves,  but give 
light and evidence to other things, that without them 
could not be seen or known.  Such is that admirable 
discovery of Mr. Newton, that all bodies gravitate to 
one another, which  may be  counted  as the basis  of 
natural philosophy;  which, of  what  use  it is  to the 
understanding of the great frame of our solar system, 
lie has to the astonishment of the learncci world showr~; 
and how  much  farther  it would  guide us  in  other 
things,  if  rightly pursued, is  not  yet  known.  Our 
Saviour's  great rule, that  6c we should love our neigh- 
hour as ourselves,"  is  such  a  fundamental truth for 
the regulating human  society, that, I think, by that 
alone, one might without difficulty determine all the 
cases and doubts in social morality.  These and such 
as these are the truths we should endeavour to find 
out, and store our minds with.  Which leads  me to 
another thing in the conduct of the understanding that 
is no less necessary,  viz. 
$44.  To accustom  ourselves,  in  any 
question proposed,  to examine  and find  Bottoming. 
out upon what it bottoms.  Most of  the difficulties 
that  coue in  our  way,  when  well  considered  and 
traced, lead us  to some proposition,  which, known to 
be true, clears  the doubt, and gives an easy solution 
of the question ;  whilst topical and superficial  argu- 
ments,  of which  there is  store to be found  on  both 
sides,  filling the head with  variety of  thoughts,  and 
the mouth with copious discourse, serve only to amuse 
the understanding and  entertain  company  without 
coming to the bottom of the question, the only place 
of rest and stability for  an  inquisitive  mind,  whose 
tendency is only to truth and knowledge. 
For example, if it be demanded, whether the grand 
seignior  can lawfully take what he will from any of 
his people ?  This question cannot be resolved withaut 
coming to a certainty, whether all men are naturally 
equal; for  upQn that it  turns;  and that truth well 
settled in the understanding, and carried in the mind 
through  the various  debates  concerning the various 
rights of men  in society, will  go a great way in put- 
ting  arm  end to them, and showing on which side the 
truth is. 
$ 45.  There is scarce  any thing more  Transfer- 
for  the improvement  of  knowledge,  for  ring of 
the ease  of life,  and the despatch of bu-  thoughts. 
siness, than for a man to be able to dispose of his own 
thoughts ;  and there is scarce any thing-  harder in the 
whole  canduct of  the  understanding than  to get a 
full  mastery over  it.  The mind,  in  a waking man, 
has always some object that it applies itself to; which, 184  Conduct of the Understanding. 
when  we  are  lazy  or  unconcerned,  we  can  easily 
change,  and  at pleasure  transfer  our  thoughts  to 
another, and from thence to a third, which has no re- 
lation to either of the former.  Hence men forwardly 
conclude,  and frequently say, nothing  is  so  free  as 
thought,  and it were well  it were  so; but the con- 
trary will  be  found  true in several instances;  and 
there are many cases wherein there is nothing  more 
resty and ungovernable than our thoughts : they will 
not be  directed what objects to pursue, nor be taken 
off from those they have once fixed on ;  but run away 
with  a man in pursuit  of  those  ideas they have  in 
view, let him do what he can. 
I will  not here  mention again what I have above 
taken notice of, how hard it is to get the mind, nar- 
rowed by a  custom of thirty or  forty years  standing 
to a scanty collection  of obvious  and  common  ideas, 
to enlsrge itself to a more copious  stock, and grow 
into an acquaintance with  those  that would  afford 
more abundant matter of useful contemplation ; it is 
not of this I am here speaking.  The  inconveniency I 
would here represent,  and find  a remedy for, is the 
difficulty  there  is  sometimes  to transfer  our minds 
from one subject to another, in cases where the ideas 
are equally familiar to us. 
Matters, that are recommended to our thoughts by 
any of our passions, take possession of our minds with 
a kind of authority, and will not be kept out or dis- 
lodged ;  but, as if the passion that rules were, for the 
time, the  sheriff  of the place,  and came with  all the 
posse, the understanding is seized and taken with the 
object it introduces, as if it had  a  legal  right to be 
alone considered there.  There is scarce any body, I 
think, of so  calm  a temper who hath  not some time 
found this tyranny on his understanding, and suffered 
under the inconvenience of it.  Who is there almost, 
whose  mind,  at some  time  or  other,  love  or  anger, 
fear or grief, has not so fastened to some clog, that it 
could not turn itself to any other object ?  I call it a 
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clog, for it hangs  upon  the mind  so as to hinder its 
vigour  and  activity in  the pursuit  of other  contem- 
plations ;  and advances itself little or not at all in the 
knowledge of the thing which  it so closely hugs and 
constantly pores  on.  Men thus possessed are some- 
times  as if they were  so in the worst sense, and  lay 
under  the power  of  an enchantment.  They see not 
what passes before  their  eyes ;  hear not the audible 
discourse  of  the company;  and when by any strong 
application to them they are roused a little, they are 
like  men  brought  to themselves  from  some  remote 
region ;  whereas in  truth they come  no farther than 
their  secret cabinet  within,  where  they have  been 
wholly taken up wit11  the puppet, which  is for that 
time appointed for  their entertainment.  The shame 
that such dumps cause  to well-bred people, when  it 
carries  them  away  from  the  company,  where  they 
should bear a part in the conversation, is a sufficient 
argument that it is a fault  in  the conduct of our un- 
derstanding, not to have that power over it as to make 
use  of it to  those purposes,  and  on those  occasions, 
wherein  we have  need  of  its assistance.  The mind 
should be always free and ready to turn itself to the 
variety of objects that occur,  and allow them as much 
consideration  as shall for  that time  be  thought  fit. 
To be engrossed  so  by one object, as not  to he pre- 
vailed on to leave  it for another that  we judge fitter 
for our contemplation, is to make it of no use to us. 
Did this state of mind  remain  always  so,  every one 
would, without  scruple, give  it the name  of perfect 
madness ;  and whilst it does last, at  whatever intervals 
it returns, such a rotation of thoughts about the same 
object no more carries us forward towards the attain- 
ment of  knowledge,  than getting upon  a mill  liorsc 
whilst he jogs on in his  circular  track would carry a 
man a journey. 
I grant something  must  be  allowed  to legitimate 
passions,  and to natural inclinations.  Every man, hc- 
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the mind will more closely stick'to ;  but yet it.is best 
that it should be always at  liberty, and under the free 
disposal of the man, and to act how and upon what 
he directs.  This we should endeavour to obtain, un- 
less we would be content with such a flaw in our un- 
derstanding, that sometimes we should be as it were 
without it; for it is very little better than so in cases 
where we cannot make use of it to those purposes we 
would, and which stand in present need of it. 
But before fit remedies can be thought on for this 
disease, we must know the several  causes  of  it, and 
thereby regulate the cure,  if we will hope to labour 
with success. 
One we have already instanced in, whereof all men 
that reflect have so general a knowledge, and so often 
an experience in themselves, that nobody doubts of it. 
A prevailing passion so pins down our thoughts to  the 
object and concern  of it,  that a man passionately in 
love cannot bring himself to think of his ordinary af- 
fairs, or a kind  mother, drooping under  the loss of a 
child, is not able to bear  a part as she was wont in 
the discourse of  the company or conversation  of her 
friends. 
But though passion  be the most obvious and  ge- 
neral, yet it is not the only cause that binds up the un- 
derstanding, and confines  it for the time  to one ob- 
ject, from which it will not be taken off. 
Besides  this, we  may  often  find  that the  under- 
standing, when it  has a while employed itself upon  a 
subject which either chance, or some slight accident, 
offered to it, without the interest or recommendation 
of any passion,  works  itself  into a  warmth,  and by 
degrees gets into a career, wherein, like a bowl down 
a hill, it increases  its motion by going, and will  not 
be stopped or diverted ;  though, when the heat is  over, 
it sees all this earnest application was  about a trifle 
not  worth  a  thought,  and  all the  pains  employed 
about it lost labour. 
There is a  third sort,  if I mistake not, yet lower 
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than this ;  it is a sort of childishness, if I may so say, 
of the understanding, wherein, during the fit, it plays 
with and dandles some insignificant puppet to no end, 
nor with any design at all, and yet cannot  easily be 
got off  from it.  Thus  some  trivial  sentence,  or  a 
scrap of poetry, will sometimes get into men's  heads, 
and make such a chiming there, that there is no still- 
ing of it; no  peace  to be  obtained,  nor attention to 
any thing else, but this impertinent guest will  take 
up the mind and possess  the thoughts in spite of all 
endeavours to get rid of it.  Whether every one hath 
experimented in themselves this troublesome intrusion 
of some frisking ideas which  thus importune the un- 
derstanding, and hinder it  from being better employed, 
I know  not.  But persons  of  very good  parts,  and 
those more  than one, I have  heard  speak  and com- 
plain  of it themselves.  The  reason I have  to make 
this doubt, is from what I have known in a case some- 
thing of kin  to this, though much  odder, and that is 
of a sort of visions that some people have lying quiet, 
but perfectly awake, in  the  dark, or with  their eyes 
shut.  It is  a  great variety of faces, most  commonly 
very odd  ones, that appear to them in  a  train one 
after another ;  so that having had just the sight of the 
one, it immediately passes  away to give place  to an- 
other, that the same instant succeeds, and has as quick 
an exit as its leader;  and so they march on in a con- 
stant succession ;  nor can any one of them by any en- 
deavour be stopped or retained beyond the instant of 
its appearance, but is thrust out by its  follower, which 
will have its turn.  Concerning  this fantastical phie- 
nomenon I have  talked with  several people, whereof 
some  have  been  perfectly  acquainted with  it,  and 
others have been  so wholly strangers to it, that they 
could hardly be brought to conceive or believe it.  I 
knew a lady of excellent parts, who had got  past thirty 
without having ever had the least notice of any such 
thing;  she was so great a  stranger to it,  that when 
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forbear thinking we bantered her ;  but some time after 
drinking a large dose  of  dilute  tea, (as  she was  or- 
dered by a physician) going to bed, she told us at next 
meeting, that she had  now  experimented what  our 
discourse  had  much  ado  to persuade her  of.  She 
had seen a great variety of faces in a long train, suc- 
ceeding one another, as we had described ;  they were 
all strangers  and  intruders, such as she  had  no ac- 
quaintance with  before, nor  sought after  then ; and 
as they came of themselves  they went too ; none  of 
them stayed a.  moment, nor could  be detained by  all 
the endeavours  she  could  use, but went  on in  their 
solemn procession, just  appeared and then vanished. 
This odd  phaenomenon  seems to have a  mechanical 
cause, and to depend upon  the matter and motion of 
the blood or animal spirits. 
When the fancy is bound by passion, I know no way 
to set the mind free and at liberty, to prosecute what 
thoughts the man would make choice of, but to allay 
the  present passion, or counterbalance it with another; 
which is an art to be got by study, and acquaintance 
with the passions. 
Those who find themselves apt to be carried away 
with the spontaneous  current of their own thougl~ts, 
not excited  by any passion  or interest, must be very 
wary and careful in all the instances of it to stop it,and 
never humour their minds in being thus triflingly busy. 
Men  know the value  of their  corporeal liberty, and 
therefore suffer not willingly fetters and chains to be 
put upon them.  To  have the mind captivated is, for 
the time, certainly the greater evil  of  the two,  and 
deserves our utmost care and endeavours to preserve 
the freedom of our better part.  In this case our pains 
will not be lost ;  striving and struggling will prevail, 
if we  constantly, on  all such  occasions, make  use of 
it.  We  must never indulge these trivial attcntions of 
thought ; as soon  as we find  the mind makes itself a 
business  of  nothing, we  should  immediately  disturb 
and check  it,  introduce  new  and more  serious  con- 
siderations,  and not leave till we  have  beaten  it off 
from  the pursuit  it was  upon.  This, at first,  if we 
have let the contrary practice grow  to  n  habit, ~rlill 
perhaps be difficult; but constant endeavours will by 
degrees prevail, and at last make it easy.  And when 
a man is pretty well  advanced, and can command his 
mind off at  pleasure from incidental  and undesigned 
pursuits, it may not be amiss for him to go on farther, 
and make attempts upon  meditations of greater mo- 
ment, that at  the last he may have a full power over his 
own mind, and be so fully master of his own thoughts, 
as to be able to  transfer them from one subject to an- 
other,  with  the same ease that he  can  lay  by any 
thing he has  in  his  hand, and  take  something else 
that he has a mind to in the room of it.  This liberty 
of mind  is of great  use  both in  business  and study, 
and he that has got it will have  no  small advantage 
of ease and despatch in all that is the chosen and use- 
f~11  employment of his understanding. 
The third and last way which I mentioned the mind 
to be sometimes  taken  up with, I mean  the chiming 
of some particular words  or sentence in the memory, 
and, as  it were, making a noise in the head, and  the 
like, seldom llappens  but when  the mind  is lazy, or 
very loosely and negligently en~ployed. It were bet- 
ter indeed to be without such impertinent and useless 
repetitions : any obvious idea, when it is roving care- 
lessly at a venture, being  of more  use,  and apter  to 
suggest something worth  consideration, than the in- 
significant buzz  of purely empty sounds.  But since 
the rousing of the mind,  and setting the understand- 
ing on work with  some degrees  of vigour,  does  for 
the most  part presently set it free  from  these  idle 
companions ;  it may not be  amiss, whenever we find 
ourselves  troubled  with  them,  to make  use  of  so 
profitable a remedy that is always at hand. SOME THOUGHTS 
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READING  is for the improvement of the understand-  - 
ing. 
The improvement of  the understanding  is for two 
ends ;  first,  for  our own increase of  knowledge;  se- 
condly,  to enable  us  to deliver  and  make  out  that 
knowledge to others. 
The latter of  these,  if  it be  not the chief  end of 
study in a gentleman; yet it is at  least equal to the 
other, since the greatest part of his business and use- 
fulness in the world is by the influence of what he says 
or writes to others. 
The extent of  our knowledge  cannot  exceed  the 
extent of our ideas.  Therefore he, who would be uni- 
versally knowing,  must acquaint himself with the ob- 
jects of  all sciences.  But this  is not necessary to a 
gentleman, whose  proper  calling is the service of  his 
country ;  and so is most properly concerned in moral 
and political knowledge ;  and thus the studies, which 
more  immediately  belong  to his  calling  are  those 
which treat of  virtues  and vices of  civil society, and 
the arts of government; and will take in also law and 
history. 
It is enough for a gentleman to be  furnished with 
the ideas belonging to his calling, which  he will  find 
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But the next step towards the improvement of  his 
understanding  must be,  to observe the connexion of 
these ideas in the propositions which those books hold 
forth, and pretend to teach as truths ;  which till a man 
can judge whether  they be truths or  no,  his under- 
standing is but little improved ;  and he doth but think 
and talk after the books  that he hath read, without 
having  any  knowledge  thereby.  And  thus  men  of 
much reading are greatly learned,  but may be  little 
knowing. 
The third and last step, therefore, in improving the 
understanding, is to find out upon what foundation any 
proposition advanced bottoms ;  and to observe the con- 
nexion of the intermediate ideas, by which it is joined 
to that foundation upon  which  it is  erected,  or that 
principle from which it is derived.  This, in short, is 
right reasoning;  and  by  this way alone true know- 
ledge is to be got by reading and studying. 
When a man,  by use,  hath got this  faculty of ob- 
serving and judging of  the reasoning and coherence 
of what he reads,  and how it proves what it pretends 
to teach ;  he is then,  and  not till then,  in the right 
way of  improving  his  understanding,  and  enlarging 
his knowledge by reading. 
But that, as I have said, being not all that a gentle- 
man should aim at in reading, he should farther take 
care to improve himself  in  the art also of  speaking, 
that so he may be able to make the best use of  what 
he knows. 
The art of  speaking well  consists chiefly  in  two 
things, viz. perspicuity and right reasoning. 
Perspicuity consists  in  the using  of  proper  terms 
for the ideas  or  thoughts which  he would  have pass 
from his own mind  into that of  another man.  It is 
this that gives them an easy entrance ; and it is with 
delight that men  hearken to those whom they easily 
understand ;  whereas what is obscurely said, dying as 
it is spoken, is usually not only lost, but creates a pre- 
judice in the hearer, as if he that spoke knew not what 
he said, or was afraid to have it understood. 
The  way to obtain this, is to read such books as are 
allowed to be writ  wit11  the greatest  clearness  anrl 
propriety,  in  the  language  that  a  man  uses.  Ail 
author excellent  in  this  faculty,  as  well  as  several 
others, is Dr. Tillotson, late archbishop of Canterbury, 
in all that is published of  his.  I have  chosen  rather 
to propose this pattern,  for the attainment of  tlle art 
of  speaking clearly,  than those who give rules about 
it ;  since we  are more  apt to learn by exainple than 
by direction.  Rut if  any one hnth a mind to consult 
the masters  in the art of  speaking  and writing,  he 
may find in Tully De Oratore,  and  another  treatise 
of his called, Orator ;  and in Quintilian's  Institutions, 
and Boileau's  Trait&  du Sublime *,  instructions con- 
cerning this and the other parts of speaking well. 
Besides perspicuity, there must be also right rcason- 
ing ;  without which,  perspicuity serves but to expose 
the speaker.  And for  tlle attaining of this, 1 should 
propose the constant reading of  Chillingworth,  who, 
by his example, will  teach  both perspicuity,  and the 
way of  right reasoning,  better  than  any book that I 
linow ;  and therefore will deserve to be read upon that 
account over  and over again ;  not to say any thing of 
his argument. 
Resides  these  books  in  English,  Tully,  Terence, 
Virgil, Livy, arid Caesar's Commentaries, may be rcad 
to form one's mind to a relish of a right wily of speak- 
ing and writing. 
The books I have hitherto mentioned have been  in 
order only to writing and speaking well ;  not but that 
they will deserve to be read upon other accounts. 
The study of  morality I have above  mentioned as 
that that becomes a gentleman;  not barely as a man, 
but in order to his business as a gentleman.  Of  this 
there  are books  enough  writ  both  by  ancient  and 
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modern philosophers ;  but the morality of  the gospel 
doth so exceed them all,  that,  to give  a  man  a  full 
knowledge of  true morality,  I shall  send him to no 
other book but the New Testament.  But if he hath a 
mind  to see  how far the heathen world carried that 
science,  and whereon  th@y  bottomed their ethics,  he 
will  be  delightfully  and  profitably  entertained  in 
Tully's Treatises De Officiis. 
Politics contains two parts,  very different  the one 
from the other.  The one,  containing the original of 
societies,  and the rise and extent of  political power ; 
the other, the art of governing men in society. 
The first of  these  hath been  so  bandied  amongst 
us for these sixty years backward, that one can hardly 
miss  books  of  this kind.  Those which  I  think  are 
most talked of  in English,  are the first  book of Mr. 
IIooker's  Ecclesiastical  Polity,  and  Mr.  Algernon 
Sydney's  Discourses  concerning  Government.  The 
latter of  these I never read.  Let me here add, Two 
Treatises  of  Government,  printed  in  1690 *;  and 
a Treatise  of  Civil Polity,  printed  this  yegr t.  To 
these one may add, Puffendorf De Officio Hominis et 
Civis,  and De Jure Naturali et Gentium ;  which  last 
is the best book of that kind. 
As to the other part of politics,  which concerns the 
art of government ;  that, I think, is best to be learned 
by experience and history,  especially that of  a man's 
own  country.  And  therefore  I  think  an  English 
gentleman should be  well  versed  in  the history  of 
England,  takiq  his rise as far back  as there are any 
records of it ;  joining with it the laws that were made 
in the several  ages, as  he goes  along in his history ; 
that he may observe from thence the several turns of 
state,  and  how  they  have  been  produced.  In Mr. 
Tyrrel's  History  of  England he  will  find  all along 
those several authors which have treated of our affairs. 
* These two treatises are written by Mr. Locke himself. 
t Civil Polity.  A Treatise concerning the Nature of  Govern- 
ment, kc.  London, 1703, in 8vo.  Written 1)y Peter Paxton, 
and which he may have  recourse  to,  concerning any 
which either his curiosity or judgment shall lead 
him to inquire into. 
Wit11 the history,  lie may also do well to read the 
ancient lawyers ; such as Bracton,  Fleta,  Henning- 
liain, Mirror  of  Justice,  my Lord Coke's  Second  In- 
stitutes, and the Modus tenendi Parliamenturn ; and 
others of  that kind which  he may find quoted in the 
late controversies between Mr. Petit, Mr. Tyrrel, Mr. 
Atwood,  &c. with  Dr. Brady ; as also,  I suppose, in 
Sedler's  Treatise  of  Rights  of  the  Kingdom,  and 
Customs of our Ancestors, whereof the first edition is 
the best; wherein lie will find the ancient constitution 
of tlie government of England. 
There are  two  volumes  of  State Tracts printed 
since the Revolution,  in which there are many things 
relating to the government of England *. 
As for general history, Sir Walter Raleigh and Dr. 
Wowel are books to be had.  He, who hath a mind to 
launch farther into that ocean,  may consult Whear's 
Methodus lependi Historias:  of the last edition, which 
will direct him  to the authors he is to read,  and the 
inethod wherein he is to read tliem. 
To the reading  of  history,  chronology  and geo- 
graphy are absolutely necessary. 
In geography, we have two general ones in English, 
Heylin and Moll ;  which  is the best of  them I know 
not, having not been much conversant in either of them. 
But the last I should  think  to be of  most use ;  be- 
cause of the new discoveries that are made every day, 
*We have now two collections of StateTracts; one  in  twovolumes 
in  folio,  pinted in  1689 and  1692, contains  Several  Treatises 
relating to the Government from the Year 1660 to 1689;  and tlie 
other,  in three volumes in folio, printed in 1705, 1706, and 1707, 
is a Collection of Tracts, published on Occasion of  the late Revo- 
lution in 1688,  and during the Reign of  K. William 111.  These 
collections might have been made more complete and more con- 
venicnt;  especially the first, which  is  extremely defective and in- 
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tending to the perfection of  tha;  science.  Though, I 
believe, that the countries, which Heylin mentions, are 
better treated of by him, bating what new  discoveries 
since his time have added. 
These two books contain geography in general ;  but 
whether an English gentleman would  thlnk  it worth 
his  time  to  bestow  much  pains  upon  that, though 
without it he cannot well understand a Gazette,  it is 
certain he cannot well be without Camden's Britannia, 
which  is  much  enlarged  in  the last English edition. 
A good collection of maps is also necessary. 
To geography, books of travels may be added.  In 
that kind, the collections  made  by  our countrymen, 
Hackluyt and Purchas, are very good.  There is also 
a very good  collection made by Thevenot in folio, i~r 
French ;  and by Ramuzio,  in Italian ;  whether trans- 
lated into English or no, I know not.  There are also 
several good books of travels of Englishmen published, 
as Sandys, Roe, Brown, Gage, and Dampier. 
There are also  several voyages  in  French, which 
are  very  good,  as  Pyrard *,  Bergeron t, Sagard f, 
Bernier §,  &c. :  whether all of them are translated into 
English, I know not. 
There is at present a very good Collection of Voy- 
ages and Travels, never before in English, and such as 
are out of  print; now printing by Mr. Churchill 11. 
There  are besides  these  a  vast  number  of  other 
travels ;  a sort of books that have a very good mixture 
* Voyage  de  Franyois  Pyrard  de Laval.  Contenant sa Navi- 
gation aux  Indes Orientales, Maldives, Moluques,  Brhsil.  Paris, 
1613, 8vo. 3d edit. 
t llelation des Voyagerj en Tartarie, &c. Le tout  recueilli  par 
Pierre Rergeron.  Paris, 1634, 8vo. 
$ Le Grand Voyage des  Hurons, situes en YAmerique, &c. par 
F. Gab. Sagard Theodat.  Paris, 1632, 8vo. 
$ Memoires de  1'Ernpire du  Grand  Mogol,  &c.  par  Fransois 
Bernier.  Paris, 1670 et 1671, 3 vols. in 12mo. 
11 That collection of voyages and travels was published an. 1704, 
in b vols. in fol. 
of  delight  and  usefulness.  To set  them  down  all 
would  take up too  much  time  and room.  Those I 
have mentioned are enough to begin with. 
As to chronology, I think Nelvicus the best for com- 
mon use; which is not a book to be  read,  but to lie 
by, and be  consulted  upon  occasion.  He that hat11 
a mind to look farther into chronology, may get Tal- 
lent's  Tables,  and  Strauchius's  Breviarium  Tem- 
porum, and may to those add Scaliger  De Emenda- 
tione Temporum, and  Petavius, if  he hath a mind to 
engage deeper in that study. 
Those, who are accounted to have writ best  parti- 
cular  parts  of  our  English  history,  are  Bacon,  of 
Henry VII ;  and Herbert of Henry VIII.  Daniel also 
is  commended;  and  Burnet's  History  of  the  Re- 
formation. 
Mariana's  History of  Spain, and Thuanus's  History 
of his Own Time, and Philip de Comines, are of great 
and deserved reputation. 
There are also several French and English memoirs 
and collections,  such  as La Rochefoucault,  Melvil, 
Rushworth, &c.  which give a great light to those who 
have a mind to look into what hath passed in Europe 
this last age. 
To fit a gentleman for the conduct of himself, whe- 
ther  as a  private  man,  or  as interested  in the go- 
vernment of his country, nothing can be  more neces- 
sary than the knowledge of men ;  which, though it be 
to be had chiefly from experience,  and,  next to that, 
from  a judicious  reading  of  history;  yet there  are 
books that of purpose treat of  human  nature, which 
help to give an insight into it.  Such are those treat- 
ing of the passions, and how they are moved ;  whereof 
Aristotle in his second book of Rhetoric hath admira- 
bly discoursed, and that in a little compass.  I think 
this Rhetoric is translated into English ;  if not, it  may 
he had in Greek and Latin together. 
La  Kruyere's  Characters  are  also  an admirable 
piece of  painting ; I think it is also translated out of 
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Satirical writings also, such as Juvenal, and Persius, 
and  above  all Horace;  though they  paint  the de- 
formities of  men, yet they thereby teach us  to know 
them. 
There is another use of reading, which is for diver- 
sion  and delight.  Such -are poetical writings, espe- 
cially  dramatic,  if  they  be  free  from  profaneness, 
obscenity, and what corrupts good manners ;  for such 
pitch should not be handled. 
Of all the books of fiction, I know none that equals 
Cervantes's  History  of  Don  Quixote in  usefulness, 
pleasantry, and a constant decorum.  And  indeed no 
writings can be pleasant, which have not nature at  the 
bottom, and are not drawn after her copy. 
There is another sort of books, which I had almost 
forgot, with which  a gentleman's  study ought  to be 
well furnished, viz. dictionaries of all kinds.  For the 
Latin tongue, Littleton, Cooper, Calepin, and Robert 
Stephens's  Thesaurus  Linguae  Latinae,  arid  Vossii 
Etymologicum  Linguae  Latinae ; Skinner's  Lexicon 
Etymologicum  is  an  excellent  one  of  that  kind, 
for the English tongue.  Cowel's  Interpreter is  use- 
ful for  the law terms.  Spelman's  Glossary is tt very 
useful  and  learned  book.  And  Selden's  Titles of 
Honour  a gentleman  should  not be  without.  Bau- 
drand  hath  a  very  good  Geographical  Dictionary. 
And there are several historical ones, which are of use ; 
as Lloyd's,  Hoffman's, Moreri's.  And Bayle's  incom- 
parable dictionary is something of the same kind.  He 
that hath occasion to look into books written in Latin 
since the decay of the Roman empire, and the purity 
of  the  Latin  tongue,  cannot  be  well  without  Du 
Cange's  Glossarium mediae et infimae Latinitatis. 
Among  the  books  above  set down,  I mentioned 
Vossius's  Etymologicum  Lingua3  Latinae;  all  his 
works  are  lately  printed  in  Holland  in  six  tomes. 
They are fit  books  for a  gentleman's  library,  con- 
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CHAPTER I. 
Of  Matter and Motion. 
MATTER  is  an  extended  solid  substance;  which 
being comprehended under distinct surfaces, makes so 
many particular distinct bodies. 
Motion is so well  known  by the sight and touch, 
that to use words to give a clear idea of  it would  be 
in vain. 
Matter, or body, is indifferent to motion, or rest. 
There is as much force required to put a body, which 
is in  motion, at rest,  as there is to set a body,  which 
is at  rest, into motion. 
No parcel of matter can give itself either motion or 
rest, and therefore a body at rest will remain so eter- 
nally, except some external  cause  puts it in motion ; 
and a body in motion will move eternally, unless some 
external cause stops it. 
A body in motion will always move on in a straight 
line,  unless  it be  turned  out of it by some  external 
cause;  because  a  body  can  no  more  alter  the de- 
termination  of  its motion, than it can begin it, alter, 
or stop its motion itself. 
The swiftness of motion is measured by distance of 
place,  and  length of  time  wherein  it is  performed. 
For instnncc, if  A and B, bodies of  equal or  different bipess, move each of them an inch in the same time ; 
thew  motions  are equally swift; but if A moves two 
inches, in the time whilst B is moving  one  inch,  the 
motion of A is twice as swift as that of B. 
The quantity of  motion  is measured by the swift- 
ness  of  the motion,  and the quantity of  the matter 
moved,  taken  together.  For instance,  if  A,  a body 
equal to B, moves as swift as B; then it hath an equal 
quantity of motion.  If A hath twice as much matter 
as B,  and moves equally as swift, it hath double the 
quantity of motion ;  and so in proportion. 
It appears, as far as human observation reaches, to 
be a settled law of nature, that all bodies have a tend- 
ency, attraction, or gravitation towards  one  another. 
The same  force,  applied  to two different  bodies, 
produces always the same quantity of motion in each 
of  them.  For  instance,  let a boat,  which  with  its 
lading is one ton,be tied at  a distance to another vessel, 
which  with its lading is twenty-six tons ;  if the rope 
that ties them together be pulled, either in the less or 
bigger  of  these  vessels, the less of  the two, in their 
approach one  to  another, will move  twenty-six  feet, 
while the other moves but one foot. 
Wherefore the quantity of matter in the earth being 
twenty-six  times more than in the moon ; the motion 
i11  the moon  towards the earth, by the common force 
of attraction, by which they are impelled towards one 
another, will  he  twenty-six  timcs  as  fast  as  in the 
earth; that is,  the moon  will move twenty-six miles 
torvards the earth, for every ~nile  the earth moves to- 
wards the nloon. 
Helice it is, tliat, in this natural tendency of bodies 
towards one  another, that in the lesser is considerert 
as gravitation,  and that  in the bigger as attraction ; 
hecau-;c thc inotioli  of  the lesser body (by reason of 
it.; much  gicater sniftness) is alone taken notice of. 
This  attraction  is  the strongest, the nearer the nt- 
trncting  1)odics  to cach  other; and, in  different 
tli.;tilll~~.:  of  tllc  snillc borlic.s,  is  rcciproc.ally  in the 
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duplicate proportion of those distances.  For instance, 
if two bodies,  at a given distance, attract each other 
with a certain force,  at half  the distance,  they  will 
attract each other with four times that force ; at one 
third of the distance, with nine times that force;  and 
SO on. 
Two bodies at a distance will put one another into 
motion by the force of attraction ; which is inexplica- 
ble  by  us,  though made evident to us by experience, 
and so to be taken as a principle in natural philosophy. 
Supposing then the earth the sole body in the uni- 
verse, and at rest; if God should create the moon, at 
the same distance that it is now from the earth,  the 
earth and the moon  would presently begin to move 
one towards another in a straight line by this motion 
of attraction or gravitation. 
If a body, that by the attraction of  another would 
move in a straight line towards it, receives a new mo- 
tion  any  ways  oblique to the first; it will no longer 
move  in a straight line,  according to either of  those 
directions,  but in a curve that will  partake of both. 
And  this  curve  will  differ,  according to the nature 
and quantity of  the forces that concurred to produce 
it ; as,  for  instance,  in many  cases  it will be such a 
curve  as  ends  where it began.  or recurs into itself: 
US 
that is,  makes up a circle, or an ellipsis or oval very 
little differing from a circle. 
CHAPTER  11. 
Of the  Universe. 
To any one, who looks about him in the world,there 
are obvious several distinct masses of matter, separate 
from  one  another;  some  whereof  have  discernible 
motions.  These are the sun, the fixed stars, the comets, 
and the planets, amongst which this earth, which we 
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inhabit,  is  one.  All  these  are visible to our naked 
eyes. 
Besides these, telescopes have discoveredseveral  fixed 
stars, invisible to the naked  eye; and  several other 
bodies  moving about some of  the planets;  all which 
were  invisible  and unkndwn  before  the use  of  per- 
spective-glasses was found. 
The vast distances between these great bodies are 
called  intermundane spaces;  in which  though there 
may be some fluid matter, yet it  is so thin and subtile, 
and there is  so little of  that in respect of the great 
masses that move in those spaces, that it is as much 
as nothing. 
These  masses  of  matter  are either luminous,  or 
opake or dark. 
Luminous  bodies,  are such  as give light of  .i;'lien~- 
selves ;  and such are the sun and the fixed stars. 
Dark or opake bodies, are such as emit no light of 
themselves, though they are capable of reflecting of  it, 
when it is cast upon them from other bodies; and such 
are the planets. 
There are some  opake bodies,  as for instance the 
comets,  which,  besides  the light that they may have 
from the sun, seem to shine with a light that is nothing 
else but an accension, which they receive from the sun, 
in their  near approaches to it, in their respective re- 
volutions. 
The fixed  stars are called  fixed, because  they al- 
ways keep the same distance one from another. 
The sun, at the same distance from us that the fixed 
stars  are,  would  have the appearance of  one of  the 
fixed stars. 
CHAPTER  111. 
Of  our  Solar  System. 
OUR  solar system consists of the sun, and the planets 
and comets moving about it. 
The planets  are bodies,  which  appear to us  like 
stars ;  not that they are luminous bodies, that is, have 
light in themselves ;  but they shine by reflecting the 
light of the sun. 
They are called planets from a Greek word, which 
signifies wandering; because they change their places, 
and  do not always keep the same distance with one 
another, nor with the fixed stars, as the fixed stars do. 
The planets are either primary, or secondary. 
There are six primary planets, viz. Mercury, Venus, 
the Earth, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. 
All these  move round the sun, which is, as it were, 
the centre of their motions. 
The  secondary  planets  move  round  about other 
planets.  Resides the moon, which  moves  about the 
earth, four moons move about Jupiter,  and five about 
Saturn, which are called their satellites. 
The middle  distances of the primary planets from 
the sun are as follows : 
Mercury 
Venus  Is distant 
sun's  cen- 
Zter 1  tre, about 
Saturn 
32,000,000)  Statute miles, 
59,000,000  1  each 5280 
,777,000,000 
The orbits of  the planets,  and their  respective di- 
stances from the sun, and from one another, together 
with the orbit of a comet, may be  seen  in  the figure 
of the solar system hereunto annexed. 
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The  I~eriodical  times  of  each  planet's  revolution 
about the sun are as follows : 
Mercury  Revolves  0  88  0  0 
Venus  I  about; the  I  0  995  0  0 
The Earth  j  Sun in  0  365  5  49 
Mars  the space 
Jupiter  1  of 
Saturn  I  29  138  0  0 
The planets move  round  about the sun from west 
to east in the zodiac; or, to speak plainer, are always 
found  amongst some  of  the  stars of those constella- 
tions which make the twelve signs of the zodiac. 
The motion  of  the planets  about  the sun is  not 
perfectly circular, but rather elliptical. 
The reason  of  their  motions  in curve lines, is the 
attraction of  the sun,  or  their  gravitations  towards 
the sun, (call it which you please) ;  and an oblique or 
siclelong impulse or motion. 
These two motions or tendencies,  the one  always 
endeavouring  to carry them in  a straight line  from 
the circle they move in, and the other endeavouring 
to draw them in a straight line to the sun, makes that 
curve line they revolve in. 
The motio~l  of the comcts about the sun is in a very 
long slender  oval :  whereof  onc  of  the focuses is the 
centre  of  the sun,  and the other very much beyond 
the sphcrc of Saturn. 
The moon moves about the earth, as the earth cloth 
about the sun.  So that it hat11 the centre of its motion 
in the earth ;  as the earth hat11 the centre of  its revo- 
lution in the sun, abo~t  wliic11 it moves. 
The moon  makes  its  synodical  motion  about  the 
earth in 29 days, 12 hours, and about 44 minutes. 
It is full moon, when, tlie earth being between the 
sun and the moon, we scc all the enlightened  part of 
the moon ;  ~icw  moon, wllcri, tllc moon being bct~vcc~l 
us and the sun,  its  enlightened  part is  turned from 
us;  and  half  moon,  when  the  moon  being  in  the 
quadratures,  as  the astronomers  call it,  we  see but 
half the enlightened part. 
An eclipse of the moon is, when the earth, being be- 
tween the sun and the moon, hinders the light of the 
sun  from  falling  upon,  and being reflected by,  the 
moon.  If the light of  the sun  is  kept  off  from  the 
whole body of  the moon, it is a total eclipse ;  if from 
a part only, it is a partial one. 
An eclipse of the sun is,  when the moon, being be- 
tween the sun and the earth, hinders the light of the 
sun from coming  to us.  If the moon  hides from us 
the whole body of the sun, it is a total eclipse ;  if not, 
a partial one. 
Our solar  system is  distant from  the  fixed  stars 
20,000,000,000  semi-diameters  of  the earth;  or,  as 
Mr.  Huygens expresses  the distance,  in his Cosmo- 
theoros * :  the fixed stars are so remote from the earth, 
that if a cannon-bullet  should  come from  one  of the 
fixed  stars with as  swift a motion  as it hath when it 
is  shot  out of  the mouth of  a  cannon,  it would  be 
700,000 years in coming to the earth. 
This vast distance so much abates the attraction to 
those remote bodies, that its operation  upon those of 
our system is not at all sensible, nor would draw away 
01-  hinder the return of any of our solar coinets ;  though 
some of them should go so far from the sun as not to 
make the revolution about it in less than 1000 years. 
It is more  suitable  to  the wisdom,  power,  and 
greatness of  God, to think that the fixed stars are all 
of  them suns,  with  systems  of  inhabitable  planets 
moving about them, to whose  inhabitants he displays 
the marks  of  his  goodness  as well  as to us; rather 
than to imagine  that those  very  remote  bodies,  so 
little useful to us,  were made only for our sake. 
* Christiani Huygenii  KOCMOOEilPOX, sive de terris ccelesti- 
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CHAPTER IV. 
Of  the Earth, considered as a Planet. 
THE  earth, by its revolution  about the sun in 365 
days, 5 hours, 49 minutes,  makes  that space of  time 
we call a year. 
The line, which the centre of the earth describes in 
its annual revolution about the sun, is called ecliptic. 
The annual motion of  the earth about the sun, is in 
the order of the signs of the zodiac ;  that is, speaking 
vulgarly, from west to east. 
Besides  this annual  revolution  of  the earth about 
the sun in the ecliptic, the earth turns round upon its 
own axis in 24 hours. 
The turning of the earth upon its own axis every 24 
hours, whilst it moves round the sun in a year, we may 
conceive by the running of a bowl on a bowlingigreen ; 
in which not only the centre of  the bowl hath a pro- 
gressive motion  on  the green;  but  the bowl  in its 
going forward, from one part of the green to another, 
turns round about its own axis. 
The turning of  the earth on its own  axis makes 
the difference of  day and night ;  it being day in those 
parts of the earth which are turned towards the sun ; 
and night in those  parts which  are in the shade,  or 
turned from the sun. 
The annual revolution of  the earth in the ecliptic, 
is the cause of  the different seasons, and of the several 
lengths of days and nights, in every part of the world, 
in the course of  the year. 
The reason of it, is the earth's going round its own 
axis  in  the ecliptic,  but at the  same  time  keeping 
every where its axis  equally inclined  to the plane of 
the ecliptic,  and parallel to itself.  For the plane of 
the ecliptic inclining to the plane  of  the equator 23 
degrees  and  a  half,  makes  that the  earth,  moving 
round in the ecliptic, hath sometimes one of  its poles, 
and sometimes the other, nearer the sun. 
If the diameter of the sun be to the diameter of the 
earth as 48 to 1, as by some it is accounted ;  then the 
disk  of  the sun,  speaking nunzero  rotzuzdo, is  above 
92000 times bigger than the disk of the earth ; and the 
globe of  the sun is above 100,000 times bigger than 
the globe of the earth. 
The distance  of  the earth's  orbit  from the sun, is 
above 200,000 semi-diameters of the earth. 
If a cannon-bullet should come from the sun, with 
the same velocity it hath when  it is shot out of  the 
mouth of a cannon,  it would  be 25  years  in coming 
to the earth. 
CHAPTER V. 
Of  the Air and Atmosphere. 
WE have already considered  the  earth as a planet, 
or one  of  the great masses of  matt?r moving  about 
the sun ;  we shall now consider it as it is made up of 
its  several parts,  abstractedly  from  its  diurnal  and 
annual motions. 
The  exterior part of this our habitable world is the 
air or atmosphere ;  a light, thin fluid, or springy body, 
that encompasses the solid earth on all sides. 
The height of the atmosphere, above the surface of 
the solid earth, is not certainly known; but that it doth 
reach but to a very small part of the distance betwixt 
the earth and the moon,  may be  concluded  from the 
refraction of the rays coming from the sun, moon, and 
other luminous bodies. 
Though considering that the air we  are in,  being 
near 1000 times  lighter  than  water;  and  that the 
higher it is, the less it is compressed  by the superior 
incumbent  air, and so consequently being  ct  springy 
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pillar of  air of  any diameter is  equal in weight to a 
pillar of  quicksilver of  the same diameter of between 
$29 and SO inches height ; we  may infer that the top 
of the atmosphere is not very near the surface of the 
solid earth. 
It  may be concluded, that the utmost extent of the 
atmosphere reaches upwards,  from the surface of the 
solid earth that we walk on, to a good distance above 
us ;  first, if we  consider that a column of  air of  any 
given diameter is equiponderant to a column of quick- 
silver  of  between  29 and 30 inches  height.  Now 
quicksilver  being  near 14 times  heavier  than water, 
if air was  as heavy as water,  the atmosphere would 
be about 14 times  higher than the column of quick- 
silver, i.  e. about 35 feet. 
Secondly,  if  we  consider  that  air is  1000 times 
lighter than water, then a pillar of air equal in weight 
to a  pillar  of  quicksilver  of  YO inches high  will  be 
35,000  feet ;  whereby we come to know that the air or 
atmosphere is 35,000  feet, i. e. near seven iniles high. 
Thirdly, if  we  consider  that the air is  a  springy 
body,  and that that,  which  is  nearest  the earth,  is 
compressed by the weight of all the atmosphere that 
is  above it,  and rests  perpendicularly  upon  it ;  we 
shall find  that the air here,  near  the surface  of  the 
earth,  is  much  denser  and thicker  than it is  in the 
upper parts.  For  example,  if  upon a fleece of wool 
you lay another;  the under one will  be a little com- 
pressed  by  the weight  of  that which  lies  upon  it; 
and so both of  them  by a third,  and so on; so that, 
if 10,000  were piled one  upon another, the under one 
would  by  the weight  of  all  the rest  be  very  much 
compressed, and all the parts of  it be brought abun- 
dantly closer together than when there was no  other 
upon it; and the next to that a little less compressed, 
the third a little less than the second, and so on till it 
came to the uppermost, which would be in its full ex- 
pansion, and not compressed at all.  Just so it is in the 
air; the higher you go in it, the less it is compressed, 
am? consequently the less dc~isc  it is ;  and. so thc upper 
part being exceedingly thinner than the lower part, 
which we breathe in (which is that that is 1000 times 
lighter than water),  the top of the atmosphere is pro- 
bably much higher than the distance above assigned. 
That  the  air  near  the  surface  of  the  earth  will 
mightily expand  itself, when  the pressure  of  the in- 
cumbent asmosphere is taken off,  may be abundantly 
seen  in  the experiments made  by  Mr. Boyle  in  his 
pneumatic  engine.  In  his  Physico-mechanical  Ex- 
periments,  concerning the  air,  he  declaresX  it pro- 
bable  that the atmosphere may be several hundred 
miles  high;  which  is  easy to be  admitted, when we 
consider what he proves  in  another part of the same 
treatise, viz. that the air here about the surface of the 
earth, when the pressure is taken from it, will dilate 
itself about 152  times. 
The atmosphere is the scene of  the meteors;  and 
therein  is  collected  the matter  of  rain,  hail,  snow, 
thunder,  and  lightning;  and  a  great  many  other 
things observable in the air. 
CHAPTER VI. 
Of  Meteors in general. 
BESIDES  the springy particles of pure air, the atmo- 
sphere is made up of  several steams or minute  par- 
ticles  of several sorts, rising from the earth and the 
waters, and floating in the air, which is a fluid body, 
and though much finer and thinner, may be considered 
in respect of its fluidity to be like water, and so capable, 
like other liquors,  of  having heterogeneous particles 
floating in it. 
* New Experiments Physico-mechanical,  touching the spring of 
the air, and its effects;  (made for the most part in a new pneunia- 
tical engine)  written. . . .  by the honourable Robert Boyle,  Esq. 
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The  most remarkable of them are, first, the particles 
of water raised into the atmosphere, chiefly by the heat 
of  the sun, out of the sea and other waters,  and the 
surface of the earth ;  from whence it falls in dew, rain, 
hail, and snow. 
Out of the vapours rising from moisture the clouds 
are principally made. 
Clouds do not consist wholly of watery parts;  for, 
besides the aqueous vapours that are raised into the air, 
there are also sulphureous and saline particles that are 
raised up,  and in the clouds mixed with the aqueous 
particles, the effects whereof are sometimes very sen- 
sible ;  as particularly in lightnin~  and thunder, when 
the sulphureous and nitrous particles firing break out 
with that violence  of  light and  noise,  which  is  ob- 
servable in thunder,  and very much  resembles gun- 
powder. 
That there are nitrous particles raised into the air is 
evident from the nourishment which rain gives to ve- 
getables more than any other water;  and also by the 
collection of nitre or salt-petre in heaps of earth, out 
of which it has been extracted,  if they be exposed to 
the air, so as to be  kept from rain ; not to mention 
other efforts, wherein the nitrous spirit in the air shows 
itself. 
Clouds are the greatest and most considerable of all 
the meteors,  as  furnishing  matter and plenty to the 
earth.  They consist of very small drops of water, and 
are elevated a good distance  above the surface of the 
earth; for a cloud is nothing but a mist flying high in 
the air, as a mist is nothing but a cloud here below. 
How  vapours  are raised  into  the air  in invisibIe 
steams by the heat of the sun out of the sea, and moist 
parts of the earth, is  easily understood ; and there is 
a visible instance of  it in ordinary distillations.  But 
how these steams are collected into drops, which bring 
back the water again, is not so easy to determine. 
To those that will carefully observe, perhaps it  will 
appear probable,  that it is  by  that  which  the  chy- 
mists  call precipitation;  to which  it answers in all 
its parts. 
The air may be looked  on  as  a clear and pellucid 
menstruum, in  which  the insensible  particles of diS- 
solved matter float up and down,  without being dis- 
cerned, or troubling the pellucidity of  the air; when 
on  a  sudden,  as  if  it were  by a  precipitation,  they 
gather into the very small but visible misty drops that 
make clouds. 
This may be observed sometimes in a very clear sky ; 
when,  there not  appearing any  cloud,  or any thing 
opake, in the whole horizon,  one may see on a sudden 
clouds gather, and all the hemisphere overcast; which 
cannot be from the rising of the new aqueous vapours 
at that time,  but from the precipitation  of  the mois- 
ture,  that  in  invisible  particles  floated  in  the air, 
into very  small but very  visible  drops,  which  by a 
like cause being  united into greater drops,  they be- 
come too heavy to be sustained in the air, and so fall 
down in rain. 
Hail seems to be the drops of rain frozen in their 
falling. 
Snow is the small particles of water frozen before 
they unite into drops. 
The regular figures, which  branch out in flakes of 
snow, seem to show that there  are some particles of 
salt mixed with the water, which makes them unite in 
certain angles. 
The rainbow is reckoned one of  the most  remark- 
able meteors,  though really it be  no  meteor at all; 
but the reflection of the sunbeams from the smallest 
drops of a cloud or mist, which are placed in a certain 
angle made by the concurrence of two lines, one drawn 
from the sun, and the other from the eye to these little 
drops  in  the cloud,  which  reflect  the sunbeams; so 
that two people,  looking upon a rainbow at the same 
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CHAPTER VII. 
Of  Springas, Rivers,  and tJ~e  Sea. 
PART  of  the water that falls down from the clouds 
runs away upon the surface of the earth into channels, 
which convey it to the sea ;  and part of  it is imbibed 
in the spungy shell of the earth, from whence sinking 
lower  by  degrees,  it falls  down  into  subterranean 
channels,  and so under ground passes  into the sea; 
or else, meeting with beds sf  rock  or clay,  it is hin- 
dered from sinking lower, and so breaks out in springs, 
which are most commonly in the sides or at  the bottom 
of hilly ground. 
Springs make  little  rivulets;  those  united  make 
brooks ;  and those coming together make rivers, which 
empty themselves into the sea. 
The sea is a great collection  of waters in the deep 
valleys of the earth.  If the earth were all plain, and 
had not those  deep hollows,  the earth would  be  a11 
covered with water;  because the water, being lighter 
than the earth, would be above the earth, as the air is 
above the water. 
The most remarkable thing in the sea is that motion 
of the water called tides.  It is a rising and falling of 
tlie water of the sea.  The cause of this is the attraction 
of the moon, whereby the part of the water in the great 
ocean, which is nearest the moon, being most strongly 
attracted, is raised higher than the rest; and the part 
opposite to  it  on the contrary side,bein,v least attracted, 
IS illbo higher than the rest.  And these two opposite 
riscs of the surface of the water in the great ocean, fol- 
lowing the motion of the moon from east to west, and 
striking against the large coasts of the continents that 
lie in its way,  from thence rebounds back again, and 
so makes floods and ebbs in narrow seas, and  rivers 
remote from the great ocean.  Herein we also see the 
reason of the tinlcs of the tides, and why they so con- 
stantly follow the course of  the moon. 
CHAPTER VIII. 
Of  several Sorts of  Earth, Stones, Metals, Minerals, 
and otller Fossils. 
THIS  solid globe we live  upon  is called  the earth, 
though  it  contains  in  it a  great variety  of  bodies, 
several whereof are not properly earth ;  which word, 
taken in a more limited sense,  signifies  such parts of 
this globe as are capable, being exposed to the air, to 
give rooting and nourishment to plants,  so that they 
may stand and grow in it.  With  such earth as this 
the greatest part of the surface of this globe is covered; 
and it is as it were the store-house,  from  whence all 
the living creatures of our world have originally their 
provisions ; for from thence all the plants have their 
sustenance, and some few animals,  and from these all 
the other animals. 
Of earth, taken in this sense, there are several sorts, 
a. g.  common mould,  or garden earth, clay of several 
kinds, sandy soils. 
Besides  these,  there  is  medicinal  earth;  as  that 
which is called terra lemnicr,  bolus armena, and divers 
others. 
After the several earths, we may consider the parts 
of the surface of this globe which are bwrcri ;  and such, 
for the most, are sand, gravel, chalk, and rocks, which 
produce  nothing,  where  they  have  no  earth  mixed 
amongst them.  Barren sands are of divers kinds, and 
consist of  several  little irregular stones without  any 
earth ; and of such there are great deserts to be seen 
in several parts of the world. 
Besides these, which are most remarkable on the sur- 
face of the earth, there are found deeper, i11  this globe, 
many  other  bodies,  which,  because  we  discover  by 
cligging into the bowels of  the earth, are called by one 
common name, fossils ;  under which are comprehended 
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kinds, and sundry bodies  that have  the texture  be- 
tween earth and stone. 
To  begin with those fossils which come nearest the 
earth; under  this  head we  may reckon  the several 
sorts of ochre, chalk, that which they call black-lead, 
and other bodies of this kind, which  are harder than 
earth, but have  not  the consistency and hardness  of 
perfect stone. 
Next to these may be considered stones of a11 sorts ; 
whereof there is almost an infinite variety.  Some of 
the  most  remarkable, either  for beauty or  use,  are 
these :  marble  of  all kinds,  porphyry,  granate, free- 
stone,  &c.  flints,  agates,  carnelians,  pebbles,  under 
which kind come the precious  stones,  which  are but 
pebbles of an excessive hardness, and, when  they are 
cut and polished,  they have  an extraordinary lustre. 
The most noted  and esteemed  are diamonds, rubies, 
amethysts, emeralds, topazes, opals. 
Besides these we must not omit those which, though 
of not so  much  beauty,  yet  are of  greater use, viz. 
loadstones, whetstones  of  all kinds,  limestones, cala- 
mine, or lapis calaminaris ;  and abundance of others. 
Besides these, there are found in the earth several 
sorts of  salts, as  eating or  common  salt, vitriol,  sal 
gemma, and others. 
The minerals,  or semi-metals,  that are dug out of 
the bowels of the earth, are antimony, cinnabar, zink, 
&c. to which may be added brimstone. 
But the bodies of most use, that are sought for out 
of the depths of the earth, are the metals ;  which are 
distinguished from other bodies by their weight, fusi- 
bility,  and  malleableness;  of  which  there  are these 
sorts,  gold,  silver,  copper,  tin,  lead,  and,  the most 
valuable of them all, iron ;  to which one may join that 
anomalous body quicksilver, or mercury. 
He that desires  to be  more particularly informed 
concerning the qualities and properties  of these sub- 
terraneous bodies, may consult natural historians and 
chymists. 
What lies  deeper  towards the centre of the  earth 
we know not, but a very little beneath the snrface of 
this globe ;  and whatever we fetch from under ground 
is only what is lodged in the shell of the earth. 
All stones, metals, and minerals, are real vegetables ; 
that is,  grow organically  from proper  seeds,  as well 
as plants. 
CHAPTER IX. 
Of  Vegetables, or Plants. 
NEST to the earth  itself,  we  may  consider  those 
that  are maintained  on  its  surface ;  which,  though 
they are fastened to it, yet are very distinct from it ; 
and those are the whole eibe of vegetables or plants. 
These may be divided  into three sorts, herbs, shrubs, 
and trees. 
Herbs are those plants whose  stalks are soft, and 
have nothing woody in them, as grass, sowthistle, and 
hemlock.  Shrubs and trees  have all wood  in them ; 
but with this difference,  that shrubs grow not to the 
height of trees, and usually spread into branches near 
the  surface of  the  earth; whereas  trees  generally 
shoot up in one great stem  or  body, and  then, at a 
good distance  from the earth, spread into branches; 
thus gooseberries and currants are shrubs ;  oaks and 
cherries are trees. 
In plants,  the most  considerable  parts  are these, 
the root, the stalk, the leaves, the flower, and the seed. 
There are very few of them that have  not  all these 
parts,  though  some  there are that  have  no  stalk; 
others that have no leaves ; and  others that have no 
flowers.  But without seed or root I think there  arc 
none. 
In vegetables,  there  are two things chiefly  to be 
considered, their nourishment and propag  a  t'  ion. 
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fibres of the roots being spread under ground,imbibe, 
from the moist earth, juice  fit for their nourishment ; 
this is conveyed by the stalk up into the branches and 
leaves,  through  little, and,  in some  plants,  imper- 
ceptible tubes, and from thence, by the bark, returns 
again to the root;  so that there is  in vegetables,  as 
well as animals, a circulation of  the vital liquor.  By 
what impulse  it is  moved,  is somewhat hard to dis- 
cover.  It  seems to be from the difference of  day and 
night,  and other  changes in the heat of the air ; for 
the heat dilating, and the cold contracting those little 
tubes, supposing there be valves in them, it is easy to 
be  conceived  how  the  circulation  is  performed  in 
plants, where  it is not  required to be  so  rapid  and 
quick as in animals. 
Nature has provided for the propagation of the spe- 
cies of plants several ways.  The first and general is 
by seed.  Besides  this, some  plants  are raised from 
any part of the root set in the ground; others by new 
roots  that are propagated  from  the  old  one,  as in 
tulips ;  others by offsets, and in others,  the branches 
set in the ground will take root  and grow ;  and last 
of all, grafting and inoculation,  in  certain  sorts, are 
known ways  of  propagation.  All these ways  of in- 
creasing plants  make  one good  part of  the skill of 
gardening; and from the books  of gardeners may be 
best learnt. 
CHAPTER  X. 
Of  Animals. 
THERE  is  another  sort  of  creatures belonging  to 
this our earth, rather  as  inhabitants than parts of it. 
They differ in this from plants, that  they are not fixed 
to any one  place, but have  a  freedom  of motion up 
and down, and, besides,  have sense  to guide them  in 
their motions. 
Man and brute  divide  all the animals of this  our 
globe. 
Brutes may be  considered  as either aerial,  terres- 
trial, aquatic, or amphibious.  I call those aerial which 
have  wings,  wherewith  they  can  support  thein- 
selves in  the air.  Terrestrial  are those whose  only 
place of rest  is upon  the earth.  Aquatic  are those 
whose constant abode is upon the water.  Those  are 
called ainpl~ibious,  which  live  freely in  the air  upon 
the earth, and yet are observed to live long upon the 
water,  as  if  they were  natural inhabitants  of  that 
element ;  though it be worth the examination to know 
whether any of those creatures that live at their ease, 
and by choice, a good while or at any time upon the 
earth, can live  a  long time  together perfectly under 
water. 
Aerial  animals may be subdivided  into birds, and 
flies. 
Fishes, which are the chief part of  aquatic animals, 
may be divided into shell-fishes, scaly fishes, and those 
that have neither apparent scales nor shells. 
And  the terrestrial  animals may be  divided  into 
quadrupeds or beasts, reptiles, which have many feet, 
and serpents, which have no feet at all. 
Insects, which  in  their  several  changes belong  to 
several of the before-mentioned divisions, nlay be con- 
sidered together as one great tribe of animals.  They 
are called insects, from a separation in the middle of 
their  bodies, whereby they are,  as  it were,  cut  into 
two parts, which are joined  together by a small lign- 
ture ;  as we see in wasps, comnion flies, and the like. 
Besides all these, there are some  aninlals that are 
not perfectly of  these  kinds, but placed,  as it were, 
in the middle  betwixt  two  of them, by something of 
both;  as bats, which  liave  something  of  beasts  and 
birds in them. 
Some reptiles of the earth, and some of  aquatics, 
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want one or more of the senses which are in perfecter 
animals ;  as worms, oysters, cockles, &c. 
Animals  are  nourished  by food,  taken  in  at the 
mouth,  digested  in the  stomach,  and  thence  by  fit 
vessels distributed over the whole body, as is described 
in books of anatomy. 
The greatest part of  animals  have  five senses, viz. 
seeing, henring, smelling, tasting, and feeling.  These, 
and the way of nourishment of animals, we shall more 
particularly  consider; because  they  are common  to 
man with beasts. 
The way of nourishment of animals, particularly of 
man, is by food taken  in  at the mouth, which  being 
chewed  these, is  broken  and mixed with  the saliva, 
and thereby prepared  for  an  easier  and better di- 
gestion in the stomach. 
When the stomzch has performed its office upon the 
food, it protrudes it into the guts, by whose peristaltic 
motion it is gently conveyed  along through the guts, 
and,  as it passes,  the chyle,  which  is the  nutritive 
part, is separated from the excrementitious, by the lac- 
teal veins ; and from thence conveyed into the blood, 
with which  it circulates  till  itself be  concocted  into 
blood.  The blood, being  by the vena  cava  brought 
into the right ventricle  of  the heart, by the contrac- 
tion of that muscle, is driven through the arteria pul- 
monaris into the lungs ;  where the constantly inspired 
air mixing with it, enlivens it; and from thence being 
conveyed  by the vena  pulmonaris  into the left. ven- 
tricle of the heart, the contraction of the heart forces 
it out, and, by the arteries, distributes it into all parts 
of the body; from whence it returns by the veins into 
the  right  ventricle  of  the heart,  to take  the same 
course  again.  This is  called the  circulation  of  the 
blood; by which life  and heat are communicated  to 
every part of the body. 
In the circulation  of the blood, a  good  part of it 
goes up into the head; 311d  by tlie brains are separated 
from it, or made out of it, the animal spirits ;  which, 
by the nerves, impart sense and motion to all parts of 
the bodv. 
- --{ 
The Instruments  of  motion  are the muscles;  the 
fibres whereof  contracting themselves,  move the se- 
veral parts of the body. 
This contraction of the muscles is, in some of them, 
by  the direction  of  the mind,  and in some of  them 
without it; which is the difference between voluntary 
and involuntary motions, in the body. 
CHAPTER  XI. 
OF  SEEING. 
THE  organ  of seeing is the eye ; consisting  of va- 
riety of parts wonderfully contrived, for the admitting 
and refracting  the rays  of  light; so  that those  that 
come from the same point of the object, and fall upon 
different parts of the pupil, are brought to meet again 
at the bottom of the  eye, whereby the whole  object 
is painted on the retina that is spread there. 
That  which immediately affects the sight, and pro- 
duces  in us  that sensation which we  call  seeing, is 
light. 
Light may be considered either, first, as it radiates 
from luminous bodies directly to our eyes ; and thus 
we see luminous bodies  themselves, as  the  sun, or a 
flame, &.  or  secondly, as  it is  reflected  froill  other 
bodies ;  and thus we see a  man, or a  picture, by the 
rays of light reflected from them to our eyes. 
Bodies, in respect of light, lnay be rlividecl into three 
sorts ;  first, those that emit  rays  of light, as t11c  sulk 
and fixed stars ;  secondly, those that transmit the rays 
of light, as tlie air ;  thirdly, thosc that reflect thc rays 
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of light, as iron,  earth, &c.  The first  are called lu- 
minous ;  the second pellucid ;  and the third opake. 
The rays of light themselves  are not seen ;  but by 
them the bodies, from which they originally come ;  as 
the sun, or a fixed star ;  or the bodies, from which they 
are reflected; as a horse; or a tulip.  When the moon 
shines, we do not see  the rays which  come from the 
sun to the moon, but by them we see the moon, from 
whence they are reflected. 
If the eye be placed in the medium, through which 
the rays pass to it, the medium is not seen at all ;  for 
instance, we  do  not see  the  air  through which  the 
rays come to our eyes.  But if a pellucid body, through 
which the light comes, be at a distance from our eye, 
we see that body,  as well as the bodies from whence 
the rays come that pass through them to come to orir 
eyes.  For instance, we do not only see bodies through 
a pair of spectacles, but we see the glass itself.  The 
reason whereof is,  that pellucid  bodies being bodies, 
the surfaces of which  reflect  some rays of light from 
their solid parts, these surfaces, placed at  a convenient 
distance from the eye, may be seen by those reflected 
rays ;  as, at the same time, other bodies beyond those 
pellucid ones may be seen by the transmitted rays. 
Opake bodies are of two sorts, specular, or not spe- 
cular.  Specular bodies, or mirrors,  are such opake 
bodies,  whose  surfaces are polished ;  whereby  they, 
reflecting  the rays in  the same  order  as they come 
from other bodies, show us their images. 
The rays  that are reflected from  opake bodies al- 
ways bring with them  to the eye the idea of colour ; 
and this  colour is  nothing  else, in the bodies,  but a 
disposition to reflect  to the eye more  copiously one 
sort of  rays  than  another.  For particular  rays  are 
originally endowed with particular colours ;  some are 
red, others blue, others yellow, and others green, &c. 
Every ray of  light, as it comes from the sun, seems 
a bundle of all these several sorts of rays; and as some 
of them are more refrangible than others ;  that is, are 
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more turned out of  their  course, in passing from one 
medium to another ;  it follows, that after such refrac- 
tion they will be  separated, and their  distinct colour 
observed.  Of these,  the most  refrangible  are violet, 
and the least red ;  and the intermediate ones, in order, 
are indigq, blue, green, yellow,  and orange.  This se- 
paration  is very entertaining,  and will  be  observed 
with pleasure in holding a prism in  the beams of the 
sun. 
As 911  these rays differ in refrangibility, so they do 
in reflexibility; that is, in the property of being more 
easily reflected from certain bodies than from others; 
and hence arise, as hat11  been  said, all the colours of 
bodies ;  which are, in a manner, infinite, as an infinite 
number  of  compositions  and proportions, of  the ori- 
ginal colours, may be imagined. 
The whiteness of the sun's  light is compounded  of 
all the original colours, mixed in a due proportion. 
Whiteness, in bodies, is but a disposition to reflect 
all colours of  light, nearly in the proportion they are 
mixed in the original rays ;  as, on the contrary, black- 
ness is only a  disposition  to absorb  or stifle, without 
reflection, most of the rays  of every sort that fall on 
the bodies. 
Light is successively propagated with an almost in- 
conceivable swiftness ; for  it comes  from the sun, to 
this  our  earth, in about seven  or  eight  minutes  of 
time,  which  distance  is  about  S0,000,000  English 
miles. 
Besides colour, we are supposed to see figure ;  but, 
in truth, that which we  perceive when we see figure, 
as perceivable by sight,  is  nothing  but the termina- 
tion of colour. 
OF  IIEARING. 
Next to seeing, hearing is the most extensive of our 
senses.  The ear is the organ of  hearing, whose curious 
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That which is conveyed into the brain by the ear is 
called sound ;  though, in truth, till it  come to  reach and 
affect the perceptive part, it be nothing but motion. 
The motion, which produces in us the perception of 
sound, is a vibration of  the air,  caused by an exceed- 
ing short,  but quick,  tremulous motion of  the body 
from which it is propagated ; and therefore  we con- 
sider and denominate them as bodies sounding. 
That sound is the effect of  such a  short,  brisk, vi- 
brating motion of bodies from which it is propagated, 
may be known from what is  observed  and felt in the 
strings of  instruments,  and the trembling of  bells, as 
long as we perceive any sound come from-them ;  for 
as soon as that vibration is stopped, or ceases in them, 
the perception ceases also. 
The propagation  of  sound  is  very quick,  but not 
approaching that of  light.  Sounds move about 1140 
English  feet  in  a  second  of  time;  and in seven  or 
eight minutes of  time they move  about one hundred 
English miles. 
OF SMELLING. 
Smelling is another sense, that seems to he wrought 
on by bodies  at a distance ;  though that which imme- 
diately affects the organ, and produces in us the sensa- 
tion of  any smell,  are effluvia, or  invisible particles, 
that,  coming from bodies at a distance,  immediately 
affect the olfactory nerves. 
Smelling bodies seem perpetually to send forth ef- 
fluvia, or steams, without sensibly wasting at  all.  Thus 
a grain of  musk will  send forth odoriferous particles. 
for scores of  years together,  without its being spent; 
whereby one would conclude that these particles are 
very  small; and yet it is  plain  that they are much 
grosser than the rays of light, which have a free pass- 
age through glass;  and grosser  also than the mag- 
netic emuvia,  which  pass  freely through  all bodies, 
when those that produce smell will not pass through 
the thin membranes of  a  bladder,  and many of  them 
scarce ordinary white paper. 
There is a great variety of  smells, though we have 
but a few names for them ;  sweet, stinking, sour, rank, 
and musty,  are almost all the denominations we have 
for odours ;  though the smell of a violet, and of musk, 
both called sweet,  are as  distinct  as  any two smells 
whatsoever. 
OF  TASTE. 
Taste is the next sense to be considered. 
The organ of taste is the tongue and palate. 
Bodies that emit light, sounds, and smells, are seen, 
heard,  and smelt  at a  distance;  but bodies  are not 
tasted, but by immediate application to the organ ;  for 
till our meat touch our tongues,  or palates,  we taste 
it not, how near soever it be. 
It may be observed of tastes,  that thougl~  there be 
a great variety of  them,  yet,  as in smells, they have 
only some few general names ; as sweet, bitter, sour, 
harsh, rank, and some few others. 
OF  TOUCH. 
The fifth and last of  our senses is touch ; a  sense 
spread over the whole body,  though  it be most emi- 
nently placed in the ends of the fingers. 
By this  sense  the  tangible  qualities of  bodies  are 
discerned;  as hard,  soft,  smooth,  rough,  dry,  wet, 
clammy,  and the like. 
But the most considerable of  the qualities that are 
perceived by this sense, are heat and cold. 
The due ten~peranlent  of  those  two  opposite  qua- 
lities is the great instrument of nature that she makes 
use of in most, if not all, her productions. 
Heat is a very brisk agitation of  the insensible parts 
of  the object,  wliicli  produces  in  us  that sensation 
from whence we denominate the object hot ; so what 
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motion.  This  appears by  the way whereby heat is 
produced; for we see that the rubbing of a brass nail 
upon  a  board  will  make it very h&;  and the axle- 
trees of  carts and coaches  are often  hot,  and some- 
times to a degree,  that it sets them on fire,  by the 
rubbing of the nave of the wheel upon it. 
On the other side, the utmost degree of  cold is the 
cessation  of  that motion  of  the insensible  particles, 
which to our touch is heat. 
Bodies are denominated hot and cold in proportion 
to the present temperament of  that part of  our body 
to which  they are applied ; so that feels  hot to one, 
which seems cold to another ;  nay, the same body, felt 
by the two hands of  the same man,  may at the same 
time appear hot to the one, and cold to the other ;  be- 
cause the motion of  the insensible particles of  it may 
be more brisk than that of  the particles of  the other. 
Besides the objects before-mentioned, which are pe- 
culiar to each of our senses, as light and colour of the 
sight ;  sound of hearing ; odours of smelling;  savours 
of tasting ; and tangible qualities of the touch ;  there 
are two others that are common to all the senses ;  and 
those are pleasure and pain,  which they may receive 
by and with their peculiar objects.  Thus,  too much 
light offends the eye ;  some sounds delight, and others 
grate the ear ;  heat in a certain degree is very pleasant, 
which  may be  augmented  to  the greatest  torment; 
and so the rest. 
These five senses are common to beasts with men ; 
nay,  in some of  them,  some  brutes exceed  mankind. 
But men  are endowed with other faculties,  which far 
excel any thing that is to be  found  in the other  ani- 
mals in this our globe. 
Memory  also  brutes may  be supposed to have,  as 
well as men. 
CHAPTER XII. 
Of  the Understanding of Man. 
THE  understanding of  man does so surpass that of 
brutes,  that  some  are of  opinion  brutes  are mere 
machines,  without  any manner  of  perceptio~  at all. 
But letting this opinion alone as ill-grounded, we will 
proceed to the consideration of human understanding, 
and the distinct operations thereof. 
The lowest degree of it consists in perceptior, which 
we have before in part taken notice of, in our discourse 
of the senses.  Coiicerning which it may be convenient 
farther to observe,  that,  to conceive a right notion of 
perception, we must consider the distinct objects of it, 
which are simple ideas; a. g. such  as  are those  sig- 
nified by these words, scarlet, blue, sweet, bitter, heat, 
cold, &c. from the other objects of our senses ;  to which 
we may add the internal operations of  our minds,  as 
the objects of  our own reflection, such as are thinking, 
willing, &c. 
Out  of these simple ideas are made, by putting them 
together,  several compounded  or  complex  ideas ;  as 
those signified by the words pebble, marygold,  horse. 
The next thing the understanding doth in its pro- 
gress to knowledge, is to abstract its ideas,  by which 
abstraction they are made general. 
A general idea  is an idea in the mind,  considered 
there as separated from time arid place ;  and so capable 
to represent any particular being that is conformable 
to it.  Knowledge, which is the highest degree of the 
speculative faculties, consists in the perception of  the 
truth of affirmative or negative propositions. 
This perception  is  either  immediate  or  mediate. 
Imrfiedintc perception of  the agreement  or  disagree- 
ment of  two ideas is,  when,  by comparing  them to- 
gether in  our  minds,  we  see,  or,  as it were,  behold, 
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called  intuitive knowledge.  Thus we see that red is 
not green ;  that the whole is bigger than a part; and 
that two and two are equal to four, 
The truth of  these  and  the like propositions  we 
know by a  bare  simple  intuition  of  the ideas  them- 
selves, without any more ado ;  and such propositions 
are called self-evident. 
The mediate perception  of  the agreement or dis- 
agreement of  two ideas is,  when, by the intervention 
of  one or more other ideas,  their  agreement or  dis- 
agreement is shown.  This is called demonstration, or 
rational knowledge.  For  instance,  the inequality of 
the  breadth of two windows, or two rivers, or any t%o 
bodies that cannot be put together, may be known by 
the intervention of the same measure applied to them 
both ; and so it is in our general ideas,  whose agree- 
ment or  disagreement  may  be  often  shown  by  the 
intervention of some other ideas,  so as to produce de- 
monstrative knowledge; where  the ideas  in question 
cannot be  brought  together,  and immediately  com- 
pared, so as to produce intuitive knowledge. 
The  understanding  doth  not  know  only  certain 
truth ;  but also judges of  probability,  which consists 
in the likely agreement or disagreement of ideas. 
The assenting  to  any  proposition  as probable  is 
called opinion, or belie:. 
We have hitherto considered the great and visible 
parts of the universe, and those great masses of matter, 
tlie stars,  planets,  and particularly this our earth, to- 
gether  with  the inanimate parts,  and animate  inha- 
bitants of it ;  it may be now fit to consider what these 
sensible: bodies  are  made  of,  and that is  of  uncon- 
ceivably small bodies or  atoms,  out of  whose various 
combinations bigger molecula: are made : and so,  by 
a  greater  and  greater  composition,  bigger  bodies ; 
and  out  of  these  the  whole  material world  is  con- 
stituted. 
By the figure,  bulk,  texture,  and motion, of these 
sinall and insensible corpuscles,  all the phenomena of 
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EPISTOLA.] A  Letter  from  Mr.  Loclce  to  Mr. 
2.  Toignard, containing  a  new  and  em?/  Method 
of  a  Common-place-book,  to  which  an In&x  Qf 
two Pages is su$icient. 
AT length, sir, in obedience to you, I publish 
my "  method of a common-place-book."  I am 
ashamed  that I  deferred  so  long  complying 
with your request; but I esteemed it so mean a 
thi~g,  as not to deserve publishing, in an age so 
full of  useful inventions as ours is.  You may 
remember, that I freely communicated it to you 
and several others, to  whom I imagined itwould 
not be unacceptable: so that it was not to re- 
serve the sole use of it  to myself that I declined 
publishing it.  But the regard  I  had  to the 
public  discouraged  me  from  presenting  it 
with such a trifle.  Yet my obligations to you, 
and the friendship between us, compel me now 
to follow  your  advice.  Your last  letter  has 
perfectly determined  me to it,  and I am con- 
vinced that I ought not to delay publishing it, 
when you tell me, that an experience of several 
years has showed its usefulness, and several of 
your friends, to whom you have communicated 
it.  There is  no  need  I should  tell you  how 
useful it has been to me, after five-and-twenty 
years'  experience,  as I told  you  eight years 
since,  when I had the honour  to wait on you 
at  Paris, and when I might have been instructed 
by your learned and agreeable discourse.  What 
I aim at  now, by this letter, is to testify publicly 
the esteem and respect I have for you,  and to 
convince you how much I am, sir, your, &c. 
Before I enter on my subject, it is fit to ac- 
quaint tlie reader,  tliat this Tract is  disposed 
in  the same manllcr  that  the Common-place- 
3.  book  ought to be disposed.  It  will  be under- 
stood  by  reading  what  follows,  what  is  the 
meaning of  the Latin titles on the top of  the 
backside of each leaf, and at  the bottom [a  little 
below the top]  of this page. 
EBIONITB.]  In eorum  evangelio,  quod  secundum 
Hebr~os  dicebatur,  historia  qua:  habetur 
Matth. xix. 16. et alia  qutlldam,  erat interPo- 
lata in hunc modum : "  Dixit ad eum alter di- 
vitum,  magister,  quid  bonum  faciens  vivam ? 
Dixit  ei  Dominus,  legem  et prophetas,  fac. 
Respondit ad eum, feci.  Dixit ei :  vade, vende 
omnia  qua: possides  et divide  pauperibus,  et 
veni, sequere me.  Ccepit autem dives scalpere 
caput suum,  et non  placuit  ei.  Et dixit ad 
eum Dominus:  quomodo  dicis,  legem feci  et 
prophetas? clim  scriptum  sit in  lege, diliges 
proximum tuum sicut teipsum : et ecce multi 
fratres  tui filii  Abrahte  amieti  sunt stercore, 
morientes  prs  fame,  et domus  tua plena  est 
bonis multis, et non egredi~ur  omnino aliquid 
ex eA  ad eos.  Et  conversus, dixit Simoni, dis- 
cipulo suo, sedenti ayud se :  Simon, fili Johan- 
na:,  facilius  est camelum  intrare per foramen 
act~s,  quam  divitem  in  regnum  ccelorum." 
Nimirum  hsc  ideo  immutavit  Ebion,  quia 
Christum  nec  Dei  filium,  nec  vopo9iqv,  sed 
nudum interpretem legis per Mosem data: ag- 
noscebat. 
In the Gospel of  the Ebionites, which they 
called  the Gospel  according  to the Hebrews, 
the story, that is  in tlie  xixth  of  St.  Matth. 
and in  the  16th  and  following verses,  was 
changed after this manner :  cc One of  the rich 
men said to him: Master, what shall I do that 
I may have life ?  Jesus said to him : Obey the 
law and the  prophets.  He answered, I have 
done so.  Jesus  said  unto him,  Go, sell what 
thou hast, divide it among the poor,  and then 
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ADVERSARIORUM  METHODUS.]  I  take a paper book 
4.  of what  size I please.  I divide  the two first 
pages that face one another by parallel lines into 
five  and  twenty equal parts,  every fifth  line 
black, the other red.  I then cut them perpen- 
dicularly by other llnes that I draw from the top 
to  the bottom of the page, as you may see in the 
table prefixed.  I put about the middle of each 
five spaces one of the twenty letters I design to 
make use of, and, a little forward in each space, 
the five vowels, one below another, in their na- 
tural order.  This is  the index to the whole 
volume, how big soever it may be. 
The index being made after this manner, I 
leave amargin in all the other pages of the book, 
of about the largeness of an inch, in a volume in 
folio, or a little larger ;  and, in a less volume, 
smaller in proportion. 
If I would  put any thing in my Common- 
Place-Book,  I find out a head to which I may 
refer it.  Each head ought  to  be some important 
and essential word to the matter in hand, and in 
that word regard is to be had to the first letter, 
and the vowel that follows it; for  upon these 
two letters depends all the use of the index. 
I omit three letters of the alphabet as of no 
use to me, viz. K Y W, which are supplied by 
C I U, that are equivalent to them.  I put the 
letter Q, that is always followed with an u, in 
the fifth space of Z.  By throwing Q last in my 
index, I preserve the regularity of  my index, 
and diminish not in the least its extent; for it 
seldom happens that there is any head begins 
with  Z  u.  I  have  found  none  in  the five- 
and-twenty years I have used this method.  If 
nevertheless it  benecessary, nothing hinders but 
that one may make a reference after Q u, pro- 
vided it be done with any kind of distinction ; 
but for lnore esactncss a place may be assigned 
5.  for Q u below  the index,  as I have formerly 
done.  When I meet with  any thing,  that I 
think fit to put into my common-place-book, I 
first find a proper head.  Suppose, for example, 
that the head  be EPISTOLA,  1  look unto  the 
index for the first letter and the  following vowel, 
which in  this instance are E i, if  in the space 
marked E i  there is any number  that directs 
me to the page designed for words that begin 
with an E, and whose firstvowel, after the initial 
letter, is I; I must then write under the word 
Epistola, in that page, what I have to remark.  I 
write the head in large letters,and begin a little 
way out into the margin, and I continue on the 
line, in writing what I have to say. I observe con- 
stantly this rule, that only the head appears in 
the margin, and that it be continued on,without 
ever doubling the line in the margin, by which 
means the heads will be obvious at first sight. 
If I find no number in the index,in the space 
E i, I look into my book for the first backside 
of a leaf that is not written in, which, in a. book 
where there is yet nothing but the index, must 
be  p. 2.  I write then,  in my index after E i, 
the number 2, and the head Epistola at  the top 
of the margin of the second page, and all that I 
put under that head, in the same page, as you 
see I have done in the second page of  this me- 
thod.  From that time the class E i is wholly 
in possession of the second and third pages. 
They are to be employed only on words that 
begin  with  an  E,  and  whose  nearest  vowcl 
is  an  I,  as  Ebionitae  (see  the  third  page) 
Episcopus,  Echinus,  Edictum,  Efficacia,  &c. 
The  reason why I begin always at  the top of the 
backside of  a leaf, and assign to one class two 
pages, that face one another, rather than an en- 
tire leaf, is,because the heads of the class appear 
all at once, without the trouble of turning over 
a leaf. 
Every time that I would write a ncw head, I 
v. 
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ADVERSARIORUM  METHODUS.]  look first in my index 
V.  for  the  characteristic  letters  of  the words, 
6.  and  I see, by  the number that follows, what 
the page is  that  is assigned  to the class  of 
that  head.  If  there  is  no  number,  I  must 
look  for  the  first  backside  of  a  page  that 
is  blank.  I then set down the number in the 
index, and design that page, with that of  the 
right  side of  the  following  leaf, to this new 
class.  Let it be,  for example,  the word Ad- 
versaria;  if  I see no number in the space A e, 
I seek for  the first  backside of  a  leaf,  which 
being at p. 4, I set down in the space A e the 
number  4,  and  in the fourth  page  the head 
ADVERSARIA,  with a11  that I write under it, as 
I have already informed you.  From this time 
the fourth page with  the fifth that follows is 
reserved for the class A e, that is to say, for the 
heads that begin with an A,  and whose  next 
vowel is an E ;  as for instance, Aer, Aera, Age- 
silaus, Acheron, &c. 
When the two pages designed for one class 
are full, I look forwards for the next backside 
of a leaf, that is blank.  If it be that which im- 
mediately follows, I write st the bottom of the 
margin, in the page that I have filled, the let- 
ter V, that is to say, Verte, turn over;  as like- 
wise the same at  the top of  the next page.  If 
the pages, that immediately follow, are already 
filled by other classes, I write, at the bottom of 
the page last filled, V.  and the number of  the 
next empty backside of a page.  At the begin- 
ning of that page I write down the head, under 
which I go on, with what I had to put in my 
common-place-book,  as  if  it had  been in  the 
same page.  At the top of  this new backside 
of  a leaf, I set down the number of  the page I 
filled last.  By these  numbers which  refer  to 
one another, the first whereof is at  the bottom 
of one page, and the second is at the beginning 
of another, one joins matter that is separated, 
as if there  was  nothing between them.  For, 
by this  reciprocal reference  of  numbers,  one 
may turn, as one leaf, all those that are between 
the two, even as if they were pasted together. 
You have an example of  this in the third and 
tenth pages. 
Every time I put a number at the bottom of 
a page, I put it also into the index;  but when 
I put only a V.  I make no addition in the in- 
dex ;  the reason whereof  is plain. 
If the head  is  a  monosyllable,  and  begins 
with a vowel, that vowel  is  at the same  time 
both the first letter of  the word,  and the cha- 
racteristic vowel.  Therefore I write the word 
Ars in A a, and 0s  in 0 o. 
You may see by what I have said,  that one 
is to begin to write each class of words on the 
backside of a page.  It may happen, upon that 
account, that the backside of all the pages may 
be  full,  and  yet  there  may  remain  several 
pages,  on the right hand,  which  are empty. 
Now if  you have a mind to fill your book, you 
may assign these right sides, which are wholly 
blank, to new classes. 
If any  one  imagines  that  these  hundred 
classes are not sufficient to  comprehend all sorts 
of  subjects without  confusion,  he may follow 
the same method, and yet augment the number 
to  five hundred, in adding a vowel.  But having 
experienced both the one and the other method, 
I prefer  the first;  and  usage  will  convince 
those, who shall try it,  how well  it will serve 
the purpose aimed at ; especially if  one has a 
book for each science,  upon which one makes 
collections, or at least two for the two heads, 
to which one may refer all our knowledge, viz. 
moral philosophy, and natural. 
You may add a thirG, which may be  called 
the knowledge of  signs, which relates  to the 
use  of  words,  and  is  of  much  more  extent 
than mere criticism. 
v. 
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ADV~SARIORUM  METHODUS.]  AS to the language. ill 
V.  which one ought to express the heads, I esteem 
8.  the Latin tongue  most commodious, provided 
the nominative case be always kept to, for fear 
lest in words of  two syllables, or in  monosyl- 
lables that beginlvith the vowel, the clian~e, 
which happens in oblique cases, should occaslm 
confusion.  But it is not of  much consequence 
what language is ~nade  use of, provided there be 
no mixture in the heads of different  languages. 
To take notice of  a place in ail author, from 
whom  I quote something,  I make use of  this 
method:  before  I write  any thing,  I put the 
name of  the author in my common-place-book, 
and under that name the title of  the treatise, 
the size of the volume, the time and place of its 
edition, and (what ought never to be omitted) 
the number of  pages that the whole book con- 
tains.  For example,  I put into the class M a, 
'<  Marshami  Canon  Chronicus  Bgyptiacus, 
Grscus, et disquisitiones fol."  London, 1672, 
p.  626.  This number of  pages serves me for 
the future to mark the particular  treatise  of 
this author, and the edition I make use of.  I 
have no need to mark the place, otherwise than 
in setting down the number of  the page from 
whence I have drawn what I have wrote,  just 
above  the number  of  pages  contained in the 
whole  volume.  You  will  see an example in 
Acherusia, where the number 259 is just above 
the number 606, that is to say, the number of 
the page, where I take my matter, is just above 
the number of pages of the whole volume.  By 
this means I not only save myself  the trouble 
of  writing Canon  Chronicus Bgyptiacus, &c. 
but am able by the rule of three to find out the 
same passage in any other edition, by looking 
for the number of  its pages ;  since the edition 
I have used, which contains 626, gives me 25:). 
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9.  You will not indeed always light  on the very 
page you want, because  of  the breaches, that 
are made  in  diferent editions  of  books,  and 
that are not always equal in  proportion;  but 
you are never very far from the place you want; 
and it is better to be able to find a passage, in 
turning over a few pages, than to be obliged to 
turn over  a whole  book  to find  it, as it hap- 
pens when the book has no index, or when the 
index is not exact. 
ACHEKON.] Pratum, ficta mortuorum habitatio, est 
locus prope Memphin,  juxta  paludem,  quam 
vocant  Acherusiam,"  &c.  This is  a  passage 
out of  D.  Siculus,  the  sense whereof  is this : 
the fields, where they feign  that the dead  in- 
habit, are only a  place  near  Memphis, near a 
marsh called Acherusia,  about which is a most 
delightful country, where one may behold lakes 
and forests  of  lotus and  calamus.  It is with 
reason  that Orpheus  said,  the dead  inhabit 
these places, because there the Egyptians cele- 
brate the greatest part, and the most august, 
of  their funeral solemnities.  They carry  the 
dead over the Nile, and through the marsh of 
Acherusia,  and thcrc put them into subterra- 
neous vaults.  There are a  great many other 
fables,  among the Greeks, touching  the state 
of  the dcud, which very well agree with what 
is  at this  day practised  in  Egypt.  For they 
call the boat, in ~vhich  thc dead are transport- 
ed,  Baris;  and a  certain  piece  of  money  is 
given  to the ferrymail for a  passage, ~vlio,  ill 
their  language,  is  called Charon.  Near this 
place is a temple of  Necate in the shades, kc. 
and the gates of  Cocytus and  Lethe, shut up 
with  bars  of  brass.  There  arc other  gates, 
which are called the gates of  truth,  with  the 
statue of  justice  before  them,  which  has no 
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EBIONITB.]  man began to scratch his head, and to dis- 
V.  3.  like the advice of Jesus :  and the Lord said unto 
10.  him, How can you say yof~  have  done  as the 
law and the prophets  direct  you? since  it is 
written in the lay, Thou shalt love thy neigh- 
bour  as thyself;  and <here are many of  thy 
brethren, children of Abraham, who are almost 
naked, and who are ready to die with hunger, 
while thy house is full of good things, and yet 
thou givest them no help nor assistance.  And 
turning himself  towards  Simon,  his  disciple, 
who  sat near  him:  Simon,  son of  Johanna, 
said he, it is easier for a camel to go through 
the eye  of  a  needle,  than for a rich  man to 
enter  into the kingdom  of  heaven."  Ebion 
changed  this  passage,  because  he  did  not 
believe Jesus Christ to be the Son of God, nor 
a lawgiver, but a mere  interpreter of the law 
of Moses.  Grotius $;A. 
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HZHETICI.]  "  Nostrum igitur fuit, eligere et optare 
12.  meliora, ut ad vestram correctionem  auditum 
habcremus, non in contentione et aemulatione 
et persecutionibus,  sed mansueti.  consolando, 
benevolP  hortando,  leniter  disputando,  sicut 
scriptum est, serfum autem Dolnini non opor- 
tet litigare,  sed mitein esse ad omnes, docibi- 
lem,  patientem,  in modestia  corripientem di- 
versa sentientes.  Nostrum ergo fuit velle has 
partes expetere:  Dei est volentibus et peten- 
tibus  donare  quod  bonum  est.  Illi  in vos 
saeviant  qui nesciunt  cum  quo labore  verum 
inveniatur, et qualn difficile caveantur errores. 
Illi in vos ssviant, qui nesciunt  quam rarum 
et arduum sit carnalia phantasmata pi=  men- 
tis  serenitate  superare.  Illi in  vos  saeviant, 
qui nesciunt  cum quanth difficultate sanetur 
oculus interioris hominis,ut possit intueri solem 
suum.  Illi  in  vos  saeviant,  qui  nesciunt 
quibus sus~iriis  et gemitibus fiat, ut ex quan- 
tulacunque parte possit intelligi Deus.  Pos- 
tremo, illi in vos saeviant, qui nullo tali errore 
decepti sunt,  quali vos  deceptos vident.  In 
catholica enim ecclesib, ut onlittam sincerissi- 
mam sapientiam,  ad cujus  cognitionem pauci 
spirituales  in hac  vitA perveniunt,  ut eam ex 
minima quidem parte,  quia homines sunt,  sed 
tamen sine dubitatione, cognoscant : caeteruni 
quippe turbam non intelligendi vivacitas,  sed 
credendi  simplicitas  tutissimam  facit."  Au- 
gustinus, Tom. vi.  col. 116. fol.  Basiliae 1542, 
contra Epist.  Manichaei,  quam vocant funda- 
menti. 
<'We were  of  opinion,  that other methods 
were  to be  made choice of,  and that,  to re- 
cover you  from your errors, we ought not to 
persecute you with injuries and invectives, or 
any ill  treatment, but endeavour  to procure 
your  attention,  by  soft  words  and exhorta- 
tions,  which  would show  the tenderness  we 
IS.  have  for  you:  according  to that passage  of 
holy  writ,  'the  servant of  the  Lord  ought 
not to love strife and quarrels, but to be gen- 
tle, affable, and patient towards all mankind, 
and to reprove with modesty those who differ 
from him in opinion.'-Let  them  only  treat 
you with  rigour,  who know not how difficult 
it is  to find  out the truth, and avoid  error. 
Let those  treat you with rigour,  who are ig- 
norant how rare and painful a work it  is calmly 
to dissipate the carnal phantoms,  that disturb 
even a pious mind.  Let those treat you with 
rigour, who are ignorant of  the extreme diffi- 
culty that there is to purify the eye of  the in- 
ward man,  to render him  capable  of  seeing 
the truth, which  is  the sun,  or light of  the 
soul.  Let those  treat you with  rigour,  who 
have never felt the sighs and groans that a soul 
must have before it can obtain any knowledge 
of  the Divine Being.  To  conclude, let those 
treat you  with  rigour  who  never  have been 
seduced  into  errors,  near alrin  to those you 
are enva  ed in.  I  pass over in  silence  that  t?  g  pure wisdom, which  but a  few spiritual  men 
attain to in this life;  so that though they know 
but in part, because they are men; yet never- 
theless  they know  what  they  do know  with 
certainty : for,  in  the  catholic  church,  it is 
not penetration of  mind, nor  profound know- 
ledge, but simplicity of  faith, which puts men 
in a state of  safety. 
"  Barbari quippe homines, Romana, imo po- 
tius  human=  eruditionis  expertes, qni nillil 
omnino  sciunt,  nisi  quod  A  doctoribus  suis 
audiunt: quod audiunt hoc sequuntur, ac sic 
necesse est eos qui totius literaturae ac scientiz 
ignari,  sacramentum  divinae  legis  doctrina, 
magis  quam lectione,  cognoscunt,  doctrinam 
potius retinere,  quam legem.  Itaque eis tra- 
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CONFESSIO  FIDEI.]  "  Periculosum nobis admodum at- 
14.  que etiam  miserabile  est,  tot riunc  fides  ex- 
istere,  quot voluntates:  et tot nobis doctrinas 
esse,  quot mores;  et tot causas blasphemia- 
rum pullulare,  quot vitia  sunt:  dum  aut ita 
fides  scribuntur,'ut  volumus, aut, ita ut volu- 
nius,  intelliguntur.  Et cum secundum unum 
Deum et unum Dominium, et unum baptisma, 
etiam fides una sit,  excidimus ab e%  fide, quae 
sola  est: et dum  plures  fiant, id  esse cepe- 
runt,  lie ulla  sit; conscii  enim nobis  invicem 
sumus, post  Niczni conventfis synodum, nihil 
aliud  quam  fideln  scribi.  Dum  in  verbis 
yugna est,  dum  de  novitatibus  quaestio  est, 
dum de ambiguis occasio est,  dum de autori- 
bus querela est, dum de studiis certamen est, 
dum in consensu difficultas est, dum alter alteri 
anathema  esse  cepit,  prope  jam  neino  est 
Christi,  &c.  Jain  vero  proximi  anni  fides, 
quid jam  de immutatione in se habet?  Pri- 
mum, quz  homousion decernit taceri : sequens 
rnrsuin, qua: homousion decernit et praedicat. 
'l'crtium  deinceps,  qua:  ousiam simpliciter  B 
patribus  przsumptam,  per  indulgentiam  ex- 
cusat.  Postl-emum quartum,  quz non excu- 
sat,  secl  condemnat,  &c.  De similitudine  au- 
tem Filii Dei ad Deum Patrem, quod misera- 
1)ilis nostri  temporis  est fides, ne non ex toto, 
sed  tantum  ex portione  sit similis.  Egregii 
scilicet arbitri calestiilm sacramentorum con- 
qllisitores,  invisibilium  mysteriorum  profcs- 
sioiiibus de fide Dei calumniamur, annuas at- 
que inenstruas  de Ileo fides  dccernimus, de- 
cretis pccnitemus,  panitentes clefendimus, de- 
fensos  anathematizamus,  aut in  nostri aliena 
aut in alienis nostrn  damnamus, et mordentcs 
invicem,  jam absumpti  suinus invicem."  15- 
larius,  p.  911. in lib. ad Constantium Augus- 
tum.  Basil.  1550, f'ol. 
"  It  is a thing ecl11;tlly dcplorabZe and dm- 
15.  gerous,that there are at  present as many creeds 
as  there  are opinions  among men,  as many 
doctrines as inclinations ;  and as many sources 
of blasphemy, as there  are faults among us ; 
because we make creeds  arbitrarily,  and ex- 
plain  them  as  arbitrarily.  And  as  there is 
but one faith ; so there is but one only God, 
one  Lord,  and  one  baptism.  We renounce 
this one faith, when we make so  many differ- 
ent creeds ; and  that diversity is  the reason 
why we  have 110  true faith among us.  We 
cannot be  ignorant that, since the council of 
Nice, we have done nothing but made creeds. 
And  while  we  fight  against  words,  litigate 
about new  questions, dispute about equivocal 
terms,  complain  of  authors,  that  wery  one 
may make his  own  party triumph;  while we 
cannot agree, while  we  anathematise one an- 
other,  there  is  hardly  one  that  adheres  to 
Jesus Christ.  What change was there not in 
the creed last year!  The first council ordained 
a  silence  upon  the  homousion;  the  second 
established it, and would  have us speak ; the 
third excuses the fathers  of  the council,  and 
pretends  they took  the word  ousia  simply; 
tlie fourth condemns them, instead of excusing 
thcm.  With respect  to the  likeness  of  the 
Son of  God  to the Father, which is the faith 
of our deplorable times, they dispute whether 
he is like in whole, or in part.  These are rare 
folks to llnravel the secrets of  heaven.  Ne- 
vertheless it is for these creeds, about invisible 
mysteries,  that we  calumniate  one  another, 
and for our belief  in  God.  We  make  creeds 
cvery year, nay every moon we reperit of what 
we have done, we defend those that repent, we 
anathematise those we defended.  So we con- 
tlenirl either the doctrine of others in oursclvcs, 
or our own in that of others, and, rcciproc:llly 
tearing  onc ;~~iotll~r  to pieccs, wc  1ia\c bee11 
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HERETICI.]  rata, quasi lex est, qui hoc  sciunt, quod 
V. 13.  docentur.  IIaeretici  ergo  sunt,  sed  non 
16.  scientes.  Denique  apud  nos  sunt  h~retici, 
apud se non sunt.  Nam in tantum se  catho- 
licos esse judicant, ut nos ipsos titulo hzreticz 
appellationis infabent.  Quod ergo illi nobis 
sunt et hoc nos illis.  Nos eos injuriam divinae 
generationi facere certi sumus, quod minorem 
Patre Filium dicant.  Illi nos injuriosos Patri 
existimant, quia aequales esse credamus. Veritas 
apud nos est ; sed illi apud se esse praesumunt. 
Honor  Dei  apud  nos  est: sed illi hoc  arbi- 
trantur, honorem divinitatis esse quod credunt. 
Tnofficiosi sunt, sed illis hoc est summum  re- 
ligionis  officium.  Impii sunt, sed hoc putant 
esse veram  pietatem.  Errant ergo, sed bono 
animo  errant,  non  odio sed  affectu  Dei,  ho- 
norare  se  Dominum  atque amare credentes. 
Quamvis  non  habeant  rectam  fidem,  illi ta- 
men  hoc  perfectam  Dei  aestimaxit  caritatem. 
Qualiter  pro  hoc  ipso  false opinionis  errore 
in die judicii  puniendi sunt, nullus scire potest 
nisi Judes.  Interim idcirco eis, ut reor,  pa- 
tientiam Deus commodat, quia  videt  eos, etsi 
non recte credere, affectu tamen pia: opinionis 
errare."  Salvinus.  %+, 
This bishop speaks here of  the Arian Goths 
and Vandals : "  They are, says he, Barbarians, 
who have no tincture of the Roman politeness, 
and  who  are ignorant  of  what is very  com- 
monly  known  among  other  men,  and  only 
know  what  their  doctors  have  taught them, 
and follow  what  they  have heard  them say. 
Men so ignorant as these find  themselves un- 
der a necessity of learning the mysteries of the 
gospel, rather by the instructions that are given 
them, than by books. 
"The  tradition  of their doctors and thc re- 
ceived doctrines are the only rule they follow, 
because  they  know  nothing  but  what  they 
have  taught  thcin.  They are  then heretics, 
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17. but they know it not.  They are so in our nc- 
count,  but  they  believe  it  not;  and  thillli 
themselves  so  good  Catholics,  that they treat 
us as heretics, judging of us as ure do of  them. 
We are persuaded that they believe amiss con- 
cernine  the  divine  generation,  when  they 
maintain  the Son  is  inferior  to the  Father; 
and  they imagine that we  rob  the Father  of 
his glory who  believe  them  both to be equal. 
We  have the truth on our  side, and they pre- 
tend it is on theirs.  We give to God his duc 
honour, and they think they honour him better. 
They fail in their duty, but they imagine they 
perform  perfectly  well;  and they make  true 
piety to consist in what we call impious.  They 
are in a mistake, but with a great deaI of sin- 
cerity;  and it is so far from being an effect of 
their  hatred,  that it is a mark of their love of 
God,  since,  by  what  they  do,  they imagine 
they show the greatest respect for  the  Lord, 
and  zeal  for  his  glory.  Therefore,  though 
they  have  not  true faith,  they  nevertheless 
look  upon  that which  they have  as  a perfect 
love of God.  It  belongs only to the Judge of 
the universe  to know how these  men will  be 
punished  for  their  errors  at  the  last  day. 
Yet  I  believe  God  will  show  compnssioil 
towards them, because  he  sees  their  heart is 
more right than their  belief, and that, if  they 
are mistaken, it is their piety made them err." INDEX 
ESSAY CONCERNING  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING. 
The Volumes are  distinguished  by  the Roman  Nunwrals  i,  ii,  iii, 
preceding the Number of the Page,  and those Fig-ures whichfollo~v 
5  refer to the Section. 
ABBOT  of  St.  Martin,  vol.  ii. 
page 225,  Q  26. 
Abstraction, i.  148,Q 9. 
Puts a perfect distance betwixt 
men and brutes, i. 149,Q 10. 
What, i. 248,  Q  9. 
How, i. 153, Q  1. 
Abstract  ideas,  why  made,  ii. 
136, 139,Q 6, 7, 8.  -  terms cannot be affirmed 
one of  another, ii. 249,  4 1. 
Accident, ii. 3,  Q  2. 
Actions,  the  best  evidence  of 
men's principles, i. 39, Q  7. 
But two sorts ofactions, i. 238, 
Q  4:  i. 300,Q  11. 
Unpleasant tnay be made plea- 
sant, and how,  i. 285,  Q  69. 
Cannot be the same in different 
places, ii. 48,Q  2. 
Colisidered  as  modes,  or  as 
moral, ii.  106,  Q  15. 
Adequate ideas, ii. 125, Q  1, 2. 
We have not of  any species of 
substances,  ii. 377,  5 26. 
Affirmations are only in concrete, 
ii. 249,  Q  1. 
Agreement  and  disagfeement of 
our ideas fourfold, ii. 309- 
314,  Q  3, 4,5,  6,7. 
Algebra, iii. 90,  Q  15. 
Alteration, ii. 43,  8 2. 
Analogy,  useful  in  natnral phi- 
losophy, iii. 110, Q  12. 
Anger, i. 234,  Q  12, 14. 
Antipathy and sympathy, whence, 
ii. 151, Q  7. 
Arguments of  four sorts, 
1. Ad  verecundiam,  iii.  13-1, 
Q  19. 
2. Ad  ignorantiam,iii.135,$20. 
3. Ad  hominem, ib.  Q  21. 
4.  Ad jndicium,ib, Q  22.  This 
alone right,  ib.  Q  22. 
Arithmetic : thenseof cyphers in 
arithmetic, ii. 371, Q  19. 
Artificial things are most of then1 
collective ideas, ii. 35,  Q  3. 
Why we are less liable to con- 
fnsion,about artificial things, 
than about  natural,  ii. 237, 
Q  40. 
Have distinct species,  ii. 238, 
Q  41. 
hsvent to maxims,  i. 18, Q  10. 
Upon hearing and nnderstand- 
ing the terms,i. 23, § 17,18. 
Assent,  a  mark  of  self-evi- 
dence,  i. 23,  Q  18. 
Not of  innate, i. 24,Q IS :  i. 25, 
4  19,20 : i. 72,  Q  19. 
Assent to probability, iii. 97, 5 3. 
Ought tobe proportioned to thc 
proofs, iii. 159,  Q  1. Index.  353 
Association of ideas, ii. 148, Q  I, 
&c. 
This  association  how  made, 
ii.  150,  Q  6. 
111  effects  of  it,  as to  anti- 
pathies,  ii.  151,  Q  7,  8 : 
ii. 154, Q  15. 
And this in sects of pt~ilosophy 
and religiou, ii.  155, Q  18. 
Its ill  influences  as to  intel- 
lectual habits, ib.  17. 
4ssurance,  iii. 105,  Q  6. 
Atheism  in  the world, i.  GO,  $ 8. 
Atom, what,  ii. 49. $ 3. 
Authority ; relying  on  ot11el.s' 
opinions,  one  great  cause 
of error, iii.  172, Q  17. 
Beings,  but  two  sorts,  iii. 59, 
Q  9. 
The eternal Bring rnust be co- 
gitative, ib. $ 10. 
Belief,  what, iii. 97.  3. 
To believe witl~out  reason,  is 
againstourduty,iii. 136,Q 24. 
Best in our opinion, not a rule of 
God's  actions, i.  66,  12. 
Bliucl man, if 111aie  to see, npould 
not  kuow  which  a  globe, 
which a cube,  by his sight, 
thougl~  he  knew  them  by 
his touch,  i, 132, 133, $ S. 
Blood, tiow it appears in a micro- 
scope,ii  15, §  11. 
Brutes have no  universal  idcas, 
i. 1.19,  Q  10, 1  I. 
Abstract not, ib, Q  10. 
Uotly.  \Ve  have  no  more  pri- 
mary ideas of  body thirn  of 
spirit, ii. 21,  $  16. 
Tl~e  primary  ideas  of  body, 
ib.  17. 
The extension  or  cohesion  of 
body,  as hard  to be under- 
stood,  as  the  thinking  of 
spirit,  ii.  23-27,  Q  23, 21, 
25, 26, 27. 
Moving  of  body  by  body,  as 
hard  to be conceived  as by 
spirit, ii. 27,  28. 
Operates  only  by  impalse,  i. 
121, Q 11. 
What, i.  163, Q  11. 
The author's  notion  of  lris 
body,  2 Cor. ver. 10, ii. 74, 
and of his own body,  1 Cor. 
xv.  35,  &c. ii.  77.  The 
rneaning of  the same body, 
ii.  72.  Whether the  word 
body  be  a  simple  or com- 
plex term, ii. 76.  This  only a 
controversy about the sense 
of a word, ii. 86. 
But, its several significations,  ii. 
247,Q  5. 
Capacity, i. 158,  3. 
Capacities,  to know theirextent, 
useful,  i. 3,  Q  4. 
To  cure  scepticism  and  idle- 
ness, i. 5, § 6. 
Are suited to our present state, 
i. 3,  Q  5. 
Caase, ii. 42,  5  1. 
And effect, ib. 
Certainty depends  on  intuition, 
ii. 319, 320,  Q  1. 
Wlrereiu  it consists,  ii.  397, 
g 18. 
Of truth, iii.  1. 
To he had in very few generid 
proposit ions ronrel.~~ing  sull- 
stances, iii. 18, 4  13. 
Wl~erc  to be had, iii. 21, Q 1G. 
Verbal, iii. 5, § 8. 
Real, ib. 
Sensible knowledge,  the  ~t- 
  no st  certainty  we  have  of 
existence,  iii. 68,$ 2. 
The author's  notion  of  it  not 
dangerous,  ii. 308, kc. 
How it differs  from assurance, 
iii. 105, $ 6. 
Cl~angclings,  whether men or no, 
ii. 392, $  13, 14. 
Clearness alone hinders confusion 
of  ideas, i. 145, 5 3. 
Clear and obscure ideas, ii.  11  1, 
0  2. 
Colours, modes of colours,  i. 225, 
4 4. 
Comments  l~pou  law,  why  in- 
finite, ii.  256,  Q  9. 
Complex ideas how made,  i. 147, 
6: i. 153,Q  1. 
In these the mind is more than 
passive, i. 154, $ 2. 
Ideas reduceable tomodes, sub- 
stances,and relations,ib. $3. 
Comparing ideas,  i. 146,  4. 
Herein men  excel  brutes,  ib. 
$ 5. 
Compounding ideas,  i. 147, Q 6. 
In this is a great difference be- 
tween  men  and  brutes, ib. 
§ 7. 
Compulsion,  i. 243, §  13. 
Confidence,  iii. 106, $ 7. 
Confusion  of  ideas,  wherein  it 
consists,  ii.  112,  113,  $ 5, 
6, 7. 
Causes  of  conf~ision  in  ideas, 
ii.  113-1  15, § 7, 8, 9 : ii. 
116,  12. 
Of  ideas, grounded  on  a  re- 
ference to  names,  ii.  115, 
116, Q  10, 11, 12. 
Its remedy, ii.  117,  12. 
Confused ideas, ii. 112, § 4. 
Conscience is our own opinion of 
our own actions, i.  39, Q  8. 
Consciousness  makes  the  same 
person,  ii. 55, 56,  10: ii. 
62, Q  16. 
Probably annexed to tlie same 
individual,  immaterial sub- 
stance, ii. 67, Q 25. 
Necessary  to thinking,  i. 88, 
g  10,  11: i 94,  19. 
What, ih. $  19. 
Contemplation, i.  137, 4 1. 
Creation, ii. 43, 4 2. 
Not to bc denlcd,  hecause we 
cannot conceive the manner 
how, iii. 67, 4  19. 
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Definition, why the genus is used 
in definitions,  ii. 170, Q 10. 
Definipg of terms would cct off a  - 
great  part  of  disputes,  ii. 
277, Q 1.5. 
Demonstration,  ii.  321,  322, 
Q 3. 
Not so cl-ear  as intuitive know- 
ledge,  ii. 322,  $ 4: ii. 323, 
6 6.  7. 
2  - 
Intuitive knowledge necessary 
in each step of  a demonstra- 
tion, ib. 4 7. 
Not  limited  to  quantity,  ii. 
324,  8  9. 
Why that has  been  supposed. 
ii. 325,  $  10. 
Not to be espected in all cases, 
iii. 75, $  10. 
What, iii. 96, $ 1 ;  iii. 132,  15. 
Desire,  i.  232, Q 6. 
Is  a state of  uneasiness,  i. 254, 
255,  Q  31, 32. 
1s moved  only  by I~appiness, 
i. 262, $ 41. 
How far, i. 263, $43. 
How to be raised, i. 266, §  46. 
Misled  hy wrong juclgment,  i. 
277, $ 60. 
Dictionaries, liow to be made, ii. 
304,305,f~  25. 
Discerning, i. 144, Q 1. 
The foundation of  some general 
maxims,  i.  144, $  I. 
Discourse cannot be between two 
men,  wl~o  have  different 
names  for  the  same  idea, 
or  different  ideas  for  the 
same name, i. 110, $ 5. 
Despair, i. 233,  11. 
Disposition, i. 300, Q 10. 
Dispnting.  The art of  disput- 
ing  pre.judicia1  to  know- 
ledge,  ii.  271-273,  § 6,  7, 
P,  9. 
Destroys the use of  language, 
ii. 274, Q 10. 
Disputes, whence, i.  173, 4 28. 
A  A Index. 
Disputes,  multiplicity  of  them 
owing to the abuse of  words, 
ii. 282,  Q  22. 
Are most about the signification 
of words, ii.  292,  Q 7. 
Distance,  i. 158,  Q 3. 
Distinct ideas, ii. 112, 4 4. 
Divisibility of  matter  incompre- 
hensible, ii. 29,30, Q 31. 
Dreaming, i. 228,  Q 1. 
Seldom  in  some  men,  i.  90, 
Q 14. 
Dreams for the most  part irra- 
tional, i. 92,  Q  16. 
In dreams no ideas but of  sen- 
gation,  or  reflection,  i. 93, 
9.17. 
Duration, i. 174,  Q  1, 2. 
Whence  we  get  the  idea  of 
duration,  i.  175,  176,  Q 3, 
4,  5. 
Not from motion, i. 181, Q 16. 
Its measure, ib.  Q 17,18. 
Any regular periodical appear- 
ance, i. 182,183,  Q 19,20. 
None  of  its  measures  known 
to be esact, i. 184, Q  21. 
We only guess them  equal by 
the train  of  our  ideas,  ib. 
Q  21. 
Minutes,  days,  years, &c.  not 
necessary  to  duration,  i. 
186, Q  23. 
Change  of  the  measures  of 
duration,  change  not  the 
notion of  it, ib. 23. 
The measures  of  duration,  as 
the revolutions  of  the sun, 
may be  applied to duration 
before  the  sun  existed,  i. 
187-189,  Q 24, 25.28. 
Duration  without  beginning, 
i. 188,Q 26. 
HOW  we  measure duration, i. 
188-190,Q  27,28,  29. 
Recapitulation, concerning our 
ideas of  duration,  time, and 
eternity, i. 191, Q 31. 
Duration  and  expansion  com- 
pared, i. 192, Q  1. 
They  mutually  embrace  each 
other,i. 201,  Q  12. 
Considered  as a  line,  i.  201, 
Q in. 
Duration  not  conceivable  by 
us  without  succession,  i. 
Education,  partly  the  cause  of 
unreasonableness,  ii.  149, 
Q  3:  Effect, 11.  42,  1. 
Enthusiasm, iii. 147. 
Described,  iii. 150,  Q  6, 7. 
Its rise, iii. 149, Q 5. 
Ground  of  persuasion  must 
be examined,  and how,  iii. 
152,Q 10. 
Firmness of  it,  no  sufficient 
proof, iii. 155, Q  12, 13. 
Fails  of  the evidence it pre- 
tends to,  iii. 153, Q  11. 
Envy,  i. 234,  Q  13, 14. 
Error,  what, iii. 159, Q  1. 
Causes of  error, ib. 
I. Want of  proofs, ib. 5  2. 
2. Want of  skill to use them, 
iii. 162,Q5. 
3. Want of  will  to use  them, 
iii. 163, Q  6. 
4. Wrong measures of  probabi- 
lity,  ib. Q 7. 
Fewer  men  assent  to  errors 
than  is supposed,  iii.  173, 
6 18. 
~ssence,real  and nominal, ii.18 1, 
Q  15. 
Supposition  of  unintelligible, 
real essences  of  species, of 
no me, ii.  182, 183, Q  17. 
Real  and  nominal  essences, 
in  simple ideas  and modes 
always  the  same,  in  sub- 
stances always different,  ii. 
183,  Q  18. 
Essences,  hm  ingenerable  and 
incorruptible, ii. 184, Q ID. 
Index. 
Specific  essences  of  mixed 
modes are of  men's  making, 
and how, ii. 196,Q 3. 
Though  arbitrary,  yet not  at 
random, ii. 199,  7. 
Of  mixed  modes,  why called 
notions, ii. 204,  Q 12. 
What, ii. 208,  $ 2. 
Relate only to species, ii. 209, 
§ 4. 
Real  essences,  what,  ii. 21 1, 
0  6- 
We know them  not,  ii.  213, 
8 9, 
Our specific essences  of  sub- 
stances are nothing but col- 
1.ections of  sensible  ideas, 
ii. 220,  Q  21. 
Nominal  are  niade  by  the 
mind, ii.  224,  Q 26. 
But not altogether arbitrarily, 
ii. 227,  Q 28. 
Nominal  essences  of  sub- 
stances,  how made,  ii. 227, 
228,t 28,29. 
Are  very  various,  ii.  229,  Q 
30 :  ii. 230,  Q 3  1. 
Of  species,  are  the  abstract 
ideas,  the names stand for, 
ii. 173,d 12: ii. 184, Q 19. 
Are of  man's  making, ii.  178, 
4  12. 
But founded in the agreement 
of  things, ii. 179, Q  13. 
Real  essences  determine not 
our species, ii. 180, Q 13. 
Every  distinct,  abstract idea, 
with  a  name,  is  a distinct 
essence  of  a  distinct  spe- 
cies, ib.  Q 14. 
Real  essences  of  substances, 
not to  be  known,  iii.  18, 
g  12. 
Essential,  what,  ii.  208, Q 2 : i~. 
210,  Q  5. 
Nothing  essential  to  indi- 
viduals, ii. 209,  Q 4. 
But to species, ii. 21 1,  Q 6. 
Essential  difference, what, ii. 
210,  Q  5. 
Eternal verities, iii. 77, 4  14. 
Eternity,  in  our  disputes  and 
reasonings about it, why we 
are apt tr, bbnder,  ii.  1  18, 
$ 15. 
Whence we get its idea, i. 188, 
6 27. 
~vil,.what, i, 262, $ 42. 
Existence,  an  idea of  sensation 
and reflection, i. 115,  4  7. 
Our  own  existence  we  know 
intuitively, iii. 55,  Q 2. 
And cannot doubt of  it, ib, 
Of  created  things,  knowable 
only by  our sesses,  iii. 68, 
§ 1. 
Past existence known  only by 
memory,  iii. 75,  Q  11. 
Expansion,  boundless,  i.  193, 
5  2. 
Should be  applied  to space in 
general, i. 1.72, Q  27. 
Experience often helps us,  where 
we  think  not  that it  does, 
i. 132, Q  8. 
Extasy, i. 228,  4  1. 
Extension:  we have  no  distinct 
ideas  of  very great, or very 
little  extension,  ii.  119, 
Q  16. 
Of  body, incomprehensible, ii. 
23,  23, &c. ' 
Denominations, from place arid 
extension, are many of  them 
relatives,  ii. 45,  Q  5. 
And body not the same thing, 
i.  163,  Q  11. 
Its definition insiguificant,  i. 
165,Q 15. 
Of  body and of  space  how di- 
stinguished, i. 109,  4  5 : i. 
172,  Q 27. 
Faculties  of  the mind  first  er- 
ercised, i. 151,Q  14. 
Arc  but  powers,  i.  245,  6 
1  i. 
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Operate not,  i.  246,  247,  8  G. 
18. 20. 
Faith  and  opinion,  as  distin- 
guished  fro~n knowledge, 
what,  iii. 97,  $ 2,  3. 
And  knowledge,  their  dif- 
ference, ib. $ 3. 
What, iii. 112,  14. 
Not  opposite  to  reason,  iii. 
136, 5 24. 
Ascontra-distinguished to rea- 
son,  what, iii. 138,  2. 
Cannot  convince  us  of  any 
thing  co~~trary  to  our  rea- 
son,  iii.  141,  &c.  $  5,  6. 
8. 
Matter of  faith is only divine 
revelation, iii. 145, $ 9. 
Things above  reason  are only 
proper matters of  faith,  iii. 
144, Q 7 : iii. 145,  9. 
Faluehood, wl~i~t  it is, iii. 6, $ 9. 
Fancy,  i.  141, $ 6. 
Fantastical ideas, ii. 122,  $  I. 
Fear, i. 233,  $  10. 
Figure,  i.  139, Q 5, 6. 
Figurative  speech,  an  abuse  of 
language,  ii. 288,  34. 
Finite,  and  infinite,   nodes  of 
quantity, i. 208,  $  I. 
All positive  ideas of quantity, 
finite, i. 213, $ 8. 
Forms,  substantial forms distin- 
guish  not  species,  ii.  315, 
g  10. 
Free, how far a man  is SO,  i. 248, 
$ 21. 
A  man  not  free  to  will,  or 
not  to  will,  i. 248-250, 
22, 23, 24. 
Freedorn beloi~gs  only to agents, 
i. 246, $  19. 
Wherein  it  conbists,  i.  251, 
27. 
Free tvill, liberty belongs  not  to 
the will, i. 243, Q  1.1. 
Wherein  cor~sists  that,  wt~ici~ 
is  called  free  will,  i. 250, 
0 24 : i. 2fi7,  Q  47. 
General  ideas,  how  laade,  i. 
148,  9. 
Knowledge,  what,  ii.  263,  5 
31. 
Propositions cannot be known 
to be true, without knowing 
the essence  of  the  species, 
iii. 8, $ 4. 
Words, how made, ii.164,165, 
§ 6,  7,  8- 
Belongs  only  to  signs,  ii. 172, 
$  11. 
Gentle~nen  shoilld  not be  igno- 
rant, iii. 163,  6. 
Genus and spccics, what,  ii. 17  6, 
q  10. 
Are but Latin names for sorts, 
ii. 201,  $ 9. 
Is but a  partial  conception of 
what  is  in  the  species,  ii. 
231, $ 32. 
And species adjusted to the cud 
of speech, ii.  233, $ 33. 
And species are madc in order 
to  general  names,  ii.  236, 
0 39. 
Generat~on,  ii. 43,  $ 2. 
God imn~oveable,  because infinite, 
ii. 22,  $ 21. 
Fills  inlmensity,  as  well  as 
eternity, i. 194, 4 3. 
I-lis  duration  not  like that of 
the creatures,  i.  201, 202, 
g  12. 
An  idea  of  God  not  innate, 
i.  60, Q 6. 
Theexistenceof a God evident. 
and obvious to reason,  i. 62, 
8 9. 
The notion of  a God once got, 
is  the  lilzeliest  to  spread 
and  be  co~tinued,  i.  65,  $ 
9,  10. 
Idea of  God late and imperfect, 
i. 68, 4  13. 
Contrary, i. 69, 70,  §  15, 16. 
Inconsister~t,  i.  69,  4  15. 
The best  notions of  God,  got 
by  thought and applicati&, 
i. 70, 6 15. 
Notions of  God frequently not 
worthy of him, i.  71,  $ 16. 
The being  of  a  God  certain, 
ibid. proved, iii.  55. 
As evident,  as that the three 
angles of a triangle are equal 
to two right ones, i. 77, § 22. 
Yea,  as  that  two  opposite 
angles are equal, i. 71, $ 16. 
More certain  than  any  other 
existence without us, iii. 58, 
0 6. 
The idea of  God, not the only 
proof of  his existence, ibid. 
§ 7. 
The  being of  a God the fonnda- 
tion of morality and divinity, 
iii. 58,  $ 7. 
How we make our idea of  God, 
ii. 3  1,  33, 34. 
Gold is fixed;  the  various  sig- 
nifications  of  this  propoqi- 
tion, ii. 244,  50. 
Water  strained  through  it, 
i. 109, $ 4. 
Good and evil, what, i. 23  1, $2  : 
i. 262,  42. 
The greater  good  determines 
not  the will,  i.  256,  $  35  5: 
i. 259,  $ 36: i.  264,  $ 44. 
Why, i. 265,§ 44 :  i. 266,g 46: 
i.  277,  &c.  59,  GO.  64, 
65. 68. 
Twofold, i. 278,  61. 
Works on the will only by  de- 
sire, i.  266, $ 46. 
Desireof good how to beraiscd, 
i. 266, 267,  $  46, 47. 
Habit, i. 300,  10. 
Habitual actions pass often with- 
out our notice, i.  134, $ 10. 
Hair, how it appears in a micro- 
scope, ii.  15, $  1  1. 
Happiness,  what,  i.  262,  8  42. 
What  happiness  inen  pursue, 
i. 263,  $ 43. 
How we come to rest in narrow 
happiness,  i. 277,  § 59,  GO. 
Hardness,  what,  i.  108, 5 4. 
Hatred, i. 232, $5  :  i.  234, $  14. 
Heat and cold, how the sensation 
of them both is produced, by 
the same water, at the same 
time, i.  125,  21. 
History, what history of  most au- 
thority, iii.  109,  11. 
Hope, i. 233,  $  9. 
Hypotheses,  their  use,  iii.  89, 
13. 
Are to be  built  on  matter  of 
fact, i.  88,  $  10. 
Ice and  water  whether  distinct 
species, ii. 218,  5  13. 
Idea, what, i.  11 9, $ 8. 
Ideas,  their original  in children, 
i. 57,  2: i.  68, $  13. 
None innate,  i. 71, 72, 5 17. 
Because not remembered, i.  73, 
g 20. 
Are what the mind is employed 
about, in thinking, i. 82,$ 1. 
All  from  sensiition,  or retlec- 
tion, ibid. Q 2, &c. 
How this is to be understood, 
ii. 334. 
Their way of  getting, ol~serva- 
ble in children, i. 85,  6. 
Why  some  have  more,  some 
fewer ideas, i. 83,  7. 
Of  reflection got late,  and  in 
some very negligently, i. 86, 
§ 8. 
Their beginning  and  increase 
in children, i. 96-98,  21, 
22, 23,24. 
Their original in sensation and 
reflection, i.  98,  24. 
Of one sense,  i.  104,  1. 
Want nalncs, i.  105,  2. 
Of Inore than one sense, j.  1  1 1. Index. 
Of  reflection, i.  11  1,  5 1.  Modes are all  adequate ideas, 
Of  sensation and  reflection, i.  ii. 127, 4 3. 
112, 4  1.  Unless,  as referred  to names, 
-4s in the mind, and in things,  ii. 128, 5 4, 5. 
must  be  distinguished,  i.  Of substances ittadequate,  ii.  - 
119,  7. 
Not  always  resemblances,  i. 
122, $  15, kc. 
Which are first, is not material 
to know, i. 131, $ 7. 
Of sensation often  altered  by 
the judgment, i. 132, § 8. 
Principally  those  of  sight, 
i. 133, 8 9. 
Of reflection, i. 151, 4  14. 
Simple  ideas  men  agree  in, 
i. 173, § 28. 
Moving in a  regular  train  in 
our minds, i.  178, 5 9. 
Such  as  have  degrees  want 
names, i.  226,  Q 6. 
Why some  have  names,  and 
others not, ibid. Q 7. 
Original, i. 292,  73. 
All  complex ideas  resolvable 
into simple, i. 298, j 9. 
What simple ideas  have been 
most modified, i. 299,  5 10. 
Our complex idea of  God, and 
other  spirits,  cornulon  in 
every  thing,  but  infinity, 
ii. 32, 33, 5 36. 
Clear and obscure, ii. 11  1, $2. 
Distinct and confused, ii. 112, 
5 4. 
May be clear  in one pact and 
obscure in another,  ii. 117, 
8  13. 
Real and fantastical, ii.  122, 
§  1. 
Simple ere all real, ii. 122,s 3 
And adequate, ii. 125, $ 2. 
What ideas of mixed modes are 
fantastical, ii. 123, 124,$4. 
What ideas of  sabstances are 
fantastical, ii. 124, $ 5. 
Adequate  and  intrdequate, ii. 
125, 5  1. 
How said to bc  in things, ibid. 
El  2. 
134, 5  11. 
I. As referred to real essences, 
ii. 129-131,  5  6,  7. 
2. As referred to a collection of 
simple ideas, ii. 132, 5 8. 
Simple ideas are perfect rx7vta, 
ii.  134, Q 12. 
Of  substances  are  perfect 
rn7v7ta, ii.  135, 5  13. 
Of  modes  are  perfect  arche- 
types, ii. 136, 4  14. 
True or false, ibid. 5  1, kc. 
When false,  ii.  146, &c.  1  21, 
22, 23,  24, 25. 
As  bare  appearances  in  the 
mind, neither true hor false, 
ii. 137, 5 3. 
As  referred  to  other  men's 
ideas, or to real  existence, 
or to real essences, may be 
true ot false, ibid. 5 4, 5. 
Reason  of  such  rdference,  ii. 
138, 139, Q 6,7,8. 
Simple ideas referred to other 
men's ideas, least aptRo be 
false, ii.  139, 4 9. 
Complex ones, in this respect, 
more  apt to be false, es  e- 
ii. 140, $  10.  B  cially those of  mixed mo  es, 
Simple ideas, referred to exist- 
ence,  are all -true,  ii.  141, 
5  14: ii.  143, 4 16. 
Though  they  should  be  dif- 
ferent  in  different men,  ii. 
142, 5  15. 
Complex ideas of modes are all 
true, ii.  143, 144, Q 17. 
Of  substances when  false,  ii. 
146, 5 21,  &c. 
When right, or wrong, ii, 148, 
5 26. 
That we  are incapaMe of,  ii. 
373, 374,$ 23. 
That we cannot attain, because 
of  their remoteness, ii. 375, 
4 24. 
~e&use  of  their  minuteness, 
ii. 376,  Q 25. 
Simple have a real conformity 
to things, ii. 385, Q 4. 
And  all  others,  but  of  sub- 
stances, ii. 386, $ 5. 
Simple  cannot  be  got; by  de- 
finitions of  words,  ii.  190, 
5  11. 
But only by experience,ii. 193, 
Q 14. 
Of  mixed  modes,  why  most 
compousded, ii.  204, 8  13. 
Bpecific, of mixed modes, how 
at first  made : inetance in 
kinneah and niouph, ii. 239, 
240, 4 44, 45. 
Of  substances:  instance  in 
zahab, ii. 241,242, $46,47. 
Simple ideas and modes have 
all abstract, as well as con- 
crete, names, ii. 249,  Q 2. 
Of substances, haye scarce any 
abstract name&,  ibid. 
Different  in  different  men, 
ii. 258,  4  13. 
OW ideas,  almost  all  relative, 
i. 237,O 3. 
Particular are first in the mind, 
ii. 255,  $ 9. 
Oeperal are imperfect, ii. 255, 
6  9. 
rHdklr  ideas may be from 
privative causes, i. 118, Q 4. 
The use of  this term not dan- 
gerous, i. 7,  &c.  It is fitter 
than  the word  notion,  i.  8. 
Other words  as liable to be 
abused as this, i. 9.  Yet it is 
condemaed,  both  as  uem, 
and  not  new,  i.  11.  The 
aame  with  notion,  sense, 
meaning, &c. ii. 313. 
Identical propositions  teach  no- 
thing, iii. 43,  $ 2. 
Identity,  not  an  innate idea,  i. 
58, 59, 5 3,4, 5. 
And diversity, ii. 47,  4  F. 
Of  a plant, wherein it consists, 
ii. 50,  4. 
Of  animals, ii. 50, 51, Q 5. 
Ofaman,ii.51,$6: ii.53,$8. 
Unity  of  snbstnnce does  not 
always  make  the  same 
identity, ii. 58,  6 7. 
Personal identity, ii. 55, 4  9. 
Depends  on  the  same  con- 
sciousness, ibid. §  10. 
Continued  existence  makes 
identity, ii. 71,  Q 29. 
And  diversity,  in  ideas,  the 
first perception of  the mind, 
ii. 309, Q 4. 
Idiots and madmen,  i. 150, 5  12, 
13. 
Ignorance,  our  ignorance  in- 
finitely exceeds  our  know- 
ledge, ii. 373, Q 22. 
Causes  of  ignorance,  ii.  373, 
374, 5 23. 
1. For want of  ideas, ibid. 
2. For want of  a  discoverable 
connexion between the ideas 
we have,  ii. 379, Q 28. 
3.  For  want  of  tracing  the 
ideas we have, ii. 381, 5 30. 
Illation, what, iii. 114, 5 2. 
Immensity, i.  158, Q 4. 
How this idea is got, i. 209,s 3, 
Immoralities,  of  whole  nations, 
i. 4042,  5 9,  10. 
Immortality, not annexed to any 
shape, ii. 393,  15. 
Impenetrability, i. 105, 106,g 1. 
Imposition of opinions unreason- 
able, iii. 103, $ 4, 
Im$possibile  est idem e8se et non 
esse,  not  the  first  thing 
known, i.  30, 5 25. 
Impossibility, not an innate idea, 
i.  58, 6 3. 
Impression  on  the  mind,  what, 
i. 15,  g 5. 
Inadequate ideas, ii.  I 12,~  I. 
Incompatibility,  how  far  know- 
able, ii. 365, Q 15. 
Individuationis  principium,  is 
existence, ii. 49,  3. 360  Index. 
Infallible judge  of  controversies,  Principles  to  no  purpose,  if 
i. 66,  12.  Inen  can  be  ignorant  or 
Inference,  what, iii. 94,  95,  Q 2,  doubtful  of  them,  i.  46, 
3, 4. 
Infinite, why the idea of  infinite 
not applicable to other ideas 
as well as those of quantity, 
since they can  be  as often 
repeated, i. 211,  5  6. 
The idea of infinity of  space, 
or number, and of space, or 
number infinite, must be di- 
stinguished, i. 212,  5  7. 
Our idea  of  infinite  very ob- 
scure, i. 213,  $ 8. 
Number furnishes us with the 
clearest  ideas  of  infinite, 
i. 214, Q 9. 
The idea of infinite, a growing 
idea, i. 2 16, 3  12. 
Our  idea  of  infinite,  partly 
positive,  partly  compara- 
tive, partly negative, i. 217, 
218,  Q 15. 
Why  some  men  think  they 
have  an  idea  of  infinite 
duration, but not of  infinite 
space, i. 221, 222,  5 20. 
Why  disputes  about  infinite 
are  usually  perplexed,  i. 
223,  3 21. 
Our  idea  of  infinity  has  its 
original  in  sensation  and 
reflection,  i. 224, Q 22. 
We have  no  positive idea  of 
infinite,  i.  216,  217,  5  13, 
14: i. 219,  $  16. 
Infinity,  wtry  more  cornmo~ily 
allowed to dnration than to 
expansion, i. 194, 3 4. 
How applied  to God  by  us, 
i. 208,  Q 1. 
How we  get this idea,  i. 209,  - 
5 2, 3. 
Tlle infinity of  nutnber, dura- 
tion,  and  space,  different 
ways  considered,  i.  200, 
201,  Q 10, 11. 
Inllatd  trull~s   nus st  be  the first 
known,  i. 31, 5 26. 
5  13. 
Principles of  my lord Herbert 
esamined,  i.  47,  48,  5  15, 
&kc. 
Moral  rules to no purpose,  if 
effaceable,  or  alterable,  i. 
51, Q 20. 
Propositions  must  be  di- 
stinguished  from others  by 
their  clearness  and useful- 
ness, i. 75, 76, 5 21. 
The doctrine  of  innate  prin- 
ciples  of  ill  consequence, 
i. 79,s 24. 
Instant, what, i.  178,  179, 5 10. 
And continual change,  i.  180. 
Q 13,  14,  15. 
Intuitive knowledge,  ii. 319, 5 1. 
Our highest certainty, iii. 131, 
Q 14. 
Invention,  wherein  it  consists, 
i. 141, 5  8. 
Joy, i. 233,  Q 7. 
Iron, of  what advantage to man- 
kind, iii. 87, Q 11. 
Judgment, wrong judgments,  in 
reference to good and evil, 
i. 276,  Q 58. 
Right judgment,  ii. 270,  Q 4. 
One cause of wrong judgment, 
iii. 102, § 3. 
Wherein it consists,  iii. 94, &c. 
Knowledge  has  a  great  con- 
nexion with words,  ii. 285, 
Q 25. 
The author's  definition  of  it 
explained  and defended, ii. 
314, note.  How it differs 
from  faith,  iii.  97,  § 2,  3 : 
ii. 316, note. 
What, ii. 308, Q 2. 
How urucl~  our knowledge de- 
pelrtls olr our scnses, ii. 302, 
23. 
Index.  361 
Actual,  ii. 316,  5 8.  Of other relations indetermina- 
Habitual,  ibid.  Q 8.  ble, ii.  368,  6  18. 
Habitual, twofold,  ii. 317,  5 9.  Of existence, ii. 372,  Q 21. 
Intuitive, ii. 319,  Q 1.  Certain  and universal,  where 
Intuitive,  the clearest, ii. 320,  to be had, ii. 380,  Q 29. 
a?:  111  USE!  of  words, a  great hin- 
Intuitive, irresistible,  ibid.  derance  of  knowledge,  ii. 
Demonstrative,  ii. 321,  Q 2.  381,  30. 
Of general truths, is all either  General,  where  to  be  got, ii. 
intuitive  or demonstrative,  383,  Q 31. 
ii. 327,  Q 14.  Lies only in our thoughts,  iii. 
Of  particnlar  existences,  is  18, Q 13. 
sensitive, ibid.  Reality of  our  knowledge,  ii. 
Clear ideas do not always pro-  384. 
duce  clear  knowledge,  ii.  Of  mathematical truths,  how 
328,  4 15.  real,  ii. 387, Q 6. 
What kind  of  knowledge  we  Of morality, real,  ii. 387,  Q 7. 
have of  nature,  ii. 16, $ 12.  Of  substances, how  far  real, 
Its beginning  and progress,  i.  ii. 391,  12. 
152, Q 15, 16,17 :  i. 21,  22,  What  makes  our  knowledge 
4 15,  16.  real,  ii. 385,  5 3 : ii. 388, 
Given  us, in  the faculties  to  Q 8. 
attain it,  i.  67,  68,  Q 12.  Considering  things,  and  not 
Men's knowledge according to  names,  the way  to  Itnow- 
the employment of  their fa-  ledge, ii. 392, § 13. 
culties, i.  76, Q 22.  Of substances, wherein it con- 
To  be got only by  tlre applica-  sists, ii. 390,  Q 11. 
ti00 of  our own  thought to  Wl~at  required  to any tolerable 
the conte~nplation  of  things,  kno\vledge  of  substances, 
i.  78,  5 23.  iii.  19, $  14. 
Extent of  human  knowledge,  Self-evident, iii. 22,  2. 
ii. 329.  Of identity,  and  diversity, as 
Our knowledge goes  not  be-  large as our  ideas,  ii. 362, 
yond our ideas,  ibid.  Q 1.  8 : iii. 23,  Q 4. 
Nor beyond  the perception of  Wherein it consists, ibid. 
their agreement or disagree-  Of  co-existence,  very scanty, 
ment, ibid.  Q 2.  iii. 25,  Q 5. 
Reaches not  to all our  ideas,  Of relations of  modes, not  so 
ibid.  3.  scanty, iii. 26,  6. 
Much  less  to  the  reality  of  Of real  existence  none,  ibid. 
things, ii. 330,  Q 6.  0 7. 
Yet  very  improveable  if  right  Begins in particulars, ibid. $ 9. 
ways were taken,  ibid. Q 6.  Intuitive of our own existence, 
Of CO-existence  very  narrow,  iii. 54,  3. 
ii. 362,363,  $ 9,10,  11.  Demonstrative  of  a  Cod,  iii. 
hut\  tlrcrefore,  of  substances  55, g  1. 
very  narrow,  ii. 364, &c. Q  I~nprovetnent of  knowledge, 
1-1,  15, 16.  iii. 78. Index. 
Not improved by  nraxims,  iii. 
78, 8  1. 
Why so thought,  iii. 79,  Q  2. 
Knowledge impto\red, only by 
perfecting  and  comparing 
ideas,  iii. 82,  9  6 :  iii. 89, 
Q  14. 
And  finding  their  relations, 
iii. 83,  Q  7. 
By intermediate ideas, iii. 89, 
Q  14. 
In substances, how to  be  im- 
proved, iii. 84,  4  9. 
Partly  necessary,  partly  VO- 
luntary, iii. 91,  6  1 :  iii. 92, 
&  3 
Law of  nature generally allowed, 
i. 38,  §  6.- 
There is, though not innate, i. 
45,  4  13. 
Its inforcement, ii. 97,  6 6. 
Learning, the  ill state of  Icarn- 
inp in these  latter  ages,  ii. 
25b, &c. 
Of the schools lies  chiefly  in 
the abuse of  words, ii. 256 
&c. ii. 271. 
Such  learning  of  ill  corise- 
qnence, ii. 273,  Q  10, &c. 
Liberty, what,  i. 240-243,  Q  8, 
g,10,11,  12 :  i. 244,  Q  15. 
Belongs not to the will, i. 243, 
J -- 
Why some, and so little, ibid.  $ 14. 
8 2-  To be  determined  by the  re- 
How increased,  iii. 105, $  6.  sult of our own deliberation, 
is no  restraint of  liberty, i. 
- 
Language,  why  it  changes,  i. 
298,  Q  7. 
Wherein  it consists,  ii.  158, 
,  g 1, 2,3. 
Its use,  ii.  199, 5 7. 
Its imperfections,  ii. 250, $  1. 
Double use, ibid. 
The use of  language destroyed 
by  the subtilty of  dispot- 
ing, ii. 271,272,  Q  6,  7, 8. 
Ends  of  language,  ii.  284,  Q 
23.  -. 
Its imperfections,  not easy to 
be  cured,  ii.  269,  Q  2:  ii. 
290, 291,  5  4, 5, 6. 
The cure  of  them  necessary 
to philosophy, ii. 290,  Q  3. 
To use  no  word  without  a 
clear and  distinct  idea  an- 
nexed to it, is  one  remedy 
of  the imperfections of  lan- 
guage, ii. 293, 294,  Q  8, 9. 
Propriety in the use of  words, 
another  remedy,  ii.  295,  Q 
11. 
266,  Q  48,49, 50. 
Founded  in  a  power  of sns- 
pending  our particular de- 
sires,  i. 267,  Q 47 :  i.  270, 
271, Q  51,  52. 
Light,  its absurd  definitions, ii. 
189, Q  10. 
Light  in  the  mind,  what,  iii. 
155,  Q  13. 
Logic  has  introduced  obscurity 
into languages, ii. 27 1,272, 
g  6, 7. 
And  hindered  knowledge,  ii. 
272,  5  7. 
Love, i. 232,  Q  4. 
Madness,  i.  150,  Q  13.  Oppo- 
sition to  reason  deserves 
that name, ii. 149,  4 4. 
Magisterial,  the  most  knowing 
are  least  magisterial,  iii. 
104,  Q  4. 
Making, ii. 43,  Q  2. 
Man  not  ttie  product  of  blind 
chance, iii. 56,  Q  6. 
The essence  of man  is placed 
in hi$ shape, ii. 395,  Q  16, 
We know not his real essence, 
ii. 208,  8 3 :  ii. 221,  Q  22 : 
ii. 226,  Q  27. 
The boundaries  of  the human. 
species not  determined,  ii. 
226, 8 27. 
What makes  the  same  indi- 
vidual  man,  ii.  64,  Q  21 : 
ii. 71,  Q 29. 
The same man may be different 
persons, ii. 63, 8  19. 
Mathematics,  their ~netliods,  iii. 
83,  Q 7.  Improvement, iii. 
90,  Q  15. 
Matter  incomprehensible,  both 
in  its cohesion and  divisi- 
bility,  ii. 23,  Q 23 : ii.  29, 
30, 5 30, 31. 
What, ii. 276,  $  15. 
Whether  it may think, is not 
to be known,  ii. 331. 358, 
359,  Q  6 :  ii. 341, &c. 
Cannot produce motion, or any 
thing else, iii.60,  $  10. 
And  motion  cannot  produce 
thought,  ibid. 
Not eternal, iii. 65,  $  18. 
Maxims, iii. 22, &c. : iii.  37,  Q 
12, 13, 14, 15. 
Not alone self-evident,  iii. 22, 
Q  3. 
Are not the truths first known, 
iii. 26,  0 9. 
Not  the  foundation  of  our 
knowledge,  iii. 28,  Q  10. 
Wherein  their  evidence  con- 
sists, iii. 29,  Q  10. 
Their use, iii. 30-37,$11,12. 
Why  ttie  most general  self- 
evident propositions  alone, 
pass  for  maxims,  iii. 37,  Q 
11. 
Are  commonly  proofs,  only 
where there is  no  need  of 
proofs,  iii. 39,  Q  15. 
Of little use, with clear terms, 
iii. 41,  Q  19, 
Of  dangerous use, with doubt- 
ful terms,  iii. 37, &c. $ 12 : 
iii. 42, 8 20. 
When  first known,  i. 17, &c. 
8 9.  12, 13 : i. 20,  8  14,  i. 
'22, 5 16. 
How they gain assent, i.26,27, 
$ 21, 22. 
Made from particular observa- 
tions. ibid. 
Not in theunderstanding before 
they are actually known,  i. 
27, 6  22. 
~eithe;  their terms  nor ideas 
innate, i. 27,  28, 4  23. 
Least  known  to children and 
illiterate people,  i.  31,  32, 
Ei  27. 
Memory, i. 137,  Q  2. 
Attention, pleasure,  and pain, 
settle ideas in the memory, 
i. 138,  Q  3. 
And  repetition,  ibid.  4 4 : i. 
140,g 6. 
Difference of  memory,  i. 138, 
139, Q 4, 5. 
In  remembrance,  the  mind 
sometimes  active,  some- 
times passive, i.  140, $ 7. 
its necessity,  i.  139,  Q  5 : i. 
141, $ 8. 
Defects,  i.  141, 142, 5 8,9. 
In brutes,i.  142,  143, 5  10. 
Metaphysics and  school divinity 
filled  with uninstructive pro- 
pasitions,  iii. 5 1,  $ 9. 
Method used in mathematics, iii. 
83,  Q  7. 
Mind,  the  quickness  of  its  ac- 
tions, i.  134,  Q  10. 
Minutes,  hours,  davs,  not  ne- 
cessary to duraiion,  i. 186, 
6  23. 
~ir&les,  the ground of assent to 
miracles, iii.  112, Q  13, 
Misery, what, i.  262, Q 42. 
Modes, mixed, i. 293,  4 1. 
Made by the mind, i. 294, Q 2. 
Sometimes got by the explica- 
tion  of  their names,  i. 295, 
4 3. Index.  Index. 
WIbence a mixed mode has its 
unity, i. 295,  4 4. 
Occasion  of  mixed modes,  i.  - - 
296,  5. 
Mixed  modes,  their  ideas,  how 
got, i. 298,  $ 9. 
Modes  simple  and  complex,  i 
155, Q 5. 
Simple modes, i. 157,  1. 
Of motion, i.  225,  2.  - - 
Moral  good -and evil,  what,  ii. 
97,  8 5. 
Three  rules,  whereby  meu  - - 
iudge of moral rectitude, ii. 
Y98,"5  7. 
Beings, how founded on simple 
ideas  of  sensation  and  re- 
flection, ii. 104-106,  §  14, 
13. 
Rules  not  self-evident, i.  37, 
§ 4. 
Variety of  opinions,  concern- 
ing  moral  rules,  whence,  i. 
37,389 8 5, 6. 
Rules, if  innate,  cannot with 
public allowance  be  trans- 
gressed, i.  42,8;~.  § 11, 12, 
13. 
Morality, capable of  demonstra- 
tion, ii.1468,5 18:  iii.84, Q 8. 
The proper study of mankind, 
iii. 87,  Q  1  1. 
Of actions,  in  their  confor- 
nlity  to  a  rule,  ii.  106, 
Q  15. 
Mistnkes in moral notions, owing 
to names, ibid. Q 16. 
Discourses in  morality,  if not 
clear, it is the  fault  of  the 
spe;lker, ii. 299,  Q  17. 
Hinderances of  demonstrative 
treating  of  morality.  1. 
Want  of  marks.  2. Corn- 
plexedness, ii. 3G9, $19.  3. 
Inferest, ii. 371,372,  20. 
Change of  names in morality, 
changes  not  the  nature  of 
things, ii. 389, 6 9. 
AIId ~nect~anism,  I~iird to  he 
rcc:oncilctl,  i. -17,  Q  1.1. 
Secured  amidst  men's  wrong 
judgments,  i.  286,  287,  5 
70. 
Motion,  slow or very swift, why 
not  ~erceivecl,  i. 178,  179, 
8 7, b,  9,  l0,ll. 
Voluotary,  inexplicable,  iii. 
67,  4  19- 
Its absurd definitions, ii. 188, 
Naming ofideas, i. 148, $ 8. 
Names  moral,  established  by 
law,  are not  to  be  varied 
from, ii. 390, Q 10. 
Of  substances,  standing  for 
real   essence^,  are not  ca- 
pable to convey certainty to 
the understanding,  iii.  10, 
§ 5. 
Standing  for nominal essences. 
will make some, though not 
many  certain  propositions, 
iii. 1  1, Q 6. 
Why men substitute names lor 
real  essenccs,  which  they 
know not, ii. 280,  f9. 
Two false suppositions, lnsu~il 
an  use  of  names,  ii.  281, 
282,  Q 21. 
A  particular  name  to  every 
particular thing impossible, 
ii. 166,  Q 2. 
Anduseless,ii.  167, $ 3. 
Pro~er  names,  where  used,  ii.  -  - 
' 167, 5  4,5. 
Specific narnes  are affixed  to 
the norninal essence, ii. 182, 
Q 16. 
Ofsi~npleideas  and sul)stances, 
refer to things, ii.  186, Q 2. 
What  narnes  stand  for  both 
real  and  nominal  essence, 
ii.  186,  3. 
Of simple itlcas not capable of 
defillitions, ibitl. Q 4. 
\Vl~y,  ii.  187, Q  7. 
Of least doubtfill signification, 
ii.  193,  4  15. 
Have  few  ascents  "in  linea 
prsedicamentali,  ii.  192,  $ 
16. 
Of cornplex ideas, may be de- 
fined, ii.  191, 192, Q 12. 
Of  mixed  inodes  stand  for 
arbitrary ideas, ii.  195,196, 
2, 3 : ii. 239,  240,  44. 
Tie together the parts of their 
complex ideas, ii. 2'02,  10. 
Stand  alrvays  for  tl~e  real 
essence, ii. 205,  14. 
Why  got,  usually,  before the 
ideas are known, ibid. $  15. 
Of relations comprehended un- 
der those  of  mixed  modes, 
ii. 206,  Q 16. 
General names  of  substances 
stand  for sorts, ii. 207,  Q 1. 
Necessary  to  species, ii.  236, 
Q 39. 
Proper  names  belong only to 
substances, ii. 238,  42. 
Of modes in their  first  appli- 
catiou,  ii.  239, 240,  44, 
45. 
Of substances in their first ap- 
plication, ii. 241,  242,  Q 46, 
47. 
Specific names stanc! for  dif- 
ferent  things  in  different 
men,  ii. 243,  Q 48. 
Are  put  in the  place  of  tire 
thing supposed  to have the 
real esseice  of  the species, 
ibid.  6 49. 
Of  mixed  mocies,  cloubtful 
often, because  of  the great 
composition  of  the  ideas 
they stand  for,  ii. 253,  5 6. 
Because  thev want  standards 
in  nature,'ii.  253,  E 7. 
Of substances,  doubtfrrl,  be- 
cause  referred  to  patterns, 
that  cannot  be  known,  or 
known  but  ilnpcrfectly,  ii. 
257,  kc. 4  11, 12,  13, 14. 
In tl~eir  pl~ilo!;opl~ici~l  use Ir;lrtl 
to  have  settled  significa- 
tions, ii. 260, Q 15. 
Instance,  liquor, ii. 261,  16: 
gold, ii. 262,  $ 17. 
Of  simple  ideas,  why  least 
doubtful, ii. 263,  4  16. 
Least conrpounded ideas harc 
the least dubious names, ii. 
264,  Q 19. 
Natural  pbilosopl~y,  not  ca- 
pable  of  science,  ii. 377,  Q 
26 :  iii. 66,  10. 
Yet very useful, iii. 87, $  12. 
How to bc improved, ibid. 
What  has  hindered  its  irn- 
provernent, iii. 88,  Q 12. 
Necessity,  i. 243,  $  13. 
n'egative terms, ii. 159,  Q 4. 
Na~ncs, signify  the  absence  of 
positive ideas, i. 118,  5. 
Newton (Mr.) iii. 31,  Q  11. 
Nothing : that  nothing  cannot 
produce  any  thing,  is  de- 
monstration, iii. 56, b 3. 
Notions, i.  294,  Q 2. 
Number, i. 203. 
Modes  of  number  the  most 
distinct ideas, ibid. Q 3. 
Demonstrations  in  numbers, 
the most determinate,  ibitl. 
hA 
3 
The general  measure,  i. 207, 
S  8. 
~ffords  the clearest idea of ill- 
finity, i. 214,  § 9. 
Numeration,  what,  i.  204,  4  5, 
Narnes necessary to it,  i.  204, 
205, 6 5, 6.  .-  ? 
And order, i. 206,§ 7. 
IYhy not early in children, ant1 
in  some never, ibicl. 
Obscurity,unavoidable in ancierit 
authors, ii. 257, 5 10 
Tl~e  cause  of  it, in  our idcas, 
ii.  11 I,  $ 3. 
~ll~tillilt~,  th('v  arc lllost,  \vlio have  least  examined,  iii. 
102, g 3. 
Opinion, what, iii. 97,  § 3. 
How opinions grow up to prin- 
ciples, i. 53, &c.  4  22,  23, 
24, 25,26. 
Of others,  a wrong ground of 
assent,  iii. 99, 5 6 :  iii. 172, 
§  17. 
Organs :  ous organs suited to our 
state, ii. 16, &c.  12, 13. 
Pain,. present,  works presently, 
I.  L81,Q  64. 
Its use, i. 113,  11 4,  4. 
Parrot,  mentioned  by  Sir W. T. 
ii. 53,  Q 8. 
Holds  a  rational  discourse, 
ibid. 
Particles  join  parts,  or  whole 
sentences  together, ii, 245, 
§  1. 
In them lies the beauty of well- 
speaking, ii. 246,  Q 2. 
How their use is to be known, 
ii 246,  8 3. 
They express some action, or 
posture of the mind, ii. 247, 
4 4. 
Pascal, his great memory, i. 142, 
5  9. 
Passion,  i. 300,  Q l I. 
Passions,  how they lead us  into 
error,  iii. 109, Q  1  I. 
Turn on pleasure  and pain, i. 
231,232,  8 3. 
I'assions  are seldom  single,  i. 
260,  $ 39. 
Perception threefold, i. 239,  5 5. 
In  perception,  the  mind  for 
the  most  part  passive,  i. 
129,  1. 
Is an impression  made or1 the 
mind, i.  130, 4  3, 4. 
In the womb, i. 131,  5. 
Difference between it, and in- 
nate ideas, ibid.  § 6. 
T'uts  the  difference between the 
auimal and vegetable  king- 
dom,i.  134,  135, $  11. 
The several degrees of it, show 
the  wisdom  and  goodness 
of  the Maker, i. 135, §  12. 
Belongs  to all  animals,  ibid. 
12,  13, 14. 
The first  inlet  of  knowledge, 
i. 136, 4 15. 
Person, what, ii. 55, $ 9. 
A forensic term, ii. 69,  Q  26. 
The same consciousness alone 
makes the same  person, ii. 
58,  13 : ii. 66,  Q  23. 
The same  soul  without  the 
same  consciousness, makes 
not the same person, ii. 59, 
§ 14,  &c. 
Reward  and punishment  fol= 
low personal identity, ii. 63, 
18. 
Phantastical ideas, ii.  122, Q  1. 
Place, i. 160, 4 7,  8. 
IJse of  place, i. 161,  Q  9. 
Nothing  but  a  relative  posi- 
tion, i. 162, Q  10. 
Sometimes taken for the space 
a body fills, i. 162, Q  10. 
Twofold, i. 195, 196, Q  6 :  i. 
196, b 6,  7. 
Pleasnre and pain, i. 231,  Q 1: i. 
234,  4  15,16. 
Join themselves to most of  our 
ideas,  i. 1  12,  Q  2. 
Pleasnre, why joined  to several 
actions, i. 112, 5 3. 
Power, how we come by its idea, 
i. 235,  236,  Q  1. 
Active and passive, i. 236,S  2. 
No passive  power in God, no 
active  power  in  matter ; 
both active  and  passive  in 
spirits,  ibid. Q  2. 
Our  idea  of  active  power 
clearest from reflection, 237, 
§ 4. 
Powcrsoperate not on powers, 
i. 246,  18. 
Make a great part of  the ideas 
of substances, ii.  12, 4 7. 
Index.  367 
Why, ii. 13, Q 8.  Generical,  teach  nothing, iii. 
An idea  of  sensation  and re-  46,  $ 4 :  iii. 52, Q 13. 
flection, i.  11  9,  Q 8.  Wherein a  part of  the defini - 
Practical  principles  not  innate,  tion  is  predicated  of  the 
i. 34, $  1.  subject,  teach  nothing, iii. 
Not universally wented to,  i.  47,48,  Q 5, 6. 
35,  Q 2.  But  the  sign~fication  of  the 
Are for operation, ibid.  3.  wwd, iii. 49,  4  7. 
Not agreed, i. 46,  §  14.  Concerning  substances,  ge- 
Different, i. 52, 53,  Q 21.  nerally either trifling or un- 
Principles,  not  to  be  received  certain, iii. 50,g 9. 
without strict examination,  Merely  verbal,  how  to  be 
iii. 81,  $ 4 :  iii. 1 65, Q 8.  known, iii. 52,  4  12. 
The ill consequences of wrong  Abstract terms, predicated one 
principles, ibid. kc. 4 9, 10.  of another,  produce mcrely 
None innate, i.  13.  verbal propositions,  ibid. 
None universally assented to,  Or part  of a complex  idea, 
i. 14,  Q  2, 3, 4.  predicated  of the whole, iii. 
How ordinarily got,  i.  53,  4  46,  6 4 :  iii. 52,  Q  13. 
22, &c.  More propositions, merely ver- 
Are  to  be  examined,  i.  55,  bal,  than is suspected, ibid. 
56,  26, 27.  4 13. 
Not  innate,  if the ideas, they  Universal  propositions  con- 
are made up of,  are not in-  cern  not  existence, iii. 53, 
nate,  i. 57,  1.  6 1. 
Privative terms,  ii.  159,  5 4.  What propositions conoe~n  ex- 
Probability,  what,  iii. 96, &c. §  isknce, ihid. 
1.3.  Certain propositions, concern- 
The grounds of probability, iii.  ing existence,are particular ; 
98,  Q 4.  concerning  abstract  ideas, 
In matter of fact, iii.  105,i 6.  may  be  general,  iii.  77,  Q 
How we are  to judge, in pro-  13. 
babilities, iii. 98,  5 5.  Mental, iii. I,  Q  3 :  iii. 3,  5. 
Difficulties  in  probabilities,  Verbal, ibid.  Q 3 :  ibid.  8 5, 
iii. 107,  Q  9.  Mental,  hard  to  be  treated, 
Grounds of  probability in spe-  iii.  1,2,  Q 3, 4. 
culation, iii.  109,  4  12.  Punishment,  what, ii. 97,  Q 5. 
Wrong  measures  of  probabi-  And reward, follow couscious- 
lity, iii. 164, 4  7.  ness,  ii  63,  Q  18 : ii. 69, 
How  &aded  by  prejudiced  2  6. 
minds, iii. 169, 4  13, 14.  An unconscious drunkard, why 
Proofs, ii.  321,  322,  Q  3.  punished, ii. 65, 4 22. 
I'roperties  of  specific  essences, 
not known,  ii. 219,  220, 
19. 
Of  things very  numerous,  ii.  Q. 
I,%?,  134,  10 : ii.  146,  Qualities:  secondary 
147, $ 24.  their  connexiolj, or  incon- 
Propositions, idelltical, teach no-  sistencr, unknown, ii. 3G3, 
thing,  iii  43,  Q  2.  g  11. Index. 
Of  substances,  scarce know- 
able, but by  experience,  ii. 
364, &c. 0  14. 16.  R. 
Of  spiritual  snbstances,  less 
than of corporeal, ii. 367,  Real ideas, ii. 122,  1, 2. 
17  Reason, its various significations, 
L,.  - 
Secondary,  have no  conceiv-  iii.  113, 0  1. 
able  connexion  with  the  What, iii. 114,  2. 
primary, that produce them,  Reasol~  is  natural  revelation, 
ii. 363, 364, &c.  12,  13  :  iii. 149,  4. 
ii. 379, 4 28.  It must judge of revelation, iii. 
Of  substances, depend on re-  156, 157, § 14, 15. 
mote causes, iii.  15, $  11.  It must be  our  last guide in 
Not  to be  known by descrip-  every thing, ibid. 
tions, ii. 301, Q 21.  Four parts of reason,  iii. 115, 
Secondary, how far capable of  § 3. 
demonstration, ii. 325,326,  Where reason fails us, iii. 130, 
Q 11, 12, 13. 
What, i. 120,  10 : i.  122, 
g 16. 
How said  to be  in things, ii. 
122, g 2. 
Secondary, would be  her, if 
we  could  discover  the mi-  -~ 
nute parts of  bodies,  ii.  15, 
0 11. 
Primary qualities,  i. 120, $ 9. 
How they produce ideas in us, 
i. 121, $  11, 12. 
Secondary  qualities,  i.  121, 
122,  13, 14, 15. 
Primary qualities resen~ble  our 
ideas, secondary not, i. 122, 
$  15, 16, &c. 
Three sorts of  qualities in bo- 
dies, i.  126,  Q 23. 
i. e.  primary,  secondary,  im- 
n~ediatel  y perceivable ; and 
secondary,  meilii~tely per- 
ceivable, i.  129, § 26. 
Secondary qualities,  are barc 
powers,  i.  126,  127,  &c. fj 
23,24, 25. 
Secondary  qualities  have  no 
discernible connesion  wit11 
§ 9. 
Necessary in  all but  intuition, 
iii. 132,  15. 
As  contra-distinguished  to 
faith,  what, iii. 136, 4  2. 
Helps us not to thc knowledge 
of innate trntl~s,  i.  15-18, 
g 5, 6, 7. 8. 
General idehs,  general  terms, 
and reason, usually grow to- 
gether, i.  21,  §  15. 
Recollection,  i. 228,  1. ' 
Reflection, i. 83, $4. 
Related, ii. 36,  1. 
Relation, ibid. 
Relation proportional, ii. 94,P 1. 
hTatural, ibid.  2. 
Instituted, ii. 95,  §  3. 
Moral, ii. 96,  4 4. 
Numerous, ii. 107, fj 17. 
Terminate in simple ideas,  ii. 
108, 5  18. 
Our clear idea of relation,  ii. 
109,  $ 19. 
Names  of  relations  doubtful, 
ibid. 9  19. 
Without correlative terms, not 
so  co~nmonly  observed,  ii. 
the first, i. 128, $ 25.  37, $ 2. 
Quotations, how little to be  re-  Different  from  the  tl~ings  re- 
licd on,  iii.  109, § 11.  lated,  ii. 38, $  4. 
Changes  without  any  change 
in the snbjcct,  il~itl.  $ 5. 
.Always  between  two,  ii.  39, 
§ 6. 
All things capable of  relation, 
ibid.  Q 7. 
The idea of the relation often 
clearer  than  of  the  things 
related, ii. 40,  8. 
All terminate  in simple ideas 
of  sensation and reflection, 
ii. 41, Q 9. 
Relative, ii. 36, 5  I. 
Some relative terms taken for 
external  denominations,  ii. 
37,  5 2. 
Some for absolute, ii. 38,  5 3. 
How  to  be  known,  ii.  41, 
g  10. 
Many words,  though seeming 
absolute, are  relatives, ii.38, 
§ 3, 4, 5. 
Religion,  all  men  have  time  to 
inquire into, iii.  161, 5  3. 
But  in many places are  hindered 
from inquiring,  ibid.  4 4. 
Remembrance,  of  great moment, 
in common life, i.  141, $ 8. 
What, i. 73,  20: i. 140,  7. 
Reputation,  of  great  force,  in 
common life, ii.  103, 5 12. 
Restraint, i. 243,  $  13. 
Resurrection, the author's notion 
of  it, ii. 89, &c. 
Not  necessarily understood  of 
the same body, ib. &c.  The 
meaning of his body, 2 Cor. 
v.  10, ii. 74. 
The  same  body  of  Christ 
arose;  and why, ii.  78-80. 
How thescripture constantly 
speaks about it, ii. 93. 
Revelation,  an  unquestionable 
ground  of  assent,  iii.  112, 
4  14. 
Belief,  no proof of  it,  iii.  157, 
$  15. 
Traditional  revelation  cannot 
convey  any  new  simple 
ideas,  iii. 138,  3. 
Not so sure as our reason, or 
senses, iii.  140, 5  4. 
VOL.  111. 
In things of  reason,  no  need 
of revelation, iii.  141,  5. 
Cannot  over-rule  our  clear 
knowledge,  ibid.  (j  5 : iii. 
145, Q 10. 
Must  over-rule  probabilities 
of  reason,  iii.  144,  145, 
§ 8, 9. 
Reward, what, ii.  97. 
Rhetoric,  an  art  of  deceiving, 
ii. 288,  34. 
Sagacity, ii. 321, $ 3. 
Same, whether substance, mode, 
or concrete,  ii. 70,  28. 
Sand, white to the eye,  pellucid 
in a microscope, ii. 15, 4 1  I. 
Sceptical, no one so sceptical as 
to doubt his own existence, 
iii. 55, Q 2. 
Schools, wherein  faulty,  ii. 27 1, 
Q 6,  &c. 
Science, divided into a considera- 
tion of nature,  of  operation, 
and of  signs, iii. 174. 
No science  of  natural  bodies, 
ii. 380,  $ 29. 
Scripture :  interpretations  of 
scripture  not  to  be  im- 
posed, ii. 267,  23. 
Self, what makes it, ii. 64,  Q 20: 
ii. 66-68,  $ 23, 24, 25. 
Self-love, ii. 149,  2. 
Partly cause of  unreasonable- 
ness in us,  ibid. 
Self-evident  propositions,  where 
to be had,  iii. 22, kc. 
Neither  needed  nor  admitted 
proof, iii. 41, $  19. 
Sensatioo, i. 83, $ 3. 
Distinguishable  from  other 
perceptions,  ii. 327, $  14. 
Explained, i.  125,  21. 
What, i. 228,  1. 
Senses, why we cannot collceive 
other qualities,  t11a11 the oh- 
jects  of our scoses,  i.  103, 
g 3. 
D  n Index.  Index. 
Learn to discern  by exercise,  Our ignorance about it, ii.  70, 
ii. 301, Q  21. 
Much  quicker  would  not  be 
useful to us, ii. 16,  Q  12. 
Our organs of  sense suited to 
our  state,  ibid.  &c.  Q  12, 
13. 
Sensible knowledge is as certain 
as we need, iii. 73,  Q  8. 
Sensible  knowledge  goes  not 
beyond the present  act, iii. 
74,  Q  9. 
Shame, i. 235, 5 17. 
Simple ideas, i. 99,  Q  1. 
Not made  by the mind,  ibid. 
6 2. 
Power of  the mind over them, 
i. 156, 5  1. 
The materials of all our know- 
ledge, i. 116, § 10. 
All positive, i.  117, Q  1. 
Very  different  from  their 
causes, i.  117,  2,  3. 
Sin,  with  different  men,  stands 
for different  actions,  i. 50, 
Q  19. 
Solidity, i. 105,  106, Q  1. 
Inseparable from body, i. 106, 
5 1. 
By  it  body  fills space,  ibid. 
Q  2. 
This idea got by touch, i. 105, 
5 1. 
How distinguished from space, 
i.  107,  Q  3. 
How from hardness, i. 108,$4. 
Something from eternity demon- 
strated, iii. 56, 5.3:  iii. 59, 
8 8- 
Sorrow, i.  233, Q 8. 
Soul  thinks  not  always,  i.  86, 
Q  9,  kc. 
Not in sound sleep, i. 88, Q  11, 
&c. 
Its  immateriality,  we  know 
not,  ii.  331.  358,  Q  6: 
ii. 345, &c. 
Religion, not concerned in the 
soul's immateriality, ii. 359, 
360,  5  6. 
Q  27. 
The  immortality  of  it,  not 
proved  by  reason,  ii.  346, 
&c. 
It is brought  to light  by  re- 
velation, ibid. 
Sound, its modes, i.  225,  Q 3. 
Space, its idea got by  sight and 
touch, i.  158, 9 2. 
Its modifications, i.  158,  Q  4. 
Not body,  i. 163,  164,  Q  11, 
12. 
Its parts inseparable,  i. 164, 
Qi3. 
Immoveable, i. 164,165,  Q  14. 
Whether body, or spirit, i. 165, 
Q  16. 
Whether  substance,  or  ac- 
cident, i.  165,Q  17. 
Infinite, i. 168,  Q  21:  i. 210, 
§ 4. 
Ideas  of  space  and  body  di- 
stinct,  i.  170,  171,  5  24, 
25. 
Considered  as a  solid, i.  200, 
201,  Q  11. 
Hard  to  conceive  any  real 
being void of  space, i. 201. 
Species;  why  changing  one 
simple idea of  the complex 
one  is  thought  to  change 
the  species  in  modes,  but 
not  in  substances,  ii.  280, 
Q  19. 
Of  animals  and  vegetables, 
mostly  distinguished  by 
figure, ii. 228,  29. 
Of  other  things,  by  colour, 
ibid. 
Made  by  the  understanding, 
for con~munication,  ii. 201, 
4 9. 
No  soecies  of  mixed  modes 
without  a  name,  ii.  203, 
0 11. 
Of  substances, are determined 
by  the nominal essence,  ii. 
212.  215.  218,  &c.  Q  7,  8. 
11.13.  - 
Not  by  substantial forms,  ii. 
215, 4  10. 
Nor  by  the  real  essence,  ii. 
219,  Q  18: ii. 223,  5 25. 
Of  spirits,  how distinguished, 
ii. 215,  9 11. 
More  species  of  creatures 
above  than  below  us,  ii. 
216,  $  12. 
Of creatures very gradual, ib. 
What  is  necessary  to  the 
making of  species,  by  re21 
essences, ii. 218,  Q  14, &c. 
Of animals and plants,  cannot 
be distinguished by propaga- 
tion, ii. 222, 5 23. 
Of  animals  and  vegetables, 
distinguished principally by 
the  shape  and  figure;  of 
other things,  by  the colour, 
ii. 228,  Q  29. 
Of man,  likewise, in  part,  ii. 
224,  Q  26. 
Instance, abbot of  St. Martin, 
ii. 225. 
Is hut  a partial  conception of 
what  is in  the individuals, 
ii. 231,  Q  32. 
It is the complex idea, which 
the  name  stands  for,  that 
makes  the species, ii. 234, 
§ 35. 
Man  makes  the  species,  or 
sorts, ii. 235,  4 36, 37. 
The foundation of  it is in the 
similitude found  in things, 
ibid.  $ 36, 37. 
Every  distinct,  abstract  idea 
makes  a  different  species, 
ibid.  38. 
Speech, its end, ii. 158, Q  1, 2. 
Proper speech, ii. 165, $ 8. 
Intelligible,  ibid. 
Spirits,  the  existence of  spirits 
not knowable, iii. 76,  Q  12. 
How it is proved, ibid. 
Operation of  spirits 011  bodies, 
uot conceivable, ii. 379, $28. 
What knowledge they have of 
bodies,  ii. 302,  § 23. 
Separate, how their knowledge 
may exceed ours, i. 141,Q 9. 
We have as clear a  notion  of 
the substance of spirit as of 
body,  ii.  11,  Q  5. 
A  conjecture,  concerning  one 
way  of  knowledge  wherein 
spirits excel us,  ii. 18,  Q  13. 
Our ideas of spirit, ii. 20,  Q 15. 
As clear as that of  body, ibid. : 
ii. 23,  Q  22, 
Primary  ideas  belonging  to 
spirits, ii. 21,  Q  18. 
Move,  ii. 2 1, 22,  Q  19, 20. 
Ideas of  spirit and bodv con+ 
pared,  ii.  23,  Q  22 :  'ii.  29, 
4 30. 
The  existence  of  spirits,  as 
easy to be admitted,  as that 
of bodies, ii. 27,  Q  28. 
We have no idea,  how spirits 
communicate their thoughts, 
ii. 32, 9 36. 
How  far  we  are ignorant  of 
the being, species, and pro- 
perties  of  spirits,  ii.  378, 
5 27. 
The word,  spirit, does not ne- 
cessarily  denote  imma- 
teriality, ii. 332. 
The scripture  speaks  of  ma- 
terial spirits, ii. 333. 
Stupidity, i. 141,  8. 
Substance,  ii. 1,  Q  1. 
No idea of it, i. 72,  Q  18. 
Not very knowable, ibid. 
Our certainty, concerning sub- 
stances, reaches  but a little 
way, ii. 390, 391,  $ 11, 12: 
iii. 20,  Q  15. 
The coufrised idea of  substance 
in  general,  makes always a 
part of  the  essence  of  tlie 
species  of  substances,  ii. 
220,  q 21. 
In substances, we must rectify 
the  signification  of  their 
names,  by  tlie things, more 
than by  definitions, ii. 303, 
24. Index. 
Their  ideas  single,  or  col- 
lective, i.  147, Q  6. 
We  have  no  distinct idea  of 
substance, i.  166, Q  18, 19. 
We have no idea of  pure sub- 
stance, ii. 2, 3, Q  2. 
Our ideas of  the sorts of  sub- 
stances, ii. 5-10,  Q  3,  4 : 
ii. 11,  Q 6. 
Observables,  in our  ideas of 
substances, ii. 33,  Q  37. 
Collective ideas of  substances, 
ii. 34, &c. 
They are single ideas,  ii. 35, 
§ 2. 
Three  sorts  of  substances, 
ii. 48,  Q 2. 
The ideas of  substances have 
in  the mind  a  double  re- 
ference,  ii. 129, Q  6. 
The properties of  substances 
numerous, and not all to be 
known,  ii.  133,  134,  Q  9, 
10. 
The perfectest  ideas  of sub- 
stances, ii.  12,  Q  7. 
Three sorts of ideas make our 
complex one of  substances, 
ii. 14, Q  9. 
Substance,  not  discarded  by 
the essay,  ii. 5,  &c. note. 
The author's account of  it as 
clear,  as that of  noted  logi- 
cians, ii.  6,  kc. note. 
We talk like children about it, 
ii. 4,  Q 2:  ii. 8, note. 
The  author  makes not the being 
of it depend on the fancies of 
men, ii. 1, &c. note. 
Idea of it obscure,  ii. 331, &c. 
note. 
The author's  principles consist 
with the certainty of its ex- 
istence, ii. 2, note. 
Subtilty, what,  ii. 272,  Q  8. 
Succession,  an idea  got  chiefly 
from the train of  our ideas, 
i. 115, $9:  i. 177,$ 6. 
Which train is the measure of 
it, i.  179, Q 12. 
Sumu~u~n  bonuln, wherein it con- 
sists,  i. 273,  § 55. 
Son, the  name of a species, though 
but one, ii. 207,  Q  1. 
Syllogism, no help to reasoning, 
iii. 115, Q  4. 
The use of syllogism, ibid. 
Inconveniencies  of  syllogism, 
ibid. 
Of  no  use  in  probabilities, 
iii.  126, p5. 
I-Jelps not to new discoveries, 
ibid. Q 6. 
Or the  improvement  of  our 
knowledge,  iii. 127, Q  7. 
Whether,  in  syllogism,  the 
middle  terms  may  not  be 
better placed,  iii.  129, Q  8. 
May be about particulars,  iii. 
128,  Q  8. 
Taste and  smells,  their  modes, 
i. 225,226,  Q  5. 
Testimony,  how  it  lessens  its 
force,  iii. 108,  Q  10. 
Thinking, i. 228. 
Modes of  thinking,  ibid.  Q  1 : 
i. 229,  Q  2. 
Men's  ordinary wily of  think- 
ing, iii. 2, Q 4. 
An operation of the soul,  i. 87, 
Q  10. 
Without memory,useless,  i. 9 1, 
Q  15. 
Time, what,  i.  181, Q  17, 18. 
Not  the  ineasure  of  motion, 
i. 185,  186, § 22. 
And place, distinguishable por- 
tions of infinite duration and 
expansion, i. 195, Q  5,  6. 
Two-fold,  i. 195, 196, Q  6, 7. 
Denominations from  time  are 
relatives, ii. 44,  Q 3. 
Toleration, necessary in our state 
of  knowledge, iii. 103, Q 4. 
Tradition,  the  older,  the  less 
credible, iii. 108, 4  10. 
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Trifling propositions, iii. 43.  Uneasiness alone determines the 
Discourses,  iii.  50-52,  9,  will to a new action, i. 252, 
10, 11.  &c.  Q  29. 31.33, &c. 
Truth,  what,  iii.  1,  Q  2: iii.  3,  Why it  determines  the  will, 
Q 5 :  iii. 6,  Q 9.  i. 257, 258,  Q  36, 37. 
Of thought,  iii. 1,  Q  3: iii. 6,  Causes of  it, i. 275,  $ 57, &c. 
0 9.  Unity, an idea,  both of  sensation 
Of  words, iii. 1, $ 3.  and reflection, i. 115, $ 7. 
Verbal and real, iii. 5,  6,  Q 8,  Suggested  by  every  thing,  i. 
9.  202, 203,  Q 1. 
Moral, iii. 7,  Q  1  I.  Universality,  is  only  in  signs, 
Metaphysical,  ii.  136,  Q  2 :  ii. 172, Q  11. 
iii. 7,  Q 11.  Universals, howmade, i. 148,Qg. 
General, seldom apprehended,  Volition, what, i. 239,$5 :  i. 244, 
but in  words, iii. 8, Q 2.  Q  15 :  i.  252,  Q  28. 
In what it consists, iii. 3,  Q 5.  Better  known  by  reflection, 
Love of  it necessary,  iii. 147,  than words, i. 253, $ :%0. 
5 1.  Voluntary,  what,  i.  239,  Q  5 : 
How we may know we love it,  i. 242,  Q  I l :  i. 251, 5 27. 
iii. 147, Q 1. 
Vacuum possible,  i. 169,  Q  22. 
Motion  proves  a  vacuum, 
i. 179, 8 23. 
We have an idea of it, i. 107, 
Q  3 :  i. 109,  Q 5. 
Variety  in  men's  pursuits,  ac- 
counted  for,  i.  272,  273, 
Q  54, &c. 
Virtuc,  what,  in  reality,  i.  49, 
Q  18. 
What in  its cornmon  applica- 
tion, i. 42,  Q  10,  11. 
Is  preferable,  under  a  bare 
possibility of a future state, 
i. 286,  287,  Q  7  0. 
How taken,  i. 49,  Q  17, 18. 
Vice lies  in  wrong measures  of 
good,  iii.  172, Q 16. 
Understanding,  what,  i.  239, 
Q 5,  6. 
Like a dark room, i. 152,  Q 17. 
When rightly used, i. 3,4,  4 5. 
Three sorts of perception in the 
underatanding, i. 239,  4 5. 
Wholly passive in the reception 
of simple ideas,  i. 98,  Q  25. 
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What is,  is,  is not universally 
assented to,  i.  14, Q  4. 
Where and when, i.  197,  Q 8. 
Whole bigger than  its parts,  its 
use, iii. 30,  Q  11. 
And  part  not  innate ideas,  i. 
59;  Q 6. 
Will,  what,  i.  239,  Q  5,  6 : i. 
244,  245,  5  16: i.  252, 
6  29. 
~iat  determines the will,  ib. 
Q 29. 
Often confounded with desire, 
i. 253, $30. 
Is conversant only about our 
own  actions,  i.  253,  254, 
Q  30. 
Terminates  in  them,  i.  261, 
4 40. 
Is determined by the greatest, 
present, removeable uneasi- 
ness,  ib. 
Wit and judgment,  wherein  dif- 
ferent, i.  144,  Q 2. 
Words, an ill  use  of words,  one 
great hinderance  of know- 
ledge, ii. 381, $30. 
(: C Abuse of  words, ii. 268. 
Sects introdlice words without 
significatio~i,  ib.  4 2. 
The schools have coined multi- 
tudes of insignificant words, 
ib. 5 2. 
And  rendered  others obscure, 
ii. 271,  5 6. 
Often used  without  significa- 
tion, ii. 269, 5 3. 
And why,  ii. 270, 5 5. 
Inconstancy  in  their  use,  an 
abuse of  words, ibid. Q 5. 
Obscurity, an abuse of  words, 
ii. 271,  5 6. 
Taking  them  for  things,  an 
abuse of words, ii. 275,276, 
5 14, 15. 
Who most liable to this abuse 
of  words, ibid. 
This abuse of  words is a cause 
of obstinacy in error, ii. 278, 
5 16. 
Making  them  stand  for  real 
essences,  which  we  know 
not,  is an abuse of  words, 
ii. 278, 279, 5 17, 18. 
The supposition of  their cer- 
tain,  evident  signification, 
an abuse of  words,  ii. 282, 
4 22. 
Use of  words is,  1. To com- 
municate  ideas.  2.  With 
quickness.  3.  To convey 
knowledge,  ii.  284,  5  23, 
24. 
How they fail in all  these, ii. 
285, 5 26,  &c. 
How  in  substances,  ii.  287, 
5 32. 
How in  modes  and  relations, 
ibid. 5 33. 
Misuse of words, a great cause 
of  error, ii. 290,  $ 4. 
Of obstinacy, ii. 291,  5 5. 
And of wrangling, ibid. 5 6. 
Signify one thing, in inquiries ; 
and another  In  disputes,  ii. 
292, 5 7. 
The meaning of  words is made 
known, in  simple ideas,  by 
showing, ii. 297,  5 14. 
In mixed  modes,  by  defining, 
ibid. 5 15. 
In substances, by  showing and 
defining too,  ii. 300,  Q 19: 
ii. 301, 302,  5 21, 22. 
The ill consequence of  learning 
words first, and their mean- 
ing afterwards, ii. 303, $24. 
No  shame  to  ask  men  the 
meaning  of  their  words, 
where  they  are  doubtful, 
ii. 304,  25. 
Are  to be  used  constantly in 
the same sense, ii. 306, 426. 
Or else to be explained, where 
the  context  determines  it 
not, ii. 306, 5 27. 
How  mhde  general,  ii.  158, 
5 3- 
Signifying  insensible  things, 
derived  from names of  sen- 
sible ideas, ii. 159, 5 5. 
Have no natural signification, 
ii. 161, 5 1. 
But by imposition, ii. 165,t 8. 
Stand immediately for theideas 
of the speaker, ii. 16  1-1  63, 
5 1, 2,3. 
Yet with a double reference. 
1. To the ideas, in the hearer's 
mind, ii. 163, 5 4. 
2.  To the  reality  of  things, 
ii. 164, 5 5. 
Apt, by custom, to excite ideas, 
ii.  164, 5 6. 
Often  used  without  significa- 
tion, ibid. 5 7. 
Most general, ii. 166, 4  1. 
Why some  words  of  one lan- 
guage  cannot  be translated 
into  those  of  another,  ii. 
200,  5 8. 
Why I have  been  so large on 
words, ii. 206, 4  16. 
New words, or in new siguifica- 
tions,  are cautiously  to be 
used, ii. 244, 8 51. 
Civil use of  words,  ii. 251, 4 3. 
Pl~ilosopbical  use of words, ii. 
251,  8 3. 
These very different,  ii.  260, 
5  15. 
Miss their end, when they ex- 
cite not,  in  the hearer,  the 
same idea,  as in  the mind 
of  the speaker, ii. 252,  5  4. 
What words are most doubtful, 
:ind why, ibid. 4  5, kc. 
What unintelligible, ibid. 
Are fitted to the use of  common 
life, ii. 25 1, 4 2. 
Not translatable,  ii. 200,  5  8. 
Worship not an innate idea, i. 60, 
5 7. 
Wrangle, when we wrangle about 
words, iii. 52,  5  13. 
Writings, ancient, \vhy hardly to 
he  precisely uoderstood,  ii. 




Air, itsnature  and properties,3 1 1. 
Animals, how divided, 321. 
Anticipation,  or first  conceived 
opinions, hinder knowledge, 
254. 
Aristotle'a  Rhetoric commended, 
299. 
Assent,  how  it may  be  rightly 
given, 265. 
Association of ideas, a disease of 
the understanding, 276, &c. 
how  to  prevent 
and cure it, ibid. 
Atmosphere,  its nature  and ex- 
tent, 31  1. 
Attraction of  bodies, 304. 
whether  explicable, 
305. 
Atwood  (William) 297. 
B. 
Bacon (lord) liis history ofHenry 
VII. 299. 
Baudrand,  his  dictionary com- 
mended, 300. 
Bayle's  dictionary  commended, 
ibid. 
Belief, what it is,  330. 
Uergeron  (Peter)  his  collection 
of voyages, 298. 
Bernier, hisMemoirs ofthe Grand 
Mogul commended, ibid. 
Blood,  the circulation of  it, 322. 
Bodies,  luminous,  pellucid,  and 
opake, 323,324. 
Hoileau,  his translation of  Lon- 
ginus commended, 295. 
Ihttoin  of a question  should be 
sougl~t  for, 283. 
Bracton,  that author commend- 
ed, 297. 
Brady, commended,  ibid. 
Brown,  his travels commended, 
298. 
Bruyere,  his  Characters a  fine 
piece of painting, 299. 
Burnet,  bishop  of  Saru~n,  lris 
history  of  the  reformation 
commended, ibid. 
C. 
Caesar, his Commentaries, 295. 
Calepin, his dictionary cornmend- 
ed,  300. 
Camden, his Britannia commend- 
ed,  298. 
Cange,  (Charles  du)  his  Glos- 
sarium mediae et infimae La- 
tinitatis commended, 300. 
Cannon-bullet,how long it would 
be  in coming  from  the sun 
to the earth, 31 1. 
Cervantes, his Don Quisote, 300. 
Chillingworth, his eulogium, 295. 
Chronology, books  that  treat of 
it, 299. 
Common-place-book,Mr. Locke's 
new method of  making one, 
331. &c. 
Comines,  (Philip  de)  his  me- 
moirs  recommended,  299. 
Coke,  (lord)  his  second  Insti- 
tutes commended, 297. 
Cooper, his dictionary commend- 
ed, 300. 
-. 
Dampier, his voyilges commend- 
ed, 298. Daniel,  lris history commended, 
299. 
Despondency of  attaining know- 
ledge, a great hinderance to 
the mind. 272. 
Dictionaries, hownecessary, 300. 
the  best  of  them 
mentioned, ibid. 
Desultoriness, often misleads the 
understanding, 238. 
Distinction, how  it differs  from 
division, 260. 
how theunderstand- 
ing is improved  by  a  right 
use of it, ibid. 
E. 
Ethics,  the  Gospel  a  sufficient 
system thereof,  295. 
F. 
Fallacies, how the understanding 
is misguided by them, 278. 
Fleta, 297. 
Fundamental  truths,  the  mind 
should chiefly apply itself to 
them, 281. 
G. 
Gage, (Thomas) his travels com- 
mended, 298. 
Gentleman,  what  studies  more 
immediately  belong  to his 
calling, 293. 
---,  what books lie ought 
to read, 295, &c. 
Geography, .books  that treat of 
it, 297. 
H. 
Hackluy t,  his  collection of  voy- 
ages commended,  298. 
Haste,  when  too  great,  often 
misleads the understanding, 
237. 
Helvicus,  his chronology  com- 
mended, 299. 
Henningham,  or  rather  Hang- 
ham,  (sir Ralph de) 297. 
Herbert of  Clrerbury,  (Edward, 
lord)  his  Life  of  Henry 
VIII. commended, 299. 
Heylin,  his  Cosmography men- 
tioned, 297. 
History,  books that treat  of ge- 
neral,  ibid. ; and of  tlre hi- 
story of particular countries, 
298. 
Hoffman,  his  dictionary  com- 
mended, 300. 
Horace, ibid: 
Howell, his history of  the world 
recommended,  297. 
Huygens, his Cosmotheoro~  com- 
mended, 309. 
I. 
Identity, the author's  opinion of 
it defended,  179, &c. 
Ignorance, not so bad as ground- 
less assurance,  269. 
how  it should be  re- 
moved, ibid. 
Indifferency for  all truth  should 
be cherished, 230.  -  the ill consequences 
of  the want of it, 266. 
Juvenal commended, 300. 
K. 
Knowledge,  wherein  it consists, 
293. 
--,  the extent of it, can- 
not exceed the extent of out 
ideas,  ibid. 
L. 
Littleton,  his  dictionary  com- 
mended,  300. 
Lloyd, his dictionary, ibid. 
M. 
Mariana,  his  history  of  Spain 
commended, 299. 
Mathematics,  the  usefulness  of 
studying them, 222, &c. 
Melvil  (James),  lris  memoirs 
coulmended, 299. 
Metals,  several  sorts  of  them, 
316. 
Meteors, 3  13. 
Minerals,  are vegetables, 3 19. 
Modus  tenendi  Parliamenturn. 
297. 
Moll  (Herman)  his  geography 
colnrnended,  ibid. 
Morality,  the  best  books  that 
treat of  it, 295. 
Moreri,  liis historical dictionary 
cornorended, 300. 
0. 
Observation,  very useful  to irn- 
prove knowledge, 233. 
Opinion, no one should be wished 
to be true,  228. 
P. 
Paxton,  his  Civil  Polity  com- 
mended, 296. 
Partiality in studies, 244. 
it misleads the under- 
standing, 245. 
Parts,or abilities, their difference, 
207.  -  may be improved by a due 
conduct  of the understand- 
ing, ibid. 
Persius commended, 300. 
Perseverance in study, necessary 
to knowledge,  271. 
Personal  identity,  the  aothor's 
opinion of it defended,  179, 
&c. 
Perspicuity in speaking, wherein 
it consists, 294. 
and how to obtain it, 
ibid. 
Petavius,  his  Chronology  coln- 
mended, 299. 
Petit, his Rights of the Commons 
of  England,  commended, 
297. 
Plants, their  several sorts, nou- 
rishment,  and propagation, 
320. 
Politics, contain  two parts, 296. 
Practice, or exercise of the mind, 
should  not  be  beyond  its 
strelrgth, 255. 
Practice,  the  understanding  is 
ilrrproved by it, 213. 
Prejudicee, every one should find 
out and get rid  of  his own, 
228. 
Presumption,  a great hinderance 
to tlre understanding, 271. 
Principles, when wrong, are very 
prejudicial,  21  6, kc.  --  we  should  carefully 
examine our own, 230,  &c.  --  the usefulness of inter- 
mediate principles, 243. 
Puffendorf,  his  writings  com- 
mended,  296. 
Purchas, his collection of voyages 
commended,  298. 
Pyrar?, his voyages commended, 
ib,;d. 
Q. 
Question,  should  be  rightly 
stated,  before  arguments 
are used, 271, &c. 
Quintilian, hisInstitutiones com- 
mended, 295. 
R. 
Raleigh (sir Walter), liis History 
of the \Vorld, 297. 
Reading,  how  the  mind  should 
be conducted in, 237.  -  its end, 293. 
Reasoning, several defects therein 
mentioned, 207, &c.  --  how it should  be im- 
proved,  21 1. 
Religion,  it concerns all mankind 
to understand it  rightly,225. 
Resignation, orflexibleness, often 
obstructs knowledge, 255. 
Rochefoucault (duke of) his me- 
moirs, 299. 
Roe  (sir Thomas)  his  voyage, 
298.  .  - 
Rushworth,  lris historical collec- 
tions, commended,  299. 
S. 
Sagard,  Iris  voyage  mentioned, 
298. Sandys  (George)  his  Voyages, 
295. 
Scaliger  de F~nc~~cl,itionc  Tem- 
 orur urn.  299. 
Sedlcr, his tiiglits  of  the  King- 
clonr, co~n~nc~rdcd,  297. 
Selden,  his  T~tlcs  oi Honour., 
comtrlentled, 300. 
Sirluey  (:\lgrrnon)  his  Dis- 
courses concerning Govern- 
ment, 29G. 
Skinner, his Lexicon  conimend- 
eti, 300. 
Society (ci\  il) boqks that treat of 
the rise and ~laturc  of  civil 
society, 296. 
Spelmiln, his Glossary comlnend- 
ed, 300. 
State-tracts,  two  collections  of 
tl~em,  commcndcd, 297. 
Stepl~ens  (Robert), his Ttlesa~~riis 
Lingua: Latina: cornarended, 
300. 
Stones are real vejiet;~bles,  319, 
St1 aucllius, his Chronology com- 
mended, 299. 
T. 
Tallent's  Tables  of  C:l~ronology 
rrconlmended, 2!i9. 
Terence, 295. 
'I'hevenot,  his Collcctio~~  of Voy- 
ages, 229. 
I'  1 heology,  should  be  st~ldictl  by 
all III~II,  225. 234. 
Thu;~nus,  11is  EListory of  his own 
r ..  I lmes, cor~r~ocritled,  2113. 
Tillotson,  archbisl~op  of  Callt.er- 
bury, his clogium, 295. 
Transferring  of  tlrol~gl~ts  not 
casily attained, 283.  --  c;rlrscs  of  the  rlif- 
ficultp of  tloing it, 2S4. 
Transferring,  how  this  clifficuIty 
rnay be overcome, 268. 
Travels,  I~ooks of  travels  and 
voyaFes cornr:lended,  208. 
l'ully,  Iris books cle  Oratorc et  dc 
Officiis  commended,  293, 
296. 
Tyrrel  (.T;~rnes) his  History  of 
Eilglarrd commended,  296. 
v. 
Veget:ibles,  an account of  them, 
319. 
Understanding of man, its opera- 
tions, 293.  --  11ow it may be  im- 
proved, 2 13.293.  --  miln's  last resort to 
it for conduct, 205.  --  to be  improved  by 
practice and h-:iit,  213.  -- where~n tlre  last 
judgment of  it consists, 236, 
kc. 
Universality of  knowledge, how 
it should be  pursued, 238. 
Vossius (Gerhard John) his Ety- 
1nologicu:n  Lit~guae  Latinse, 
c~inmentled,  300. 
Voyages,  see Travels. 
w. 
Wiundering, we should endcnvoor 
to keep  our rnintls frorn it, 
259. 
Wlrear,  his  Metllod~~s  lcgendi 
I-Iistori;~~,  co~~r~r~cr~cletl,  297. 
\\'orcl.;,  sllo~~ltl  riot be  uscd with- 
out a fisetl sense, 257. 
Y. 
Yeicr, n~atle  hy tlre  revolution  of 
tl~ceartb  iiborlt the sun,310. 
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